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The study explores the political choices and confl icts inherent in the “technical” specifi cations 
of any monetary system and some of the social scientifi c implications of the prevailing forms 
of money in the widest possible sense of the terms. As a constantly evolving social relation, 
no single theory of money is likely to capture its tremendous capacity for self-transformation. 
It is argued that the precise manner in which the prevailing forms of fi nancial capital in 
general and money in particular are socially constructed creates a privileged reality for 
fi nancial capital which distorts competition among the diff erent factors of production 
and eliminates money’s capacity to accurately capture and reproduce real world economic 
phenomena – if possible even in theory. Contrary to some of the traditional economistic 
legitimating narratives for money, it is suggested that control over the issuance and 
circulation of money may render various aspects of the human governable with a fraction 
of the resources that might be required to implement comparable combinations of coercion 
and rewards through alternative institutional mechanisms. While it is far from clear that 
money can ever be specifi ed in a manner that would solve its inherent political and social 
confl icts to an extent that would permit “economic” analysis to begin, some of the social and 
political implications of diff erent types of monetary institutions are often not beyond the 
reach of public policy decisions. A combination of a seigniorage-based unconditional basic 
income and a demurrage tax on money is introduced as an example of a specifi c public policy 
program that could rectify or mitigate some of the polarizing consequences of the prevailing 
forms of money as well as illuminate the spectrum of political choice inherent in the design 
of any monetary system. The study explains the continuing signifi cance of a wide spectrum 
of explanatory frameworks for the nature of money as a function of their strategic political 
utility rather than empirical accuracy and identifi es four main issue areas as particularly 
fruitful for further research.
Key words: money, unconditional basic income, demurrage tax, governmentality, 
biopolitics
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7Preface and Acknowledgements
 
Th is study began as an inquiry into market populism – the functions, 
processes or outcomes that are sometimes attributed to market-mediated 
social interaction for utilitarian purposes, which could maintain their 
instrumental rhetorical value in the pursuit of particularist political 
strategies only through gross simpliﬁ cation or misrepresentation of 
the underlying reality. Nonetheless, it soon became clear that publicly 
professed understanding of the political signiﬁ cance of one of the central 
institutions which contributes to the discrepancy between the rhetoric and 
practice – the social relation of money – was insuﬃ  cient to continue with 
the selected method and scope of analysis. At the risk of potentially dire 
professional consequences, the process of specializing in a progressively 
narrower ﬁ eld of study until one knows everything about nothing was 
halted at a stage that might be described as an inter- or post-disciplinary 
inquiry into money as an institution.
Basing economic decision-making on monetary calculation may not 
be entirely unlike reading the future from tea leaves: with a suﬃ  cient 
number of leaves and properly encoded sizes, shapes, positions etc. the 
leaves may have the technical capacity to act as an information system, 
but to render such pursuits meaningful one would also need some kind 
of a mechanism which ensures that future events do indeed get encoded 
into the system. In the absence of a causal relationship between the tea 
leaves and future events or money and real world economic opportunity 
structures that goes beyond socially constructed beliefs, the respective 
“information systems” are entirely self-referential – perhaps suitable for 
academic model building or political rhetoric to advance one’s relative 
position in each historically speciﬁ c or governmentally contingent 
power structure, but hardly appropriate for the purposes of disinterested 
observers aiming to analyze real world phenomena. Such a mechanism is 
conspicuously absent from the monetary system. Monetary calculation 
is used for allocating resources – for determining who will do what in 
the future. In order to perform such a task accurately, money should 
have the capacity to perfectly capture and reproduce the production 
conditions in the real world – the natural laws that govern the physical 
reality. Yet there is no mechanism that could replace the self-referentiality 
8of money – money’s tendency to reﬂ ect the logic built into its “technical” 
speciﬁ cations rather than to measure some external opportunities or 
constraints – with a perfect capacity to reproduce real world conditions. 
It is in fact far from clear that constructing such a mechanism would be 
technically feasible, let alone desirable.
Even if the relevant standard of performance for socially desirable 
forms of money were lowered from eﬃ  cient economic calculation to 
the neutral facilitation of multilateral exchange, it is not obvious that 
money – whether conceptualized as a commodity, debt, or something 
else – has the technical capacity to attain such a standard of performance 
without profound conceptual modiﬁ cations to some of the fashionable 
interpretations of property rights. Irrespective of the narratives of 
choice evoked to rationalize and legitimize the origins and continuing 
economic, political and social signiﬁ cance of money as an institution, 
reconciling the right of “real” asset holders to monetize their property 
for the purposes of multilateral exchange with the perceived right of the 
holders of the existing monetary media to prevent the dilution of the real 
value of their holdings through money creation may be a more complex 
matter than is often acknowledged. In a commodity-based “monetary” 
system this tradeoﬀ  manifests itself in the extent to which the holders of 
the “monetary” commodity can prevent the holders of other forms of real 
wealth from introducing alternative media of exchange into circulation. 
In a debt-based monetary system, in contrast, a similar conﬂ ict arises 
through the government’s practice of granting greater degrees of 
moneyness to the private liabilities of politically favored institutions or 
constituencies: while a bank’s liabilities – such as deposits which have been 
created in loan transactions – are often convertible to state money at face 
value, an individual citizen or a non-bank legal person – no matter how 
creditworthy – will often have to accept whatever discounts or additional 
guarantees of a suﬃ  ciently wide acceptability the “market” chooses to 
demand for accepting private liabilities that do not enjoy privileged access 
to state money. As the government itself does not provide any real goods 
or services in exchange of the liabilities that it issues but extracts the goods 
and services which “back” the value of the currency from the members of 
the monetary space through its taxation powers, a fundamental conﬂ ict 
emerges between the gatekeepers of monetized market exchange – the 
9government and the private banking system whose liabilities are rendered 
de facto money by administrative ﬁ at – and all other institutions and 
individuals who will have to compete for the government’s or the banking 
system’s liabilities in order to participate in the community’s monetarily 
mediated division of labor. As the government cannot avoid taking 
sides on private liabilities through its taxation and spending decisions 
– unless, perhaps, it allows the establishment of private banks for the 
sole purpose of paying taxes and monitors the relative share of speciﬁ c 
types of private currencies in circulation in real time and continuously 
adjusts the currency composition of its own outlays accordingly – the 
hypothetical case of free banking with no government issued currency 
would not appear to provide an easy solution to this dilemma either. If, 
on the other hand, the government decides to specify a unit of account in 
terms of a commodity basket without a commitment for convertibility, 
many of these problems would appear to be merely transferred to the 
regulation of the private entities that would issue the value units – the 
monetary media representing the commodity basket in actual transactions 
– and the settlement procedures for payments between the private issuers 
of the monetary media. Th e potential issues at stake in analyzing the 
institutional preconditions for “neutral” money may thus extend far 
beyond the common activist suggestion that compound interest should 
be abolished as it causes the growth of claims on future wealth to outpace 
the production of real goods and services or the appeals to enhanced 
regulation as a potential mechanism that could restrict credit creation to 
an appropriate level: if the gatekeeper function of money is inherently 
inimical to each individual’s right to monetize the value of real assets 
under neutral conditions for the purposes of multilateral exchange, no 
amount of regulation or “technical” modiﬁ cations to the institution of 
money may reconcile some of the most common legitimating narratives 
for money with the potentially irresolvable conﬂ icts observed in the 
actual physical reality.
If money appears incapable of performing some of its most important 
publicly professed functions, why, then, does money exist? Social sciences 
have long been perplexed by the apparent paradoxes and contradictions 
of money. Could the cause of such confusion be endogenous to the 
institution of money rather than the method of analysis – the logical 
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impossibility of money manifesting itself through theorization which 
continues to presuppose an intelligible explanation for the apparent 
inconsistencies? In other words, would “Is money feasible?” always have 
been the right question that could have provided an explanation for some 
of the diﬃ  culties in answering the question “Under what conditions is 
money feasible?”? What does the ease with which a socially constructed 
accounting logic may overtake the natural laws of the physical reality 
as an appropriate reference point for “economic” decision-making tell 
about the nature of the relationship between money and the real world 
or the likely evolutionary fate of a community which continues to adhere 
to the prevailing notions of money?
Th e mystery of money may begin to unravel as one discovers that 
money is not a randomly distorted reﬂ ection of the physical reality. As 
money is located at the intersection of an exceptionally wide range of 
human motivations, its impact on self-conceptualization, subjectivities, 
culture, livelihood and ultimately life itself is potentially pervasive. 
Control over the issuance and circulation of money may render all these 
aspects of the human governable with a fraction of the resources that 
might be required to implement comparable combinations of coercion 
and rewards through alternative institutional mechanisms. Furthermore, 
once a socially constructed parallel reality becomes pervasive enough, 
monetary surrealism may produce spontaneous rationalizations for its 
own necessity – passionate praises for the proverbial imperial wardrobe 
to crowd out any potential speculation on the ﬁ neness of the emperor’s 
outﬁ t as new fashions in economic or monetary theory emerge. Given 
the apparent lack of an appropriate “technical” benchmark, the material 
practices and subjective frameworks associated with money may be 
relatively free to evolve in response to particularist political strategies: 
while the conﬂ icts and contradictions inherent in any monetary system are 
unlikely to ever be solved to an extent that would permit the politics of the 
social construction of money to end and objective monetary calculation 
or decision-making to begin, money’s self-deﬁ nitional eclecticism and 
amenability to a wide spectrum of legitimating narratives provide fertile 
ground for shaping subjectivities, livelihood and ultimately the odds for 
the survival of the species under the disguise of technocratic objectivity.
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Th e main objectives of this study are to show that the social construction 
of money is logically prior to any form of human interaction involving 
some of the “technical” functions of money and to explore the potential 
sources and uses of monetary power. Other recurrent themes include 
reﬂ ection on the feasibility of constructing a single causal theory on the 
nature of money, mechanisms that could rectify or mitigate some of the 
polarizing consequences of the prevailing forms of money, the nonlinearity 
of scientiﬁ c progress as relevant issues may be assumed away from the 
academic research agenda, the need for a single integrated social science 
to overcome disciplinary divisions that may hinder more comprehensive 
understanding of the logical limits and limitations of money, and, in 
the words of Robert Merton, specifying ignorance – determining what 
it is about money that is not yet known and pointing out its practical 
signiﬁ cance to generic knowledge (Merton, 1996: 55).
Th e argument of the study is structured as follows. Chapter 1 introduces 
the themes and the objectives of the study.
Chapter 2 outlines the methodological choices. As one of the most 
complex, paradoxical, pervasive and elusive regulators and transformers of 
social interaction, it is suggested that perhaps nowhere else is tolerance for 
theoretical, methodological and epistemological ambiguity and pluralism 
as warranted as in the study of money. Consequently, this study may not 
be ideal for the purposes of the self-compartmentalizing social scientist 
who hesitates to venture outside one’s established sources of livelihood 
in the academic bazaar of maximizing the strategic utility of contending 
knowledge claims.
Chapter 3 explores ﬁ nancial capital’s unique position as the only 
politically and socially constructed factor of production – the sovereign 
factor of production, which eﬀ ectively governs other factors through 
its contractual exemption from the laws of the physical reality that 
conditions the existence of labor and land. While labor in the sense of 
human productive capacity and land as natural territory would continue 
to exist with precisely the same physical attributes and natural laws 
governing their opportunity sets for productive interaction even in the 
absence of money, multilateral exchange, economics as a science, or any 
other mental model evoked to depoliticize the diﬀ ering ontologies of 
the factors of production, the precise manner in which ﬁ nancial capital 
is socially constructed often creates a privileged reality for money – a 
12
parallel universe with its own natural laws and rules for the physical 
existence and subsistence of ﬁ nancial capital and its interaction with 
other factors of production. Th e social construction of ﬁ nancial capital’s 
privileged reality structurally distorts competition among the factors 
of production, renders the pursuit of economic eﬃ  ciency or any other 
policy objective through monetized market exchange self-referential – 
i.e. subject to the logic of the socially constructed accounting system of 
money rather than the underlying physical reality that money is supposed 
to measure – and confers ﬁ nancial capital unearned privileges such as 
de facto right on residual claimancy, the capacity to expropriate other 
factors of production through structurally distorted rules of the game 
and the privileged status as being the one factor of production whose 
gains deﬁ ne and measure the desirability and “productivity” of other 
factors’ eﬀ orts to contribute to a structurally condoned form of market 
imperfection – the structural necessity to maximize return on ﬁ nancial 
capital if an economy1 is to utilize its resources – through unconditional 
ﬂ exibility and self-sacriﬁ ce. Consequently, it is argued that the most 
politicized dimension of the “economic” reality should have always been 
the structural rules governing the dynamic interaction between diﬀ erent 
factors of production rather than the static allocation of ownership 
rights in a certain factor of production as suggested by the dichotomy 
between capitalism and socialism. Th e distribution of ownership of a 
certain factor of production tells nothing about the rules of the game 
that regulate the interaction between diﬀ erent factors of production in 
addressing productive opportunities. Widely dispersed – perhaps even 
completely egalitarian – private initial ownership of capital can be an 
extremely ineﬃ  cient and wealth-centralizing system in the long-run if 
the rules of the game structurally favor capital over labor in addressing 
productive opportunities. Conversely, a highly concentrated initial 
ownership of capital can be overcome in the long-run if the rules of the 
economic mating game between the factors of production structurally 
favor labor over capital. Th e aim of the chapter is both to help the reader 
situate the study’s contribution into a wider theoretical framework and 
to provide background for the analysis of the subsequent chapters by 
1 Th e choice of the word “economy” is purely stylistic throughout this study, as it 
implies a priority of motives which may simply not be there in any given social unit of 
analysis.
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highlighting perhaps the most fundamentally political aspect of money 
as an institution – the politically and socially constructed physical and 
symbolic speciﬁ cations and the rules that regulate money’s interaction 
with other factors of production which cannot select the physical laws 
governing their subsistence. 
Chapter 4 reviews some of the contending theories on the nature of 
money in an attempt to identify the institutional requirements for a 
socially neutral monetary system. Despite money’s tremendous capacity 
for self-transformation, social sciences often continue to seek monocausal 
explanations for the nature of money. Adopting a variant of Goodhart’s 
law for money, the chapter suggests that the sociology of money should 
aim to develop a benchmark of socially neutral money against which the 
social footprint of actual monetary systems can be judged. Such socially 
neutral money would maximize the freedom of social agents to deﬁ ne, 
contextualize and tailor monetary relationships with the desired mixtures 
of meaning with minimum structural interference from established 
monetary social hierarchies. It is argued that the distribution of the 
monetary media rather than the dominant view on the nature of money 
determines the limits of social agency. Th e proposed benchmark would 
involve egalitarian initial distribution of newly created monetary media 
and potentially taxation of the money supply – a speciﬁ c proposal will be 
discussed in more detail in chapter 10 – in order to achieve the desired 
balance between the medium of exchange and store of value functions 
of money and to render the institutional logic of money a closer 
approximation of the laws of the physical reality that money is supposed 
to measure and mediate. Chapters 4 and 10 draw in part upon the article 
‘A Th eory of Socially Neutral Money’ published in the Hamburg Review 
of Social Sciences, Volume 3, Issue 2, pp. 193–212.
Th e corresponding research problem for chapter 5 would have 
involved the identiﬁ cation of the institutional preconditions for the 
possibility of economically neutral money – the point at which the 
politics of the social construction of money might graduate into the 
politics of the management of money according to principles which are 
universally recognized as neutral enough to merit the conceptual leap 
from money as an object of social struggle to money as a neutral measure 
of conceptually distinct social struggles. As it is far from clear that the 
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political and social conﬂ icts inherent in money’s speciﬁ cation process 
can ever be solved to an extent that would permit the establishment of 
predominantly “economic” rules of the game, the attention is turned to 
the practical and disciplinary implications of the potential impossibility 
of economically neutral money. As every set of technical speciﬁ cations 
for money would have the capacity to produce a diﬀ erent equilibrium or 
equilibria – however unrealistic the assumptions for arriving at one might 
once again have to be – orthodox economics might face the choice of 
either becoming a post-money science – beginning its analysis from the 
point where money has already been speciﬁ ed within the theoretical and 
methodological frameworks of other disciplines – or returning to its roots 
in political economy by acknowledging the inseparability of economic, 
political and social considerations.
Chapter 6 elaborates on some of the themes of the previous chapter 
in the context of a commodity-based monetary system. Austrians and 
libertarians have typically conceptualized money as the most suitable 
intrinsically-valued commodity emerging through the voluntary decisions 
of individual market participants. While not being entirely unsympathetic 
to some of the criticisms of the prevailing monetary system emanating 
from these theoretical traditions, the chapter challenges the notion 
of the monetary commodity as a “neutral” form of money that could 
create objective monetary rules of the game for economic interaction. 
In particular, the paper seeks to complicate the implicit convolution of 
commodity money, property rights, and economic freedom by pointing 
out the inherent conﬂ ict between the medium of exchange and the store 
of value functions of money – or the property rights of the holders of 
real assets, on the one hand, and the monetary media, on the other. It is 
argued that this conﬂ ict could be understood – albeit never solved in a 
universally optimal manner – by making a clear conceptual distinction 
between money’s role in current and intertemporal exchange. Given 
the logical impossibility of constructing objective, universally optimal 
monetary rules of the game, the notion of economic freedom becomes 
problematic. Although the model that is being addressed in the chapter 
comes from the Austrian school, many of the insights may also have 
wider analytical applicability.
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It has sometimes been suggested that some of the tradeoﬀ s and 
contradictions arising from the theoretical indeterminacy of money that 
are analyzed in chapter 6 might be avoided by conceptualizing money 
always and everywhere as debt: as a voluntary act of intertemporal exchange 
between mutually consenting parties. As the terms and conditions of every 
transaction involving the creation, extinction or circulation of money 
have to be speciﬁ ed in advance in order for mutually beneﬁ cial monetized 
market exchange to take place, the argument would go, monetization 
merely represents the temporary conversion of relatively illiquid forms 
of real wealth into more liquid forms, which will be withdrawn from 
circulation as soon as their purpose in facilitating monetary exchange 
has been fulﬁ lled and the underlying debts repaid. Chapter 7 tackles 
these claims by suggesting that it may be the terminology rather than the 
substantive content of the analysis which is modiﬁ ed when the tradeoﬀ s 
between the diﬀ erent “technical” functions of money are theorized 
in the context of a debt-based monetary system. Whenever money is 
conceptualized as debt, the tradeoﬀ  between the medium of exchange 
and the store of value functions of money – or the property rights of the 
holders of real assets, on the one hand, and the monetary media, on the 
other – is merely relabeled as a conﬂ ict between the issuers of “monetary” 
and “non-monetary” liabilities. Rather than the holders of non-monetary 
real assets having to agree to any demands or lending proposals made by 
the holders of the monetary commodity before being able to engage in 
multilateral exchange as was argued in the previous chapter, the holders 
of all forms of real assets will have to conform to the conditions set by 
the issuers of “monetary” debt in order to participate in the community’s 
monetarily mediated division of labor. Th e suggestion that all money is 
debt is thus largely meaningless without simultaneous speciﬁ cation of 
which debts are money – or, in the case of the purists who would rather 
eradicate the entire concept of money from the vocabulary and replace it 
with the word debt, which claims are either liquid enough to fulﬁ ll some 
of the traditional functions of “money” in the utopian case of perfect 
competition among the actual and latent monetary IOUs, or backed by 
suﬃ  cient state power and violence in the more realistic case that it is the 
state that chooses which forms of liabilities it accepts for tax payments and 
requires all transacting parties to accept in settlement of debts through 
legal tender laws. Th e chapter also proposes a novel deﬁ nition for an 
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endogenous money supply, tackles some controversial interpretations 
that are sometimes associated with the notion of money as debt, explores 
some of the informational implications of centralized money creation 
powers and elaborates on the use of complexity as a political strategy in 
monetary aﬀ airs.
Chapter 8 adopts an integrated analytical perspective – drawing upon, 
among others, the work of Foucault, Agamben and Hardt and Negri – to 
explore the incentive structures and the structurally rigid social hierarchies 
inherent in the economically, politically and socially polarizing logic of 
modern credit money. In other words, rather than seeking to understand 
intrinsic features of monetary systems corresponding to certain economic, 
political or social ideals – or the logical limits and limitations of money 
– as was often done in the previous chapters, the focus is shifted for 
a moment towards the (mis)use of the prevailing forms of money as 
instruments of geopolitical, biopolitical and social power projection. Th e 
chapter proposes a novel analytical approach to understanding monetary 
power in various spatio-temporal contexts. In order to understand the 
geography of monetary power, it is necessary to explain both the origins 
of monetary power in general and the factors that permit such power to 
assume a territorial character. Th e chapter identiﬁ es two primary power-
enabling elements of the institutional design of money and explores 
their territorial implications. It is suggested that a conceptual distinction 
between money’s dimensions both as a material practice and as a 
symbolic or subjective cognitive framework – or the recognition of both 
the structural and the post-structural characteristics of money – provides 
a useful analytical tool for understanding the mechanisms through which 
monetary power projection may assume a territorial character. 
Although the primary aim of this study is to point out the wide range 
of political choice and conﬂ ict inherent in the “technical” speciﬁ cations 
of any monetary system rather than constructing yet another detailed 
proposal for monetary reform, it may be diﬃ  cult to avoid the presentation 
and analysis of concrete reform proposals altogether. Chapter 9 brieﬂ y 
summarizes some arguments from the monetary reform debate. Th e 
chapter aims to serve as an introduction to some of the themes that follow 
rather than purporting to provide an in-depth view of the rich variety 
of actors and arguments that have been associated with the historical 
monetary reform debates. Th e chapter draws in part on ‘A Monetary 
17
Reformist Road to Universal Basic Income’ published in Basic Income 
Studies, Volume 2, Issue 1, Article 8.
Chapter 10 makes a speciﬁ c reform proposal – combining seigniorage-
based unconditional basic income (UBI) with a demurrage tax on money – 
for expository reasons. One of the main guiding principles of the proposal 
is parsimony: while a more complex reform proposal might achieve any 
given objectives more eﬀ ectively, such a scheme might lose some of its 
expository value by unnecessarily complicating the interrelationship 
between seemingly minor “technical” reforms of the monetary system 
and the transforming economic, political and social realities. Th e 
chapter uses the speciﬁ c reform proposal as an analytical launch pad to 
expand the analysis into what Weber referred to as the substantive and 
formal rationalities of economic action, possible political strategies for 
establishing a multilateral clearing union as an international counterpart of 
the proposed domestic reforms, the potential complementarities between 
monetary and land reforms, the politicization of political incorrectness 
in the context of some issues that may potentially be associated with 
monetary reform, and speculation on the long term feasibility of money 
as an institution.
Chapter 11 elaborates on some of the choices made in the speciﬁ c 
reform proposal outlined in the previous chapter and takes the opportunity 
to illuminate the inherently political nature of the institutional design of 
any monetary system by engaging the argument of some contemporary 
neo-chartalists on the allegedly inﬂ ationary nature of UBI. Th e chapter 
explores some of the most common deﬁ nitions of inﬂ ation and the 
extent to which UBI might have an impact on inﬂ ation as measured 
by the conventional indicators. Th e selectively politicized nature of the 
concept of inﬂ ation is also pointed out through a variety of perspectives. 
It is argued that the allegations of UBI as a particularly inﬂ ationary 
form of public policy fail to take into account the true pace of currency 
debasement under the current monetary system and the economically, 
politically, socially and morally unsustainable nature of its distributional 
implications.
Chapter 12 ventures into a territory that has already been declared to 
fall outside the purview of scholarly capacities: the construction of a single 
theory of money. Th is is made possible by redeﬁ ning the objectives of such 
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a theory: while the novel approach – dubbed critical surrealism – might not 
reconcile the substance of the diﬀ erent views on the nature of money into a 
single coherent theory, it may help to explain why such a theory is unlikely 
to ever be attained and to put the contending conceptualizations on the 
nature of money into perspective by contextualizing their relationship to 
what will be labeled as the real and the surreal planes of social interaction. 
Some of the distinctive features of the novel analytical approach involve 
theorizing the tremendous ease with which a patently implausible socially 
constructed accounting system may overtake alternative analytical 
frameworks in the production of agentic subjectivities and explaining the 
continuing signiﬁ cance of a wide spectrum of explanatory frameworks for 
the nature of money partly as a function of their strategic political utility 
rather than empirical accuracy. Th e model may also give some indication of 
the possible strategies that are likely to be used by the monetary powers that 
be for repackaging hypocrisy according to the consumption preferences of 
diﬀ erent types of audiences.
Th e ﬁ nal chapter concludes by outlining four speciﬁ c issue areas for 
further research and reﬂ ecting on the signiﬁ cance of the ﬁ ndings.
Among all the rites of passage of academic ordination, acknowledge-
ments may be one of the most ﬂ aringly futile. If intellectual honesty were to 
be the guiding principle of academic knowledge production/preservation, 
one might expect citations and acknowledgments to include a disclaimer 
stating that what is being presented to the reader constitutes a power-
based social convention designed for governing livelihood, prestige and 
privilege rather than attribution for genuine analytical accomplishments. 
After all, how many self-reﬂ ecting social scientists can avoid the creeping 
suspicion that someone – individuals who lacked either the means or the 
inclination to make their voices heard in a manner speciﬁ ed by the powers 
that be – had, or with suﬃ  cient resources in any case could have, already 
made every major intellectual discovery before suﬃ  ciently inﬂ uential 
members of the established social hierarchies repackaged or rediscovered 
the material. While the logistical accomplishments that may sometimes 
be associated with academic success – the optimization of the supply 
chain involving incoming ideas from whatever source, repackaging and 
rebranding those ideas with the most proﬁ table labels and spin, minimizing 
time to market through cliquish publishing collectives, and constructing 
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barriers to market entry for the originators of ideas who either try to 
bypass established networks or demand an unacceptable price for the 
raw material in terms of attribution requirements2 – may according to 
some fashionable normative frameworks deserve to be rewarded, citation 
or attribution may be unlikely to constitute the most appropriate form 
of rewards for such achievements.3 Th us, if the intention is to trace the 
2 Th is may be an overly kind description of some of the potential routes to analytical 
“success” in hierarchically organized societies. Th ere would, for instance, clearly appear to 
be the theoretical possibility for part-time mavericks to utilize the cognitive goodwill – 
the cumulative capacity to inﬂ uence opinion resulting from actual or perceived expertise 
in a given subject matter – created by disseminating plagiarized dissent to enhance 
the perceived credibility of the wealth- and power-centralizing views uttered in their 
alternative capacities as self-declared high priests of the dominant legitimating narratives 
for privilege. Under such a scenario it would be some of the architects of misery creatively 
combining the marginalization of genuine dissent with the advancement of their own 
careers: while during particularly turbulent times their blogs, presentations or publications 
might contain a relatively high proportion of recycled dissent to both score points for 
capitalism-bashing and prevent unaﬃ  liated sources from developing suﬃ  cient brand 
equity for autonomous dissent, in gentler or strategically important times some of the 
accumulated cognitive goodwill might be expended on wildly implausible spin-building 
processes to rationalize and legitimate privilege. Consequently, under such circumstances 
one of the most signiﬁ cant scientiﬁ c challenges for humanity – a potential precondition 
for the possibility of science or non-instrumental interpretations of the human in general 
– might involve the neutralization of the social networks which permit livelihood to be 
governed in a manner that may not be optimal for the widest possible production and 
dissemination of alternative knowledge claims.
In a hypothetical world of evenly distributed lunacies, one might also wonder where 
are the multimillion dollar lawsuits against scholars who share unpublished material via 
various formal or informal peer-to-peer networks. Recent lawsuits have put the price of 
illegally shared music in the range of $22,500–$80,000 per song (e.g. Lavoie, 2009). Yet 
in the case of inadequately regulated and monitored distribution of unpublished scientiﬁ c 
work the potential damages to prospective authors and scientiﬁ c credibility in general 
may be signiﬁ cantly larger. In contrast to music which presumably maintains some 
of its entertainment value regardless of the number of times any given song is played, 
the scientiﬁ c value of unpublished academic work is exhausted once the substantive 
informational content has been transmitted without any guarantee that the authors will 
ever receive any compensation for their eﬀ ort in the form of eventual publication of their 
work, career advancement, royalties, or something else. Once again, the optimization of 
scientiﬁ c advance and diversity may well involve more egalitarian distribution of income, 
wealth and status irrespective of conventional measures of eﬀ ort rather than the institution 
of stronger property rights for prospective authors to their unpublished work.
3 Academic insiders can, of course, take the hypocrisy to a whole new level by publicly 
lamenting the vanities and practical infeasibilities often associated with attribution 
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originators of the ideas that have made the largest contribution to one’s 
intellectual development rather than to list the names of the individuals 
who may have been kind enough to grant an author a traineeship or 
full knowledge-certifying membership in some of the cartels of academic 
knowledge production/preservation, the entire social convention of 
beginning academic works with an acknowledgements-section might 
appear redundant.4
With these caveats in mind, the present author owes perhaps the largest 
intellectual debt of gratitude to all those individuals who have or could 
have produced high quality scholarship without leaving their marks to 
the recorded history of academic attribution. Th e author is particularly 
indebted to the incognitos who have chosen nonviolent cognitive civil 
disobedience over the demands and rewards of the liberal norm life – the 
optimally responsive subjectivities and forms of life around which the 
probability distributions for incrementally punishable deviation and the 
cut-oﬀ  points for extermination are implicitly or explicitly modeled in 
liberal regimes of governance. Without the cognitive guidance provided 
by elementary observation of the surrounding academic realities – the 
potential academic superstars who have died oppressed throughout 
the history, the academic sweatshop labor that produces ideas for the 
processes – typically in publications that contribute to their own career advancement 
and further reinforce the gap between the attributional haves and have-nots. If the 
practical infeasibilities of correct attribution indeed are widely recognized, why not 
make all academic publications anonymous, thus potentially converting at least some 
of the wars between tribalist networks of privilege into wars of ideas? Why not break 
the link between one’s publication history and academic career development altogether? 
Rather than rewarding the intellectual litterers who necessitate the periodic rediscovery 
of insights that are buried under mountains of self-referential odious scholarship with the 
powers of knowledge certiﬁ cation, social scientiﬁ c research might signiﬁ cantly improve 
its credibility by simply acknowledging its powerlessness under the prevailing forms 
of income, wealth, and power disparities to make accurate statements on the scientiﬁ c 
quality of any speciﬁ c piece of academic work.
4 It might also be intellectually dishonest not to point out that in the academic 
lexicon even the most sincere acknowledgements should not automatically be taken as 
evidence of actions that have been in the best interests of the author. In the academia as 
well as many other realms of social interaction established group loyalties often set the 
behavioral benchmarks which deﬁ ne the limits for the acceptable exercise of discretionary 
virtue. It is not obvious that the net impact of actions based on selective obligations and 
the exercise of discretionary virtue within such behavioral boundaries will necessarily 
always be positive from the perspective of a prospective author.
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tenured brands at a subsistence level of attribution or worse, the self-
eﬀ acing anti-opportunists who have rejected the analytical jurisdiction of 
the cheerleaders for privilege in favor of alternative peer groups among 
the oppressed, the unbearably diﬃ  cult anti-utilitarian personalities 
who regularly invite ostracism through outmoded motivations and 
behavioral patterns, the talent that has chosen not to inﬂ ict the injuries 
and injustices on their fellow human beings that the pursuit of “success” 
in virtually every hierarchically organized social activity requires, or the 
self-marginalizing students who forgo academic careers due to predatory 
immaturity, underdeveloped self-righteousness, or some other instances 
of a failure to develop inﬂ atable egos that would be conducive to the 
utilitarian governance of group loyalties – this study might never have 
reached anything resembling its present form. Without an awareness 
of some of these evolutionary dissidents and advocates of radicalized 
love, the direction of what commonly passes for human evolution – the 
elimination of diversity through socially constructed sorting mechanisms 
and asymmetrically applied violence before humanity may even begin to 
understand some of the characteristics that might have been required in 
the next steps of its journey – may not have been equally evident to the 
author. If the present author or some of the more gifted fellow incognitos 
have not seen any farther, it may only be because the shoulders of the 
giants of the established social hierarchies have been blocking the view.5
5 Some readers may wonder whether the author is not being unduly harsh on some 
of the conventions governing academic knowledge production/preservation. A simple 
comparison to some of the opportunities and constraints in the corporate world might 
help to shed light on whether this indeed might be the case. Despite all the Enrons 
and Madoﬀ s that are periodically rediscovered as the driving forces behind capitalist 
wealth accumulation, corporate crime is often subject to at least some forms of empirical 
constraints: if a Ponzi scheme goes bust, the corporate “peer reviewers” or regulators have 
only a limited capacity to claim otherwise for extended periods of time without obtaining 
the missing moneys from some other source. Academic dishonesty – such as the neutral 
veil approach to money that is described in more detail below – in contrast, would not 
appear to be constrained by empirical phenomena: patently absurd paradigms or practices 
may not have strictly limited natural life spans as the true or instrumental believers keep 
on reproducing inside the academia while the deviant real-world oriented potential 
scholars are excluded from academic resources. While some corporate criminals who have 
misled investors may end up in jail, the academic Madoﬀ s who mislead the civilization 
while suppressing alternative views can often themselves decide whether to continue 
propagating their current schemes or to switch into alternative rhetorics. In the absence of 
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Without implication for the views presented in this study or the 
remaining inaccuracies, the author also wishes to thank Petri Koikkalainen 
for dedicated supervision of the author’s postgraduate studies and thesis 
work, Julian Reid for invaluable support during some of the critical stages 
of the PhD studies and the People’s Cultural Foundation, the Finnish 
Cultural Foundation (Lapland Regional Fund), and the University of 
Lapland for ﬁ nancial support.6 Magnus Ryner and Earl Gammon gave 
widespread and permanent scrutiny of the distributional preconditions of the possibility 
of science – the more egalitarian distribution of income, wealth, power, status etc. in a 
manner that might be more conducive to unbiased observation and communication of 
social realities – there would appear to be no obvious limits to any potential skepticism 
or cynicism that the prevailing practices of academic knowledge production/certiﬁ cation 
might evoke and ultimately also justify.
6 Th e longest contiguous funding period was four months. Multiple longer-term 
funding applications were rejected by each of the following foundations and the National 
Graduate School of Political Studies, albeit in the latter case apparently based on the 
recommendations of the University of Lapland: 
http://www.koneensaatio.ﬁ /en/grants/decisions/
http://www.wihurinrahasto.ﬁ /apurahat.html
http://www.skr.ﬁ /default.asp?docId=12642
http://www.emilaaltonen.ﬁ /nuoret2009.html
http://www.kordelin.ﬁ /myonnetyt.html
http://www.uta.ﬁ /politu/
Contrary to some of the public relations eﬀ orts of the competition cult that may seem 
to have colonized much of the economic, political, social and academic policy space, 
it is quite possible to raise questions about the appropriateness of speciﬁ c academic 
funding policies without in any way suggesting that such questions would be satisfactorily 
addressed as soon as funding is granted to any speciﬁ c project or individual. In much of 
academic decision-making in general and in the case of funding applications in particular 
neither the identities of the decision-makers or the external reviewers nor the substance of 
all the “losing” proposals are typically disclosed to public scrutiny. To adopt a fashionable 
although in some respects admittedly an inappropriate sports analogy: what would be the 
substantive signiﬁ cance of a sporting event where a group of judges – perhaps “peers” – 
whose identities remain unclear select the winner according to criteria which may or may 
not be adhered to in the selection process, after which only the “winner’s” prerecorded 
performance is released to public circulation while footage on the “losers’” performance 
remains censored? Could any and all criticism of such practices be unproblematically 
dismissed as embittered rhetoric of the envious losers who could be silenced if only 
they could have their moment of power-approved fame in some other “competition” 
– or if only they could become aware of the enlightening insight that it is presumably 
the hierarchy-producing travesty of competition that matters rather than the speciﬁ c 
metric for relative “performance” that happens to be applied in the production of the 
“winners”? Th e opposite of competition is not monopoly – a speciﬁ c pattern for the 
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highly pertinent suggestions for improving the quality of the manuscript 
as external reviewers. While much of this feedback will be highly useful 
for the author’s subsequent work, the present, sparingly edited form 
of the study may provide more relevant raw material for hermeneutic 
interpretations of the circumstances which have animated this particular 
research project.7
distribution of power in a society that continues to be subordinated to the demands 
of the competition rhetoric – but co-operation – the essence of all economic activity 
behind the most fashionable ideological facades for the production and preservation of 
privilege. Th e maximization of human productive eﬃ  ciency through co-operation may 
well ultimately involve the minimization of “economically” induced social hierarchies. No 
emancipatory social scientist should thus refrain from criticizing the prevailing academic 
funding policies merely to avoid charges of hypocrisy or moral double standards: any 
potential suggestions that competition rhetoric may in some cases be used to conceal the 
absence of open competition, for instance, in no way imply endorsement of the objectives 
of such rhetoric. If science is to be more than a private analytical shopping mall for the 
wealthy where research plans for funding applications may assume the role of product 
descriptions and “peer” review some of the functions of a warranty, both the funding 
policies and the processes through which such objectives presumably are to be attained 
deserve to be extensively scrutinized and debated until the implementation of more co-
operative forms of general economic organization may ﬁ nally terminate the Dark Ages of 
competitively distorted eﬃ  ciency and equity.
7 In a sense, the form of this study might be seen as a yet another artifact of the 
analytical violence induced by some of the prevailing governance structures. To the extent 
that this study will have any impact at all on the recorded history inside the Fortress 
Academica, the tactics used by some of the gatekeepers of science to rewrite history 
might be compared to the intellectual equivalent of beating up an unwilling challenger 
before throwing him into the ring for a managed showdown with the bodyguards of the 
champions of the established social hierarchies. One of the main emancipatory points 
that this study attempts to convey is that every struggle is worth ﬁ ghting for its own sake 
regardless of its expected impact on history as recorded by the appearance-producing 
industries. Every act of cognitive civil disobedience forces latent power relations to become 
more openly expressed and thus also more vulnerable to contestation. Th e distinction 
between lavishly funded power-preserving scholarship and the occasional pieces of isolated 
dissent may in fact ultimately have the potential to become emancipatory in its own 
right: once the potentially irremediable corruption of the dominant academic brands in 
a governmentally secured society becomes widely appreciated, analytical focus may shift 
from subjectic self-engineering through the pursuit of external recognition to the self-
actualizing optimization of one’s identity and analytical and perceptual inclinations. If 
the reader believes that the author is being overly pessimistic due to imperfect knowledge 
of analytical spaces where life might still be feasible – where no path needs to be left 
unexplored due to external coercion – the author would be delighted to hear from you.
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1 Introduction
Th e role of money as an institution remains undertheorized in 
interdisciplinary economic, social and political analysis. In neoclassical 
economics money is conceptualized as an “obscuring layer” (Samuelson, 
1973: 55) or a “veil” (Pigou, 1949: 14, both quoted in Ingham, 2004: 
15) of the “real” economic processes, which remain unaﬀ ected by the 
speciﬁ c choice of the monetary media. Outside relatively marginalized 
heterodox circles money is thus regarded as an apolitical, asocial facilitator 
of economic exchange, which has no independent inﬂ uence on the 
economic, political or social realities experienced by economic agents. 
Sociology, in turn, has only relatively recently started to overcome the 
post-Methodenstreit intellectual division of labor with economics, whereby 
money was often seen as an insuﬃ  ciently sociological object of inquiry 
and hence left almost exclusively to the realm of economics. Despite 
Collins’ observation in 1979 that “Money is doubtless the single most 
important neglected topic in sociology. For that matter, it is probably the 
most important neglected topic in all the social sciences” (1979: 190), 
analytical attention has rarely been focused on identifying the logical and 
practical preconditions for fulﬁ lling speciﬁ c combinations of potentially 
contradictory monetary functions or the social implications of the 
potential infeasibility of such analytical pursuits. Recent contributions 
have pointed out the social relations that are inherent in all monetary 
institutions, albeit often from rather narrowly deﬁ ned perspectives on 
the nature of money itself (e.g. Ingham, 1996; 2004). Similarly, the 
notion of the political is rarely extended to money as an institution in 
contemporary political analysis. Although the contemporary currency 
systems are often perceived to have political elements in their origins, 
functioning and management, the notion of money as an institution is 
eﬀ ectively depoliticized by a widespread adherence to the orthodox view 
of money as a neutral veil of real economic phenomena. Consequently, 
the nature – and sometimes also the mere possibility – of monetary power 
has been largely overlooked. In the words of Cohen, “no true theory of 
monetary power may be said, as yet, to exist” (2002: 434).
One way to illustrate the limits of the dominant notions of the 
political in the context of monetary systems is to analyze recent work 
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that is explicitly positioned to challenge those limits. It has, for instance, 
been suggested that 
Although monetary phenomena deﬁ ne the contemporary economic 
scene, insuﬃ  cient attention has been given to their political content 
and consequence. While the practice of strategic trade and debates 
over taxation are easily recognizable as political matters, issues such as 
ﬁ nancial liberalization and CBI [Central Bank Independence] are not. 
In fact, such measures are often expressly represented as apolitical, as 
steps that remove a contentious issue from the political sphere. However, 
monetary phenomena are always and everywhere political. (Kirshner, 
2003: 3, original emphasis)
Th e “principal argument” of a volume on the “ubiquitous politics” of 
monetary orders is that “economic theory is indeterminate in its ability 
to account for most of the monetary policy choices and reforms that 
are observed in the world today” (ibid: 4). While it may be diﬃ  cult to 
disagree with such conclusions, the silence on the political nature of 
the institutional features of money – not necessarily the author’s fault 
in an academic environment where even the more limited ﬁ ndings 
are still largely disputed or ignored – is deafening. Before the political 
nature of monetary policy, or indeed any monetary phenomenon, can 
be analyzed, there must be some form of an agreement on the forms 
of technical processes or social relations that deserve to be described as 
“monetary” to the exclusion of all other forms of human interaction. Th is 
process of constructing the institutional speciﬁ cations of money is more 
fundamentally political than any subsequent policy decision which takes 
the socially constructed technical speciﬁ cations of money as given. What 
are the political implications of alternative institutional designs of money 
– including but not limited to features such as the speciﬁ cation of the unit 
of account and the monetary media that correspond to that deﬁ nition, 
the method of creating monetary media and withdrawing them from 
circulation, any possible disparities in the rules governing the circulation 
of money and physical and human capital, and the incentive structures 
for the employment of ﬁ nancial capital in productive uses? Th e most 
commonly cited technical functions of money – medium of exchange, 
unit of account and store of value – can be performed in any combination 
by an inﬁ nite set of technical arrangements which can have widely 
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diﬀ erent political implications. Questions related to the management of 
a speciﬁ c monetary system, such as disputes on the appropriate inﬂ ation 
rate or interest rates, pale into insigniﬁ cance compared to the political 
importance of questions that deﬁ ne the speciﬁ c type of institution that 
the monetary system constitutes, such as who has the power to create 
and allocate newly created money and on what basis8 and what is the 
appropriate interest rate that money should attract as a condition for 
its existence.9 Despite a colorful history of controversy and contestation 
whereby arguments about money have often been explicitly recognized 
as arguments about the desirable forms of social relations or society in 
general10, the question of how various conceptualizations of money may 
8 Under the current monetary system the bulk of newly created money is allocated to 
borrowers as the counterpart of credit created by the private banking system. It might not 
be inherently any less arbitrary to allocate the same quantity of newly created money to 
lenders instead by – building on Milton Friedman’s famous metaphor (see e.g. Friedman, 
1992: 29) – regular helicopter drops directed exclusively at the yards of the lenders. Under 
such circumstances it might be the rentiers rather than the debtors who would beneﬁ t 
from inﬂ ation, as the loss of the real value of the credit instruments resulting from inﬂ ation 
might be more than oﬀ set by the real value of the inﬂ ation-inducing money supply growth 
that is falling from the sky to the lenders’ backyards. It is not obvious what can be gained 
by analyzing the political dimensions of the management of money unless the thoroughly 
political nature of the institutional features of the monetary system that specify, produce 
and reproduce the winners and the losers in the ﬁ rst place is taken into account.
9 While some form of compensation is likely to be required to induce the supply 
of monetary capital for productive purposes, the reasons behind the current practice of 
having to make interest payments for the bulk of the money supply merely to exist are 
predominantly political. In fact, as will be seen later, a strong case can be made for a 
negative interest rate as a precondition for the existence of money. Depending on the size 
of the negative interest rate and the demand and supply conditions for capital, monetary 
capital employed in productive uses would either continue to increase its nominal 
value over time – albeit at a lower rate than under the current monetary system – or 
lose less of its nominal value over time than idle capital – the diﬀ erence constituting 
return on investment. Th roughout the introductory chapter it is assumed that in the 
absence of decentralized money creation powers among the members of a monetary 
space, maintaining a community’s capacity to engage in forms of social interaction 
involving some of the technical functions of money calls for a permanently circulating 
money supply. For a more detailed treatment of the alternative view that questions the 
relevance of the concept of money supply for credit money – irrespective of the degree of 
centralization of money/credit creation powers and their “endo-/exogeneity” with respect 
to the transacting parties – see particularly chapter 7.
10 See e.g. Carruthers and Babb (1996) in the context of the late 19th century 
American debate between the greenbackers and the bullionists.
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aﬀ ect political agents, structures or the formation and evolution of state 
sovereignty rarely enters the contemporary political discourse.
Th e aim of this study is to extend the notion of the political to the 
institutional aspects of money through inter- and postdisciplinary 
perspectives blending and combining literature, insights and methodo-
logical approaches from sociology, political science, political economy, 
economics, political philosophy and other relevant ﬁ elds. Th e study 
adopts a critical view towards the orthodox economic reductionism, 
pointing out the historical speciﬁ city of the economic, social and political 
arrangements that have come to be associated with contemporary forms 
and functions of money as well as the wide spectrum of political choice that 
is inherent in the institutional speciﬁ cations of any monetary system.
One of the study’s main theses is that the social construction of 
ﬁ nancial capital in general and money in particular11 – the choice of 
the precise manner in which tokens of abstract value come to symbolize 
wealth and the rules governing their issuance, subsistence, circulation 
and extinction – is logically prior to any form of economic, political and 
social analysis that involves or is inﬂ uenced by some of the technical 
functions of money – virtually all forms of human activity in a modern 
society. Like all human institutions, the institutional speciﬁ cations of 
money have a profound impact on the types of social relationships and 
activities that money is likely to promote. Far from representing alternative 
sets of equally neutral rules of the game, the institutional speciﬁ cations 
of money have the potential to eﬀ ectively ﬁ nish the game of achieving 
economic eﬃ  ciency, distributional justice or any other objective pursued 
through monetized market exchange before it has even started. In other 
words, the “technical” speciﬁ cations of money may be so deeply at odds 
with publicly professed policy goals, structurally favoring alternative 
outcomes, that it is diﬃ  cult to see the relevance of political discourse 
that does not entertain the possibility – and perhaps the necessity – of 
alternative institutional conﬁ gurations for money. Widespread recognition 
of this thesis would have profound implications across the disciplinary 
boundaries. If the entire score-keeping system for resource allocation and 
11 As will become clear later, it is not obvious that these two concepts can ever 
be deﬁ ned mutually exclusively and exhaustively (see particularly chapter 4). For the 
purposes of this study, the social construction of money can be seen as a special case of 
the social construction of ﬁ nancial capital.
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economic interaction is recognized as a thoroughly political creature that 
may have a larger impact on economic, political and social outcomes 
through its socially constructed technical speciﬁ cations than its capacity 
to aggregate and channel presumably apolitical market signals, it is not 
obvious that an “economic” sphere of human interaction in a monetary 
“economy” is logically possible, let alone has ever existed. Similarly, if 
the relative incomes and power positions of capital and labor are largely 
determined by the precise manner in which ﬁ nancial capital is socially 
constructed – as opposed to the interplay of market forces after the 
nature of ﬁ nancial capital has been politically and socially determined – 
the historical ideological struggle between capitalism and socialism, i.e. 
a dispute focusing on the ownership of the means of production, may 
pale into insigniﬁ cance compared to the economic, political and social 
implications of specifying ﬁ nancial capital in a manner that structurally 
favors one factor of production over others. 
Another central theme of the study relates to the source of money’s 
political powers. Th e precise role that money has played in state building 
or other forms of economic, political and social power projection has 
often been analyzed in detail. As Helleiner (2003: 2) has observed, “…
the construction of territorial currencies was an intensely political process 
involving domestic and international struggles over issues such as the 
nature of state building, the construction of national identities, the 
proper scale of markets, and the implementation of competing market 
ideologies.” Yet it is not obvious why a presumably neutral facilitator 
of multilateral exchange has the capacity to shape such a wide range of 
political objectives. Th e infrastructures for production and exchange 
involve a virtually inﬁ nite set of technical arrangements designed to 
facilitate certain parts of the transactions. Why has money proven to be 
a more eﬀ ective instrument for the consolidation or projection of state 
power than many other elements of the infrastructures for production and 
exchange? Why have states not been equally prone to use, say, territorially 
branded information systems for creating political communities or 
geographically delimited logistics networks for shaping national identities 
or the proper scale of markets? Which elements in the institutional design 
of money confer its political powers? Once these powers are actually used, 
should money still be regarded primarily as a facilitator of multilateral 
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exchange with unfortunate but inevitable political side eﬀ ects, or perhaps 
as an instrument of power projection that happens to fulﬁ ll some of the 
technical functions commonly attributed to the hypothetical notion of 
politically neutral money? While widespread agreement on the nature of 
money may be neither necessary nor suﬃ  cient to understand the nature of 
monetary power, each contending perspective on the ontology of money 
needs to address these questions if monetary power is to be regarded as 
materially diﬀ erent from the power dimensions involved in other stages 
of production and multilateral exchange. 
Th is study suggests that money’s political power derives largely from 
its institutional capacity to obscure the transformation of economic, 
political and social opportunity structures. While a requirement, for 
instance, to borrow most computers into existence from the private 
computer industry – payable with interest in computers manufactured 
by the same companies – and to make resource transfers to the same 
industry to compensate for the ultimately inevitable defaults would 
be likely to attract widespread scrutiny and protest, no such qualms 
appear to arise when perhaps equally arbitrary policies are implemented 
via the institutional structure of money. Th e disproportionate political 
signiﬁ cance of ﬁ nancial capital for most – if not all – of its history stems 
largely from the asymmetric understanding of its economic, political and 
social functions in a community: there may not be any widely shared 
agreement on the essence of money, but its potential functional value is 
understood well enough by concentrated power12 to render it a valuable 
instrument for power projection and consolidation. Th us the fact that 
the social construction of money as an institution is logically prior to 
12 Th roughout the study, a failure to specify actors should not be taken as an indication 
of discounting the role of agency. Th e focus of the study is on the underpoliticization – 
indeed depoliticization in much of the contemporary academic literature – of money 
as an institution rather than the forms of political organization or interaction adopted 
by those institutions or individuals who are in the best position to beneﬁ t from such 
underpoliticization. While questions of agency are far from unimportant, any potential 
controversies in identifying the relevant actors should not inhibit research on the ways 
in which the socially constructed accounting system of money shapes human behavior. 
Unless indicated otherwise, the analysis remains applicable irrespective of the primary 
locus of agency – whether states, corporations, domestically organized social groups or 
classes, a transnational capitalist class, or any other form of political organization that has 
the capacity to convert asymmetric information and access to the speciﬁ cation process of 
money as an institution into an instrument of power projection.
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any economic, political or social analysis involving some of the technical 
functions of money does not imply that the speciﬁ cation process 
must produce an unambiguous, transparent, uncontested or stable 
deﬁ nition for money. On the contrary, ambiguity, lack of transparency, 
contestability and strategic instability may all improve the capacity of the 
social “weapon” (Weber, 1978: 108) of money to transform opportunity 
structures and should therefore be expected to the extent that they 
are permitted by the lack of public oversight. Distributional justice in 
information dissemination and a more widespread understanding of the 
political role of money do not alter the inherently political nature of the 
process of constructing and specifying money as an institution, but they 
do make such processes less susceptible to particularistic inﬂ uences.
In addition to the aforementioned themes, the signiﬁ cance of the 
study is ﬁ vefold. First, contrary to much of the existing literature which 
adopts a positivist, monocausal approach to analyzing the nature of 
money, the study questions whether a single causal theory can ever fully 
capture the essence of money as a constantly evolving political process 
and social relation. Since money always involves a power dimension, no 
sovereign authority is likely to voluntarily surrender some of the social 
beneﬁ ts of money creation by transparently specifying the source and 
limits of its own monetary powers. Hence any persistent conceptual 
ambiguities can hardly be attributed to some innate characteristics of 
money to the exclusion of the human agency and the political and social 
structures that produce and reproduce the speciﬁ c temporal and spatial 
manifestations of such deﬁ nitions. Second, it is argued that although 
the concept of money may remain elusive, the economic, social and 
political implications of diﬀ erent types of monetary institutions are 
often not beyond the reach of public policy decisions. Unconditional 
basic income (UBI) – an unconditional periodic cash grant paid to every 
member of society – is introduced as an example of a speciﬁ c public 
policy program that could rectify or mitigate some of the polarizing 
consequences of the prevailing forms of money. Th ird, orthodox 
economic conceptualizations of money are found to involve substantial 
elements of ahistoricism and intra-disciplinary amnesia, vindicating the 
observations of Kuhn and others on the nonlinearity of scientiﬁ c progress 
and the possibility that knowledge may also be lost when confronted 
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with adverse incentive structures. Fourth, the study aims to transcend 
the epistemological politics of previous research that often remains 
organized in “tribal conclaves on disciplinary lines” (Scholte, 2000), 
discouraging fruitful dialogue among social scientists of diﬀ erent ﬁ elds 
and persuasions. Fifth, the study’s main contribution is intended to fall 
within what Robert Merton called speciﬁ ed ignorance – the process of 
specifying “what it is about an established phenomenon that is not yet 
known and why it matters for generic knowledge that it become known” 
(Merton, 1996: 55, original emphasis). In other words, the aim is to 
point out the underpoliticized nature of money as an institution and 
why it matters for both academic social scientiﬁ c analysis and, directly 
or indirectly, the everyday life of virtually every individual irrespective 
of any prior knowledge of or relationship to the prevailing forms money. 
While a speciﬁ c reform proposal is made in chapter 10 to illustrate the 
implications of seemingly minor technical changes in the institutional 
speciﬁ cations of money, the aim is to provide a concrete example of an 
otherwise abstract issue in order to inspire contemplation on some of 
the economic, political and social issues that are involved rather than 
to outline a complete agenda for reform. Th e rationale behind such an 
approach is informed by pragmatism rather than theoretical or analytical 
preference: while the construction or reform of any social institution may 
always involve legitimate divergence of interest or opinion, such legitimate 
diversity should not be allowed to divert attention away from the speciﬁ c 
social issues that need to be addressed by any position articulated in favor 
of either the status quo or any speciﬁ c variant of reform. In other words, 
the reader may disagree with the reform proposals outlined in this study, 
but any alternative view will also have to be transparently justiﬁ ed in 
terms of the economic, political and social issues that are inherent in the 
“technical” speciﬁ cations of any monetary system.
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2 On Methodology
Methodological choices in thematically oriented interdisciplinary 
research are typically somewhat limited. Applying a single, internally 
coherent disciplinary methodology consistently throughout the study 
would deny its interdisciplinary nature. Conversely, categorically denying 
the validity of any speciﬁ c methodology or epistemology through which 
thematically relevant knowledge claims have been produced might easily 
turn into a tribalist attack under the guise of interdisciplinarity. Avoiding 
these pitfalls requires a form of eclecticism which achieves suﬃ  cient 
disciplinary coverage to justify the preﬁ x “inter-“ and to present any 
potential criticism of speciﬁ c disciplinary traditions as being suﬃ  ciently 
broad-based to be beyond petty tribalism. From a purely theoretical 
perspective, methodological eclecticism may not be quite as detrimental 
to the attainment of the selected research objectives as the associated 
non-alignment may turn out to be for academic career development. 
Wassily Leontief articulated the logical complementarity of multiple 
incommensurable theoretical approaches as follows: 
…we face the choice between obdurate insistence on some monistic 
interpretation – which means overtaxing the analytical resources of one, 
chosen discipline and neglecting the capacities of all the others – or 
practical pluralism. 
Th e pluralistic character of any single explanation reveals itself not in 
simultaneous application of essentially disparate types of considerations 
but rather in the ready shift from one type of interpretation to another. 
Th e justiﬁ cation for such methodological eclecticism lies – and this is the 
principal point of the argument that follows – in the limited nature of 
any type of interpretation or causation … Neither the economic, nor 
the anthropological, nor, say, geographical argument can, in the present 
state of development of the respective disciplines, lead to the statement 
of uniquely deﬁ ned necessities. Considering any given sequence of events 
alternatively in the light of each one of such diﬀ erent approaches, one can 
at best assign it to as many diﬀ erent ranges of “possibilities.” Although 
the internal logics of the respective disciplines are incommensurable, the 
various ranges of possibilities thus derived are comparable, since all of 
them are described in terms of alternative developments of the same 
particular process (1948: 617–624, quoted in Merton, 1996: 35–36, 
original emphasis).
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In other words, according to Leontief, the “practical pluralism” that 
involves “the ready shift from one type of interpretation to another” to 
overcome “the limited nature of any type of interpretation or causation” 
may in fact be necessary to capture the multiple “ranges of possibilities” 
associated with each phenomenon. 
Th e scope of this study may be exceptionally broad. Any of the 
following chapters could – and perhaps should, if the ever more pertinent 
maxim for a successful scholar to continue specializing until knowing 
everything about nothing were to be followed13 – be expanded into a 
PhD dissertation, greatly improving the odds that the author’s eﬀ orts 
would appear to ﬁ t into a neatly discretized mental map popularized by 
one of the dominant academic tribes, or at the very least be perceived 
as a theoretically informed form of eclecticism that provides order into 
the methodological and epistemological anarchy by deﬁ ning or assuming 
away aspects of reality that the scholar is not equipped to study. Yet the 
scope may also remain inexcusably narrow, being to some extent a prisoner 
to the views and interests of the historically speciﬁ c or governmentally 
contingent groups of individuals who have had both the means and the 
inclination to become the gatekeepers of social science to the exclusion 
of all alternative conﬁ gurations of at least equally talented “peer” groups. 
A few words on the views on the production of knowledge claims that 
have inspired this study may thus help the reader to follow the argument 
in the following pages.
A logically contiguous social reality has an inﬁ nite number of potential 
theoretical, methodological, perceptual or stylistic discretizations. None 
of these discretizations are logically prior to research. As Kenneth Burke 
put one of the dilemmas that any self-reﬂ ective observer is surely aware of: 
“A way of seeing is also a way of not seeing – focus upon object A involves 
neglect of object B” (Burke, 1935: 70, quoted in Merton, 1996: 54). 
Rather than explicating the essentially arbitrary selection of discretizations 
ex ante and ignoring all details during the conduct of research that do 
not neatly ﬁ t into the chosen conceptual framework, social reality in 
its inﬁ nite diversity may also be confronted with minimum conscious 
13 In an ideal world the successful social scientist’s maxim might be precisely the 
opposite: to continue breaching the disciplinary and methodological containers of 
academic knowledge production until such knowledge-preserving safeguards can no 
longer conceal how little is “known” about any social phenomenon.
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interference from preconceived mental maps. In other words, rather than 
focusing on alleviating the limited perceptual and analytical capacities 
of the human mind through discretized mental models, the inevitable 
errors of perception and analysis introduced by such models can also 
be seen as a justiﬁ cation for a conscious attempt to minimize their use. 
Under such circumstances methodological and epistemological choices 
are transformed from ex ante ﬁ lters on perception and analysis into ex post 
tools for analyzing the applicability of the research results within diﬀ erent 
discretized analytical frameworks. Rather than the author specifying 
the parallel universe in which her knowledge claims are conceived, it is 
left to the reader to decide whether certain insights might have some 
validity within speciﬁ c analytical worldviews and whether any possible 
diﬀ erences of opinion might stem from the limitations of the research or 
the limitations of the mental maps consciously or unconsciously adopted 
by the reader.
Such techniques have in fact already been widely adopted among some 
of the more established writers in the academia. Ulrich Beck, for instance, 
articulates the reader’s responsibility as follows: 
How is it possible to champion and vindicate historical appearance, of 
all things the most ridiculous and ragged of all excuses, against a hydra-
headed social science armed to teeth with expensive theories and ﬁ gures? It 
is utterly impossible, and should therefore be held in this book’s favour as 
a ﬁ rst mode of self-refutation. For the record: whoever takes my arguments 
on board does so in spite of my own misgivings, and therefore on their own 
initiative and according to their own lights (Beck, 1995: 5).
Th is is not seen as an insurmountable problem that might diminish the 
scientiﬁ c value of Beck’s work, as 
Th e argument of the book can only be as powerful as the reader judges 
it to be. … To put it bluntly, I am perhaps the least certain participant 
in the uncertain science with which I deal. Th e lack of ifs and buts in 
the formulations is a question of style. Let this fact be taken out of 
parentheses and writ large once and for all. Yet the uncertainty of all 
claims to knowledge, as revealed to consciousness by thorough inquiry, 
need not end up as pussy-footing. … Anyone who has grasped the 
fragility of what is most certain can fall silent, turn cynical, get into a rut 
– or else take the opportunity of transforming prevalent concepts, once 
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having discerned their fallibility. … Th e error to which the ossiﬁ cation of 
scientiﬁ c concepts leads can only be broken up by an interplay between 
the internal and the external, with the courage that draws its strength 
from the will to know (ibid: 13).
Elsewhere, Beck describes his work as containing “some empirically 
oriented, projective social theory – without any methodological safeguards” 
(Beck, 1992: 9, original emphasis). Beck’s description of methodology 
as a safeguard rather than an indispensable, analytically or perceptually 
neutral element of research is highly instructive, not least in helping to 
“grasp the fragility of what is most certain” or “discerning the fallibility of 
the prevalent concepts”. Another relatively well known academic, Noam 
Chomsky, has described his relationship to social scientiﬁ c theory as 
follows: “Is there anything in the social sciences that even merits the term 
‘theory’? Th at is, some explanatory system involving hidden structures 
with non-trivial principles that provide understandings of phenomena? 
If so I’ve missed it.” (quoted in Edgley, 2002: 29). Michel Foucault goes 
a step further, suggesting that adhering to predetermined mental models 
may in fact be counterproductive, as part of the research objective often 
involves the transformation of the researcher: 
I write a book only because I still don’t know exactly what to think about 
this thing I want so much to think about, so that the book transforms me 
and transforms what I think. Each book transforms what I was thinking 
when I was ﬁ nishing the previous book … I’m an experimenter in the 
sense that I write in order to change myself and in order not to think the 
same thing as before (quoted in Faubion, 2001: 239–240).
It is not obvious that Foucault’s methodological choices are meant to be 
externally discernible or semantically stable even after any speciﬁ c project 
of personal transformation has been completed: “do not ask me who I am 
and don’t ask me to remain the same” (Foucault, 1989: 17). 
Ironically, such candor does not diminish the potential utility of 
Beck’s, Chomsky’s or Foucault’s work in providing appropriate theoretical 
frameworks for other scholars’ work – including PhD students, who may 
have signiﬁ cant diﬃ  culties in getting away with similar theoretical and 
methodological pluralism without the instrumental use of citations from 
more authoritative sources. Th e intention here is not, of course, to try to 
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discredit the work of Beck, Chomsky, Foucault or the countless others 
in the history of science who have conformed less than perfectly to the 
dominant fads in the mental models or disciplinary divides intended for 
academic consumption. On the contrary, the author has a high regard 
for all three and believes that the world would be both academically 
and intellectually much poorer if the prevailing dogma on knowledge 
production had always been meticulously followed. Th e choice of peer-
approved methodologies – like all other realms of human interaction – is 
not immune to power-based considerations. Th e choice of an approved 
methodology, explication requirements, the extent to which obscure 
or stylistically unconventional language is tolerated, the proportion of 
potential misunderstandings or controversies which must be addressed 
privately before publication rather than publicly after publication in the 
form of additional publications, and the degree to which a work must 
incorporate feedback irrelevant or hostile to its original intent before 
publication, among other things, are all more thoroughly conditioned by 
power than many academics might feel comfortable to publicly admit.14 
Not entirely unlike the way in which research on inherently adisciplinary 
concepts – essentially any concept in a world of fairly arbitrary dis ci-
14 To give but one example of a relatively common stylistic double standard among 
the gatekeepers of science, it is instructive to observe the frequency with which sentences 
starting with the expression “needless to say” make it to peer-reviewed publications. If 
there ever have been valid reasons to exclude speciﬁ c stylistic choices from the purview 
of academic expression, one might expect self-declared redundancies to fall within this 
category. Some other historically speciﬁ c or governmentally contingent combinations 
of gatekeepers could undoubtedly either weed out such redundancies from academic 
publications – perhaps with appropriately self-righteous labeling conventions ranging 
from “unprofessional” to “crankish” emerging to describe the work of such stylistic 
heretics – or to elevate some heretofore unacceptable stylistic choices to the realm of 
academic respectability. In either case the self-selecting and self-perpetuating dynamics 
of academic publication would virtually ensure that the chosen stylistic conventions 
– irrespective of their intrinsic merits – would come to be seen as natural, while any 
potential critics questioning the appropriateness of the substance of such stylistic 
preconditions for academic publication could be safely ignored due to their self-professed 
inability to conform to the realities of “science”. Needless to say, once one has grasped 
the nature and signiﬁ cance of the processes which produce the peculiar combination of 
power-based social conventions sometimes referred to as academic writing style, one may 
also have fewer illusions about the mechanisms that co-brand more substantive issues 
with academic respectability. It is partly for this reason that this study aims to match the 
breadth of its substantive scope with an equally thought-provoking range of expression.
38
plinary distinctions, but for the sake of the argument the reader may 
think of some of the more highly charged terms such as “terrorism” 
or “democracy” – may be completely overshadowed by political and 
ideological disputes, misunderstandings and misinterpretations of the 
diﬀ erent contents and connotations of the terms, explicating speciﬁ c 
theoretical and methodological choices may hinder as well as advance 
understanding of the actual phenomenon that is being investigated 
by focusing the dispute on the contending notions of what literature, 
perceptual ﬁ lters, or lines of reasoning should have been adopted when 
certain theoretical or methodological buzzwords are used. In short, there 
is a ﬁ ne line between a methodologically sound – as deﬁ ned by the 
prevailing academic conventions and power structures – and an “overly 
domesticated and academically henpecked Ph.D.” (Merton, 1996: 58). 
It is the author’s intention to leave the burden of proof for any possible 
violation of the former concept on the reader rather than autonomously 
seeking to prove the latter’s validity.
Th is study invites the reader to contemplate upon the relationship 
between theoretical and methodological choices – including the possibility 
of a conscious non-choice – and the production of knowledge claims 
through the most widely disseminated discretized mind maps for peer-
approved theoretical, methodological or epistemological approaches. Th e 
invitation of the reader to reverse engineer the author’s theoretical and 
methodological (non)choices may not only help to capture elements of 
reality that are imperfectly understood by the dominant discretizations 
but also to distinguish between the assumptions of the author and those 
of the underlying social reality that is being investigated. In other words, 
the refusal to explicate a parallel universe for scholarly purposes forces 
the reader to contemplate upon the conditions in which the author’s 
knowledge claims might be valid rather than going against the spirit of the 
argument by contesting the author’s use or interpretation of any speciﬁ c 
discretized theoretical frameworks. Alfred Marshall once proposed the 
“general rule that in discussions on method and scope, a man is nearly 
sure to be right when aﬃ  rming the usefulness of his own procedure, 
and wrong when denying that of others” (Marshall, 1961: 1; quoted 
in Merton, 1996: 40). Despite any potential intrinsic merits of such 
observations, methodological non-alignment amidst tribalist warfare may 
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be perceived as a threat to the very survival of the organizational power 
structures that draw much of their legitimacy from academic identity 
politics. According to one explanation for the ongoing self-inﬂ icted brand 
diﬀ erentiation of the uniform analytical enterprise of explaining the 
social reality, “For while the so-called disciplines can no longer plausibly 
defend their legitimacy intellectually as separate disciplines, they are 
organizationally fortiﬁ ed in their trench-like structures (Wallerstein, 
1991: 102). As contemporary academic tribalism will surely inspire 
more creative descriptions of non-aligned eclectic eﬀ orts than “practical 
pluralism”, it may be appropriate for the author to suggest a more colorful 
term for any possible methodological “mock controversy” (Merton, 1996: 
36) that may ensue. Methodological capitalism – entailing unabashedly 
utilitarian consumerism of disposable methodologies – might capture 
some part of the original intent. Th eory, as Wallerstein has reminded us, 
is “no more than a correlated set of questions to the social reality under 
study” (1991: 80). It has been suggested that “Money’s indeterminacy 
is its sole distinguishing feature” (Dodd, 1994: 152) and that “Th e 
tensions between the various ways of understanding money need not be 
resolved, but they do need to be revealed” (Gilbert, 2005: 381). As one 
of the most complex, paradoxical, pervasive and elusive regulators and 
transformers of social interaction, perhaps nowhere else is tolerance for 
theoretical, methodological and epistemological ambiguity and pluralism 
as warranted as in the study of money.15
15 If it is true that “Our social interaction consists very much in telling one another 
what right thinking is and passing blame on wrong thinking”, leading into institution 
building through “squeezing each other’s ideas into a common shape so that we can prove 
rightness by sheer numbers of independent assent” (Douglas, 1986: 91), then instead of 
networking with the most prestigious power-approved certiﬁ ers of knowledge to negotiate 
truth through mutual give and take, genuine science might require the conscious avoidance 
of excessively close social interaction with anyone who might be in a position to pass 
comment on the extent to which one’s work conforms to the most powerful streams of 
academic or scientiﬁ c group-think at each point in time. In other words, methodological 
isolationism – a self-actualizing state of mind which remains impervious to the mental 
guidance of external power-based knowledge certiﬁ cation processes while certain lines of 
thought are being developed – might be a further necessary but not suﬃ  cient condition 
for the possibility of science.
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3 The Sovereign Factor of Production? 
 On the Social Construction of Financial Capital 
3.1 The Social Construction of Financial Capital
 
More than a century ago Carl Menger wondered why “every economic 
unit in a nation should be ready to exchange his goods for little metal 
disks apparently useless as such, or for documents representing the latter” 
as such procedure was “so opposed to the ordinary course of things, that 
we cannot well wonder if even a distinguished thinker like Savigny ﬁ nds 
it downright ‘mysterious’” (Menger, 1892: 239). Countless variants of 
essentially the same question have been posed throughout the history. 
Th e answer has often relied, in the words of Weber, on the recognition 
of the probability that such non-commodity-based money “will be at 
some future time acceptable in exchange for speciﬁ ed or unspeciﬁ ed 
goods in price relationships which are capable of approximate estimate” 
(Weber, 1978: 169). Such circular logic – advocated particularly by the 
methodological individualism of neoclassical economics in the context of 
minimizing transaction costs – presupposes the existence of money as an 
institution and thus cannot account for the process through which the 
speciﬁ cations of money are established (Ingham, 2004). Nevertheless, 
perhaps more illuminating questions relating to the type of institution 
that money may constitute have rarely been articulated. If the practice 
of exchanging “useless” metal disks for goods is not suﬃ  ciently strongly 
“opposed to the ordinary course of things” to render money as an 
institution dysfunctional, are there any natural, technical, economic, 
political or sociological limits to the speciﬁ cations of money? Where does 
the line between “mysterious” but functional and patently implausible 
and thus potentially dysfunctional go – or does such a line exist? What 
does it tell about the nature of money that asking these kinds of questions 
is possible – indeed necessary – in a world where all forms of economic 
activity and political and social relations must ultimately conform to a 
single set of presumably uniform and non-negotiable natural laws?
Unlike other factors of production, the entire concept of ﬁ nancial 
capital is socially constructed. Labor in the sense of human productive 
capacity and land as natural territory would continue to exist with 
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precisely the same physical attributes and the same natural laws governing 
their opportunity sets for productive interaction even in the absence of 
money, multilateral exchange, economics as a science, or any other mental 
model evoked to depoliticize the diﬀ ering ontologies of the factors of 
production. In contrast to labor and land, all the physical attributes of 
ﬁ nancial capital and the laws governing its subsistence and interaction 
with the other factors of production are socially constructed. Nothing 
in the natural laws of the universe suggests that tokens of abstract value 
such as notes, coins or bits on computer hard drives should mediate 
the production and exchange of intrinsically valued goods and services, 
let alone under terms which violate those very same natural laws that 
condition the existence of labor, land and the rest of the physical reality. 
Th e choice of a unit of account, the monetary media which correspond 
to that deﬁ nition, the distributional implications of money creation 
and circulation, and the extent to which money as an institution must 
conform to the same natural laws aﬄ  icting labor and land, for instance, 
are all political decisions, which do not lose their political character once 
incorporated into the socially constructed “economic” laws governing a 
speciﬁ c type of monetary system.
Th e indeterminacy of material factors to account for the emergence 
or functioning of any speciﬁ c type of monetary system has often been 
pointed out in the context of peripheral and, from the modern viewpoint, 
seemingly primitive networks of exchange. One of the better known 
historical examples of an unconventional system of exchange involved 
the use of fei – “large, solid, thick, stone wheels, ranging in diameter from 
a foot to twelve feet, having in the centre a hole … suﬃ  ciently large and 
strong to bear the weight and facilitate transportation” (Furness, 1910: 
93) – in ceremonial exchange in the Island of Uap in the turn of the 20th 
century.16 It is instructive to observe the process through which a ﬁ ne 
set by the German colonial government ﬁ nally achieved its objective of 
inducing the natives to improve the road system of the island:
In what shape was the ﬁ ne to be levied? It was of no avail to demand 
silver or gold from the chiefs, – they had none – and to force them to pay 
in their own currency [fei] would have required, in the ﬁ rst place, half 
16 Whether the stones constituted a monetary system remains a matter of controversy 
(see e.g. Wray, 1998: 73, note 36). What is relevant here is the socially constructed nature 
of their perceived value and role in exchange. 
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the population of the island to transport the ﬁ nes; in the second place, 
their largest government building could not hold them; and ﬁ nally, fei, 
six feet in diameter, not having been “made in Germany,” were hardly 
available as a circulating medium in the Fatherland. At last, by a happy 
thought, the ﬁ ne was exacted by sending a man to every failu and pabai 
throughout the disobedient districts, where he simply marked a certain 
number of the most valuable fei with a cross in black paint to show that 
the stones were claimed by the Government. Th is instantly worked like 
a charm; the people, thus dolefully impoverished, turned to and repaired 
the highways to such good eﬀ ect from one end of the island to the other, 
that they are now like park drives. Th en the Government dispatched its 
agents and erased the crosses. Presto! the ﬁ ne was paid, the happy failus 
resumed possession of their capital stock, and rolled in wealth (Furness, 
1910: 99–100).                     
While the increased mobility and appropriability of the modern fei of 
money and near-money ﬁ nancial instruments may have solved some of 
the problems experienced by the German colonial administration, it is not 
obvious that the socially constructed process of ﬁ nancial capital’s value 
formation has experienced comparable evolution: instead of marking 
speciﬁ c physical objects with black crosses to symbolize impoverishment, 
it is presumably the symbolic violence inﬂ icted by the banking system’s 
manipulation of monetary bits on computer hard drives that determines 
a community’s capacity to pursue their visions of the good life. In both 
cases the extent to which the symbolic manipulation (of the stone wheels 
or the bits) constrains actual behavior – or, in the words of Edgar Cahn, 
builds a “prison” for our imagination by shaping “our sense of what is 
possible” (quoted in Lietaer, 2001: 146) – depends on our interpretation 
of the signiﬁ cance of such events. What is at stake here is not just the 
source of money’s value formation in taxation, coercion or something 
else, but also the credibility of the socially constructed accounting system 
of money in accurately representing the spectrum of choice available to 
the community in real terms. It would in theory be possible to recognize 
taxation powers as the main source of money’s value while vehemently 
denying that the socially constructed accounting system of money 
conveys any meaningful information about the community’s production 
opportunities in real terms – as may indeed have been the case in some of 
the colonized communities where the traditional patterns of production 
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and exchange were destroyed by the imposition of taxation denominated 
in the colonial currencies. Rather than recognizing the modern equivalents 
of the colonial currencies as instruments of domination which were never 
designed to convey accurate information for economic decision-making, 
the socially constructed accounting system of money has been elevated 
into a position of an arbiter of economic, political and social relations 
without any need of explaining how precisely it is supposed to perform 
such tasks accurately or why the prevailing forms of money should be any 
more suitable for the task than any of the inﬁ nite number of potential 
alternatives.
Yet a much more fundamentally political dimension of the socially 
constructed nature of ﬁ nancial capital – nothing less than the 
speciﬁ cation of a parallel universe with its own natural laws and rules 
for the physical existence and subsistence of ﬁ nancial capital and its 
interaction with the other factors of production – has also often been 
overlooked in contemporary academic literature. Under the current 
monetary arrangements ﬁ nancial capital is a peculiar creature indeed. 
Money can be created ex nihilo at the stroke of a pen – or a keyboard 
– by a speciﬁ c type of legal person entrusted with the task, not other 
legal or natural persons.17 With the socially constructed ability to attract 
compound interest in a world where physical assets rot and break, it 
does not share the same physical reality with the mere mortal factors of 
production: even in cases where productive investments which enable the 
payment of interest in real terms can be identiﬁ ed, the compounding of 
interest on ﬁ nancial capital is not temporally limited to the period that 
the relevant physical assets can continue to produce exponential returns 
in real terms. Rather than representing accumulated wealth that could 
be “saved” to ﬁ nance investment, the bulk of money disappears as soon 
as other factors of production are not willing to pay a tribute to induce 
17 If money is conceptualized as debt that is created and destroyed according to need 
at the time of each transaction, money creation “at the stroke of a pen” may superﬁ cially 
not appear to be an issue. Nonetheless, as will be seen later, the implications for the 
monetary system’s capacity to accurately reﬂ ect “real” economic variables are profound, 
and the criteria for distributing capacity to issue monetary IOU’s among economic 
agents and the conditions under which money may be created by such actors become 
crucial. Orthodox economics and much of social scientiﬁ c inquiry in general, in contrast, 
continue to conceptualize money eﬀ ectively as a commodity – as a neutral veil of “real” 
economic phenomena.
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its continuing circulation in the form of interest payments. In addition 
to the inherently political nature of specifying the institutional features 
of money, the extent to which the speciﬁ cations of money have been 
detached from virtually any substantive connection to the rules or the 
realities experienced by other factors of production in the physical world 
that is nonetheless supposed to achieve economic eﬃ  ciency and a host of 
other objectives through monetary calculation and monetarily mediated 
social relationships deserves particular scrutiny. Few individuals might be 
willing to grant producers and service providers the right to freely specify 
alternative physical realities to which their products and services marketed 
for human consumption are actually designed to conform.18 Who, for 
18 Th roughout this study, metaphors which might be characterized as anything 
between stylistically unconventional but acceptable, on the one hand, and inappropriate, 
unsophisticated, “unacademic” or crankish, depending on one’s level of self-righteousness, 
on the other, are adopted to illustrate particularly blatant economic, political, social 
or academic double standards to wider audiences. Th e rationale for such a choice is 
threefold. First, it is the author’s wish to extend the explication requirements commonly 
applied to academic work in general to some of the unstated conventions of “academic” 
writing style. If some of the stylistic choices are deemed inappropriate for knowledge-
creating or –preserving inquiry, what precisely is it about these expressions that renders 
them unacceptable and why? Th e larger the realm of unstated conventions in academic 
knowledge production/preservation, the greater the role of power in inducing prospective 
academics to conform to all rituals of the dominant disciplinary tribes – including matters 
of substance in addition to style – in order to avoid inadvertently transgressing crucial 
unstated gatekeeping conventions for academic career progression. Second, in a world 
characterized by pervasive violence, adherence to some illusory notions of “neutral” or 
“technical” forms of language constitutes a methodological choice which may preclude 
the possibility of understanding the world as it is. Violence is not constrained by self-
reﬂ ection upon some illusory norms of credibility or sophistication. Any attempt to 
impose equally arbitrary standards of self-restraint for academic knowledge production/
preservation might in its actual eﬀ ect be virtually indistinguishable from a conscious 
attempt to co-brand privilege-preserving violence with neutral technicality in academic 
expression. Th ird, one’s mode of expression may be as much of a personal “choice” as 
one’s gender, religion, sexual orientation or some other potential cause of bigotry: while it 
may in theory be possible to modify any one of these attributes to an extent that satisﬁ es 
the perceptual standards of superﬁ cial inquiry, the rationale for protecting the academia 
with glass ceilings or cognitive closets against the threat of openly expressed diversity 
has luckily been questioned. Th is study – intended as a contribution to the so far largely 
unsuccessful liberation movement for cynics and stylistic deviants – joins in solidarity the 
more traditional movements in promoting originality of thought and accuracy of insight 
as the only relevant standards for assessing the quality of academic work. After all, if 
stones are to be thrown on stylistic grounds, who is to say that much of the mainstream 
academic work cannot be less accessible or more oﬀ ensive than some of the more marginal 
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instance, would be willing to board an airplane that has been designed 
for the conditions of another planet? For a moment – potentially long 
enough for the engineers to cash in their stock options and to raid the 
bailout packages – the ride might be spectacular, and the victims of the 
eventual crash could perhaps ﬁ nd consolation in the fact that Ivy League 
oracles representing prestigious international institutions would surely 
take the opportunity to chastise planet earth for failing to eliminate its 
structural rigidities that led to the accident – for failing to adjust the 
natural laws of the physical reality to the logic of the airplane in a manner 
not entirely dissimilar to the recalcitrant refusals of labor and the natural 
environment to conform to the socially constructed higher wisdom of 
ﬁ nancial capital which allegedly contribute to ﬁ nancial and economic 
crises and stagnation. If the creative tampering with the natural laws 
underlying the design of any speciﬁ c product, service or social institution 
is deemed undesirable, one might assume that the same logic should also 
apply to the social construct of money which mediates virtually all forms 
of economic, political and social interaction.
A long tradition of economists and social reformers has argued for 
monetary reform on the grounds of the structural disparity between 
natural laws and the rules governing the production and circulation of 
money. According to perhaps one of the best-known proponents of this 
view – albeit in the rather narrow sense of aiming to extend the laws of 
physical entropy to the circulation of the monetary media – the German 
economist Silvio Gesell:
Our goods rot, decay, break out, rust, so only if money has equally 
disagreeable, loss-involving properties can it eﬀ ect exchange rapidly, 
securely and cheaply. For such money can never, on any account, be 
preferred by anyone to goods. … We then part with our goods for money 
only because we need the money as a means of exchange, not because we 
expect an advantage from the possession of money. So we must make 
money worse as a commodity if we wish to make it better as a medium 
of exchange. As the owners of goods are always in a hurry for exchange, 
it is only just and fair that the owners of money, which is the medium 
of exchange, should also be in a hurry (Gesell, 1958, quoted in Boyle, 
2002: 41–42).
views in the opinion of those who have to bear the brunt of the violence that academic 
orthodoxy often attempts to rationalize?
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Th ere is much more at stake here than merely “eﬀ ecting exchange rapidly, 
securely and cheaply.” As will be seen later, it is far from obvious that 
the political and social issues inherent in the technical speciﬁ cations of 
money can ever be solved to an extent that would permit “economic” 
calculation to begin or that such monetarily mediated calculation will 
ever have the technical capacity to accurately capture and reproduce real 
world economic phenomena.
Although the case for the necessity of human institutions to conform 
to the natural laws of the physical reality is persuasive in the long-term, 
short-term deviations have sometimes been justiﬁ ed by appeals to their 
contractual and thus presumably voluntary nature. In order to understand 
the political implications of such short-term deviations from the natural 
laws, it is instructive to note what similar creative freedoms would imply 
in the context of other factors of production. Let us assume that the 
humans’ divine-like power to create and specify ﬁ nancial capital applies 
equally to all factors of production. In other words, for the sake of the 
argument, suppose that it was up to the politicians and bureaucrats in 
charge of planning public policy and institutions to determine, among 
other things, whether labor needs food, shelter and clothing for subsistence 
or is physically able to survive without the inconvenience imposed by 
such arbitrary necessities. Suppose that such planners also had to face the 
choice of either making labor continuously available in the factor markets 
as a matter of physical necessity or giving labor the ability to extinguish 
the productive factor dimension of its existence unless other factors of 
production agree to borrow labor into circulation. In other words, the 
planners would have to decide whether other factors should be paying a 
salary for the mere existence of labor in the factor markets independently 
of whether it is actually employed in productive uses.19 Irrespective of 
the eventual choices that the community would make with respect to the 
physical speciﬁ cations of labor, these would be likely to be recognized 
as inherently political and potentially highly divisive issues which have 
profound implications for the expected outcomes of economic, political 
19 Th is example is, of course, meant to be analogous to the choice between forcing 
money – or the capacity to monetize real assets according to those who view money 
as a form of mutual credit – to exist as a matter of physical necessity or allowing it to 
temporarily extinguish itself unless other factors of production agree to borrow the bulk 
of it into existence and to make interest payments to induce its continued circulation.
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and social interaction. With labor potentially not only relieved of all 
material requirements for physical subsistence, but also receiving a salary 
or interest payment from the other factors of production merely to 
induce labor’s – or its mere debt-activatable potentiality’s – continued 
existence in the factor markets, it is not diﬃ  cult to foresee which factor 
of production would dictate the terms of its own employment to others 
and act as the driving force behind the economic, political and social 
transformation of the world economy resulting from any possible 
tendencies for the globalization of economic activity. Accusations of 
foul play – not necessarily entirely unfounded – from capital would no 
doubt abound. Th e speciﬁ cation of the socially constructed factor(s) of 
production – ultimately only ﬁ nancial capital in the real world – is by far 
the single most important “economic” task, upon which all subsequent 
analysis builds. Structurally skewing the rules of the game in favor of labor 
by bureaucratic ﬁ at would be likely to be recognized as a highly purposive 
political decision designed to achieve speciﬁ c market outcomes as opposed 
to neutral and equitable market processes. Yet political decisions of equally 
heroic magnitude on the physical speciﬁ cations of ﬁ nancial capital often 
escape the attention of observers who are focused, at best, on the political 
nature of the management of the interaction between diﬀ erent factors of 
production or their ownership patterns – both quite possibly historical 
footnotes compared to the political signiﬁ cance of the ﬁ nancial capital’s 
speciﬁ cation process.
Th e most politicized dimension of the “economic” reality should 
have always been the structural rules governing the dynamic interaction 
between diﬀ erent factors of production rather than the static allocation 
of ownership rights in a certain factor of production as suggested by 
the dichotomy between capitalism and socialism. Th e distribution of 
ownership of a certain factor of production tells nothing about the rules 
of the game that regulate the interaction between diﬀ erent factors of 
production in addressing productive opportunities. Widely dispersed – 
perhaps even completely egalitarian – private initial ownership of capital 
can be an extremely ineﬃ  cient and wealth-centralizing system in the 
long-run if the rules of the game structurally favor capital over labor in 
addressing productive opportunities. Conversely, a highly concentrated 
initial ownership of capital can be overcome in the long-run if the 
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rules of the economic mating game between the factors of production 
structurally favor labor over capital. While a more equal distribution of 
wealth may be a precondition for the political feasibility of reforming 
the rules of the game, any reform program is unlikely to be successful 
unless the technical speciﬁ cations of ﬁ nancial capital are modiﬁ ed to 
reﬂ ect the objectives of the reform. Th e failure to contest the structural 
protectionism of ﬁ nancial capital’s unearned privileges inherent in its 
“technical” speciﬁ cations constitutes one of the single most important 
failures of progressive scholarship and activism. It is this structural ﬁ ction 
that must be confronted if meaningful notions of equity – or, for that 
matter, eﬃ  ciency – are to be attained.
3.2 On the Politics of the Political: 
 Some Selective Structural Depoliticizations Arising 
from the Privileged Reality of Financial Capital
Paraphrasing Einstein, ostensibly technical problems cannot be created 
on the same level of understanding that led to the acknowledgement of 
their potential political utility in the ﬁ rst place. While this observation is 
potentially relevant to every instance of decision-making that is perceived 
to be primarily of economic nature, three examples suﬃ  ce to illustrate 
how ﬁ nancial capital’s privileged reality20 structurally depoliticizes choices 
when there not only is an alternative to the prevailing policies, but often 
an alternative that should in fact be preferred to the prevailing policies 
according to most publicly professed policy objectives.
Irrespective of the amount of TINA21 discourse advocating the 
necessity of all other factors of production to contribute to the highest 
20 Charles Lindblom (1977) famously pointed out the “privileged position” of 
business in a capitalist economic system. In the case of ﬁ nancial capital, it is not the 
position or the level of abstraction per se that merits to be described as privileged, but 
the lack of any objective constraints in deﬁ ning the speciﬁ cations of ﬁ nancial capital and 
the rules that govern its interaction with other factors of production – quite literally a 
privileged reality.
21 Shorthand for “there is no alternative”, in the words of one politician responsible 
for inﬂ icting a particularly exotic alternative to the search for the appropriate technical 
speciﬁ cations for money upon her people.
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possible return on capital, the incidence of residual claimancy – the ownership 
of the residual income stream arising from a productive opportunity after 
all factors of production have been paid the price required to induce their 
supply – is a predominantly political decision. A closely related point has 
sometimes been articulated in the context of capital and labor as follows:
…ownership of a capitalist corporation does not legally entail ‘ownership 
of a productive opportunity,’ since the capital assets of a corporation can 
be hired out instead of labor’s being hired in. Th at contract reversal shifts 
residual claimancy in the productive opportunity, but it does not shift 
ownership of the corporation. Th erefore, residual claimancy could not be 
legally part of the corporate ownership rights (Ellerman, 2007: 5).
Th e same logic applies equally to all factors of production: in an economy 
with three factors of production – capital, labor and land – “laborism” 
or “landism” – economic systems whereby the right to residual claimancy 
has been allocated to labor and land holders, respectively22 – would be 
technically feasible alternatives to capitalism. Th e de facto monopoly of 
capital on residual claimancy under capitalism is a direct result of the 
structural distortion of competition between the factors of production 
resulting from ﬁ nancial capital’s privileged reality. It would be perfectly 
feasible to specify ﬁ nancial capital in a manner that abolishes or reverses its 
current competitive advantage in relation to other factors of production. 
Chapter 10 of this study outlines one such possibility. As the entire concept 
of ﬁ nancial capital is socially constructed, none of the available alternatives 
can be delegitimized with TINA discourse without transparently articulating 
the desirable forms of economic, political and social realities that the chosen 
type of monetary system should contribute to.
Th is is a staggering thought in a world where traditional patterns of 
social interaction have been largely destroyed and reshaped according 
to the “technical” requirements of a capitalist world economy. Th e 
primary victims of such policies, say, peasants deprived of their land and 
traditional ways of livelihood, would no doubt be pleased to learn that 
assigning labor or land similar powers for global transformation through 
22 Such de facto allocation could result from instituting rules of the game that are 
structurally biased in favor of the chosen factor of production. As in the case of capitalism, 
the de facto right of the dominant factor of production to residual claimancy does not 
need to be legally mandated.
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de facto monopoly on residual claimancy would not have been inherently 
any more arbitrary than the current form of capital fundamentalism. In 
other words, the burden of adjustment could well have fallen on capital 
in the form of forced abandonment of its traditional identity (e.g. the 
creation of money as the counterpart of credit through the private 
banking system) or ways of livelihood (e.g. compound interest) as a part 
of a world economic transformation aiming to maximize the residual 
income accruing to labor. Th e selection of the factor of production whose 
income is to be maximized just never entered the political discourse.23 
In comparison, in a laborist world economy all social interaction would 
be rearranged to ﬁ t labor’s de facto right to the ownership of productive 
opportunities. Financial capital would compete for employment in 
labor-managed productive enterprises by lowering its required return.24 If 
unduly restrictive capital market rigidities such as collective bargaining of 
capitalists would impede the attainment of the prevailing deﬁ nitions of 
economic eﬃ  ciency, perhaps the institutional power of the International 
Labor Organization would be harnessed to help to speed up the race to the 
bottom in return on capital by oﬀ ering properly tailored conditionality 
23 As should be clear by now, the economistic notion of an objective competitive 
equilibrium is purely ﬁ ctional when one of the factors of production is socially 
constructed. Some readers with predominantly economic mental maps might argue 
that at this point the argument “begs” discussion of the substantial economic literature 
ﬂ irting with the implications of labor hiring capital rather than the other way round. 
Th e relevant question to ask in this context would be what kind of capital is labor hiring. 
Each set of technical speciﬁ cations for ﬁ nancial capital results in diﬀ erent power relations 
and factor incomes. Under a competitive equilibrium produced by the prevailing factor 
speciﬁ cations, each factor has a certain threshold level of income that is required to 
induce its supply for productive purposes. Change the technical speciﬁ cations of ﬁ nancial 
capital – for instance, make money “rot, decay, break out and rust” as suggested by Gesell 
– and suddenly the threshold income required to induce the supply of ﬁ nancial capital 
is likely to be very diﬀ erent. Th ere is nothing natural about the size of factor incomes, 
the size of the surplus to be distributed to the residual claimants, or the incidence of 
residual claimancy in any competitive equilibrium or any other mental model evoked to 
depoliticize the undepoliticizable: the social construction of ﬁ nancial capital – the choice 
of the precise manner in which tokens of abstract value come to symbolize wealth and the 
rules governing their issuance, subsistence, circulation and extinction – is logically prior 
to all these concepts.   
24 Th e notion of ﬁ nancial capital as a naturally scarce factor which must be “saved” 
before investment can take place does not bear scrutiny of the modern monetary 
system.
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packages to economies suﬀ ering from a sudden withdrawal of labor input. 
At its climax, the laborist world economy might institute a requirement 
for the capitalists to compensate labor for its mere existence – analogous 
to the necessity of labor to make interest payments on unrepayable debt 
merely to keep money in circulation under capitalism.
Despite the revanchist feelings that such an economic system might 
evoke in some after centuries of exploitation, laborism would not 
necessarily be any less arbitrary or ineﬃ  cient as an economic system than 
capitalism. Th ere is no purely economic justiﬁ cation for allocating the 
right to residual claimancy to any single factor of production, as such 
practice would produce excessive incentives to acquire and employ the 
gatekeeper factor of production for the access to residual claimancy. Th is 
has often been recognized in the context of, for example, proposals for 
distributing the value of external assets – assets that no-one alive produced 
such as natural resources – on the basis of one’s labor contribution, which 
would over-incentivize work at the expense of other activities. Th us, even 
on purely “economic” grounds, a fourth potential form of economic 
organization might have to be added to the list of capitalism, laborism and 
landism: democracy – entailing the unconditional egalitarian distribution 
of the residual income streams arising from the joint ownership of 
productive opportunities to all members of the community.25
25 Although the focus of this study is on the politicization of money as an institution 
rather than exploring the imperfections and ineﬃ  ciencies of some of the more explicitly 
political institutions of representative democracy, it may be appropriate to push the 
analogy between an eﬃ  cient market and an “eﬃ  cient” political system – one that is 
optimally responsive to the electorate’s democratic preferences – a bit further in order 
to elaborate on some of the possible contexts in which the notion of democracy may be 
evoked throughout this study. One of the conceptually purest practical approximations 
of the undistorted aggregation of an electorate’s democratic preferences might involve the 
constitutional transfer of the ownership of all voting opportunities to each member of the 
electorate. In other words, all compulsory institutional intermediaries of representative 
democracy would be abolished and replaced with each individual’s inalienable right to 
determine in each and every voting opportunity whether to exercise her constitutional 
right to direct democracy by personal voting or to delegate the voting powers to a selected 
individual. Such an arrangement would be likely to signiﬁ cantly reduce the governmental 
distortions arising from the prevailing institutional structures of representative democracy: 
while most members of the electorate would still be likely to delegate most of the day-
to-day voting activities to a representative, voters could change their representatives at 
any given point in time as opposed to having to wait until the next elections and in 
particularly important issues each voter could choose to cast the vote personally in order 
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Regardless of the eventual choice of the most appropriate form of 
economic organization, the substantial ineﬃ  ciencies and injustices 
involved in the de facto decision to grant the right to residual claimancy to 
ﬁ nancial capital due to the structurally distorted competition among the 
factors of production suggest an immediate moratorium on all political 
and social engineering designed to improve “competitiveness” according 
to the prevailing indicators. Th e audacity with which such ongoing and 
in all likelihood escalating ineﬃ  ciencies and injustices are depoliticized 
is breathtaking: it is not the substance of the issue, but the primary 
to eliminate the possibility of unnecessary distortions in the aggregation of the democratic 
preferences. Virtually any existing interactive form of communication technology 
could provide the technical infrastructure for recording the votes, while the activities 
of the delegates – now in all likelihood private entrepreneurs subject to the potentially 
instantaneous market discipline imposed by their customers in the electorate rather 
than being cogs in the party machines – could be ﬁ nanced by the state with the funds 
that currently go into the salary costs and other “expenses” of professional politicians 
based on each delegate’s number of customers and the proportion of all possible voting 
decisions that each customer has contracted to the delegate. Whatever the institutional 
structures or decision-making procedures which may or may not emerge through the 
system might be, the likely intensity of the interaction between the voters and the 
contract-delegates would have the potential to signiﬁ cantly enhance the understanding of 
contentious economic, political, social, environmental etc. issues among wider audiences: 
media wallowing in the details of the personal lives of politicians would be likely to be 
replaced at least to some extent with coverage of substantive issues as the voters would 
have the instantaneous power to terminate their contracts with delegates who do not 
live up to any given ethical or moral standards, would-be delegates representing even 
the most marginal views would have a direct ﬁ nancial incentive to confront some of the 
most powerful media outlets with substantive argumentation, and even delegates backed 
by the most formidable agglomerations of economic and media power could never be 
quite sure about whether their customers would indeﬁ nitely be content with prepackaged 
positions allegedly reﬂ ecting the preferences of the electorate or terminate their contracts 
due to insuﬃ  cient initiative on the part of the delegates to actively market alternative 
positions or decision-making rationales which the voters may not have been aware of. 
In short, the intent would be to harness the economistic competition rhetoric to the 
elimination of political market imperfections: if it is not feasible or desirable to conﬁ ne 
the rights of the holder of one dollar to the periodic selection of a representative who 
may or may not utilize the dollar in the manner intended by the owner until the next 
carefully managed oligopolistic selection ritual, why should the holder of one vote accept 
the bureaucratic limitation of the validity of her political asset to periodic elections in a 
manner that drastically curtails the political market’s capacity to aggregate “knowledge 
dispersed among and accessible only to thousands or millions of separate individuals” 
(Hayek, 1978: 76) from the electorate?
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beneﬁ ciary which determines the extent to which an issue has a political 
dimension. A political decision is made to structurally depoliticize the 
interests of ﬁ nancial capital. Once ﬁ nancial capital has been granted 
its privileged reality, maximizing the return on capital becomes the 
normal course of events, which cannot be challenged on the same level 
of understanding that permitted the profoundly political nature of 
such decision to be ignored or obscured in the ﬁ rst place. In short, the 
structural privileges of capital cannot be challenged because they are 
capital’s privileges. For the same reason, it is not considered productive to 
speculate on the feasibility of alternative economic systems that privilege 
diﬀ erent factors of production or promote genuine competition among 
all the factors. Productive creativity has been politically determined to be 
conﬁ ned to the maximization of return on capital. Without a thorough 
repoliticization of the prevailing limits to the notion of the political, the 
capacity of social scientiﬁ c inquiry to oﬀ er hope for a brighter future is 
clearly limited: it may be unnecessary to delve into questions of agency, 
as mainstream social science across the spectrum often pleads ignorance 
of the mere existence of the political role of one of the major institutions 
governing humanity. 
A closely related opportunistic reinterpretation of the rules of the game 
arising from the structurally distorted competition in favor of ﬁ nancial 
capital involves the selective expropriation of income streams according 
to the type of asset holder. In some of the parallel universes which may 
occasionally be explicated for analytical purposes, the creative destruction 
brought about by competitive market forces naturally creates winners 
and losers among diﬀ erent types of asset holders. Nevertheless, nothing 
in the economic or social scientiﬁ c theory suggests that certain types of 
assets should be commodiﬁ ed through marketization and competition, 
while state or corporate power is harnessed to protect or to enhance the 
earnings potential of other forms of capital. Th ese are purely political 
decisions, which almost always result in a reduction of the overall welfare. 
Th e commodiﬁ cation of low-skilled labor, for instance, by state and 
corporate bureaucracies is not inherently any more desirable than the 
commodiﬁ cation of more highly-skilled (or in some cases merely more 
privileged?) factors of production. If global working class laissez-faire is 
regarded as eﬃ  ciency-enhancing, surely the same logic must also apply 
to the desirability of any potential commodiﬁ cation of ﬁ nancial, medical 
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and legal services, for instance, through free migration and the abolition 
of restrictive licensing practices or any other asymmetric impediments 
to the universal elimination of elitist bargaining power. If the rent-
seeking behavior of trade unions is regarded as a threat to national 
competitiveness, how can the burden placed on the real economy by the 
necessity to borrow money into existence from the private banking system 
and to pay interest merely to maintain money in circulation be justiﬁ ed? 
Expropriation involves the elimination of an income stream generated 
through the possession of an asset. Th is is precisely what often happens to 
the working class holdings of low-skilled human capital – not as a result 
of some uniform tendency towards a more eﬃ  cient world economy, but 
through the selective state and corporate planning that is sometimes also 
euphemistically referred to as market economy.26 Hence the capitalist 
misconception of the inherent right of capital to residual claimancy may 
also apply to expropriation: instead of capital being the gatekeeper factor 
that cannot be expropriated and must be revered by the unconditional 
ﬂ exibility and self-sacriﬁ ce of other factors of production if the economy 
is to utilize its resources, any factor of production could technically be 
granted an equally privileged position at the expense of capital. 
Following Carl Schmitt’s well known deﬁ nition for sovereignty, it may 
not be an exaggeration to view ﬁ nancial capital as the sovereign factor 
of production, which deﬁ nes the exceptions to and the non-punishable 
inconsistencies in the interpretation of the rules of the game. Of all the 
factors of production, it is ﬁ nancial capital whose right to unlimited 
income maximization cannot be violated if the economy is to engage in 
productive activity and whose income quantiﬁ es the beneﬁ ts obtained 
through undermining the competitive position and the property rights 
26 As a matter of semantics, it could be argued that human capital rendered useless 
or less productive in terms of the monetary income stream that it can generate through 
state or corporate action does not constitute expropriation, as each individual in question 
still possesses the capital that has merely been rendered worthless by bureaucratic action. 
Following the same logic, a neo-Luddite attack on physical capital would not constitute a 
violation of property rights as long as the machinery rendered worthless through vandalism 
remains in the possession of its rightful owner. Th e relevant theoretical distinction between 
expropriation and creative destruction is the origin of the adjustment in property values: 
state or corporate vandalism versus the utopian case of pure impersonal market forces 
under perfect competition. Th e relative frequency with which these tendencies can be 
observed in the real world gives an indication of the extent to which market exchange 
constitutes politics in an economic disguise.   
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of other factors of production, including physical capital.27 Financial 
capital’s capacity for unpunishable expropriation of physical capital and 
other factors of production derives from its privileged reality and its 
socially constructed ability to create and manage artiﬁ cial scarcity – in 
the midst of a possible abundance of all the physical factors of production 
that the natural laws of the universe would suggest are necessary for 
productive economic activity, it is the human social convention according 
to which such activity cannot be undertaken unless the wealth- and 
power-centralization requirements of a diﬀ erent, socially constructed 
accounting system are satisﬁ ed that becomes the binding constraint.28 
Under an appropriate cognitive framework any factor of production 
could be granted similar privileges at the expense of other factors through 
structural manipulation of the rules of the game. Th us, once again, a 
society infested with arbitrary expropriations and instances of unjust 
enrichment should be exceptionally wary whenever any political program 
is promoted or the status quo defended on the basis of eﬃ  cient or just 
property rights or economic activities.
Unlike research on the inevitably political nature of residual claimancy 
or selective expropriation, enhanced economic eﬃ  ciency through 
competition is nearly universally advocated by the hegemonic discourse. 
As was noted above, structurally skewed rules of the game eﬀ ectively 
amount to institutionalized expropriation, primarily to the beneﬁ t of the 
arbitrarily selected factor ﬁ nancial capital.29 Few contemporary observers 
27 Capital’s position in the economic realm may not be entirely dissimilar to the 
sovereign’s position in the political realm. According to Giorgio Agamben, “…the state 
of exception has today reached its maximum worldwide deployment. Th e normative 
aspect of law can thus be obliterated and contradicted with impunity by a governmental 
violence that – while ignoring international law externally and producing a permanent 
state of exception internally – nevertheless still claims to be applying the law” (Agamben, 
2005: 87). Like the sovereign in the political realm, capital may ignore universalist 
economic rules – particularly the notion of free and undistorted competition between 
neutrally speciﬁ ed factors of production – with impunity and institute a permanent state 
of exception, whereby the fact that the monetary system as a whole is technically close to 
insolvency at any given point in time can be used to justify interventions.
28 Ironically, the continued adherence to the principles of artiﬁ cial scarcity may 
ultimately result in much stricter physical constraints on economic activity through 
environmental degradation and resource depletion.
29 I am puzzled by the suggestion of some self-proclaimed progressives that it is 
unproductive to delve into the speciﬁ c mechanisms through which eﬃ  cient markets 
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have fully grasped and articulated the implications of advocating 
economic eﬃ  ciency – understood here in the sense of minimizing the 
income of all factors of production through competition in a manner 
analogous to the alleged eﬃ  ciency of expropriating low-skilled human 
capital – as the overriding organizing principle for human interaction.30 
As numerous examples from the history of capitalism illustrate, there 
is nothing ineﬃ  cient about expropriation per se, whether in the form 
of outright repossession of assets or market reregulation to alter the 
expected income streams from diﬀ erent types of physical, ﬁ nancial or 
human capital. All that matters is the relative eﬃ  ciency with which 
the new owners of the means of production or relatively more valuable 
human capital utilize their newly-acquired assets. According to one 
possible criterion, expropriation and redistribution is economically 
eﬃ  cient whenever the new owner continues to produce the same amount 
of output at a lower compensation level. Such logic results in a race to the 
bottom to identify the most eﬃ  cient property holders. At its end point 
all economic rents – the portion of factor incomes over and above the 
bare minimum required to induce their supply for productive purposes – 
are abolished and property holders are compensated solely based on the 
value added by their labor contribution. If it is possible to temporarily 
utilize an asset only by demonstrating superior capacity to put the asset 
to its most productive use and all economic rent obtained through such 
means must, by deﬁ nition in a competitive market, be paid as a user 
(as opposed to all the other conceivable and intuitively more likely forms of human 
organization) might be created – or spontaneously come into existence according to 
the more heroic version of the story – as economic theory in general acknowledges the 
possibility that markets may fail. If eﬃ  cient market indeed is the guiding metaphor that 
has to be proven wrong rather than right in a society where a bureaucracy presumably 
loses its undesirable qualities at the moment of incorporating itself as a privately owned 
legal person, the word market becomes entirely devoid of economic content. Any and all 
mechanisms for social control could be labeled market economies as long as the structural 
coercion and violence are built into the rules of the game or their non-punishable 
inconsistencies.
30 Capitalism’s inherent tendency towards self-annihilation through the equalizing 
force of competition has, of course, often been recognized. Nonetheless, in practice, 
no economic system has let the requirements of logical consistency interfere with the 
application of the label “capitalist” to virtually any form of organized extortion that is 
unlikely to ever achieve anything resembling perfect – or even symmetrically imperfect 
– competition.
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fee to the state, private property has eﬀ ectively been abolished and all 
“surplus value” is held by the state and ready for redistribution according 
to democratically determined criteria. As the commodiﬁ cation of labor 
becomes complete, everyone has an equal chance and monetary incentive 
to periodically employ assets for productive purposes. Property belongs 
to no-one and everyone at the same time. In its most utopian perfect 
eﬃ  ciency incarnation, capitalism converges with socialism. 
What proponents of economic eﬃ  ciency often have in mind is the 
maximization of income for the one arbitrarily selected factor of production 
– almost invariably ﬁ nancial capital – with which they are relatively well 
endowed. Th e capital fundamentalist mindset has so thoroughly distorted 
the progressive imagination that elementary “economic” truisms may 
regularly be denied the attention that they deserve. In order to maximize 
economic eﬃ  ciency, all factor incomes, including the income accruing 
to ﬁ nancial capital, must be minimized. Th e economic ineﬃ  ciencies 
stemming from excessive factor income accruing to ﬁ nancial capital 
are conceptually analogous to the ineﬃ  ciencies arising from excessive 
compensation of any other factor of production.31 For a true advocate of 
eﬃ  ciency, the central question is what to do with the surplus when the 
incomes of all factors of production have been minimized through perfect 
competition in a manner consistent with the democratically determined 
technical speciﬁ cation of the socially constructed factor of ﬁ nancial capital. 
As there is no market-based solution to this dilemma – to the contrary, 
as we have seen, any single factor of production should not be granted 
the de facto right to the residual claimancy of this surplus – any potential 
solution will have to acknowledge the political and social dimensions of 
31 Indeed, this insight is perhaps one of the clearest indications of the underlying 
political agenda of the capital fundamentalist competition discourse. Any nation could 
signiﬁ cantly improve its national competitiveness in the global markets by abolishing 
the requirement of its companies and consumers to make interest payments merely to 
keep money in circulation – or by abolishing the requirement to make interest payments 
merely to obtain or to maintain the possibility of monetizing real assets according to those 
who still attempt to conﬂ ate a central monetary authority’s capacity to issue legal tender 
that is eﬀ ectively backed by the members of the monetary space with any transacting 
party’s alleged capacity to create monetary IOU’s backed by their own physical assets 
or labor power. Th e fact that no nation has so far taken such an elementary step to 
improve its global competitiveness while often continuing to suppress labor in the name 
of competition goes to the heart of the political role of economic double standards.
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the problem. Hence what is needed is more thorough politicization of 
the limits to the political: the uncovering of the economistic attempt to 
redeﬁ ne the political as a function of its own selective interpretation and 
implementation of the rules of the game. Th e nature of the decision to 
structurally depoliticize the economic, political and social implications 
of ﬁ nancial capital’s privileged reality is distinctively political, and the 
burden of proof for claiming otherwise rests ﬁ rmly on the side of any 
potential selective depoliticizer. 
Th is chapter has highlighted the inherently political nature of ﬁ nancial 
capital’s technical speciﬁ cations and suggested that the prevailing 
choices lead to structural distortion of competition among the factors of 
production with highly signiﬁ cant and pervasive implications for other 
forms of economic, political and social interaction. Th e following chapter 
begins the quest for alternatives by outlining some of the dominant 
theories of money and seeking to deﬁ ne a common denominator for 
social neutrality – a form of money that maximizes each individual’s 
capacity for autonomous social agency. 
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4 A Theory of Socially Neutral Money
According to Marx, it was Gladstone who asserted that “even love has 
not turned more men into fools than has meditation upon the nature 
of money” (1970: 64).32 Apart from less sexism and a more elaborate 
disciplinary division of labor to limit the scope of the fora in which one’s 
foolishness may be exposed, it is not obvious that the nature of money 
has become any more hospitable to intellectual inquiry since Gladstone’s 
observation in the mid-19th century. Th us, the recent social scientiﬁ c 
revival of interest in the conceptual reﬁ nement of money should be 
applauded for its ambition and audacity.
Nonetheless, it is puzzling to observe the extent to which the non-
economic social sciences, which otherwise may have overcome their post-
Methodenstreit inferiority complex for being insuﬃ  ciently “economic”, 
have focused on the positivist quest for conceptual clarity of money at 
the expense of analyzing how the contested and continuously evolving 
notion of money shapes social hierarchies. Few non-economic social 
scientists might dispute the fact that the notion of money – the speciﬁ c 
economic, political and social processes that are commonly associated 
with the word “money” for analytical purposes to the exclusion of other 
forms of human interaction – is essentially a social construct. Hence any 
persistent conceptual ambiguities can hardly be attributed to some innate 
characteristics of money to the exclusion of the human agency and the 
political and social structures that produce and reproduce the speciﬁ c 
temporal and spatial manifestations of such deﬁ nitions. Particularly 
the last three decades have witnessed an acceleration of the conceptual 
evolution of money beyond the diﬀ erent shades of vanilla credit or socially 
motionless commodities up to a point where it may not be an exaggeration 
to speak of genetically modiﬁ ed money (or perhaps “Frankenmoney”, 
depending on one’s position in the debate): the development of monetary 
or near-money instruments for particularistic purposes with uncertain 
long-term implications for the stability of the ﬁ nancial system and the 
nature of money itself. As the perceived characteristics of commodities, 
credit, equity and state certiﬁ ed “moneyness” continue to intermingle, 
32 Despite Marx’s assertion, the origin of this phrase remains contested (Ganßmann, 
1988).
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it is perhaps not surprising that the distinctive characteristics of money 
that go beyond the duck theory of money (“if it waddles like money and 
quacks like money, then it must be money” [Bryan and Raﬀ erty, 2007: 
140]) may be increasingly diﬃ  cult to identify.
Yet social scientiﬁ c inquiry often continues to seek monocausal 
explanations for the nature of money based on its speciﬁ c spatial and 
temporal manifestations – a situation not entirely dissimilar to a biologist 
explaining “duckness” exclusively in terms of the outcomes of privatizing 
duck’s genetic makeup and cross-breeding for maximum particularistic 
gain. Such analysis runs the risk of reifying historically contingent forms 
of social relations marked by power, circumstances and chance rather than 
reasoned inquiry on the logical limits of the concept of money. Th ere is 
no reason to assume that the social relation of money should take the 
same form and functions through time and space. It would be a peculiar 
coincidence indeed if the entire human experience – past, present and 
future – with money was limited by some heretofore undiscovered law 
of social relations to a single notion of commodity-based, credit-based, 
universally particularistic, or some other stationary form of money. No 
single theory of money is likely to capture its tremendous capacity for 
self-transformation. Money is a perpetual motion machine of social 
power relations, which attracts opportunistic energy precisely because of 
its malleability to self-deﬁ nitional eclecticism and a wide spectrum of 
legitimating narratives. It would be a relatively straightforward exercise of 
sovereign authority to produce an unambiguous conceptual or functional 
deﬁ nition of money and to enforce the limits of the chosen monetary 
social convention through coercion, persuasion, regulation and taxation. 
Forms of economic, political and social processes that could conceivably 
be classiﬁ ed as involving money would certainly still continue to exist 
and evolve outside the prevailing deﬁ nition, and the state could regulate 
their scope with varying degrees of success much in the same way as 
contenders to the legal tender can currently be controlled via varying 
degrees of integration into the banking system. Despite its practical 
feasibility, no sovereign authority or a group of market participants that 
is capable of imposing its own unit of account and a dominant monetary 
medium is likely to voluntarily surrender some of the social beneﬁ ts of 
money creation by transparently specifying the source and limits of its 
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own monetary powers. Th us, it may not be an exaggeration to adopt 
a variant of Goodhart’s Law for money: any attempt to deﬁ ne money 
explicitly for analytical or regulatory purposes is likely to render such 
deﬁ nitions obsolete through enhanced incentives to develop forms of 
money that are not captured by the prevailing deﬁ nition. 
What is needed is not a less obviously obsolete description of what 
money is in its current historically speciﬁ c or governmentally contingent 
capitalist manifestation as the breeding of new variants proceeds, but a 
model that allows the assessment of money’s impact on social relations 
irrespective of the speciﬁ c form it takes. In other words, the sociology 
of money needs a theory of what money should be if it were to be 
consistent with a society’s publicly professed ideals in other realms of 
social interaction – a kind of benchmark money that is neutral in terms 
of its impact on class, community and identity formation – against which 
the social footprint of actual monetary or near-money instruments can 
be judged. Th is chapter develops a theory of socially neutral money 
from the perspective of equitable allocation of newly created monetary 
media through unconditional basic income (UBI). Th e speciﬁ cation 
of ‘moneyness’ – whether through an exercise of sovereign authority as 
suggested by the statists or a market-mediated competitive process as 
implied by many neoliberals and Marxists – and the monetary media 
which correspond to that deﬁ nition are politically and socially relevant 
acts only insofar as they aﬀ ect the subsequent opportunity structures for 
producing and obtaining the monetary media. While it may or may not 
be possible to arrive at a generic deﬁ nition of money that satisﬁ es most 
of the contending theoretical perspectives, the social implications of each 
layer of the monetary hierarchy can be analyzed through the potential 
asymmetries in access to the production and initial distribution of the 
monetary media that shape the individual opportunity structures for 
autonomous social agency. Th e following sections develop these arguments 
by exploring the shortcomings of the existing literature on the nature of 
money, the ultimate source of money’s value and the preconditions for 
socially neutral money.
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4.1 A Fool’s Paradise: Some Meditation upon the 
Nature of Money
Schumpeter noted that there are “only two theories of money which 
deserve the name … the commodity theory and the claim theory. From 
their very nature they are incompatible.” (quoted in Ellis 1934: 3). Th is 
theoretical bifurcation gives rise to a conceptual distinction between 
“real” and “monetary” or “nominal” analysis of economic phenomena: 
Real Analysis proceeds from the principle that all the essential phenomena 
of economic life are capable of being described in terms of goods and services, 
of decisions about them, and of relations between them. Money enters the 
picture only in the modest role of a technical device that has been adopted 
in order to facilitate transactions. Th is device can no doubt get out of 
order, and if it does it will indeed produce phenomena that are speciﬁ cally 
attributable to its modus operandi. But so long as it functions normally, it 
does not aﬀ ect the economic process, which behaves in the same way as it 
would in a barter economy: this is essentially what the concept of Neutral 
Money implies. … Monetary Analysis … spells denial of the proposition 
that, with the exception of what may be called monetary disorders, the 
element of money is of secondary importance in the explanation of the 
economic process of reality … Money prices, money incomes, and saving 
and investment decisions bearing upon these money incomes, no longer 
appear as expressions – sometimes convenient, sometimes misleading, but 
always nonessential – of quantities of commodities and services and of 
exchange ratios between them: they acquire a life and importance of their 
own (Schumpeter, 1954: 277–278).
According to the commodity theory money emerges spontaneously from 
the process of economic exchange as the most suitable commodity to 
facilitate exchange, or, in Marxist terminology, the “universal equivalent” 
that is exchangeable to all other commodities. Money is seen primarily 
as a medium of exchange that solves the problem of double coincidence 
of wants aﬄ  icting unmediated barter exchange. In its original metallist 
manifestation the commodity theory held that the value of money 
derives from its metallic content that is independent of its form and 
nominal value as currency. As metal standards have been replaced with 
“unbacked” ﬁ at currencies, the commodity theory and particularly one 
of its most faithful exponents, neoclassical economics, has continued to 
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conceptualize money as an “obscuring layer” (Samuelson 1973: 55) or a 
“veil” (Pigou 1949: 14, both quoted in Ingham, 2004: 15) of the “real” 
economic processes without elaborating on the speciﬁ c mechanisms 
through which ﬁ at currency obtains its value. In the famous metaphor of 
Milton Friedman, a helicopter drop is a perfectly feasible assumption on 
the origins of money when it comes to neoclassical theorizing of money’s 
impact on the real economy.
Th e claim theory – including a number of distinct but overlapping 
analytical approaches from chartalism to the credit and state theories 
of money – conceptualizes money as a token which obtains its value 
independently of the speciﬁ c monetary media that are used to represent 
it. Knapp described the process through which a “chartal” form of 
payment – deriving from the Latin word “charta” for “ticket” or “token” 
(1973: viii) – obtains its value as follows: 
When we give up our coats in the cloak-room of a theatre, we receive a 
tin disc of a given size bearing a sign, perhaps a number. Th ere is nothing 
more on it, but this ticket or mark has legal signiﬁ cance; it is a proof that 
I am entitled to demand the return of my coat. When we send letters, we 
aﬃ  x a stamp or ticket which proves that we have by payment of postage 
obtained the right to get the letter carried (ibid: 31).
In contrast to the spontaneous market processes of the commodity 
theory, the claim theory draws attention to the authoritative foundations 
of money. In the words of Ingham, money is “a form of sovereignty, and 
as such it cannot be understood without reference to an authority” (2004: 
12). While any form of authority could conceivably facilitate multilateral 
exchange by establishing “moneyness” through the speciﬁ cation of 
a common unit of account, historically it has been the state that has 
performed such functions most eﬀ ectively. A central proposition of 
the state theory of money involves the state’s capacity to impose a unit 
of account and the speciﬁ c monetary media which correspond to that 
deﬁ nition through its taxation powers. Keynes expressed this point as 
follows:
the Age of Chartalist or State Money was reached when the State claimed 
the right to declare what thing should answer as money to the current 
money of account – when it claimed the right not only to enforce the 
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dictionary but also to write the dictionary. Today all civilised money is, 
beyond the possibility of dispute, chartalist (1930: 5).
Another branch of the claim theory regards the simultaneous existence of 
debt as a precondition for the existence of money. According to this view, 
‘”something can only be issued as money if it is capable of canceling any 
debt incurred by the issuer” (Ingham 2004: 12, original emphasis). Th e 
claim theory also has a number of more specialized permutations that 
illustrate the challenges and tradeoﬀ s involved in theorizing money based 
on speciﬁ c historically contingent forms of social relations. According to 
the monetary circuit approach, for instance, 
Money is at all times the liabilities issued by banking institutions which 
have been endorsed by the state primarily for the purpose of ﬁ nancing 
the formation of future real wealth. Th is money has a real extrinsic value 
because every holder of these liabilities has acquired a claim on the future 
physical wealth that results from the initial bank credit advances (Parguez 
and Seccareccia, 1999: 107, emphasis added).
Research on the social construction of money – while perhaps not deserving 
the name of a separate theory of money according to Schumpeter – has 
sometimes been categorized into “macrostructural”, “microcultural” and 
“macrocultural” approaches (Mizruchi and Stearns, 1994: 317; Carruthers 
and Babb, 1996: 1559–1560). Th e macrostructural view recognizes 
the structural constraints on social agency: “If money is power… then 
what is used as money and how money is used are determined by those 
who control economic resources in a society” (Baker 1987: 110). Th e 
microcultural view, in contrast, highlights the diversity of the social 
motives and contexts inherent in monetary relations. Multiple social 
meanings may be attached to money by its users, as
All moneys are actually dual: they serve both general and local circuits. 
Indeed, this duality applies to all economic transactions. Seen from 
the top, economic transactions connect with broad national symbolic 
meanings and institutions. Seen from the bottom, however, economic 
transactions are highly diﬀ erentiated, personalized, and local, meaningful 
to particular relations. No contradiction therefore exists between 
uniformity and diversity: they are simply two diﬀ erent aspects of the 
same transaction (Zelizer, 2000: 386).
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Th e macrocultural approach, in turn, expands the analytical framework 
to the economic, political, social and cultural institutions at the macro-
level under the assumption that “Money works best when it can be taken 
for granted and its social construction is hidden” (Carruthers and Babb, 
1996: 1556).
 
4.2 Snapshots of an Evolving Pendulum: 
 Shortcomings of Monocausal Theories of Money
Much of the existing literature on the nature of money seeks to apply 
a monocausal explanation for a complex and constantly evolving social 
phenomenon. No single theory of money can explain why economic 
actors may sometimes behave as if money were a commodity (e.g. require 
weighing of gold coins before accepting them as payment), sometimes as 
if it were a pure token (e.g. accept “unbacked” ﬁ at currency as payment), 
and why both the proportion of people who adhere to certain conceptions 
of money and the degree of their conﬁ dence in the legitimacy and 
naturalness of their views may also evolve through time. Furthermore, 
as a social relation, there is little evidence to suggest that the evolution 
of money is a linear process tending towards some more “advanced”, 
legitimate, or widely accepted notion of money. In the absence of such 
normative convergence, it is not entirely obvious what precisely the 
monocausal theories of money aim to explain and how they plan to deal 
with the persistent residual empirical inconsistencies.
Th e structural relationship between the commodity and the chartalist 
views on money, for instance, has resembled more of an evolving pendulum 
than a linear process towards a more legitimate or widely accepted form of 
money. Although the structural features of the pendulum may currently 
seem to favor the chartalist position, the timing, speed and extent of 
each swing to the opposite direction have historically been unpredictable. 
Even in the presumed heyday of the commodity theory, the 19th century 
international gold standard, the preferences of domestic actors with 
regard to the adoption of the gold standard were far from uniform and 
challenges to the dominant conception of money were not uncommon 
(e.g. Broz, 1997; Carruthers and Babb, 1996; Frieden, 1992). Similarly, 
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despite the recent hegemony of ﬁ at currencies, the commodity view has 
not been short of inﬂ uential proponents. Th e former French president 
Charles de Gaulle, for instance, regarded gold as “the unalterable ﬁ duciary 
value par excellence” (quoted in Mylchreest, 2006: 34). According to 
Alan Greenspan, the former Chairman of the Federal Reserve, “Gold 
still represents the ultimate form of payment in the world. Germany in 
1944 could buy materials during the war only with gold. Fiat money in 
extremis is accepted by nobody. Gold is always accepted” (ibid.). 
At least three considerations that are relevant to the contemporary 
debate about the nature of money arise from the position exempliﬁ ed 
by the comments of de Gaulle and Greenspan. First, it is instructive to 
note how de Gaulle and Greenspan are not concerned about the speciﬁ c 
abstract unit of account that according to an inﬂ uential branch of the 
chartalist position would deﬁ ne gold’s “moneyness”. In other words, 
although the comments do not preclude the possibility that a money of 
account is “logically anterior to money’s forms and functions” (Ingham 
2004: 6), in extremis, it is the monetary medium that is seen as limiting an 
authority’s capacity to deﬁ ne a unit of account rather than the other way 
round. Hence the state’s, or some other dominant authority’s, capacity 
to create alternative monetary realities is highly asymmetric: while 
concentrated power may often be able to create temporary monetary 
hierarchies through its own selective acceptance of diﬀ erent types of 
claims, it is quite another thing to reduce the attractiveness of other forms 
of monetary media that have historically retained their role and value 
irrespective of speciﬁ c economic and political power structures. Second, 
if some of the leading authorities doubt their capacity to achieve the best 
possible “working ﬁ ction of a monetary standard” (Mirowski 1991: 579) 
without gold, how much faith should others have in such pursuits? Th e 
relevant issue here is not whether gold indeed constitutes some natural 
benchmark towards which all monetary systems eventually gravitate in the 
absence of particularistic intervention, but the profound and legitimate 
divergence of opinion with regard to the nature of money regardless of 
the prevailing historically speciﬁ c or governmentally contingent forms of 
monetary relations. Th ird, even actors with relatively clear impressions 
of what money in their view is seem to be capable of accommodating 
and promoting alternative conceptions of money for prolonged periods 
of time whenever it serves their economic, political or social interests to 
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do so. Th e parallel existence of diﬀ erent conceptualizations of money 
and diﬀ erent notions of the top monetary media hence constitutes an 
integral part of the Weberian economic “struggle of man against man” 
in which money is “primarily a weapon” (1978: 108). Th ese observations 
do not, of course, diminish the utility of any speciﬁ c theory of money 
in capturing some aspects of money’s multiple potential manifestations. 
Th ey do, however, illustrate the futility of the attempt to construct a 
positivist, monocausal deﬁ nition of the social relation of money.
Sometimes the striving for a monocausal theory of money may also 
lead to a loss of explanatory powers in a model’s core ﬁ eld of competence. 
Th e central proposition of the credit theory of money – the issuance of 
money as debt – for instance, misses a crucial feature of the prevailing 
monetary system – the issuance of money against debt. Whether modern 
money constitutes debt remains a matter of controversy, but it can hardly 
be disputed that most of it enters into circulation only against a borrower’s 
promise to repay, i.e. against another interest-bearing credit instrument 
or IOU. Th is practice places the private banking system in the position of 
a monopoly supplier of the dominant monetary medium, the monetary 
counterpart of its own credit, which is introduced into circulation only if a 
suﬃ  ciently creditworthy customer is willing to commit to the repayment 
of another IOU that not only “cancels” the bank’s original liability but 
also pays interest. Th e implications go to the heart of the nature of the 
prevailing forms money. In the case of government spending, money – 
whether conceptualized as credit or commodity – enters into circulation 
without a commitment from the end-users to repay with interest. Modern 
neo-chartalism formulates this point as follows:
Governments issue money to buy what they need; they tax to generate 
a demand for that money; and then they accept the money in payment 
of the tax… If the government wants to, it can let the population trade 
the money for interest-earning government bonds, but the government 
never needs to borrow its own money from the public. Taxes and bonds, 
therefore, have nothing to do with ﬁ nancing a government’s spending. 
Th ey necessarily follow spending rather than precede it (Wray, 2000: 62; 
original emphasis).
In the case of the private banking system, on the other hand, the 
introduction of interest-bearing liabilities into circulation in conjunction 
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with money creation is non-discretionary. According to the credit theory 
of money, money gets its value from the issuers’ commitment to accept 
their own money in settlement of debts. Yet if the issuance of money 
automatically involves the creation of borrower IOUs that exceed the 
value of the money that is put into circulation, the issuers can gradually 
increase their control over economic activity within a given monetary 
space that eﬀ ectively lacks a permanent money supply or capacity to 
monetize real assets. Th us, the price of membership in a given debt-based 
monetary space, far from providing a neutral solution to the problem of 
double coincidence of wants, approaches inﬁ nite for a substantial portion 
of its members in the form of interest payments on unrepayable loans.33 
Th is conclusion survives alternative conceptualizations of money, such as 
that of Heinsohn and Steiger:
…money is created in a credit contract but is not itself a credit. … Th e anonymized 
title – the money proper – represents only an option for the current holder to 
present it to the creditor-issuer and have it redeemed. Th e obligations ﬁ xed 
in the speciﬁ ed title – the credit – are not optional in character, but deﬁ nite 
(Heinsohn and Steiger, 1999: 86, original emphasis).
Th e conceptualization of money as debt does not capture this crucial 
insight, which is independent of the speciﬁ c form of money as long as 
money is issued against interest-bearing debt.          
Perhaps the most diverse of the “snapshot” theories of money, the 
microcultural view entailing nearly inﬁ nite potential for the social 
variability of the meaning of money, largely overlooks the role of the 
prevailing power structures in shaping the social meanings of money 
and fails to apply its ﬁ ndings to the intertemporal evolution of the 
dominant notions of money. Structural political and economic power 
shapes the opportunity structures for the formation of social relations 
and guides the evolution of the dominant conceptualizations of money. 
Hence the fact that local currencies, for instance, “have been viewed as 
a counterweight to global capitalism (Pacione, 1999), as an important 
tool of local economic development (North, 1999, 2002; Seyfang, 
33 According to some opportunist reinterpretations that eﬀ ectively attempt to relabel 
institutionalized default settlement procedures “repayment”, unrepayable monetary debt 
is allegedly repayable, as the issuer of such debt may either accept partial payment in kind 
or issue or “recycle” additional liabilities into circulation to avoid the juridical deﬁ nition 
of default. See particularly section 7.2 for a more detailed treatment of this topic.
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2001) and as a vital means of ‘community-building’ (Glover, 1999; Lee, 
1996; Seyfang, 2004)” (Dodd, 2005: 560) may well have more to do 
with the prevailing economic and political power structures than some 
innate propensity of these communities to experiment with peripheral 
and often isolated monetary spaces. Furthermore, the same logic of the 
cross-sectional variation in the social meaning of money applies, perhaps 
even more forcefully, to intertemporal variation in the dominant patterns 
of monetary relations. Both the dominant monetary manifestation of a 
speciﬁ c kind of social relation and its degree of dominance over alternative 
forms of monetarily mediated social relations evolve through time. While 
multiple meanings of money may co-exist in the collective consciousness 
indeﬁ nitely, some of them are likely to be more dominant than others at 
each point in time. Th e capacity for such profound self-transformation 
through evolving politics, economics and psychology implies that 
money as a social relation is hardly reducible to an apolitical, stationary 
set of monetary functions from which social actors can tailor the most 
appropriate monetary instruments for each social context. Th e positivist 
quest for a single deﬁ nition of money may therefore be interpreted as a 
symptom of misidentifying the problem: the lack of a generic deﬁ nition 
of money does not entail a failure of research, but the success of politics.
4.3 The Monetary Implications of an Absence of Trust: 
Gold as a Form of Unspecifi c, Non-redeemable, 
Perpetually Circulating Debt
In order to illustrate the futility of the quest for a generic, monocausal theory 
of money, it is instructive to explore in more detail one counterexample 
that has consistently challenged such theories: the persistent monetary 
role of gold. None of the existing theories can adequately explain the 
source of gold’s value and its resilience to changing economic and political 
power structures that have variously tried to eradicate gold from the 
monetary system or institute it as the sole standard of monetary valuation. 
Th roughout the history gold has been relatively useless as an industrial 
commodity. Th e commodity theory’s contention that gold’s value as a 
commodity is simply the price that emerges through the forces of supply 
70
and demand involves a circular argument that ignores the social nature of 
a substantial portion of such transactions: the monetary demand for gold 
is socially constructed and thus it has nothing to do with the intrinsic 
value of the commodity. Without signiﬁ cant monetary demand, gold 
could hardly reach valuation levels that would make it attractive as a status 
symbol or a store of value. Hence the commodity theory may indeed be 
correct in suggesting that gold constitutes a universal equivalent, but it 
does not explain the substantial premium at which gold has historically 
traded in comparison with its intrinsic value nor does it make it entirely 
clear why the relative monetary role of gold in relation to the spectrum 
of particular equivalents – chartalist forms of money whose value derives 
from speciﬁ c historically or governmentally contingent power structures 
– has ﬂ uctuated widely.
Th e credit theory’s insistence on identifying a speciﬁ c issuer whose 
debts money may cancel has so far prevented it from recognizing one of 
the most crucial insights of the social nature of money: it is possible to 
have a money supply that is unrelated to speciﬁ c relationships of credit 
and debt, but which nevertheless is collectively recognized as unspeciﬁ c 
indebtedness. Th e monetary component of gold’s value – the portion that 
cannot be explained by industrial usefulness or any other consideration 
that is unrelated to the persistent conception of gold as money – may 
be conceived of as a form of unspeciﬁ c, non-redeemable, perpetually 
circulating debt. Virtually any community in humanity’s modern 
history has acknowledged its indebtedness to whoever has happened 
to present gold in settlement of such debts. Th is startling observation 
alone should be suﬃ  cient to dissipate any illusions about mutual trust or 
coercive power as the exclusive sources of money’s value. Any community 
could optimize its own welfare by refusing to accept a credit contract – 
gold’s embedded monetary value – which it has never itself consented 
to. Yet the universal lack of trust in authoritative enforcement of debt 
contracts across time and space continues to confer gold monetary value. 
Gold’s persistent monetary role testiﬁ es profound cynicism towards the 
human nature: generations after generations have placed more trust in 
a relatively useless commodity as a guarantor of debt contracts across 
diﬀ erent monetary spaces and power structures than in any historically 
speciﬁ c or governmentally contingent form of economic, political or 
social organization. Hence it is not mutual trust, but the lack of it, that 
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explains the existence of the closest thing to a permanent money supply 
that humanity has so far come to. 
Another common misconception of a branch of the credit theory 
involves a more elementary confusion of general and particularistic 
considerations. In the words of Innes:
Future ages will laugh at their forefathers of the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, who gravely bought gold to imprison in dungeons in the belief 
that they were thereby obeying a higher economic law and increasing the 
wealth and prosperity of the world (1913: 408).
Gold, as any other form of claim on wealth, increases the relative position 
of its holder in the social hierarchy irrespective of the total wealth or 
misery experienced in the world. Th e future ages may well laugh (or 
perhaps curse) at their forefathers of the twenty-ﬁ rst century, who 
gravely created credit to imprison in computer hard drives in the belief 
that they were thereby not transgressing any higher physical or ecological 
law too seriously or diminishing the real wealth and prosperity of future 
generations permanently.     
Th e peculiarities of the prevailing forms of money and gold’s resilience 
to changing conceptions of “moneyness” thus draw attention to yet 
another paradox of money that often escapes the analytical lens of snapshot 
theorizing: the forms of money that are presumably based on mutual trust 
(the particular equivalents created by historically speciﬁ c or governmentally 
contingent power structures or the speciﬁ c debtor-creditor relations of 
the credit theory) are likely to be the most vulnerable to particularistic 
bias and periodic loss of conﬁ dence, while the ones that thrive due to a 
persistent lack of trust (gold as a universal equivalent or the unspeciﬁ c, non-
redeemable, perpetually circulating debt of the credit theory) may achieve 
relative permanence and stability of social relations precisely because of 
their perceived independence of any form of mutual trust.
4.4 Measuring the Social Footprint of Money: 
 A Matter of Distribution
Th e positivist penchant for monocausal theorization of the forms of 
social relations which each historically contingent power structure has 
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attempted to dub “monetary” has diverted attention away from both the 
logical limits of the concept of money and normative analysis of what 
money should be if it were to be consistent with the society’s publicly 
professed ideals in other realms of social interaction. Th e corresponding 
policy problem involves two conceptually distinct dimensions: the 
selection of the speciﬁ c combination of technical functions from the 
universe of social relations regarded as “monetary” and the identiﬁ cation 
of the logical and practical preconditions for performing all of and 
nothing but the selected combination of functions. Perhaps nowhere else 
is the neglect of particularly the latter question as obvious as in the alleged 
separation of distributional considerations from some of the technical 
functions of money.
Distribution is logically endogenous to money’s function as a medium of 
exchange. In order to perform its function as a medium of exchange, money 
must be where the exchange is taking place – physically or symbolically. 
If money is to neutralize personal relations (Heinemann, 1987) or to act 
as a “generalised medium of communication” (Luhmann, 1973; 1988, 
quoted in Schrader, 1994: 13), the monetary media which allegedly 
perform such functions must be available to every individual who has 
the capacity and the willingness to engage in multilateral exchange in real 
terms without preconditions that would aﬀ ect the nature of the exchange. 
Whenever disparities exist between the rules governing the allocation of 
the actual goods and services that are to be exchanged in the market and 
the distribution of the monetary media that regulate the access to and the 
cost of multilateral exchange, the form of exchange that money mediates 
diverges from the multilateral exchange of goods and services. Th e prevailing 
practice of forcing the members of the monetary space to borrow into 
existence the bulk of the money supply against interest-bearing debt, for 
instance, eﬀ ectively eliminates the possibility of neutral multilateral barter 
of goods and services: it is the rules governing the issuance and circulation 
of the “value of things without the things themselves” (Simmel, 1978: 
121) – the price of the socially constructed gatekeeper for social interaction 
involving some of the technical functions of money – which determines 
each individual’s ability and willingness to engage in multilateral exchange 
rather than their capacity in real terms to do so.
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Th e closest feasible monetary approximation of the logic of undistorted 
multilateral exchange might involve either the issuance of the monetary 
IOUs at each transaction on a mutual credit basis or the debt- and interest-
free delivery of the monetary media to the members of the monetary 
space who would spend them into circulation. Even in the latter case 
distribution would remain intimately linked to money’s role as a medium 
of exchange. For the sake of the argument, suppose that after a number 
of transactions which all members of the monetary space recognize as 
perfectly neutral and legitimate one individual ends up holding all of 
the community’s money supply. Under such circumstances money may 
have ceased to perform its function as a medium of exchange for the 
overwhelming majority of transactions. Th e community as a whole may 
have a normative preference for maintaining money’s function as a store of 
value at any cost in terms of its capacity to act as a medium of exchange,34 
but one would expect to ﬁ nd evidence of a conscious choice for such 
a preference in the social contract establishing the monetary system as 
the gatekeeper for social interaction involving some of the technical 
functions of money. Furthermore, such a social contract would merely 
establish the possibility of successive monetized market transactions to 
extinguish much of money’s function as a medium of exchange: it is the 
speciﬁ c combination of money’s functions that is evolving as a result 
of changing distributional patterns rather than the mere allocation of 
the monetary media within some hypothetical ﬁ xed set of functions. If 
the community has some preference for money to act as a medium of 
exchange, distribution is endogenous to money’s “technical” functions. 
Not entirely unlike some of its more positivist social scientiﬁ c 
disciplinary peers, sociology has often focused on the romanticized notion 
of monetized barter exchange involving monetary media of unspeciﬁ c 
origin and distributional patterns deemed to fall outside the purview 
of sociological analysis without identifying the analytical preconditions 
for such a situation to emerge or the intimate interconnection between 
the excluded variables and the research problem. Money can never be 
neutral in terms of universal agreement on the speciﬁ c combination 
of functions that it is performing at each point in time – even in any 
34 It is debatable whether a social relation which excludes a signiﬁ cant number of 
individuals from monetized market exchange – no matter how neutral or legitimate the 
process leading into such a situation might be – should be referred to as money.
74
imaginary “formal” sense that a long tradition of sociologists have used 
as an intellectual disguise for positivism. Th e selection of the “neutral” 
combination of potentially contradictory technical functions for money 
is a thoroughly political process, whether or not explicitly recognized as 
such. Th e nature of any potential decision which might permit politics 
to end and “monetary” analysis to begin – or the politics of the social 
construction of money to graduate into politics of the management of 
money – is contractual: a result of a social agreement to treat the inbuilt 
economic, political and social biases of the prevailing forms of money 
as “neutral”. It has been argued throughout this chapter that such social 
agreement has never existed, is unlikely to ever exist, and any appearance 
of such has more often than not been preceded by and associated with 
coercion rather than “trust” in the universal optimality of the selected 
combination of money’s functions. Consequently, the best that monetary 
analysis based on the assumption of autonomous, consenting agents can 
strive for is to identify the conditions under which autonomous agents 
might either be indiﬀ erent between belonging to diﬀ erent types of 
monetary spaces or, particularly in the case of forced membership, possess 
the maximum amount of freedom to construct the most meaningful 
social relationships involving some of the technical functions of money.
Despite the foreseeable lack of theoretical, empirical or normative 
convergence on the nature of money, the social implications appear to be 
surprisingly robust to changing conceptualizations of money across the 
spectrum of commodity and credit theories. According to both theories the 
monetary system’s social footprint – the extent to which money shapes rather 
than merely reﬂ ects social relations – depends on the distribution of the 
monetary media rather than the prevailing notions of the nature of money.  
In the case of the commodity theory the assessment of the monetary 
system’s social footprint is relatively straightforward: as money is 
conceptualized as the most tradable commodity, social externalities 
arise when the tradability and initial allocation of the monetary 
commodity do not follow the same patterns as other commodities. 
Perfect commodiﬁ cation of money would not, of course, imply that 
money becomes irrelevant to social relationships. It would, however, 
depict a situation in which social actors have the maximum freedom to 
deﬁ ne, contextualize and tailor such monetary relationships with the 
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desired mixtures of meaning with minimum structural interference from 
established monetary social hierarchies.
An evaluation of the current debt-based monetary system against such 
a standard illustrates the extent to which the positivist obsession with 
the conceptual reﬁ nement of money has diverted attention away from 
the analysis of the monetary system’s social implications. In the current 
monetary system most of the monetary commodity has to be borrowed 
into circulation from the banking system before multilateral exchange can 
take place. Th e fact that the positive accounting value of the monetary 
commodity must always be accompanied by a corresponding negative 
accounting value of the credit instrument plus the interest payable 
indicates that the economy as a whole is incurring debt that is both 
wealth-centralizing and eﬀ ectively unrepayable. Such a startling disparity 
between the distribution of the monetary commodity and the markets 
for all other commodities has profound implications for the social impact 
of monetized market exchange. If the members of a monetary space must 
gradually transfer real wealth to the banking system – or ultimately to 
the “lock-in between the political, legal, banking and institutionalized 
monetary system” (Lietaer, 2001: 214) – in the form of the borrowing 
requirement of the monetary commodity and interest payments on 
unrepayable debt, membership in such a community inevitably entails 
a loss of social autonomy in favor of the structurally mediated social 
relationships inherent in the division of labor in each monetary space. 
Decisions to engage in multilateral exchange among individuals are based 
on one’s relative position in the monetarily-induced social hierarchy and 
the cost of survival outside such hierarchies rather than any objective 
exchange ratios between one’s own physical and human capital and the 
commodities to be obtained through the market mechanism. Trade 
between nations becomes similarly mediated by the peculiarities of the 
prevailing forms of money rather than comparative advantage based on 
objective factor scarcities, unless the intermediate step of borrowing the 
monetary commodity into circulation against interest-bearing debt can 
be bypassed through direct barter. 
Th e social implications of the credit theory in the context of a debt-
based monetary system are at least equally signiﬁ cant: in the absence of 
a permanent and relatively stable money supply, the monetary system 
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cannot convey meaningful information for rational decision-making 
and the pursuit of economic eﬃ  ciency.35 In addition to the wealth-
centralizing eﬀ ect emanating from the issuance of money – an IOU 
itself according to the credit theory – against debt, the quantity of such 
money would ﬂ uctuate according to the credit cycles and the individual 
lender and borrower preferences and hence lack the capacity to aggregate 
information in a manner that would be conducive to economic eﬃ  ciency. 
As the unpredictable and asymmetrically distributed changes in the 
credit-money supply would virtually ensure that the hypothetical goal 
of an eﬃ  cient relative price structure – the sine qua non for eﬃ  cient 
economic decision-making and the raison d’être of economics as a 
science – could never be reached, the rationale for promoting market 
relationships over all other forms of social organization would be put 
into question.36 In a debt-based monetary system with a monopoly issuer 
of the currency the logic of structurally modiﬁ ed social relationships 
applies equally to both commodity- and credit-based conceptualizations 
of money: in a credit-money system it is the lack of monetary IOU’s 
borrowed into existence rather than the lack of the monetary commodity 
that necessitates borrowing just to facilitate multilateral exchange. In 
both cases the monetary modiﬁ cation of the organic social relations 
originates in the disparity between the rules governing the allocation of 
the actual goods and services that are to be exchanged in the market and 
the distribution of the monetary media that regulate the access to and the 
cost of multilateral exchange.
Hence it is the distribution of the monetary media rather than the 
dominant view on the nature of money that has the largest impact on the 
social footprint of money. Th e establishment of “moneyness” through an 
authoritative speciﬁ cation of a unit of account, for instance, conveys little 
meaningful information about the social relations embodied in a monetary 
system. Whether the monetary system under any speciﬁ c unit of account 
35 As has already been noted earlier, it is far from clear that even a permanently 
circulating and stable money supply could do so. Nonetheless, some of the basic 
informational limitations of any monetary system may be more readily accessible through 
the example involving unpredictable and asymmetrically distributed changes in the 
money supply.
36 Incidentally, this question has periodically resurfaced across the disciplinary 
boundaries. For a recent formulation, see e.g. Watson (2005).
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resembles a neutral veil of “real” economic relations as suggested by some 
variants of the commodity theory or a distorting prism that operates 
according to its own logic of abstract value depends in part on the extent 
to which the introduction of the speciﬁ c unit of account transforms the 
opportunity structures for producing and obtaining the actual monetary 
media. It is not the money of account that the state has historically sought 
to preserve through coercion, but its monopoly power to produce – or to 
outsource the powers of production to the institutions or individuals of 
its choice – the actual monetary media that correspond to that deﬁ nition. 
Th e extent to which the value of the monetary media depends on mutual 
trust is an equally peripheral consideration in assessing the social relations 
inherent in a monetary system: a “trust-based” ﬁ at currency, for instance, 
may exercise substantial social inﬂ uence in the absence of socially neutral 
rules for its production and circulation, while monetary media that obtain 
exchange value in spite of their lack of authoritative endorsement, such as 
gold, may be relatively neutral socially in case the initial allocation of the 
monetary media and access to additional production capacity is perceived 
as socially just. In short, rendering the cyclical conﬁ dence game of money 
neutral through a social contract to recognize a speciﬁ c combination of 
monetary functions as “neutral” – or perhaps non-neutral but inevitable 
for pragmatic reasons to permit monetized market exchange – would 
require ﬁ rst and foremost a theory of distribution independent of the 
speciﬁ c forms that the monetary media may take.
4.5 Towards a Theory of Socially Neutral Money: 
Equitable Distribution as a Facilitator of Social 
Agency
A sociologically relevant theory of money must thus address at least two 
concerns: what distinguishes money from the universe of all conceivable 
forms and combinations of social relations and how the production and 
distribution of the monetary media should be governed to minimize 
social externalities. Th e ﬁ rst question can be reformulated as follows: how 
much inﬂ uence can a monetary system have on social relations before it 
becomes misleading to describe it as money? In comparison, due to their 
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pervasive social externalities, it would hardly be appropriate to analyze 
slavery primarily in terms of its impact on the employment rate of ethnic 
minorities or to regard colonialism primarily as a free trade policy. In both 
cases it would be factually incorrect to deny the possibility of analyzing 
these phenomena in terms of the chosen variables, yet the relevance 
of such analytical frameworks would undoubtedly be questioned. Th e 
functions that are most commonly associated with money – medium of 
exchange, unit of account and store of value – can be performed in any 
combination by an inﬁ nite set of technical arrangements, which can have 
widely diﬀ erent social implications. None of the existing theories of money 
adequately engage a crucial question that would go a long way towards a 
sociologically relevant deﬁ nition of money: under what conditions does 
“moneyness” dominate other forms of social relationships that could be 
better described by some other adjective than “monetary”?
In order to minimize the social distortions introduced by any given 
monetary system, access to the existing and newly produced monetary 
media should follow as closely as possible the community’s rules and 
norms governing other realms of social interaction. In other words, an 
individual’s capacity for autonomous social agency is maximized when the 
monetary system exerts minimal inﬂ uence on her freedom to construct 
social relationships involving some of the technical functions of money. In 
a community that values the autonomy of each individual as an end itself, 
such freedom would entail distributing newly created monetary media 
equally among the members of the monetary space – a form of UBI, albeit 
in a rather narrow sense as the size and the timing of the payments would 
depend on the chosen monetary conventions and policies.
Irrespective of whether the money supply is conceptualized as a stock 
of the most tradable commodity or abstract purchasing power giving rise 
to the “virtual wealth” (Soddy, 1926) of the community – an imaginary 
form of wealth over and above the total value of the community’s real 
assets, which persists as long as a suﬃ  cient number of people do not try 
to convert their money holdings into real assets – access to newly created 
money cannot be monopolized by any single actor or group of actors if 
the monetary system is to maintain its social neutrality. As Schumpeter 
noted, all forms of money are ultimately backed by “the only ﬁ nal means of 
payment, the consumers’ good” (1954: 321). In the case of a commodity-
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based money supply, asymmetric access to additional production 
capacity of the monetary commodity would entail unequal access to 
all the goods and services produced by the community for monetized 
market exchange irrespective of each individual’s ability and willingness 
to engage in such exchange in real terms. Unless the community as a 
whole takes charge of the production and egalitarian distribution of the 
monetary commodity, opportunities for autonomous social agency are 
distorted by the unequal access to the monetary commodity, which the 
social contract inherent in the monetary system has authorized to regulate 
opportunity structures in other realms of social interaction. In other 
words, once a speciﬁ c commodity has been designated as “monetary” 
– or the gatekeeper commodity for social interaction involving some of 
the technical functions of money – social neutrality requires that such 
commodity remains equally distributed among the members of the 
monetary space until each individual has had the opportunity to utilize 
her share of the monetary commodity to construct the most meaningful 
social relationships involving some of the technical functions of money. 
Any non-egalitarian initial allocation of the monetary commodity would 
redistribute capacity for autonomous social agency before any of the 
technical functions of money have been fulﬁ lled through monetized 
market exchange, producing pre-market inequalities that would violate 
the social contract establishing the monetary commodity as a neutral 
facilitator of social relations involving some of the technical functions 
of money.37       
37 As was noted earlier, insistence on the primacy of the store of value function 
of money over its role as a medium of exchange is a logically coherent position, albeit 
potentially requiring enhanced transparency of its underlying assumptions on the nature 
of desirable social institutions. If some redistribution is nonetheless to be undertaken to 
enhance money’s capacity to perform its function as a medium of exchange, several technical 
arrangements could achieve such an objective. One of the simplest arrangements, with 
intriguing implications for the entire economic system, would involve the combination 
of issuing all newly created money debt- and interest-free through UBI and instituting 
a corresponding demurrage tax on money (see chapter 10). Everyone would have some 
guaranteed capacity to take advantage of the “trust” and “neutrality” embodied in the 
social institution of money as a medium of exchange and, provided that the demurrage 
tax is applied to all monetary and possibly near-money instruments, the incidence of the 
demurrage tax might fall mainly on the relatively privileged who would already have had 
ample opportunity to monetize their share of the real claims to neutral multilateral market 
exchange. Th e amount of the periodic redistribution would reﬂ ect the community’s 
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Although the same logic applies equally to a non-commodity-based 
money supply, the situation is more complex due to the “virtual” nature of 
the monetary wealth. To the extent that the members of a monetary space 
willingly abstain from owning real assets in favor of holding monetary 
tokens, the community as a whole functions as if its total wealth had 
increased by an amount corresponding to the value of its monetary 
holdings. In contrast to land, natural resources or other “external assets” 
– assets that no-one alive produced (see Van Parijs, 1995) – the money 
supply represents socially constructed abstract value, which disappears as 
soon as a suﬃ  cient number of individuals questions its exchangeability 
into real assets. Yet, in a functioning non-commodity-based currency 
system the virtual wealth must exist, and access to it eﬀ ectively regulates 
each individual’s capacity for autonomous social agency. As the virtual 
wealth is created through the social contract embodied in the monetary 
system and ceases to exist as soon as the members of the monetary space 
no longer acknowledge the exchangeability of money and real assets, 
maintaining the social neutrality of the opportunities provided by the 
newly created monetary media requires egalitarian initial distribution.
Seen from another perspective, each individual’s claim to a share of 
the community’s virtual wealth arises from two sources: (1) the active 
contribution that one makes to the virtual wealth when joining the 
monetary space and (2) the “passive contribution” (see Widerquist, 2006) 
arising from sacriﬁ ces that facilitate social co-operation, such as accepting 
the distributional implications of submitting oneself to the division of 
labor within the monetary system or agreeing to forgo the opportunities 
for alternative types of monetarily mediated social interaction with the 
members of the monetary space. As the number of members in the 
monetary space increases, the relative importance shifts from the active 
type of contribution towards the passive. For instance, in the case of a 
local community currency, the skills, resources and the willingness to 
preferences with respect to the relative importance of the store of value and medium of 
exchange functions of money – and potentially a wide range of economic, political, social, 
ecological or “technical” objectives. Irrespective of what the choice regarding the potential 
redistribution would be, any sociologically relevant inquiry into the “nature”, “concept”, 
“deﬁ nition”, “theory” or any other cognitively compartmentalized dimension of money 
must recognize the logical preconditions for the fulﬁ llment of the chosen combination of 
potentially contradictory monetary functions.
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hold the currency brought in by each new member is likely to make 
a substantial contribution to the breadth and depth of the division of 
labor in the monetary space, justifying relatively high unconditional 
payments based on one’s active contribution to the community’s virtual 
wealth. In contrast, in the case of a national currency system the passive 
contribution arising from the acceptance of the loss of alternative types 
of access to the resources and the division of labor regulated by the 
national monetary space gains in importance. Th e notion of passive 
contribution thus recognizes the fact that any social contract is likely to 
involve the negotiation and reconciliation of a multitude of competing 
and contrasting ends. While the democratically determined monetary 
arrangements may not ﬁ t the preferences of every member of the 
community, they do, however, require some degree of co-operation even 
from the dissenting minorities to function properly. Egalitarian initial 
allocation of the monetary media may represent precisely the kind of 
compromise that maximizes each individual’s capacity for autonomous 
social agency irrespective of their views on the democratically determined 
monetary arrangements. Once again, it may be appropriate to remind 
the skeptical reader that a monetary space with a centralized monopoly 
issuer of claims “backed” not by the issuer itself but by the members of 
the monetary space cannot avoid the political choice of an appropriate 
method of distribution for newly created monetary media: it is not 
capital, but a mere accounting system for facilitating the multilateral 
exchange of existing real capital, that the transacting parties are in need 
of – thus potentially rendering the entire debate on what the appropriate 
interest rate on ﬁ nancial capital might be irrelevant to the present analysis 
– while any potential tendency for apologist views on the prevailing 
forms of money to hide behind the notion of money as debt would only 
be applicable in the context of a mutual credit based currency system – 
one where the issuer of monetary IOUs is personally liable for settlement 
in real goods or services rather than extracting them from someone else 
in the capacity of an intermediary – not the prevailing forms of ex nihilo 
money creation by a monopoly supplier. In other words, the reader may 
disagree with the arguments presented in this section, but the substantive 
issues which the arguments address cannot be avoided simply by evoking 
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mental models of capital lending or money as a form of mutual credit 
which do not capture the issues that are of interest here.
Hence social neutrality does not necessarily imply homogeneity. 
Every type of monetary system favors certain types of transactions and 
forms of social interaction over others, and it is ultimately the task of 
the democratic process to determine the number and nature of the 
monetary spaces in any given polity. Socially neutral money maximizes 
each individual’s capacity to tailor monetarily mediated social relations 
with the desired mixtures of meaning – whether community building 
through local currencies, least-eﬀ ort indiﬀ erence expressed through the 
use of the most widely circulating currencies, or mental earmarking of 
global currencies for particularistic signiﬁ cance – by eliminating from 
the monetary system features that are not directly relevant to money’s 
technical functions. Th e relevant criterion for submitting oneself to the 
division of labor in a given monetary system becomes the meaning that 
one can derive from the interactions with other members of the monetary 
space rather than the coercive need to compete against others resulting 
from the extra-monetary features of debt-based monetary spaces.
Some contemporary monetary reformers have suggested that newly 
created debt-free money should be spent into circulation by the 
government (e.g. Huber and Robertson 2000).38 Such proposals are 
unpersuasive in articulating why the virtual wealth should belong to 
the government rather than the providers of “the only ﬁ nal means of 
payment” – the individual members of the monetary space – and remain 
silent on the desirable combinations of money’s technical functions. Social 
neutrality requires that no-one should be allowed to issue IOUs on behalf 
of someone else. If the value of government-issued money is ultimately 
backed by the resources and eﬀ ort extracted from its citizens – all of them 
making some combination of active and passive contributions to fulﬁ ll 
38 I am taking issue here with the authors’ suggestion that the government – no matter 
how “representative” or democratic – should have the discretionary power to decide on 
the use of the newly created money. Huber’s earlier work (1999), although more clearly 
in favor of distributing newly created money through UBI, outlines a speciﬁ c proposal for 
monetary reform rather than the necessary conditions for social neutrality among a wide 
spectrum of technically feasible monetary arrangements, and factors such as the proposed 
means test and the suggestion that “probably not all of the fresh money would be used 
for basic income purposes” (ibid: 48) would appear to render the proposal inconsistent 
with social neutrality. 
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their part of the social contract embodied in the monetary system – the 
rightful initial owners of those IOUs are the citizens themselves. If the 
government wants to acquire some of those IOUs for the funding of 
public policies, military adventures or some other perceived necessities, 
by all means, let it present its case to the electorate and proceed collecting 
the taxes transparently after obtaining the democratic approval. After 
all, much of democratic political theory suggests that it is typically the 
government which has to expose itself to public scrutiny by transparently 
exercising its power on each individual rather than each individual trying 
to expose and rectify perceived injustices in government policy. But let 
it also be clear that if the government requires its citizens to accumulate 
unrepayable debt by borrowing their own IOUs at interest from the private 
banking system, the social implications of such a system of governance go 
far beyond the publicly professed technical functions of money and the 
public can hardly be blamed for becoming cynical towards the symbols 
of representative political democracy. 
Th e benchmark for socially neutral money thus focuses on the 
egalitarian initial allocation of the monetary media rather than the 
speciﬁ c conceptualization of the nature of money. Such a deﬁ nition 
refocuses the attention of social scientiﬁ c inquiry on money from the 
post-Methodenstreit neglect, neutralization and positivist obsession with 
monocausal conceptual reﬁ nement back to its own intellectual home turf 
by analyzing social relations through the concrete experience of actual 
social agents. While the presumably enhanced conceptual sophistication 
of money following the cross-breeding of various monetary and near-
money instruments may be obvious only to a relatively small group of 
specialists who are often not in the losing end of such developments, 
the social implications of even the plain vanilla credit-money may be 
abundantly clear to monetarily less sophisticated social actors. With 
a socially neutral initial distribution of the monetary media and the 
abolition of the private banking system’s privileged access to state money 
at the top of the monetary hierarchy, ﬁ nancial innovation would be 
likely to become more of the “tin disc” variety as outlined by Knapp 
as opposed to the present breeding of “ﬁ nancial weapons of mass 
destruction” as the legendary investor Warren Buﬀ et called derivative 
instruments. Irrespective of whether UBI proves to be the most suitable 
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practical approximation, the deﬁ nition of socially neutral money based 
on an egalitarian distribution of the monetary media is not an abstract 
intellectual exercise, but a precondition for a more detailed and relevant 
sociological analysis of money: if the initial allocation of the monetary 
media is not socially neutral, more detailed situational analysis of the 
social roles, meanings and functions of money will merely reproduce the 
structural biases of the actual system of allocation.    
Th ere are no technical reasons why the conceptual ambiguities and 
paradoxes of money should inhibit research on the social footprint of 
each historically speciﬁ c or governmentally contingent form of monetary 
system. Socially neutral money – entailing the distribution of the 
monetary media as unconditional basic income to the members of the 
monetary space and potentially “redistribution” to achieve the desired 
combination of money’s “technical” functions – would maximize each 
individual’s capacity to select the most meaningful forms of monetary 
relationships for each social context. As there is little reason to assume that 
the monetary adaptation of Goodhart’s law will lose its applicability in 
the foreseeable future, any analysis of the social consequences of diﬀ erent 
types of monetary systems cannot ignore distributional considerations. 
In Weberian terminology, as money may always remain a “weapon” 
in the economic “battle of man against man”, the insight that can be 
gained from a purely technical analysis of the latest hardware in such 
a social arms race is clearly limited. What matters the most is not the 
technical evolution of the social weapon of money, but the changes in 
social relations that the use of such weapons may bring about. It is not 
obvious why the more socially oriented social sciences should rely on any 
other discipline for methodology or conceptual guidance in developing 
and articulating such analysis.
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5 On the Feasibility of an Economic 
Conceptualization of Money
Th is study has so far argued that the social construction of ﬁ nancial capital 
is logically anterior to any form of economic, political or social analysis 
involving some of the technical functions of money. It has been suggested 
that ﬁ nancial capital cannot indeﬁ nitely function in a socially constructed 
privileged reality that is detached from the natural laws conditioning the 
existence of other factors of production. In addition to demonstrating 
the impossibility of depoliticizing the choices, tradeoﬀ s and conﬂ icts of 
interest inherent in the technical speciﬁ cation of ﬁ nancial capital, it has 
been suggested that the possibility of rendering any monetary system – 
no matter how economically ineﬃ  cient or environmentally destructive – 
socially neutral would require at the minimum equitable rules governing 
the initial allocation and circulation of the monetary media to maximize 
each individual’s capacity for autonomous social agency and to achieve 
the desired balance between the medium of exchange and store of value 
functions of money. Th e substantive argument of this chapter on the (in)
feasibility of an economic conceptualization of money may thus have 
already been addressed in the previous chapters. To sum up the preceding 
analysis: it is far from clear that money can ever be speciﬁ ed in a manner 
that would solve its inherent political and social conﬂ icts to an extent that 
would permit “economic” analysis to begin – or the politics of the social 
construction of money to graduate into politics of the management of 
money according to principles which are universally recognized as neutral 
enough to merit the conceptual leap from money as an object of social 
struggle to money as a neutral measure of conceptually distinct social 
struggles. Consequently, the role of this chapter may be largely limited 
to providing background for the subsequent analysis of commodity and 
credit based monetary systems particularly in chapters 6 and 7 and to 
explore some of the disciplinary implications of the potential infeasibility 
of an economic conceptualization of money.
Disinterested paradigm theorists – and just about everyone else 
with nonnihilist and nondeterminist views on the desirable forms of 
economic, political and social organization – would be well advised to 
analyze the evolution of the dominant views on the notion of money as 
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an institution. Potentially “the most important institution of civilization” 
(U.S. Monetary Commission, 1877: 46, quoted in Carruthers and Babb, 
1996: 1579), the social construction of money is variously “’forgotten 
about’ in order to ensure its continued functioning” and “remembered”, 
often resulting in a power struggle to “reessentialize and recollectivize” the 
“divisive social institution” of money in a manner that “provides a way for 
groups to support and justify social institutions and then ‘deny’ or ‘forget’ 
their own agency and complicity”(Carruthers and Babb, 1996: 1559, 
1560, 1578, 1579). In the academic context, one of the most eﬀ ective 
ways to hide divisiveness, complicity or analytical or perceptual amnesia 
might involve the methodological marginalization of social disputes – the 
promotion of methodological approaches that structurally exclude the 
possibility of divisive social issues becoming legitimate objects of analysis. 
In the case of money, such objectives may be achieved by co-branding the 
neutral veil approach to money in orthodox economics – no matter how 
intrinsically implausible or empirically absurd – with power, prestige and 
analytical rigor, while ostracizing heterodox approaches – no matter how 
marginally they might touch upon the “economic” implications of the 
social construction of money.39
Th e privilege-preserving “methodological safeguards” (Beck, 1992: 
9) of the neutral veil approach notwithstanding, the monetary reality is 
somewhat more complex than orthodox analysis might suggest. As has 
often been pointed out, if the members of the monetary space refused to 
incur money-creating debt under the terms imposed by the issuers of the 
currency, monetary media would start to be withdrawn from circulation 
as previous debts would be repaid to the banking system, thus gradually 
extinguishing the money supply that is supposed to act as a neutral measure 
of value. Fortunately the educational value of such examples cannot be 
assumed away by the not uncommon suggestion of some economically 
oriented social scientists that “unrealistic” thought experiments cannot 
convey meaningful information on the prevailing economic dogma. 
39 For the marginalization of heterodox economic approaches – independently 
of the extent to which they might provide institutional space for real-world oriented 
analytical and perceptual standards to ﬂ ourish as opposed to representing yet another 
power-infested attempt to rebrand carefully managed deviations from the most proﬁ table 
interpretations of the social realities as analytical and perceptual freedom and rebellion – 
see e.g. the special issue on ‘Publishing, ranking, and the future of heterodox economics’ 
in On the Horizon, Vol. 16, No.4 2008.
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If money indeed is a neutral veil of real economic phenomena, what 
is “unrealistic” about the possibility that the members of the monetary 
space might abandon the prevailing monopoly supplier and the private 
entities of its choice and construct an alternative, presumably equally 
neutral monetary system with diﬀ erent “technical” speciﬁ cations? As 
in the absence of both money-creating debt and a money supply – or 
the capacity to monetize real assets for the purposes of multilateral 
exchange – money’s capacity to fulﬁ ll some of its most commonly 
attributed “technical” functions would clearly be limited, precisely how 
much money-creating indebtedness must the members of the monetary 
space incur before the monetary system supposedly becomes an accurate 
and neutral measure of value? Is the required limit of money-creating 
indebtedness a threshold – a borderline between neutral and non-neutral 
forms of money – or is it a continuum – some forms of neutrality being 
incrementally more neutral than others?
According to another relatively frequent observation, it is the 
commercial banking system which determines the size and the initial 
allocation of the increase in the money supply according to its proﬁ t-
maximizing motives rather than some impersonal market mechanism 
that could facilitate the instantaneous transformation of one monetarily 
neutral state of aﬀ airs into another.40 Consequently, it has sometimes been 
suggested that the value of each individual’s currency unit depends on the 
individual’s relative rank in receiving the newly created currency. If, for 
instance, the entire money supply growth of an economy is allocated to 
one individual, for that individual’s economic decisions one dollar, euro or 
yen might appear more valuable than for the 100th or 1000th individual as 
the newly created money trickles down through the economy. According 
to a relatively marginalized formulation, the resulting incentive structures 
might be described as a “race to see who can get the new money earliest” 
(Rothbard, 1980: 31). According to another interpretation of the general 
relativity and perspectivism of monetary phenomena:
…when the value of money changes, it does not change equally for 
all persons or for all purposes. A man’s receipts and his outgoings are 
not all modiﬁ ed in one uniform proportion. Th us a change in prices 
40 As a number of heterodox economists have pointed out, the relevant consideration 
is likely to be proﬁ tability rather than some external constraint such as reserve requirements. 
See e.g. Wray, 1998.
88
and rewards, as measured in money, generally aﬀ ects diﬀ erent classes 
unequally, transfers wealth from one to another, bestows aﬄ  uence here 
and embarrassment there, and redistributes Fortune’s favours so as to 
frustrate design and disappoint expectation (Keynes, 1923: 1–2, original 
emphasis).
Given the frequency with which the notion of money as a neutral veil of 
real economic phenomena is contradicted in both academic literature – 
albeit obvious contradictions are often not explicitly recognized as such – 
and the everyday experience of perhaps most individuals, its paradigmatic 
dominance within much of the discipline of economics may be puzzling 
to anyone inclined to discount the role of power-based considerations 
in constructing and managing historically speciﬁ c or governmentally 
contingent regimes of truth – or regimes of socially sanctioned illusions 
as will be pointed out in chapter 12. As Smithin has observed:
…if money really does not matter it would be impossible to explain why 
the social control and production of money and credit continues to be 
the subject of such ferocious political debate. Why is it important to the 
ﬁ nancial interests, for example, that central banks should be independent 
(i.e., not subject to democratic control)? Why do participants in the 
ﬁ nancial markets in Wall Street hang on every word uttered by the 
Chair of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System in 
congressional testimony? And what is the signiﬁ cance of the contentious 
social experiment of the ‘single currency’, the Euro, currently underway 
in Europe? (1999: 3)
If money indeed does not matter, why did the early monetary authorities 
ﬁ nd it necessary to impose severe penalties, such as ﬁ nes, ﬂ ogging, burning 
foreheads with coins or destroying crops that allowed self-suﬃ  ciency 
(e.g. Ingham, 2004; Wray, 1998), to induce the adoption of their speciﬁ c 
versions of monetary neutrality? Did all the colonized populations that 
resisted the displacement of their traditional networks of exchange and 
ways of life by the imposition of new currencies by the colonizers suﬀ er 
from the same delusion – sometimes risking their lives merely to escape 
the tricks played by their minds as a neutral measurement device was 
introduced into their communities? Why do governments not abolish 
central banks not only as ineﬀ ective, impotent and wasteful bureaucracies, 
but also due to their role in apparently misleading the public in regard 
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of the true nature of money as a neutral technical device that has no 
independent impact on economic outcomes?
Another commonly cited contradiction relates to “the frequency 
with which problems in the real economy have been accompanied 
by, or coincided with disruptions and crises in monetary conditions” 
(Smithin, 1999: 2). If national currencies are merely territorially branded 
representations of the same uniform and economically neutral monetary 
commodity, it may be diﬃ  cult to see the logic behind some of the actions 
in the ﬁ nancial markets. Do the capital markets not understand that the 
dollar, euro and the yen are just brand names for the same neutral veil as 
the real, ruble and the ringgit? If there is no correlation between monetary 
and real crises, have all calls for, or attempts at, building an international 
monetary system that would respond to the needs of wider segments of 
the world’s population been motivated by sheer ignorance, a desire for 
bureaucratic self-aggrandizement, or something worse?
Some of the orthodox economic conceptualizations of money may 
remain so ﬁ rmly outside the normal human analytical predispositions 
that the use of metaphors may not be a mere voluntary stylistic choice 
for anyone attempting to point out some of the issues involved: without 
comparisons to more familiar areas of life many ironies and double-
standards might remain lost in technicality and asymmetric access to 
credibility-building knowledge-certifying institutions. As money is 
often viewed as a neutral measure of value, a particularly instructive 
thought experiment might involve the application of one variant of 
the debt-based, interest-bearing logic of some of the prevailing forms 
of money to the physical measurement standards – the metric system 
and the corresponding physical measurement devices. Suppose that 
all physical measurement devices had to be borrowed into circulation 
against interest-bearing debt from the private measure industry – not 
to compensate for the value of the “capital” embodied in the physical 
measure, but merely to obtain a representation of the legally mandated 
monopoly estimate of the abstract deﬁ nition of one meter to be used 
in measurement decisions. Suppose also that the actual length of 
each one meter measure ﬂ uctuates, partly due to the trickling down 
of the additional centimeters added to newly created measures by the 
manufacturers. While the average increase in the length of one meter is 
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determined by the proﬁ t-maximizing motives of the industry, the length 
of each individual’s meter depends on the exact time when the measure 
was acquired. Th ose who are among the ﬁ rst ones to receive the newly 
created physical measurement devices experience a meter that is relatively 
close to 100 centimeters in length in their measurement decisions, while 
the latecomers will have to adjust to the trickling down of the additional 
centimeters through the economy. Th e dominant branches of the dismal 
science of measurenomics continue to argue that the physical measures 
are merely neutral facilitators of the real measurement results, which 
remain unaﬀ ected by the speciﬁ c instruments used in the measurement 
process. At the very least real measurement activity is supposed to achieve 
its independence of “nominal” ﬂ uctuations in the metric system in the 
long run, which curiously never appears to arrive despite the fact that all 
of the theory’s proponents at a certain point in time may already be dead 
– one of the criteria for identifying the long run according to a previously 
prominent but currently unfashionable measurenomist.41
Although the analogy to the current monetary system is not complete – 
the comparison may be overly concrete and several (conﬁ dence-building?) 
institutional intricacies have been left out – the anecdote does highlight 
at least three factors that are relevant to the feasibility of an economic 
conceptualization of money. First, outside relatively marginalized hetero-
dox circles, economics as a science would appear to have a fundamental 
problem with its treatment of money. Th e notion of money as a neutral 
veil of the “real” economic phenomena does not bear scrutiny of the 
current monetary system. Yet the implications of acknowledging money’s 
inﬂ uence on economic outcomes are likely to be too far-reaching for 
preserving other central features of the current economic paradigm. 
Second, it is not obvious that money can ever be speciﬁ ed in a manner 
that would be “neutral” enough for the political struggle for structurally 
granted privilege to give way to genuine competition under neutral and 
universally optimal monetary rules of the game. Th ird, it would appear 
to be far from clear that money can ever have the technical capacity to 
accurately measure the economic reality. Unlike in the case of the metric 
system or physical measurement devices, there is no transparent and ﬁ xed 
benchmark against which anyone could easily assess the plausibility of the 
41 At the risk of stating the obvious, it was Keynes who observed that “In the long run 
we are all dead” (1923: 80, original emphasis).
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various value claims made through the monetary system and ﬂ uctuations 
in the value of money itself. If a relatively low income obtained or 
persistent indebtedness incurred through the market mechanism 
reﬂ ects coercively imposed structural exploitation through the contested 
speciﬁ cations of money rather than inability or unwillingness to excel 
in the economic competition under neutral rules of the game, one may 
wonder whether the nature of the phenomenon that is being studied 
deserves to be labeled as predominantly “monetary” or “economic” as 
opposed to some of the intuitively more plausible expressions involving a 
signiﬁ cant power dimension. Furthermore, as there may be no objective 
conceptual benchmarks for monetizing economic calculation, physical 
measures such as resource-based accounting methods might outperform 
monetary analysis in terms of eﬃ  ciency. One meter is deﬁ ned by 
the International Bureau of Weights and Measures as the distance 
traveled by light in a vacuum in 1/299,792,458 of a second. No similar 
benchmarks for money may ever be identiﬁ ed in terms of either value or 
eﬃ  ciency. Th eoretically a close approximation in terms of value might 
consist of deﬁ ning the unit of account in relation to an all-embracing 
commodity basket including all the goods and services produced by an 
economy in the relevant proportions42, albeit the predictable problems 
with measurement and continuous adjustment – political if not ultimately 
also technical – are likely to render such plans infeasible in practice. In 
terms of productive eﬃ  ciency monetary calculation is unlikely to ever 
fully capture and reproduce the physical costs, beneﬁ ts and feasibility of 
economic activities based, for example, on the principle of optimizing 
resource throughput per each physical or temporal unit of consumption. 
In a monetary economy it may not be entirely obvious what could be 
gained by the pursuit of market eﬃ  ciency as indicated by the prevailing 
forms of money without ﬁ rst ensuring that the monetary system is 
capable of overcoming its self-referentiality by accurately capturing and 
reproducing real world economic opportunity structures.43
42 Any potential claims to the contrary are often based on diﬀ erent conceptual 
deﬁ nitions or analytical aims.
43 Th ematically, the analysis presented in section 10.6 on the technical feasibility 
of eﬃ  cient economic calculation through a monetary unit of account as well as perhaps 
several other insights spread throughout the study might belong to this chapter. Th e 
argument that is being advanced in section 10.6, for instance, suggests that it may not be 
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It may be easy to accuse orthodox economics of being among the top 
social sciences in terms of the size of the divergence between the dominant 
theoretical and methodological frameworks and the empirically observed 
policies, practices and phenomena. A reasonable argument might also be 
put forth on the diﬃ  culty of misunderstanding or misinterpreting the 
nature of money to a greater extent than orthodox economists commonly 
do: to the extent that the average layperson attributes a power dimension 
to money – no matter how inaccurate or imperfectly described – such 
accounts of money, the argument would go, might well be empirically 
more relevant than more precisely stated economistic irrelevancies on 
“neutral” money. To a certain extent such accusations may be on the 
mark. Yet orthodox economics may have a formidable defense against 
some of the allegations: one of the most inﬂ uential and longest-standing 
models of the economy does not even attempt to explain the existence or 
the nature of money.
As Ingham has observed, “…two slightly diﬀ erent versions of the basic 
orthodox conception of the medium of exchange may be distinguished. 
Th e medium of exchange may be either an actual commodity that 
maintains an exchange rate with other commodities or, as in Walrasian 
general equilibrium theory, a symbol of a ‘representative’ commodity 
or ‘basket’ of commodities” (Ingham, 2004: 18). In the Walrasian 
general equilibrium model market clearing is achieved through the 
arbitrary assignment of a numéraire – a random value for the symbolic 
commodity, which permits the process of relative valuation to begin. Th e 
rationale for such arbitrary assignment is entirely functional: without a 
benchmark value for the symbolic commodity the economistic virtue of 
quantitative obfuscation of questionable qualitative assumptions could 
technically feasible to overcome money’s self-referentiality – or to ensure that whatever 
monetary calculation says about the costs, beneﬁ ts and feasibility of any speciﬁ c economic 
activity will indeed be perfectly matched by equal costs, beneﬁ ts and feasibility when 
calculation is performed in terms of the real resources and other factors inputs according 
to the natural laws of the physical reality. Nonetheless, the aim of this chapter was to 
keep the analysis as simple as possible: even if the potential infeasibility of economically 
eﬃ  cient monetary calculation or any other “technical” discrepancy between some of the 
implicit assumptions of conventional economic analysis and the actual monetary realities 
were ignored, the inherent conﬂ icts and contradictions of money would still be unlikely 
to ever be solved to an extent where the politics of the social construction of money might 
graduate into the politics of the management of money.
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not be exercised. Th e dilemma that the model poses for the existence and 
nature of money can be articulated as follows:
Th e most serious challenge that the existence of money poses to the theorist 
is this: the best model of the economy cannot ﬁ nd room for it. Th e best-
developed model is, of course, the Arrow-Debreu version of a Walrasian 
general equilibrium. A world in which all conceivable contingent future 
contracts are known neither needs nor wants intrinsically worthless 
money (Hahn, 1982: 1, quoted in Ingham, 2004: 18).
  
In other words, in the world of the Walrasian auctioneer, “intrinsically 
worthless” money would not exist, and nobody would even notice it.
Given the recent criticism that some aspects of the Walrasian model 
have attracted, it may be unfair to judge a major disciplinary theoretical 
tradition on the basis of its past excesses – no matter how substantial 
or long-standing. Economists who have acknowledged some of the 
limitations of previously dominant models have sometimes engaged in 
the following kind of self-reﬂ ection:
Th e reader may wonder why we do not just pack up and become 
sociologists. Th e answer, we think, is that the distinctive strengths of 
economics – explaining prices and quantities, as well as exploring the 
complex and often unexpected ways that countless uncoordinated actions 
generate sometimes unanticipated aggregate outcomes and dynamics 
– is no less relevant today than when it was pioneered by the classical 
economists two centuries ago. Th e inadequacy of the Walrasian general 
equilibrium in no way diminishes the importance of general equilibrium 
thinking (Bowles and Gintis, 2000: 1433).
A friendly cynic might inquire about the type of general equilibrium that 
the authors are referring to: is it the world where money does not exist 
or the one where it is either irrelevant or “neutral”? What is such an 
analytical framework relevant for?
Suppose that it ultimately became the mainstream wisdom in economics 
to suggest that money does have an impact on real phenomena. While 
everyone except perhaps professional orthodox economists might be 
unimpressed, the implications for the disciplinary division of labor are 
intriguing. Th e concept of multiple equilibria would obtain a whole new 
meaning. Every set of technical speciﬁ cations for money would have the 
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capacity to produce a diﬀ erent equilibrium, perhaps equilibria – however 
unrealistic the assumptions for arriving at one might once again have to 
be. Would orthodox economics willingly become a post-money science 
– beginning its analysis from the point where money has already been 
speciﬁ ed or its irresolvable conﬂ icts analyzed within the theoretical and 
methodological frameworks of other disciplines – by acknowledging the 
force of the logic in the political scientist’s or sociologist’s argument about 
the predominantly political or social nature of the process of money’s 
social construction or technical speciﬁ cation? Or would it return to 
its roots in political economy by acknowledging the inseparability of 
economic, political and social considerations? If so, what would continue 
to separate diﬀ erent social scientiﬁ c disciplines from each other? Money 
has historically had the capacity to mould markets and foster political 
communities. It may also represent one of the most promising objects 
of analysis to reunite the social sciences into an optimum cognitive area 
– an area of inquiry characterized by synchronized cycles of knowledge 
production, mobility of ideas and common responses to external 
paradigmatic disturbances.44
Although it is far from clear that the political and social conﬂ icts 
inherent in money’s speciﬁ cation process can ever be solved to an extent 
that would permit the establishment of predominantly “economic” rules 
of the game, it may still be too early for economists to “pack up and 
become sociologists”. A continued insistence on the absence, irrelevance or 
neutrality of money on the part of orthodox economists would undoubtedly 
both increase and prolong the embarrassment caused by the discipline’s 
perceptual deﬁ ciencies in respect of the empirical reality that most other 
people have to endure through their forced contact with the real world. An 
epistemologically more humble version of economics, in contrast, might 
have a distinct comparative advantage in the social scientiﬁ c analysis of 
money. Th e electorate would presumably want to have the most complete 
information that is available on the long-term economic, political and 
social implications of alternative monetary or non-monetary economic 
systems. Economically oriented social scientists with fewer ontological 
illusions about the nature of “economic”, political and social realities 
44 As in the case of the political discourse that has often been associated with the creation 
of optimum currency areas, it could be argued that the mere creation of the optimum cognitive 
area of a single social science would ultimately produce the desired degree of synchronized 
knowledge production, mobility of ideas etc. irrespective of the starting point.
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might be in a particularly good position to model and analyze the likely 
implications of diﬀ erent institutional conﬁ gurations of money or some 
alternative metric of performance, to be used as an input and continuous 
feedback for the political and social choices inherent in any monetary 
or non-monetary economic system. Nonetheless, despite the potential 
comparative advantages of diﬀ erent theoretical and methodological 
approaches in analyzing diﬀ erent aspects of money’s multiple potential 
manifestations, the interrelationship and overlap between the economic, 
political and social dimensions of money suggest that it is one integrated 
social science rather than a collection of disciplinary specialists that is best 
suited to explore the institutional aspects of money.
Th us, according to some analytical frameworks or normative positions, 
the potential impossibility of an economic conceptualization of money 
should perhaps not be taken as an indication of the need to discard 
monetary analysis altogether. Regardless of some structural constraints 
such as the need to approximate the natural laws of the physical reality 
to the greatest possible extent in the long term, the precise choice of 
the technical speciﬁ cations for any monetary system is always inherently 
arbitrary. Once the theoretical indeterminacy of money has been 
recognized on the input side – at the time of the monetary system’s social 
construction – it may be diﬃ  cult not to extend similar considerations also 
to the output side – the outcomes of monetarily mediated multilateral 
exchange. Th e markets will continue to deliver their precisely stated 
verdicts, which will nonetheless be regarded partly as artifacts of the 
inherently arbitrary technical speciﬁ cations of money rather than objective 
and unalterable results of each individual’s atomistic competitive eﬀ orts 
in some hypothetical neutral, technocratic or “economic” playing ﬁ eld. 
Economists may continue to produce their equilibrium models based on 
the prevailing forms of money, but instead of the TINA implementation 
under the disguise of economic eﬃ  ciency, any market outcome would 
be seen as a product of political choice and thus potentially reversible 
or transformable through the political process. Th e following chapter 
expands on some of these issues in the context of a commodity-based 
monetary system. Although the model that is being explicitly addressed 
comes from the Austrian school, many of the insights may also have 
wider analytical applicability.
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6 Money as a Commodity: On Money, Property 
Rights and Freedom
Libertarian and Austrian45 proponents of a variant of the commodity 
theory of money – the notion that money emerges as the most suitable 
intrinsically-valued commodity to facilitate exchange – have a long history 
of theorizing the analytical preconditions for “neutral” money that few other 
analytical traditions may be able to match. In much of the literature along 
these theoretical lines money’s neutrality has been tied to its capacity to 
facilitate undistorted multilateral exchange through the voluntary decisions 
of individual market participants. Deviations from this benchmark have 
often been ﬁ ercely condemned. According to one account of the prevailing 
monetary system, “Th rough banking cartels and inﬂ ation, government and 
its favored interests loot the people’s earnings, water down the value of the 
market’s money, and cause recessions and depressions” (Rockwell, 1990: 
8). Th e disparities between the perceptions of the ideal forms of money 
and the actually circulating forms of currency have also given rise to a lively 
debate on whether private counterfeiters should be regarded as “heroic”, 
non-condemnable in the face of pervasive state counterfeiting, or criminal 
(Block, 1991; Machaj, 2007; Murphy, 2006).
While not being entirely unsympathetic to some of the criticisms of 
the prevailing monetary system, this chapter challenges the notion of the 
monetary commodity as a “neutral”46 form of money that could create 
45 Th ere may be suﬃ  cient overlap between libertarians and Austrians to justify 
the convolution for the purposes of this chapter. As Yeager has deplored: “Austrian 
economists tend to be libertarians (although several of them insist that there is no necessary 
connection). Many libertarians – to look at the relation the other way around – tend to 
regard Austrianism as their own ‘house brand’ of economics. Th is is unfortunate” (2001: 
18, emphasis in original).
46 Th e choice of a relevant benchmark for neutrality or the speciﬁ c procedures 
through which intrinsic values are arrived at does not alter the core argument of this 
chapter. Th ere is no such thing as a non-neutral monetary system in the sense that some 
working ﬁ ction of neutrality is required for money to exist in the ﬁ rst place. What the 
self-proclaimed subjectivists or normatively opinionated proponents of conceptually 
non-neutral money often have in mind is that the relevant standards of neutrality should 
in their opinion be institutional rather than transactional. As long as a certain ideal set 
of institutional preconditions – which itself is a variable that ﬂ uctuates across time, 
space and individual subjectivity – is fulﬁ lled, the monetary system which for normative 
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objective monetary rules of the game for economic interaction. In particular, 
the chapter seeks to complicate the implicit convolution of commodity 
money, property rights, and economic freedom by pointing out the 
inherent conﬂ ict between the medium of exchange and the store of value 
functions of money – or the property rights of the holders of real assets, on 
the one hand, and the monetary media, on the other. It is argued that this 
conﬂ ict could be understood – albeit never solved in a universally optimal 
manner – by making a clear conceptual distinction between money’s role 
in current and intertemporal exchange. Given the logical impossibility of 
constructing objective, universally optimal monetary rules of the game, the 
notion of economic freedom – in the sense that seeks to construct either a 
reasons continues to be labeled “non-neutral” is seen to produce desirable, spontaneous or 
“neutral” market outcomes. Th e precise content of the subjectively determined ideal set 
of institutional practices – for the sake of the argument, let us call it the Austrian dream 
– may include factors such as a subjective preference for the enforcement of a speciﬁ c 
variant of private property rights to the exclusion of all the communal, nonexclusive, 
shared, partial or overlapping alternatives, the ontological exceptionalism of the state in 
the legitimate exercise of property rights (see e.g. Widerquist, 2009), or more general 
views on certain forms of violence being more desirable or acceptable than others. Th e 
spectrum of valuations that any speciﬁ c commodity adopts in voluntary market exchanges 
when the Austrian dream prevails constitutes a “neutral” or “intrinsic” range of valuations 
– the benchmark against which deviations can be measured and decried on normative 
grounds. When one or more conditions of any speciﬁ c variant of the Austrian dream are 
less than perfectly fulﬁ lled, the range of market valuations for any speciﬁ c commodity 
is likely to deviate from the market prices produced under the relevant variant of the 
Austrian dream, implying unauthorized coercion, illegitimate use or interpretation of 
property rights, or simply a failure of the spontaneous human evolutionary processes 
which must be rectiﬁ ed by a properly informed libertarian central planner. Seen from 
another perspective, one of the core arguments of this study is that any monetary system 
by deﬁ nition involves a signiﬁ cant power dimension: the structurally exploited individuals 
cannot escape the tyranny of monetarily mediated division of labor merely by choosing to 
incur the costs and inconveniences of barter in their mutual trades. A monetary economy 
– no matter how arrived at – is a fundamentally freedom-constraining enterprise, 
whereby the ontological necessity of instituting some working ﬁ ction of neutrality and 
the inevitable practical deviations from it constitute a part of the economic, political, 
social and environmental price which has to be paid to overcome the real or perceived 
costs and inconveniences of barter. While it may indeed be possible to implicitly claim 
that the conceptual stage where the social construction of “neutrality” or “intrinsic” values 
takes place is not the monetary transaction per se, but the institution and implementation 
of any speciﬁ c variant of the Austrian dream, the substantive analytical shortcomings 
remain conceptually analogous to the critique that has been made in this study in the 
context of neoclassical conceptualizations of money.
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positive or a normative distinction between economic and political realms 
of social interaction – becomes problematic.
6.1 Property Rights for Money vs. Real Assets: 
Substitutes Rather than Complements
According to a reasonably representative Austrian interpretation:
all money has originated, and must originate, in a useful commodity 
chosen by the free market as a medium of exchange. Th e unit of money 
is simply a unit of weight of the monetary commodity – usually a metal, 
such as gold or silver. Under freedom, the commodities chosen as money, 
their shape and form, are left to the voluntary decisions of free individuals 
(Rothbard, 1990: 28, emphasis in original).
Th e deﬁ nition of a “useful commodity” is crucial to deﬁ ne the nature 
of the exchange that is taking place. “Useful” might conceivably refer 
either to a commodity priced at its intrinsic or use value in market 
transactions – in which case the exchange constitutes pure barter with 
no obvious monetary component involved – or to a commodity with 
some intrinsic value, which nonetheless circulates at a market price that 
may substantially exceed its use value. Rothbard – as well as much of the 
literature that he draws upon tracing back to Menger (1892) – relies on 
the latter interpretation:
money must have pre-existing prices on which to ground a demand. But 
the only way this can happen is by beginning with a useful commodity 
under barter, and then adding demand for a medium for exchange to the 
previous demand for direct use (e.g. for ornaments, in the case of gold) 
… money is only useful for its exchange value (Rothbard, 1990: 13, 19, 
emphasis in original).
In order to illustrate some of the implications of the chosen deﬁ nition, 
it is instructive to ﬁ rst outline what the alternative interpretation of pure 
barter might entail.
In the case of pure barter, commodities are assumed to be circulating 
in the markets at their intrinsic values. By deﬁ nition, the possession 
of a “monetary” commodity – however deﬁ ned by diﬀ erent market 
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participants – could not confer any special privileges to the holders of 
“money” at the expense of the holders of non-monetary commodities. Th e 
monetary component of economic freedom and property rights would be 
guaranteed by constant competition among potential monetary media: 
in case the terms under which the “monetary” commodity is available 
diverge from the incentive structures inherent in the multilateral barter 
of intrinsically-valued goods and services, any speciﬁ c transacting parties 
could freely select a competing vehicle commodity to execute their desired 
exchanges, thereby ultimately forcing the market price of the “monetary” 
commodity back to its intrinsic value. If, for instance, gold is selected as 
the “monetary” commodity, any possible preconditions or unreasonable 
price tags that the holders of gold might be tempted to impose in order to 
exploit gold’s presumed gatekeeper function need not constrain anyone’s 
capacity to enter into monetary exchange: the individuals who have the 
capacity to engage in multilateral exchange in real terms but lack the 
monetary media can either ignore the demands of the holders of gold 
and agree upon an alternative vehicle commodity or, according to the 
more heroic version of the story, spontaneously create an alternative 
medium of exchange through a sequence of self-interested transactions. 
With suﬃ  cient information processing capacity any conceivable 
combinations of direct barter exchange might ultimately become feasible 
without the cumbersome need to intermediate through a “monetary” 
or some alternative vehicle commodity, potentially eliminating much 
of the perceived need among market participants to mentally earmark a 
speciﬁ c commodity as “monetary”. As every commodity is by deﬁ nition 
circulating at its intrinsic value and assumed to be latently available 
as a potential spontaneously emerging monetary medium, the unit of 
account – to the extent that a “monetary” commodity exists – medium of 
exchange and store of value functions of money are performed perfectly 
and simultaneously without compromises or tradeoﬀ s.
Once the assumption of the monetary commodity circulating at its 
intrinsic value is relaxed – implying some form of market imperfection 
that prevents the emergence of or a spontaneous switch into alternative, 
intrinsically-priced media of exchange – the situation looks quite diﬀ erent. 
A conﬂ ict emerges between the diﬀ erent “technical” functions of money: 
the medium of exchange and the store of value functions of money are 
no longer performed simultaneously by an intrinsically-priced monetary 
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commodity. Instead, money becomes a tool of power projection which 
inevitably, in some combination determined by the results of the ongoing 
power struggle, both prevents some economic agents from monetizing 
their real claims to multilateral exchange and violates the prevailing 
ownership rights to real assets through the ﬁ at component of the money 
supply. Irrespective of any potential normative preference for guaranteeing 
the property rights of the holders of the monetary commodity at any 
cost, there is no technical justiﬁ cation for anyone to have to incur 
debt denominated in the monetary commodity or to accept any other 
conditions that the holders of the monetary commodity might choose to 
set for circulating their property merely to be able to engage in monetized 
multilateral exchange. While the holders of gold, for instance, may have 
the right to set the price for their property and to refuse to part with 
their possessions unless their conditions are met, there is no reason why 
the holders of silver, copper, professional education or any other form 
of physical or human capital should agree to any demands or lending 
proposals made by the holders of gold before being able to engage in 
monetary exchange of their physical and human capital. In the absence of 
competition between the actual and the latent monetary media that could 
ﬁ x commodity prices to their intrinsic values, the holders of the monetary 
commodity can extract a premium – not entirely dissimilar to a private 
tax on monetized market exchange – from individuals whose property 
rights to real assets are eﬀ ectively compromised by imperfect competition 
among media of exchange. Th e ﬁ at component – for ﬁ at is the appropriate 
expression irrespective of whether it is created by the government or the 
markets – of the price of any commodity which trades at a premium to 
its intrinsic value due to durability, divisibility, marketability or any other 
“monetary” quality introduces a power dimension to the markets that pits 
the property rights of the holders of money and real assets against each 
other. To the extent that the ownership of money is centralized and the 
socially constructed gatekeeper function of money to monetized market 
exchange is adhered to, the holders of money eﬀ ectively determine the 
extent, form and nature of the division of labor that may emerge in 
the economy. Instead of monetary policy being “aside from war – the 
primary tool of state aggrandizement” (Rockwell, 1990: 7), it would be 
the private money holders who would be meddling with property rights 
and freedom of exchange, quite possibly “looting the people’s earnings” 
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(ibid: 8) through their position as gatekeepers to the division of labor 
accessible only through monetized market exchange.
Th e traditional libertarian interpretation thus tends to overlook one 
of the most basic conceptual limitations of monetized market exchange: 
whenever the value at which the monetary medium circulates in the economy 
deviates from its intrinsic value, property rights can be guaranteed either 
for real assets or for money, but not for both simultaneously. At the risk 
of stating the obvious, property rights are never absolute. In the words 
of Feder, for instance, “’Property’ is not an asset but a ‘proper’ relation 
between the owner and other persons with respect to the disposition of 
that asset” (2001: 570). In the case of the monetary medium circulating 
at a premium to its intrinsic value, the negotiation of the precise nature of 
such a “proper relation” involves a tradeoﬀ  between the property holders’ 
right to monetize the value of their real assets for purposes of multilateral 
exchange and the money holders’ right to prevent the dilution of the 
value of the existing monetary balances through the creation of additional 
currency. In a pure barter economy any real asset can be monetized – i.e. 
exchanged into the “monetary” commodity that circulates at its intrinsic 
value – without a loss of value or “looting the people’s earnings” through 
inﬂ ation. In a monetary economy, in contrast, someone’s property 
rights must by deﬁ nition be violated at each monetary transaction. If 
speciﬁ c forms of money – irrespective of whether the monetary media are 
conceptualized as a commodity, debt, pure abstract value or something 
else – monopolize access to monetized market exchange, it is the price 
of those monetary media which determines each individual’s ability and 
willingness to engage in monetized market exchange rather than their 
capacity in real terms to do so. Either the holders of real assets must 
compromise their property rights by accepting whatever conditions the 
holders of money choose to set for circulating the gatekeeper commodity 
to monetized market exchange, or the holders of money must accept that 
monetized market exchange will take place under diﬀ erent conditions, 
potentially diluting the store of value function of the existing monetary 
balances. Th e larger the diﬀ erence between the intrinsic value and the 
market price of the monetary medium, the more salient the conﬂ ict 
between the property rights of the real asset holders and the holders or 
issuers of money becomes.
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Many of these insights are not, of course, entirely new. As Silvio Gesell47, 
for instance, pointed out in the context of explaining the motives behind 
any potential decision by the holders of money to interrupt the ﬂ ow of 
exchange: “Our purpose is usury, for to bring someone into embarrassment 
in order to exploit his embarrassment, is to practice usury … mutual 
plundering conducted with all the wiles of salesmanship, is the foundation 
of our economic life” (1958, part III, section 4). Are such “usury” and 
“mutual plunder” inevitable characteristics of monetized market exchange? 
Th ere are two possible approaches to prove the contrary: either (1) a form 
of monetary system which permits unlimited monetized market exchange 
– the monetary settlement of all real claims to monetized market exchange 
– while fully respecting the prevailing interpretations of the property rights 
of the holders of both money and real assets must be conceived or (2) the 
dominant interpretation of property rights must be redeﬁ ned to account 
for the inevitable tradeoﬀ s arising through monetized market exchange. 
Perhaps the most signiﬁ cant eﬀ ort to prove the feasibility of the former 
approach involves the pure barter model of the economy. Th e following 
section evaluates this approach in more detail.
6.2 Can a Monetary Commodity Ever Circulate at Its 
Intrinsic Value?
If property rights to money and real assets are indeed substitutes rather 
than complements in any monetary system where the medium of 
exchange circulates at a premium to its intrinsic value, can such a tradeoﬀ  
be eliminated or at least mitigated through the use of commodity-based 
currencies? In other words, is competition from all other latent monetary 
media likely to keep the market price of the “monetary” commodity at its 
intrinsic value, thus preventing a power dimension from emerging through 
the non-intrinsically-valued component of the monetary commodity’s 
market price? A closer look at the value formation of one of the most 
serious contenders for the task, gold, suggests that this is unlikely.
Th e commodity theory’s contention that gold’s value as a commodity 
is simply the price that emerges through the forces of supply and demand 
47 For a brief introduction to Gesell’s work, see e.g. Blanc (1998) and Onken 
(2000).
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involves a circular argument that ignores the social nature of a substantial 
portion of such transactions: the monetary demand for gold is socially 
constructed and thus it has nothing to do with the intrinsic value of the 
commodity. Gold has been relatively useless as an industrial commodity 
throughout the history. Without signiﬁ cant monetary demand, gold 
could hardly reach valuation levels that would make it attractive as a 
status symbol or a store of value. As soon as gold is demanded for its 
monetary rather than intrinsic value, the monetary component of gold’s 
value – the portion that cannot be explained by industrial usefulness or 
any other consideration that is unrelated to the persistent conception of 
gold as money – confers gold a gatekeeper function to monetized market 
exchange that has substantial overlap with the power dimension involved 
in ﬁ at currencies. If the monetary demand for gold is deemed to originate 
from some unique physical properties – such as scarcity, durability or 
divisibility – which no other commodity possesses, gold as a monetary 
commodity would involve some resemblance to a natural monopoly: as 
the unique physical properties of gold would be demanded solely due 
to their role in performing monetary functions, the diﬀ erence between 
the intrinsic value and the market price of gold – in all likelihood 
increasing through time in a growing economy as the holders of money 
would capitalize the value of its gatekeeping function to monetized 
market exchange – would not be entirely dissimilar to monopoly rent. 
A “commodity” with no other use value except its monetary functions 
is ﬁ at currency. Hence the commodity theory may indeed be correct in 
suggesting that gold constitutes a universal equivalent, exchangeable to 
all other commodities, but it does not explain the substantial premium 
at which gold has historically traded in comparison with its intrinsic 
value nor does it make it entirely clear why the relative monetary role of 
gold in relation to the spectrum of particular equivalents – chartalist or 
“unbacked” forms of money whose value derives from speciﬁ c historically 
contingent power structures – has ﬂ uctuated widely.
Several alternative analytical frameworks can be adopted to 
demonstrate the distinction between the intrinsic value and the market 
price of gold. For instance, paraphrasing the credit theory of money – 
the notion that “something can only be issued as money if it is capable of 
canceling any debt incurred by the issuer” (Ingham, 2004: 12, emphasis 
in original) – the monetary component of gold’s value may be conceived 
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of as a form of unspeciﬁ c, non-redeemable, perpetually circulating debt 
– a money supply that is unrelated to speciﬁ c relationships of credit 
and debt, but which nonetheless is collectively recognized as unspeciﬁ c 
indebtedness. Virtually any community in humanity’s modern history 
has acknowledged its indebtedness to whoever has happened to present 
gold in settlement for such debts. Th is startling observation alone should 
be suﬃ  cient to dissipate any illusions about mutual trust or coercive 
power as the exclusive sources of money’s value. Any community could 
optimize its own welfare by refusing to accept a credit contract – gold’s 
embedded monetary value – which it has never itself consented to. 
Yet the universal lack of trust in the authoritative enforcement of debt 
contracts across time and space continues to confer gold monetary value. 
Gold’s persistent monetary role testiﬁ es profound cynicism towards the 
human nature: generations after generations have placed more trust in 
a relatively useless commodity as a guarantor of debt contracts across 
diﬀ erent monetary spaces and power structures than in any historically 
speciﬁ c or governmentally contingent form of economic, political or 
social organization.48 Hence it is not mutual trust, but the lack of it, that 
explains the existence of the closest thing to a permanent money supply 
that the humanity has so far come to. 
Th e success of gold in guaranteeing debt contracts across time and space 
thus conﬁ rms rather than challenges the suggestion that whenever any 
commodity for whatever reason becomes “monetary” – i.e. a gatekeeper 
commodity for monetized market exchange – its gatekeeper function 
will create a premium in relation to the commodity’s intrinsic value. 
Consequently, the tradeoﬀ  between the property rights for real assets 
and the monetary medium cannot be eliminated merely by changing the 
form of the monetary medium.
48 Such historically speciﬁ c or governmentally contingent power structures have 
often sought to counter this observation with yet another variant of the end of history 
thesis: of all the particular equivalents that gold and other precious metals have outlived, 
it is the current monetary system that supposedly proves the permanently marginalized 
monetary signiﬁ cance of precious metals. While the end of history thesis in general may 
amount to little more than one of the most predictable and least deserved academic career 
boosters in each historically speciﬁ c or governmentally contingent power structure, the 
end of the monetary history in particular would be likely to entail a degree of coercion 
that would render the description of such social relations as “monetary” meaningless.
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6.3 Money, Property Rights and Freedom in Current vs. 
Intertemporal Exchange
If the choice of a speciﬁ c monetary medium is largely irrelevant to solving 
the paradoxes and contradictions between the diﬀ erent “technical” 
functions of money and the forms of property rights that they entail, has 
some relevant constitutive element of monetized market exchange which 
would have implications on the prevailing interpretations of property 
rights perhaps escaped analytical attention? In other words, is there a 
theoretical justiﬁ cation for redeﬁ ning the dominant interpretation of 
property rights as opposed to trying to ﬁ t theorization on the nature 
of money into a mental model that fundamentally misconceives what 
property rights in “neutral” monetized market exchange should be? 
Such a justiﬁ cation may be evident in the temporal aspect of monetized 
market exchange: while current exchange calls for money that performs 
reasonably well both as a medium of exchange and as a store of value, in the 
case of intertemporal exchange the theoretical case for the simultaneous 
fulﬁ llment of these functions is less obvious.
In current exchange the desirability of the simultaneous fulﬁ llment 
of the medium of exchange and the store of value functions of money is 
rarely questioned. A monetary medium which does not capture the full 
value of an exchangeable commodity – i.e. act as a perfect store of value 
for the duration of the exchange – may be unlikely to be voluntarily 
selected as a vehicle for executing the trade among the transacting parties. 
Furthermore, in order to fulﬁ ll its function as a medium of exchange, the 
monetary medium must be available to all individuals with the ability 
and willingness to engage in multilateral exchange in real terms without 
preconditions that would alter the nature of the exchange. Should this 
not be the case – as has become amply clear under the prevailing forms 
of money – some individuals are unduly excluded from monetizing their 
real claims to multilateral exchange and the forms of exchange that money 
mediates become partly deﬁ ned and constituted by the peculiarities of 
the forms of money that are being used. Under a debt-based ﬁ at currency 
supply, for instance, the interest charges required merely for borrowing 
the monetary media into circulation signiﬁ cantly alter the incentive 
structures involved in monetized market exchange. While the practical 
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feasibility of ever achieving the perfect and simultaneous fulﬁ llment of the 
medium of exchange and the store of value functions of money in current 
exchange may be dubious at best, the undistorted barter of intrinsically-
priced commodities at least provides a conceptual benchmark against 
which actual monetary systems can be designed and evaluated.
In intertemporal contexts, in contrast, the situation is more complex 
due to the lack of a widely accepted analogy between monetized 
exchange and direct barter that could unambiguously specify the precise 
combination of “technical” functions that a “neutral” monetary system 
should aim for. According to Rothbard (1990: 13):
Money is not an abstract unit of account, divorceable from a concrete 
good; it is not a useless token only good for exchanging; it is not a 
‘claim on society’; it is not a guarantee of a ﬁ xed price level. It is simply 
a commodity. It diﬀ ers from other commodities in being demanded 
mainly as a medium of exchange. But aside from this, it is a commodity 
– and, like all commodities, it has an existing stock, it faces demands by 
people to buy and hold it, etc. Like all commodities, its ‘price’ – in terms 
of other goods – is determined by the interaction of its total supply, or 
stock, and the total demand by people to buy and hold it. (People ‘buy’ 
money by selling their goods and services for it, just as they ‘sell’ money 
when they buy goods and services.)
Others have suggested that “the importance of money essentially ﬂ ows from 
its being a link between the present and the future” (Keynes, 1973: 293–
294), facilitating, among other things, “the continuing management of 
emergent events” (Loasby, 1976: 165) and permitting “choice to be deferred 
until knowledge of needs and opportunities has improved (i.e. has become 
more exact, complete, or assured)” (Shackle, 1974: 62, all quoted in 
Fontana, 2001: 730). What is remarkable about such conceptualizations 
of money is the absence of any attempts to explicate and justify the 
underlying assumptions that could explain what kind of link between the 
present and the future “neutral” money should be. As was noted earlier, 
it is unlikely that the monetary medium can ever circulate at its intrinsic 
value. Given the inevitable ﬁ at component and thus also the power 
dimension of money, what is the precise mechanism through which the 
relative property rights between the holders of money and real assets 
should be negotiated in intertemporal exchange? What is the theoretical 
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basis for granting the holders of the monetary medium certain types of 
claims on the future productive capacity of the economy as a whole?
According to one possible interpretation, Rothbard appears to suggest 
that in a monetized market economy the position of the holders of 
the monetary commodity may not be entirely unlike that of common 
stockholders of the economy as a whole: the holders of the monetary 
medium – or the “shares” of the real economy – might ultimately be 
able to extract the value of any productivity increases through the 
gatekeeper role of money to monetized market exchange. Aside from the 
hypothetical example of an economic system based on pure barter, money 
is the lifeblood of economic exchange. More often than not it is control 
over money rather than any alternative resource or stage of production 
or exchange that determines the allocation of economic rent. As Arthur 
Kitson noted in the context of one of the most serious challenges to the 
primacy of money in controlling economic activity and the distribution 
of economic rent, the allocation of land:
One never hears of money-lords begging for land on which to employ their 
wealth. But landlords are continually becoming indebted to the money 
power for the use of money. In other words, land is far more plentiful and 
more readily procurable than money. And to-day money is made more 
essential to men than land. And into the hands of the money power land 
must inevitably fall (Kitson, 1895, quoted in Hudson, 2008: 21).
It is not obvious why the exercise of such “money power” should have 
any role in monetized market exchange. Why should the availability 
or the future value of a medium of exchange – all other functions being 
merely “corollaries” of this “one great function” (Rothbard, 1990: 14) – 
be contingent on speculative or power-based factors? What does it tell 
about humanity’s level of monetary sophistication if presumably the best 
conceivable approximation of a “neutral” technical facilitator of monetized 
market exchange must necessarily involve such pervasive externalities? Is 
it not possible to design a medium of exchange which reﬂ ects nothing 
but factors that are intrinsic to the logic of the real exchange that money 
is supposed to merely mediate?
Alternative theories of what the intertemporal exchange value of 
money should be have, of course, been proposed, albeit often without 
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elaborating on their rationale or implications for property rights. Gesell, 
for instance, suggested that:
Independently of time and place money should always obtain the price it 
obtains today. What the holder of money has paid for it in commodities 
he should be able to demand  in commodities tomorrow or ten years 
hence. In this way the debtor pays back what he has received, and the 
creditor receives what he has given, no more, no less.
Th at is self-evident and requires no proof (1958, part III, section 6).
In other words, according to this interpretation the appropriate 
intertemporal benchmark for “neutral” money might be conceptualized 
either as a costless, fully insured warehouse receipt or as a costless – in the 
sense of risk premiums – derivative instrument to its bearer: an option 
to exercise the bearer’s right to the physical delivery of a ﬁ xed amount of 
speciﬁ c commodities at any given point in time.49 While this analytical 
position may be more easily defendable than the orthodox economic view 
– the perceived necessity for the society as a whole to not only grant a 
costless options contract to anyone refraining from current consumption 
for any reason, but also to let the value of such contracts increase through 
time via compound interest – it is far from obvious that either view “is 
self-evident and requires no proof”.
Any potential capacity for money to maintain its purchasing power 
in intertemporal exchange or to attract a positive rate of interest – or 
the coupling of the capital dimension of money with its core function 
as a current medium of exchange – is a pure social construct, eﬀ ectively 
amounting to an intertemporal violation of real property rights in favor 
of the current holders of the monetary media.50 In order to pursue this 
49 Any potential circulation fee that Gesell’s work is perhaps best known for would 
merely discourage the hoarding of the monetary media for unproductive purposes without 
altering the underlying assumptions on the nature of money.
50 Th eories of money which attribute money’s value to an “extrinsic” form of future 
wealth conﬂ ate the capital dimension of money with its role as a medium of exchange. 
Whatever the underlying assumptions that attempt to justify or obscure such a conﬂ ation 
may be, it is worth pointing out that the issuers of money are under no obligation to prove 
that incremental future wealth – as opposed to existing real assets or natural resources – 
will ultimately “back” the value of the newly issued currency. Newly created money can 
and does reallocate existing marketable assets without creating new wealth and privatize 
the global commons under various euphemisms, eﬀ ectively expropriating rather than 
creating the real wealth that presumably was to be produced with the newly created 
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point to its logical extreme, it may be appropriate to ask why the store 
of value function of money should have any intertemporal validity at all. 
A current monetary transaction in real assets involves the core function 
of money as a current medium of exchange which deﬁ nes what the store 
of value function of money must be in order for the transaction to take 
place. Yet it may not be obvious what is “monetary” about the situation 
if any potential transacting party chooses not to exchange her money 
holdings into real assets in the hope that the society as a whole would 
reward her indecision or “usury” by extending the rate of return that 
a speciﬁ c commodity, insurance, credit, equity or derivative instrument 
could have provided, had she completed her transaction, to the monetary 
infrastructure of exchange itself. In a free market any potential transacting 
party may either keep her real assets until they are lost, stolen, broken, 
rotten, exchanged or consumed, or purchase an insurance or a derivative 
instrument for the desired commodities and delivery dates in the future. 
In a free society – including but not limited to the capacity of individuals 
to select alternative modes of social organization to the ones mediated 
by the prevailing forms of legal tender – any potential transacting party 
would even have the option of – and in all likelihood also an incentive 
for – investing the real assets in relationships of unspeciﬁ c reciprocity. 
One observer has described the implications of the de facto absence of 
the latter option due to the competitive logic of the prevailing forms of 
money as follows:
Of course money is easy to handle and is practical, but, as it does not 
rot, if it is preserved, people put it aside instead of sharing it with others 
(as a chief should do) and they become selﬁ sh. On the other hand if 
food is the most precious possession a man has (as it should be the case 
because it is the most useful and necessary thing) he cannot save it and 
one will be obliged either to exchange it for another useful object or share 
it with his neighbours, lower chiefs and all the people in his care, and that 
money released into circulation. As Sullivan (2003: 621), for instance, has pointed out, 
it may not be obvious how “globalization” in its current form might diﬀ er from “the ﬁ nal 
privatization of the planetary commons”. More importantly, the entire process is highly 
wealth- and power-centralizing: no matter what happens to the real economy as a result of 
money creation, the real wealth corresponding to the value of the newly created money is 
extracted from some other members of the monetary space as opposed to being provided 
by the issuer of the currency, while the real resources corresponding to the repayments of 
or defaults on money-creating, interest-bearing debt accrue to the issuer of the currency.
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for nothing without any exchange. I know very well now what makes 
Europeans so selﬁ sh – it is money (Finow, Chief of the Tonga Islands, 
quoted in Williams, 1997: 216–217).
By advocating a ﬁ ctitious property right – in the sense that none of 
the contending theories of money appear to explain why a medium 
of exchange should necessarily modify property rights to real assets 
in a manner that is more akin to instruments of speculation or power 
projection – to the monetary infrastructure of exchange itself, the holders 
of money are eﬀ ectively attempting to socialize the cost of their insurances 
or derivative instruments. Th is conclusion survives any possible conﬂ ation 
of capacity to exchange with production capacity: even when the object 
of exchange is a productive asset the technical infrastructure for exchange 
– the monetary medium – is under no obligation to reproduce the 
physical return that the possession of the real asset could have produced 
to its initial holder. Th e holder of the productive asset may exchange 
it for another productive asset, commodity, derivative instrument or 
insurance policy through monetized market exchange, but there is no 
reason why the costs of the unﬁ nished transaction should be socialized by 
extrapolating the characteristics of the productive asset to the monetary 
infrastructure of exchange.
It may thus not be an exaggeration to suggest that the conﬂ ict between 
the property rights to real assets and the monetary media – or the medium 
of exchange and store of value functions of money – is irresolvable in 
both current and intertemporal contexts: in the former case no actual 
monetary system may ever attain the perfect and simultaneous fulﬁ llment 
of the medium of exchange and the store of value functions of money, 
while in the latter case no comparable conceptual benchmark for the 
design and evaluation of actual monetary systems may even exist.51 Yet 
51 It is not obvious that the proposals for specifying a commodity basket as a unit of 
account without guaranteed convertibility (e.g. Greenﬁ eld and Yeager, 1983; Yeager and 
Greenﬁ eld, 1989) contain any new insights that would need to be separately addressed. 
Leaving aside some of the more general questions of feasibility and desirability, whenever 
barter transactions are mediated by intermediaries charged with the task of producing a 
unit of account corresponding to the value – not necessarily the content – of a speciﬁ c 
commodity basket, several problems are likely to arise. Some of the issues that are most 
closely associated with the conﬂ ict between the medium of exchange and the store of value 
functions of money may include (1) the mechanisms that are simultaneously supposed to 
restrict entry to the banking industry and to ensure the equivalence of the value of speciﬁ c 
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it may also be diﬃ  cult to deny that the store of value function of money 
is conceptually subordinate to its role as a medium of exchange: without 
exchange, money – or “monetarily” stored value – would not exist. For 
some this might imply an inherent conﬂ ict between economic freedom 
and a non-commodity-based, non-intrinsically-priced money supply 
– irrespective of the practical feasibility of implementing an economic 
system based on pure barter. For others it might suggest that money 
should include an expiry date: use it or lose it, but do not expect money 
itself to involve the characteristics of the commodity, insurance, credit, 
equity or derivative instrument which you should have purchased with 
the money in the ﬁ rst place.
6.4 Redefi ning the Politics
 of Monetized Market Exchange
Th e irresolvability of the conﬂ ict between the medium of exchange and 
the store of value functions of money thus calls for a redeﬁ nition of the 
primary locus of the political in monetized market exchange. Rather than 
attempting to conﬂ ate speciﬁ c forms of monetary particularism with 
economic freedom or respect for property rights on ideological grounds, 
a proponent of economic freedom – as well as any potential skeptic of the 
theoretical or practical feasibility of such a concept, however deﬁ ned – 
might more appropriately focus on the political implications of economic 
indeterminacy. Th e inherent conﬂ ict between the diﬀ erent “technical” 
functions of money and the diverging views on property rights that they 
entail must be recognized before the gatekeeper function of money to 
monetized market exchange can be reconciled with any speciﬁ c normative 
privately issued currency units and the value of the underlying commodity basket and (2) 
the possibility that the settlement medium used between the issuers of value units will 
start to trade at a premium compared to its intrinsic value – either through its use as a 
settlement medium between the issuers or as a result of wider circulation as money outside 
the banking system. In other words, the critical junctions in which the logic of monetized 
market exchange may diverge from the logic of barter would remain in the diﬀ erentiated 
access to the institutions capable of monetizing the value of real assets and the likelihood 
that a speciﬁ c settlement medium will challenge the position of the commodity basket as 
an exclusive unit of account. Both cases are likely to result in a divergence between the 
intrinsic and the market values of the actual monetary media.
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position on property rights or freedom. Furthermore, any potential 
decision to regard speciﬁ c forms of property rights violations or incentive 
structures as “monetary” while dismissing alternative policies or proposals 
as misguided meddling or worse neglects the inherently arbitrary nature 
of any monetary system – no matter how many self-interested transactions 
or institutional layers have been involved in the “spontaneous” emergence 
of the most appropriate monetary gatekeeper to an economy’s division of 
labor. In short, any conceptualization of monetized market exchange is 
likely to involve irresolvable conﬂ icts between diﬀ erent functions and 
economic, political and social consequences of money. Economic freedom 
– to the extent that the concept remains non-oxymoronic – would involve 
both the negotiation of a universally optimal combination of “technical” 
functions for money and the recognition that, even with the “optimal” 
combination of money’s “technical” functions and the forms of property 
rights that they entail, the distributional impact of monetized market 
exchange remains partly a product of the political choices inherent in 
the “technical” speciﬁ cations of money rather than constituting a neutral 
measure of each individual’s economic value to the community.
While it is unlikely that any speciﬁ c combination of monetary 
functions will ever be universally recognized as optimal, it may be possible 
to outline some broad principles that might constitute improvements 
to the prevailing forms of money according to most publicly professed 
indicators. One such principle might involve the separation of the capital 
dimension of money from its core function as a current medium of 
exchange. In the words of one of the earliest advocates of such conceptual 
separation, Aristotle, gain through exchange
is justly censured; for it is unnatural, and a mode by which men gain 
from one another. Th e most hated sort, and with the greatest reason, is 
usury, which makes a gain out of money itself, and not from the natural 
object of it. For money was intended to be used in exchange, but not 
to increase at interest. And this term interest, which means the birth of 
money from money, is applied to the breeding of money because the 
oﬀ spring resembles the parent. Wherefore of all modes of getting wealth 
this is the most unnatural (1885, book I, part X).
According to one possible interpretation, a conservative version of the 
corresponding policy reform might involve a requirement for each 
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individual to cover the full cost of the speciﬁ c functions for which money 
is demanded through the purchase of real or ﬁ nancial assets with the 
appropriate characteristics – in a sense, the conversion of monetary value 
into use value by forcing the holders of money to specify a precise type 
of “link between the present and the future” in order to optimize the 
real value of their present money holdings. Depending on the economy’s 
normative preferences for the types of social relations that ﬁ nancial 
engineering is permitted to foster, any function for which money is 
demanded can, if needed, be performed by other ﬁ nancial instruments. 
If, for instance, the intention of the money holder is to speculate on the 
productivity gains of the economy as a whole, the money might as well 
be invested in common shares or other forms of securitized claims on the 
economy’s productive enterprises. If the goal is to obtain the same amount 
of commodities in the future as the individual currently possesses, then 
the most appropriate form of investment might involve an insurance 
policy or a futures or options contract. As has been repeatedly noted by 
various observers since Aristotle, it is not obvious why such functions, 
among others, should be attached to a medium of exchange which acts as a 
gatekeeper to monetized market exchange – with potentially far-reaching 
externalities and implications for the form and nature of the economy’s 
division of labor.
As a logical corollary to providing all of the community’s preferred 
monetary functions unrelated to current medium of exchange through 
the possession of real assets or non-monetary ﬁ nancial instruments, some 
of the superﬂ uous monetary functions could be eliminated or at least 
mitigated through a negative rate of return on money. As a result, money 
would also be made to conform more closely to the entropy and the 
natural laws of the physical reality that condition the existence of other 
factors of production. One of the simplest ways to implement such a 
reform would involve the introduction of a tax or a “demurrage” charge 
on all forms of money – not for the mere encouragement of enhanced 
circulation of the monetary medium, but also to deliberately eliminate 
functions that might more appropriately be performed by something else 
than money52. A negative rate of return is, of course, quite diﬀ erent from 
a negative incentive to employ money in productive uses: to the extent 
52 An appropriate tax rate could also be applied to any speciﬁ c ﬁ nancial instrument 
which starts to circulate or act as a substitute for money.
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that money would continue to circulate as capital, productive monetary 
capital might lose less of its nominal value over time than idle capital – 
the diﬀ erence constituting return on investment. While money would 
be deprived of its capacity to permit costless deferment of choice, there 
would be no necessary impact on the incentive structures for employing 
money in productive uses.
Finally, any monetary system purporting to approximate a neutral 
solution to the tradeoﬀ  between money’s diﬀ erent “technical” functions 
must involve some mechanism that balances money’s gatekeeper function 
to the economy’s division of labor with some guaranteed capacity to 
monetize the value of real assets for the purposes of multilateral exchange. 
In the absence of perfect competition between the actual and the latent 
intrinsically-priced monetary media, such a mechanism might involve 
either the issuance of money by the transacting parties as mutual credit or 
the unconditional, egalitarian transfer of newly created monetary media 
to the members of the monetary space (see Auvinen, 2008).
Nonetheless, no matter what the chosen combination of money’s 
“technical” functions would be, it would clearly constitute only 
one possible solution to inherently irresolvable conﬂ icts selected for 
pragmatic rather than technical reasons – to facilitate monetized market 
exchange amidst the recognition that no neutral “technical” rules for 
such exchange can ever exist. Once the theoretical indeterminacy of 
money has been recognized on the input side – the ongoing political and 
social construction of the monetary system – it may be diﬃ  cult not to 
extend similar considerations also to the output side – the outcomes of 
monetarily mediated multilateral exchange. Th e markets will continue to 
deliver their precisely stated verdicts, which will nonetheless be regarded 
partly as artifacts of the inherently arbitrary technical speciﬁ cations of 
money rather than objective and unalterable results of each individual’s 
atomistic competitive eﬀ orts in some hypothetical neutral, technocratic 
or “economic” playing ﬁ eld. Th e hypocrisy of the presumed innocence 
of the ﬁ rst distorter would be replaced by universal applicability of the 
political process: rather than declaring the market mediated gains of 
whoever has managed to structurally rig the monetary rules of the game 
in her favor as sacrosanct, both the “pre-market” processes of specifying 
or “discovering” money and deﬁ ning the rules of the game and the 
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“post-market” redistribution would be seen as equally political decisions. 
Redistribution – implying the existence of some neutral criteria of market 
mediated distribution that are being tampered with through ex post 
political decisions – would either disappear from the political lexicon 
or be equally applied to both the pre-market rule-setting processes and 
the post-market distributional decisions. In short, monetized market 
exchange would be seen as the humanity’s feeble attempt to reconcile 
its incapacity to create just or eﬃ  cient rules for social interaction with 
its failure to achieve just or eﬃ  cient social outcomes. Finding the 
right balance between these limitations of social organization – partly 
through “pre-market” analytical eﬀ orts to identify and approximate the 
characteristics and functions of “neutral” money, partly through “post-
market” eﬀ orts to mitigate the economic, political and social consequences 
of the inevitable conceptual and practical failures – is a political rather 
than technical decision, which does not lose its political character merely 
due to any potential tendencies to associate speciﬁ c versions of monetary 
particularism with economic freedom or respect for property rights on 
ideological grounds.
 
6.5 Concluding Remarks
No meaningful notions of economic freedom or property rights may 
emerge without accounting for the conﬂ icting “technical” functions of 
money. As a gatekeeper to monetized market exchange and the economy’s 
division of labor, money is unlikely to ever circulate at its intrinsic 
value. Consequently, property rights can be guaranteed either for real 
assets or for money, but not for both simultaneously. Th e focus of any 
analytical eﬀ ort aiming to identify the monetary preconditions for any 
speciﬁ c variant of economic freedom or property rights should be on the 
speciﬁ cation process of money’s “technical” functions and the forms of 
property rights and economic interaction that they entail. Nonetheless, 
as the ongoing process of specifying the monetary rules of the game 
involves substantial, apparently irresolvable political elements, one may 
wonder whether the conventional images of procedural eﬃ  ciency and 
justice commonly attributed to monetary calculation will eventually 
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give way to more realistic notions of the nature of monetized market 
exchange. To the extent that economic freedom survives as a valid subject 
for academic inquiry at all, the term may well ultimately come to refer to 
freedom from dogmatic interpretations of what should be economically 
feasible, desirable or “natural”, while its current usage as a battle cry for 
particularist forms of distortions of property rights and freedom will fall 
into oblivion.
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7 Money as Debt: On Endogeneity, Redeemability 
and the Informational Implications of Centralized 
Money Creation Powers
It has sometimes been suggested that some of the tradeoﬀ s and 
contradictions arising from the theoretical indeterminacy of money might 
be avoided by conceptualizing money always and everywhere as debt: as 
a voluntary act of intertemporal exchange between mutually consenting 
parties. As the terms and conditions of every transaction involving the 
creation, extinction or circulation of money have to be speciﬁ ed in 
advance in order for mutually beneﬁ cial monetized market exchange 
to take place, the argument would go, monetization merely represents 
the temporary conversion of relatively illiquid forms of real wealth into 
more liquid forms, which will be withdrawn from circulation as soon as 
their purpose in facilitating monetary exchange has been fulﬁ lled and the 
underlying debts repaid. Consequently, money is viewed primarily as a 
“ﬂ ow” variable as opposed to a “stock” variable and the concept of money 
supply is regarded as largely meaningless.
Th e conceptualization of money as debt does not resolve the inherent 
conﬂ ict between the diﬀ erent “technical” functions of money outlined 
in the previous chapter. Th e tradeoﬀ  between the medium of exchange 
and the store of value functions of money – or the property rights of the 
holders of real assets, on the one hand, and the monetary media, on the 
other – is merely relabeled as a conﬂ ict between the issuers of “monetary” 
and “non-monetary” liabilities. Rather than the holders of silver, copper, 
professional education or any other form of physical or human capital 
having to agree to any demands or lending proposals made by the holders 
of the monetary commodity before being able to engage in multilateral 
exchange – as was argued in the previous chapter – the holders of all 
forms of real assets will have to conform to the conditions set by the 
issuers of “monetary” debt in order to participate in the community’s 
monetarily mediated division of labor. Th e suggestion that all money is 
debt is thus largely meaningless without simultaneous speciﬁ cation of 
which debts are money – or, in the language of some of the opportunists 
who attempt to conceal the essentially arbitrary distribution of money 
creation powers by administrative ﬁ at and the political foundations of 
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money’s gatekeeping function by eradicating the entire concept of money 
from their vocabulary and replacing it with the word debt, which claims 
are either liquid enough to fulﬁ ll some of the traditional functions of 
“money” in the utopian case of perfect competition among the actual and 
latent monetary IOUs, or backed by suﬃ  cient state power and violence 
in the more realistic case that it is the state that chooses which forms of 
liabilities it accepts for tax payments and requires all transacting parties 
to accept in settlement of debts through legal tender laws.
Th e notion of money as debt nonetheless does highlight some of the 
economistic rhetoric that is commonly adopted in heterodox circles – not 
infrequently to the detriment of a more comprehensive understanding of 
the economic, political and social issues involved in the social relation 
of money. Th ree examples – some widely discussed in the academic 
literature, others more often privately or anonymously uttered to 
avoid potentially unmanageable intellectual liabilities – are particularly 
instructive: the criteria according to which money is commonly classiﬁ ed 
either as endogenous or exogenous, money-creating interest-bearing debt 
is deemed to be redeemable, and monetary calculation is believed to 
provide accurate information for “economic” calculation.
7.1 Endogenous Money, Exogenous Incentives?
Several possible deﬁ nitions have been proposed for classifying money 
either as endogenous or exogenous (see e.g. Smithin, 1999). According to 
perhaps one of the most common deﬁ nitions, endogenous money entails 
“a situation in which the monetary base of the economy, measured in 
terms of its own unit of account, expands and contracts endogenously 
in response to developments elsewhere in the system, and regardless of 
the nature of the exchange rate regime” (Smithin, 1999: 1077). Other 
potential deﬁ nitions involve, among other things, the variability of the 
money multiplier between base money and the overall money supply, 
and an endogenously ﬂ uctuating money supply in response to balance of 
payments developments (ibid.). Despite the virtually endless potential for 
self-deﬁ nitional diﬀ erentiation, relatively stable overall interpretations of 
the nature of money often emerge among groups of like-minded scholars. 
According to one such interpretation, for instance:
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there is a large consensus on the fundamental elements of [Post Keynesian] 
horizontalism: the endogeneity of money in relation to the ﬁ nancial needs of 
production; the unconstrained ability of banks to meet the ﬁ nancing needs 
of private agents as long as they are deemed creditworthy by the banks; the 
exogeneity of the rate of interest, dictated by the policies of the central bank; 
and the necessity of central banks to meet the needs of the banking system 
in order to maintain interest rates at their desired level and to guarantee the 
stability of the banking system in general (Rochon, 2007: 4).
While heterodox authors are often quite explicit about their intention to 
describe the prevailing power-based, historically speciﬁ c or governmentally 
contingent monetary system as opposed to the logical limits of the concept 
of money, one might expect there to be some kind of a logically derived 
connection between a speciﬁ c view on the nature of money and the overall 
incentive structures in an economy.53 As Wray (2002: 30) has observed:
rather than arguing that money is a veil that hides ‘real’ activity (as 
Friedman does), one might more accurately argue that money is the ‘real’ 
variable that motivates production while the ‘real’ output that results is 
a veil that obscures the true purpose of individual decision-making in 
capitalist production.
53 According to some of the liability-deﬂ ecting anonymous or privately delivered 
feedback on the form of monetary reform proposed later on in this study, the proposed 
reform is, to use one of the more polite expressions, “unrealistic”, as one cannot examine 
the monetary system in isolation of the entire economic system. If this objection to 
the proposed reform is widely shared among orthodox economists, this study has 
clearly achieved its primary objective of pointing out the inherently political nature 
of any monetary system. If money indeed constitutes a neutral veil of “real” economic 
phenomena that can freely evolve in response to changing power structures without losing 
its presumed neutrality, one cannot possibly alter the surrounding economic, political or 
social realities merely by changing the “technical” speciﬁ cations of money. If the proposed 
reform nonetheless manages to meddle with some undisclosed higher purposes that an 
economic system with a speciﬁ c form of money is supposed to achieve, one can hardly 
avoid the intriguing question of the precise criteria according to which the suggested 
reform interferes with the presumed neutrality of the prevailing and the past monetary 
systems. One might thus expect the scholars in question either to publish their views on 
the appropriate criteria for specifying “neutral” money for public scrutiny and debate, or 
to relinquish all pretense of their capacity to act as gatekeepers of science – which perhaps 
only the simplest of minds unfamiliar with the perceptual standards of rigorous economic 
scholarship might think to amount to the same thing.
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In other words, the relevant object of inquiry for an economically oriented 
social scientist is the incentive structures involved in acquiring, spending, 
saving or investing money rather than “real” assets. As any possible 
similarity between the monetary and the “real” incentive structures may 
be purely coincidental, it is the monetary incentive structure that must 
be extrapolated to other forms of economic interaction for analytical 
purposes rather than letting the cognitive goodwill produced by the 
analysis of a barter economy colonize monetary transactions.
Seen from the perspective of economic incentives, the prevailing 
heterodox criteria for classifying money either as endogenous or 
exogenous appear curious. Suggestions such as “the monetary base of 
the economy, measured in terms of its own unit of account, expands 
and contracts endogenously in response to developments elsewhere 
in the system” or that the money supply ﬂ uctuates “in relation to the 
ﬁ nancial needs of production” tell nothing about the monetary incentive 
structures of an economy. How, under what conditions, and by whom 
money may be issued into circulation are not deemed to be relevant 
criteria for the classiﬁ cation. Nor is the elaboration of the conceptual 
justiﬁ cation for interest – not only a potential mechanism for channeling 
current productivity gains to the holders of ﬁ nancial capital,54 but also 
quite simply a tax on an economy’s division of labor irrespective of the 
growth rate – considered to be important. It may be diﬃ  cult not to 
question the relevance of “economic” analysis which acknowledges the 
non-neutrality of money and yet may fail to fully incorporate the eﬀ ects 
of the monetarily induced incentives into economic decision-making 
processes. While a centrally planned tax on an economy’s productivity 
gains and division of labor – an interest rate on money, however deﬁ ned 
– for instance, may well achieve its stated objective in regulating the 
overall quantity of economic activity, any analysis that continues to rely 
on economic rhetoric would have to both explain the rationale for such 
drastic deviations from the more familiar competition discourse and to 
trace the implications on incentive structures throughout the economy. 
As one observer expressed the shifting analytical priorities that might 
result from focusing on relevance: “If a realistic explanation of how the 
world works were the decisive factor in determining the success of an 
54 See the debate on a “fair” rate of interest in e.g. Pasinetti (1981), Lavoie and 
Seccareccia (1999) and Smithin (2007).
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analytic theory, economic thought would focus on how property rights 
in land, natural monopolies and ﬁ nance obtain the economic surplus and 
what they do with it” (Hudson, 2008: 2).
In the context of specifying the criteria which deﬁ ne money’s 
endogeneity, increasing relevance might imply shifting the focus as close 
to each economic decision-maker as possible. Rather than being content 
with the endogeneity of the money supply as a whole, the focus would be 
shifted to each economic transaction: the relevant unit of analysis would 
be each economic agent having a valid real claim to monetized market 
exchange. Whenever any speciﬁ c transacting party can monetize real 
assets – either issue or access the required amount of monetary media for 
the purposes of monetized market exchange – under the same incentive 
structures as in a barter economy, the money supply would be classiﬁ ed as 
endogenous. Conversely, whenever the allocation of the monetary media 
is governed by any other incentive structure except undistorted barter – 
necessitating the transacting parties to conform to a separate, monetarily 
induced incentive structure dictated by the holders or the issuers of money 
– the money supply would be regarded as exogenous to real transactions. 
By shifting the focus from the money supply as a whole to each real 
transaction, the proposed classiﬁ cation mechanism would automatically 
indicate which type of logic applies to the transaction in question. In the 
case of endogenous money – independently of the related question of 
whether the concept might remain purely hypothetical – money would 
be neutral with no impact on incentive structures determined by “real” 
economic variables. For exogenous money the precise types of deviations 
from the logic of non-monetary barter exchange would determine 
the types of adjustments in incentive structures that would have to be 
undertaken for economic analysis to retain its relevance.
Th e proposed classiﬁ cation mechanism helps to illuminate the 
conceptual similarity of the tradeoﬀ  between money’s diﬀ erent “technical” 
functions irrespective of whether money is conceptualized as a commodity, 
debt or something else. Whenever money is conceptualized as debt, 
the tradeoﬀ  between the medium of exchange and the store of value 
functions of money manifests itself through the socially constructed rules 
and regulations which conceptually and/or functionally specify certain 
types of debt claims as money. While any speciﬁ c transacting party may 
issue a debt claim for the purposes of monetized multilateral exchange, 
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the acceptance of speciﬁ c IOUs as money is highly asymmetric. In one 
extreme, if all debt claims were automatically recognized as money, one 
might expect banks or partnerships to be established for the sole purpose 
of issuing monetary IOUs for the payment of taxes.55 In the other 
extreme, the socially constructed criteria for conceptually or functionally 
specifying certain debt claims as money may completely overshadow the 
non-monetary economic incentive structures: instead of viewing money 
as a mere neutral facilitator of “real” exchanges, economic agents may 
respond primarily to the incentive structures inherent in the production 
and circulation of money rather than real assets. Th e tradeoﬀ  between 
the diﬀ erent “technical” functions of money is not amenable to simplistic 
solutions based on the economistic state vs. markets dialectics: neither the 
state nor the markets can escape from the fact that some forms of debt 
claims will always have more monetary qualities than others, and the 
relevant classiﬁ catory criteria between diﬀ erent degrees of “moneyness”, 
“liquidity” or whatever label one chooses to adopt will have a profound 
impact on the overall incentive structures of the economy. Even in a 
laissez-faire context, the optimal number of private currency issuers may 
well be one, potentially converting a public monopoly in money into a 
private one (see e.g. Cooper, 1989). Even in the absence of legal tender 
laws or concentrated private market power, the government cannot avoid 
taking sides on the forms of private IOUs that it accepts in payment 
of taxes or uses for its own outlays. Irrespective of the mental model 
evoked in an attempt to normatively justify monetary laissez-faire among 
competing private credit-currencies, the social struggle for issuing or 
accessing the most “monetary” or “liquid” forms of IOUs on favorable 
terms is likely to have the familiar consequences of distracting eﬀ ort from 
productive activities and signiﬁ cantly modifying the incentive structures 
inherent in non-monetary barter exchange.
While there may be no theoretical or practical shortcut that could 
neutralize or objectify the inherently normative and non-neutral rules of 
monetized market exchange, the inherent tradeoﬀ s and contradictions 
of money may thus at least be made more transparent by modifying the 
deﬁ nition of endogenous money. Nonetheless, as one might expect to 
55 Th is point has been made, in the context of a critique of a proposal for monetary 
reform that has perhaps quite inappropriately been labeled “a laissez-faire approach to 
monetary stability” (Greenﬁ eld and Yeager, 1983), by e.g. Cooper (1989).
123
be the case when a socially constructed accounting logic overtakes the 
natural laws of the physical reality as a relevant standard for governing life 
and livelihood, whoever chooses to pursue this objective will undoubtedly 
have to do so “according to their own lights” (Beck, 1995: 5), with a 
full understanding that “[t]o the extent that theories justify or criticize 
speciﬁ c policies, they aﬀ ect the vested interests” and that “the most 
relevant explanatory tools do not necessarily win out in the intellectual 
struggle for existence” (Hudson, 2008: 1).
7.2 Repayability through recycling?
Another controversial interpretation sometimes associated with the 
notion of money as debt – perhaps more commonly uttered in private 
or anonymous contexts to express disgust at the interlocutor’s presumed 
naiveté behind the privilege-preserving safeguards of intellectual 
unaccountability – involves the proposition that since all money may 
be conceived of as debt and a given face value of money may in certain 
circumstances clear an unlimited number of transactions, money-creating 
interest-bearing debt should never be regarded as unrepayable. In other 
words, this view rarely questions the fact that whenever money is issued 
into circulation against interest-bearing debt, the amount of money in 
circulation will at any given point in time be insuﬃ  cient to permit the 
simultaneous monetary settlement of all such money-creating interest-
bearing debt. Instead, it is the monopoly issuer’s willingness to accept 
other forms of settlement – whether real assets, labor input, monetary 
or near-money instruments issued by private parties or something else 
– which presumably renders such concerns redundant.56 To put the 
argument in a more simplistic and provocative form: it presumably does 
not matter that the monetary monopolist essentially owns and controls 
56 Due to the wide variety of competing conceptualizations of the nature of money, 
the terminology is inevitably potentially confusing. At the risk of oversimpliﬁ cation, what 
is meant by monopoly issuer here might be conceived of as the issuer of legal tender: the 
party who has the power to either deﬁ ne what economic agents must accept in settlement 
of debts or specify the type of claim that can be used in the payment of taxes, irrespective 
of any other forms of monetary or near-money ﬁ nancial instruments that may be created 
by other public or private actors. 
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the entire money supply and governs the community’s livelihood, as the 
monopolist has been entrusted with the task – or in any case has often 
enough been observed to be in the habit of – introducing “suﬃ  cient” 
monetary media into circulation. Th e practical feasibility of such a 
normative – albeit technically incorrect – logic may be hard to deny. 
After all, if a community determines to give control of its money supply 
to a speciﬁ c institutional structure which may be in the habit of spending 
or lending money into circulation according to its own – or perhaps 
“independent” – priorities, it may be diﬃ  cult to deny the functionality 
of such a system to the extent that the predictable wealth- and power-
centralizing social implications are deemed to be normatively desirable. 
Nonetheless, to suggest that the money-creating, interest-bearing debt 
that may be involved in such a system is repayable or redeemable is 
nonsense that conﬂ ates features of a monetary economy with those of a 
barter economy.
By deﬁ nition, debt which cannot be repaid without discretionary 
concessions is in default. Money-creating interest-bearing debt speciﬁ es an 
amount to be repaid in units of currency: it is not labor input or real assets 
that the borrower is supposed to deliver to discharge her obligation, but 
abstract units of value with an uncertain conversion rate into real assets. 
If a speciﬁ c amount of labor input or real assets were ex ante deemed 
to be good for redemption, it is debatable whether the debt in question 
would still be monetary in nature as a speciﬁ c real return would have 
been agreed on a speciﬁ c initial outlay of real goods or services. One of 
the central questions of social scientiﬁ c analysis on money – who has the 
power to issue money and under what conditions – remains thus highly 
relevant in assessing the redeemability of money-creating interest-bearing 
debt. As long as the capacity to issue money is centralized, money-creating 
interest-bearing debt is unrepayable regardless of the community’s debt 
servicing capacity in real terms. Monetary debt – debt that is issued by 
an entity which does not itself hold or produce any real goods or services 
to “back” the value of such currency, according to one possible deﬁ nition 
– cannot be repaid with real goods. “Redemption” of monetary debt 
with real goods or services constitutes default – the negotiation of an 
amount of real assets which may be oﬀ ered by the borrower instead of 
or in order to obtain the sum of money speciﬁ ed in the debt contract. 
“Redemption” of monetary debt with newly issued or “recycled” money, 
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in turn, merely replaces the typical accounting procedures associated 
with default – repossession of collateral, possibly involving some or 
all of the debtor’s future labor power – with an arrangement whereby 
new liabilities are issued into circulation quite possibly against the same 
collateral in order to repay the original debt. In other words, instead of 
foreclosing the collateral – and thus potentially running into the legal 
problems of how to repossess the debtor’s future labor power without 
overly obvious forms of slavery – servitude is facilitated by the issuance 
of newly created monetary IOUs into circulation. Perhaps the simplest 
indication of whether a debt is in fact repaid involves what might be 
called a walk away test: if debt has been settled once and for all, the former 
debtor is able to walk away from the former creditor with no additional 
conditions attached during the repayment process. Th is is clearly not 
what is happening in the “repayability through recycling” narratives: as 
a result of each additional “repayment” ﬁ nanced with money-creating 
interest-bearing debt, the members of the monetary space collectively 
will be in ever deeper servitude to the monetary authority and the private 
entities of its choice.
To illustrate the diﬀ erence between monetary repayment of debt 
and default through transfer of real assets, it is instructive to provide 
an example – perhaps kind enough to provide ample opportunities for 
one sort of potential critic to dismiss its substantive content with a wide 
spectrum of irrelevancies – for expository reasons. Suppose that there 
are only two individuals in planet earth: X owns the entire planet, Y 
initially owns nothing but her labor power and the capacity to issue all 
money on earth against interest-bearing debt. X borrows one dollar from 
Y at an interest rate of one percent, perhaps to facilitate the monetary 
payment of the part of Y’s wages that exceeds physical subsistence 
requirements. As the debt falls due, it is clear that in the absence of 
discretionary concessions on the part of Y, X will be in breach of her 
contract: the amount to be repaid is $1.01, while the amount of money 
in circulation – the theoretical maximum that X might have been able 
to gather through all conceivable means in the absence of discretionary 
“recycling” on the part of Y – is $1.00. It makes little sense to claim that 
the missing cent will be “repaid” with real assets or labor input. Th e debt 
contract is in default and it is completely up to Y to set the conditions 
for relending or spending the amount needed by X into circulation: if Y 
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so wishes, she might demand the entire planet from X in settlement of 
the breached contract – quite possibly for the nominal monetary value 
of one cent. It is, of course, quite another matter whether Y will in fact 
decide to set transparently absurd conditions for X to “repay” her debt: 
X’s enslavement to Y’s demands is perpetual as long as debt contracts 
are honored, and any requirements perceived as excessive by X might 
merely threaten the long-term political viability of the newly discovered 
monetary mechanism of governance.
One may wish that some of the economically oriented social scientists 
– not exactly renowned for discarding theoretical models on the slightest 
suspicion of the relevance of their underlying assumptions, let alone 
for refraining from giving policy advice based on such models – would 
apply the same standards of relevance and rigor to their own work as has 
sometimes been directed at some variants of the aforementioned thought 
experiment. As long as money is issued against interest-bearing debt, no 
amount of monetary “recycling” for whatever reason between X and Y – 
however X and Y may be redeﬁ ned to increase the number of individuals 
or institutions involved – can challenge the fact that the money-creating 
interest-bearing debt remains unrepayable. Any potential appeal to the 
“sameness” of the money that is paid to the issuer of the currency in 
settlement of money-creating interest-bearing debt and the money which 
the issuer subsequently may or may not introduce “back” into circulation 
with the conditions and distributional patterns of its choice in no way 
alters the nature of the default. Irrespective of whether the issuer chooses 
to extract real resources by introducing the “same” money “back” into 
circulation – perhaps in an attempt to preserve the illusion that the 
original money-creating interest-bearing debt was in fact repayable – or by 
outright repossession of the collateral for money-creating interest-bearing 
debt, the borrowers as a group never had a chance to settle their debt with 
the monetary media that originally were in circulation. In other words, 
the debtors collectively never had and never will have a chance to walk 
away from their creditors in the absence of monetary reform.57 While the 
57 Th is is perhaps one of the simplest illustrations of the governmental signiﬁ cance of 
the prevailing forms of money. If money indeed were a mere neutral intermediary between 
diverging intertemporal consumption preferences, it would at least in theory be possible for 
the members of the monetary space to collectively liberate themselves from debt servitude 
by rendering money redundant through a complete harmonization of their intertemporal 
consumption preferences. Yet, in the absence of debt write-oﬀ s, the collective liabilities 
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expropriation of real resources in the latter case is obvious, in the former 
case the conditions and distributional patterns for the money that is issued 
“back” into circulation assume the function of rescheduling unrepayable 
debt by real resource transfers. It may be possible to mitigate the wealth- 
and power-centralizing social impact of the monetary incentive structures 
through other economic, political or social mechanisms. It may perhaps 
even be possible to defend the presumed optimality of the prevailing 
monetary system by transparently justifying the alleged desirability of 
its economic, political and social outcomes. Nonetheless, it would not 
appear to be possible to claim that money-creating interest-bearing debt 
is repayable without creatively expanding the suggested meaning of the 
word “repayment” into functions that have more traditionally been 
associated with default.
Any potential act of semantic entrepreneurship – the innovation of 
techniques to frame substantive social conﬂ icts in terms of semantic 
misunderstandings in an attempt to rationalize controversial social 
practices – which attempts to conﬂ ate repayability with speciﬁ c 
institutionalized default settlement procedures tends to overlook the fact 
that there may be only two basic ways to conceptualize the circulation of 
money, neither of which appears to justify the forms of monetary power 
currently exercised by central banks and the banking system in general 
on purely “economic” grounds. Money may either be conceptualized as 
a physical or a symbolic object issued by some form(s) of concentrated 
power, giving rise to a money supply that must at any given point in time 
circulate in one form or another in the economy to maintain its division 
of labor, or as a pure abstract social relation of (mutual) credit – implying 
that money is issued and destroyed by the transacting parties without the 
need to resort to a pre-existing, exogenous money supply. In the former 
case, perhaps the most ﬂ agrant economic double standard involves 
the common failure to point out the wealth- and power-centralizing 
implications of outsourcing the power to issue money against interest-
bearing debt to a central authority or the public or private institutions 
of the members of the monetary space continue to compound exponentially regardless 
of intertemporal consumption preferences. Under such circumstances it may be small 
wonder that activities associated with manipulating the incidence of the gains and losses 
arising from such structural “debt pollution” (Hudson, 1998) – particularly ﬁ nancial and 
legal services under the support of the political authorities – may completely overshadow 
both productive economic activities and attempts at social reform.
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of its choice. Th e issuer of the currency provides no other “economic” 
service to the community except creating the physical or symbolic media 
which the rest of the community may use – and must accept according 
to legal tender laws – as a socially constructed accounting system to 
keep track of their indebtedness to each other and to the issuer of the 
currency. Th e price of such an outsourcing decision for much of the 
community may be perpetual enslavement to the demands of the central 
monetary authority: as most of the economic rent may be capitalized and 
extracted through the banking system, it may be the social struggle for 
control over the monetary system rather than any intrinsically productive 
activity which determines each individual’s relative standing in the 
structural social hierarchy imposed by eﬀ ectively unrepayable money-
creating interest-bearing debt and the economy’s structural dependence 
on discretionary concessions from the issuer of the currency.58 It may 
be diﬃ  cult to see how central banks or the banking system in general 
could have any legitimate discretionary role in the issuance of currency 
– particularly against interest-bearing debt. Discretion breeds corruption 
by potentially rendering the manipulation of the money-creation and 
circulation processes more proﬁ table than real economic activity. One 
possible solution to overcome the risks, ineﬃ  ciencies and allocational 
injustices posed by central banking and the associated privatized rent-
extracting agencies in the banking sector would be to distribute all newly-
issued money debt- and interest-free to every member of the community 
(see chapter 10).
In the latter case – essentially a mutual credit based currency system – 
the central bank, the banking system in general, the government, or any 
other external authority would by deﬁ nition not have any direct role in 
the issuance and destruction of the monetary media by the transacting 
parties. While some forms of rules for creditworthiness – or for managing 
the inherent conﬂ ict between the medium of exchange and the store of 
value functions of money – might have to be enforced to verify the issuers’ 
capacity and intention to repay, such rules would be agreed upon among 
58 Although the relative importance of interest-bearing debt as a method of extracting 
economic rent has ﬂ uctuated historically (or governmentally, depending on one’s 
perspective), it may not be an exaggeration to claim that interest-bearing debt is currently 
the overwhelmingly dominant method. In the words of Hudson (2008: 20), for instance: 
“Today, creditors have become the ultimate recipients of the economy’s rental revenue.”
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the transacting parties or the members of the monetary space collectively 
as opposed to being imposed by a central authority as a means for the 
self-aggrandizement of its power. As no money would ever come into 
existence without a commitment from the issuer to provide real goods 
or services in return of her IOUs – presumably no single issuer could 
indeﬁ nitely avoid personal redemption of one’s credit notes by extracting 
the corresponding value from other members of the monetary space 
as may be the case in some of the more centralized forms of monetary 
systems – it might ﬁ nally start to make sense to speak of “repaying” one’s 
debts with real goods or services. As the monetary and the credit values 
of the monetary IOUs would be equal by deﬁ nition, the returning of the 
original monetary IOU to its issuer – or the corresponding adjustment 
of the appropriate bookkeeping entries – in exchange of real goods or 
services would indeed constitute fulﬁ llment of contract rather than 
the coercive renegotiation of monetary debt in default. While some of 
the implications of a global mutual credit based currency system on 
privacy and thus potentially also for the centralization of power may be 
problematic, there may be plenty of room for creativity in constructing 
a mutual credit based alternative to the current monetary system which 
both respects privacy and tailors the number, nature and the scale of 
monetary institutions according to the local preferences.
It is this distinction between centrally provided credit and decentralized 
or mutual credit that often becomes blurred in apologist accounts of the 
prevailing monetary system. Whenever a central monetary authority or 
the private entities of its choice hold monopoly for money creation against 
interest-bearing debt, one might expect enough currency to be created 
in the process to facilitate the repayment of both the outstanding loan 
principal and interest. Th e proponents of the semantic engineering to 
conﬂ ate recycling with repayment often make an unwarranted conceptual 
leap from a monetary economy into a barter economy when it comes to 
the repayment of the portion of money-creating interest-bearing debt 
which cannot be repaid with the prevailing amounts of currency in 
circulation. While a publicly professed objective of the central monetary 
authority and the private entities of its choice may be the provision of 
suﬃ  cient media of exchange to facilitate monetized market exchange 
and thereby to maintain or to expand the economy’s division of labor, 
a collective repayment of debts to the monetary authority itself would 
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curiously enough require partial payment in kind due to the relative 
scarcity of money in relation to money-creating interest-bearing debt.
One of the attractions of the repayability through recycling narrative 
is undoubtedly its capacity to divert attention from the potential absence 
of any legitimate claim on the part of the central monetary authority or 
the public or private entities of its choice to the economic rent extracted 
through money-creating interest-bearing debt. When attention is focused 
on the technical feasibility of debt repayment by labeling institutionalized 
forms of default – the forced settlement of monetary claims through 
payments in kind due to the relative scarcity of money in relation to 
money-creating interest-bearing debt – as “recycling” or “repayment”, 
potentially a far more signiﬁ cant issue – the economic rent accruing to the 
central monetary authority and the public or private entities of its choice 
– may escape analytical attention. It is far from clear why such an extra-
economic – in the sense of its radical departure from the conventional 
competition discourse and other dominant views on how the “economic” 
reality is supposed to operate – rent-extracting mechanism should exist 
based on the hegemonic explanatory models for the prevailing economic, 
political and social realities.
 
7.3 The Impact of Centralized Money Issuing Powers on 
the Informational Content of Monetary Calculation
A ﬁ nal point on the economistic rhetoric commonly adopted to the 
detriment of a more comprehensive understanding of money concerns 
the informational implications of centralized money issuing powers. 
Intuitively the connection is simple: as monetized market exchange is 
supposed to aggregate “knowledge dispersed among and accessible only 
to thousands or millions of separate individuals” (Hayek, 1978: 76), 
one might expect to ﬁ nd an inverse relationship between the price tag 
of participating in monetized market exchange and the informational 
content on relative factor scarcities reﬂ ected in the relative price structure. 
Consequently, disparities between the incentive structures for monetary 
and barter exchange or extreme income and wealth disparities in general 
deprive the relative price structure of the informational content that 
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is a precondition for eﬀ ective fulﬁ llment of the market’s function as a 
discovery procedure.
Once again, a properly provocative example will illustrate the point. Let 
us imagine a community where one person, X, initially owns all wealth, 
while the rest of its six billion inhabitants enjoy the emancipatory power 
of “free” markets and private property rights without the mental burden 
of material possessions. No serious interdisciplinary debate is likely to 
emerge on who is in charge. As a rational homo economicus, X expresses 
his preferences through the market mechanism whenever convenient 
and resorts to a spectrum of extra-economic means of persuasion and 
coercion whenever they provide a higher expected return for a unit of 
eﬀ ort. Th rough economic and political channels of inﬂ uence X is able 
to dictate virtually any relative price structure. X may decide to price 
all resources at extraction cost, subsidize productive activities through 
an unlimited supply of free pollution permits, enact legal tender laws 
that make contracts unenforceable unless settled in a currency borrowed 
from X and restrict labor market competition in the highest income 
groups while enthusiastically endorsing laissez-faire for the majority of 
the population. According to a conventional line of reasoning it would 
be a grave misrepresentation of the actual state of aﬀ airs to regard any of 
X’s actions as dictatorial. X has simply adopted one out of a potentially 
inﬁ nite number of possible normative positions to plan for competition, 
while “the impersonal and anonymous mechanism of the market” and the 
“spontaneous forces of society” (Hayek, 1944: 15, 13) produce a happy 
congruence of interests that leads to allocative eﬃ  ciency. Th e economy 
is producing an optimal mix of goods and services as determined by all 
those that matter economically and no-one could be made better oﬀ 
without making someone else worse oﬀ . According to conventional 
wisdom X could have become the sole producer only by being voted into 
such position by consumers through the market mechanism. For the sake 
of the skeptics X could also set up hundreds of smaller enterprises, each 
ostensibly too small to inﬂ uence the price mechanism alone, to achieve 
the same objectives. After all, under the prevailing conditions there is no 
authority – public or private, centralized or decentralized – that would 
have both the means and the motive to challenge X’s claim of competitive 
pricing, and perhaps enterprising scholars from the proverbial Parris 
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Island59 would have long since proven such considerations to be superﬂ uous 
anyway. If the intellectual industry indeed was entirely immune to the 
mental guidance of material incentives, it would provide a fascinating 
case study for the implementation of planning for competition elsewhere 
in the economy. X can continue to dictate virtually any relative price 
structure until some external constraint – ecological, social, political or 
something else – forces the relative price structure back to the objective 
physical reality. At this point of time the physical reality may have already 
been transformed beyond recognition with no reliable measure for the 
precise extent of the damage.
At least two relevant considerations arise from the story. First, in 
general, it is hardly appropriate to consider allocative eﬃ  ciency in 
isolation of the distributional patterns for income and wealth, even within 
disciplinary boundaries that could provide ample intellectual cover for 
ignoring foreseeable problems that can plausibly be regarded as falling 
within some other ﬁ eld of intellectual inquiry. Not only do relative price 
structures generate certain distributional patterns, but distributional 
patterns also shape the relative price structures through the generation 
of concentrated economic power that is conducive to the emergence of 
market imperfections and informational ineﬃ  ciencies. In any community 
with extreme income and wealth disparities, the poor majority may 
have ample evidence of anticompetitive practices, wasteful production 
methods, negative externalities or the uneconomic nature of further 
increases in resource throughput, yet the inequitable income and wealth 
distribution prevents this information from being registered in the price 
59 It was the 1973 “Nobel” Laureate in Economics – the arguably misnamed Bank 
of Sweden prize – Wassily Leontief, who observed that “Page after page of professional 
economic journals are ﬁ lled with mathematical formulas leading the reader from sets of 
more or less plausible but entirely arbitrary assumptions to precisely stated but irrelevant 
theoretical conclusions. … How long will researchers working in adjoining ﬁ elds, such 
as demography, sociology, and political science on the one hand and ecology, biology, 
health sciences, engineering, and other applied physical sciences on the other, abstain 
from expressing serious concern about the state of stable, stationary equilibrium and the 
splendid isolation in which academic economics now ﬁ nds itself? … Th e methods used to 
maintain intellectual discipline in this country’s most inﬂ uential economics departments 
can occasionally remind one of those employed by the Marines to maintain discipline on 
Parris Island” (Leontief, 1982: 104, 107).
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mechanism.60 Consequently, the interests, opinions and informational 
biases of a disproportionately small group of economic actors may shape 
the supposedly eﬃ  ciency-seeking relative price system more than the 
“knowledge dispersed among and accessible only to thousands or millions 
of separate individuals” that would have to be incorporated into any 
information system aiming to achieve “economic eﬃ  ciency”.
A popular normative view also suggests that it does not matter 
whether X is a single person, a class, an empire or any other subset of 
the economy’s six billion inhabitants. Each and all of the six billion 
inhabitants has economic information that no central authority can expect 
to obtain and process that could contribute to the price mechanism’s 
closer approximation of the economy’s actual physical circumstances and 
objective relative scarcities, yet it is far from universally recognized that 
the distribution of income and wealth as well as political power may 
aﬀ ect the informational content of prices and hence the capacity for 
“economic” calculation. Th e allocative equilibrium achieved by X the 
individual is often considered to be equally eﬃ  cient as equilibria based 
on larger samples of the economic knowledge base, while the conceptual 
purity of the market mechanism as a source of procedural eﬃ  ciency and 
justice is preserved by externalizing any foreseeable political, ecological or 
social consequences to “researchers working in adjoining ﬁ elds”.
Second, and more speciﬁ cally related to money, any discrepancy 
between the incentive structures for obtaining the monetary media 
and those inherent in barter exchange will be reﬂ ected also in the 
60 Th is is not, of course, an entirely new idea. Karl Polanyi, for instance, wrote in 
reference to the nineteenth-century Britain, that
the trading classes had no organ to sense the dangers involved in the exploitation of 
the physical strength of the worker, the destruction of family life, the devastation of 
neighborhoods, the denudation of forests, the pollution of rivers, the deterioration of 
craft standards, the disruption of folkways, and the general degradation of existence 
including housing and arts, as well as the innumerable forms of private and public life 
that do not aﬀ ect proﬁ ts (1957: 133).
Th ere is far more at stake here than the mere distribution of wealth in an economic system 
that could be plausibly claimed to be operating eﬃ  ciently, or the familiar pseudo-problem 
– in the sense that it is far from clear that the prevailing economic system would survive 
if eﬀ ort rather than rhetoric was dedicated to solving the problem – of internalizing 
externalities: an “organ to sense” neatly captures the lack of information that is a direct 
result of the failure of markets as information systems.
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informational content of the relative price structure. In other words, 
the terms and conditions for obtaining the gatekeeper for monetized 
market exchange – the monetary media – will have an eﬀ ect on which 
information will be incorporated into the relative price structure. In the 
hypothetical case of a monetary system that permits all real claims to 
monetized market exchange to be monetized under precisely the same 
incentive structures as in multilateral barter, the monetary system would 
not prevent any relevant information from being incorporated into the 
relative price structure: while income and wealth disparities would still 
ﬁ lter out some relevant information from the relative price structure, the 
monetary system might not exercise any independent inﬂ uence on prices. 
In any actual monetary system, in contrast, the gatekeeper role of money 
combined with the inherent conﬂ ict between the medium of exchange 
and the store of value functions of money are likely to produce additional 
informational distortions.
In the prevailing monetary system such distortions manifest themselves 
partly through the necessity to pay interest merely for “issuing” or accessing 
the monetary media. As was noted in the previous chapter in the context 
of a commodity-based currency system, there is no technical reason why 
the holders of real assets – valid claims to monetized market exchange in 
real terms – should agree to any conditions or lending proposals made 
by the holders or the issuers of money merely to be able to engage in 
monetized market exchange. Th e centralization of the money issuing 
powers to the banking system which permits the issuers and the holders 
of money to extract the value of productivity increases through money’s 
gatekeeper function thus also restricts the amount of information that 
can be incorporated into the relative price structure. On the one hand, 
some real claims to monetized market exchange fail to take place due to 
the scarcity of a monetary scorekeeping system that could be employed 
without the incentive-distorting royalty payments to the issuers or the 
holders of money. Consequently, the potential informational content from 
these uncompleted transactions may not register in or may be distorted 
by the monetary information system. On the other hand, the entire price 
structure of the economy will reﬂ ect the (potentially asymmetric) costs 
of obtaining the gatekeeper medium for monetized market exchange. 
Th e impact of these informational ineﬃ  ciencies could be mitigated – 
albeit perhaps never completely rectiﬁ ed in a monetary economy – either 
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by distributing all newly created money debt- and interest-free to the 
members of the monetary space or decentralizing the money-issuing 
powers to the members of each transaction where money is needed. Both 
alternatives are discussed in more detail elsewhere in this study.
Th e argument that is being advanced in this section is thus not 
concerned with the common criticism that markets only cater for the 
needs of the rich, but with the impossibility of eﬃ  cient “economic” 
calculation in the absence of accurate relative prices. Th e eﬃ  ciency-based 
argument for a more equal distribution of wealth and income has nothing 
to do with equity, justice, or the wants of the people per se. Incidentally, 
a redistribution of purchasing power from X the individual to a larger 
sample of the economic knowledge base would allow more people to 
satisfy their basic wants, but for the eﬃ  ciency-based justiﬁ cation of 
such redistribution all that matters is that through the redistribution of 
production and consumption possibilities the relative price structure is 
likely to more closely approximate the economy’s objective relative factor 
scarcities. Distribution – of both income and wealth as well as the power 
to issue or access money – matters for getting the prices right. Th e more 
unequal the distribution of income and wealth, the larger one might expect 
the price distortions emanating from imperfect information to be. While 
markets can produce an equilibrium allocation for any distribution of 
income and wealth, not all such equilibria are equally eﬃ  cient in terms of 
the information content that is reﬂ ected in the relative prices. Th e claim 
of markets as eﬃ  cient aggregators of dispersed information rests solely on 
the notion of markets as eﬃ  cient information systems. An information 
system’s failure to reﬂ ect relevant knowledge is not only a matter of equity 
or justice. It is also a matter of eﬃ  ciency.
 
7.4 Complexity as a Political Strategy:  The Cases of Semantic 
Traps and All or Nothing Cognitive Gatekeepers
As John Kenneth Galbraith (1975) observed, complexity is often used 
to conceal the true nature of monetary aﬀ airs. Although not all potential 
appropriations of monetary complexity to the service of particularistic 
political strategies are situated within the theoretical framework of money 
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as debt, this chapter provides perhaps the most appropriate context for 
analyzing some of the techniques which may sometimes be used to 
suppress legitimate discussion and criticism. Of the potentially inﬁ nite 
variety of techniques through which complexity can be used to disguise 
the types of social relations embodied in a monetary system, two deserve 
particular scrutiny due to their prevalence and potential eﬀ ectiveness 
in silencing legitimate criticism: the construction of semantic traps to 
facilitate the illusion that the substance of the inquirer’s concern has been 
addressed and the promotion of an ostensibly technocratic all-or-nothing 
approach as a cognitive gatekeeper to legitimate criticism. 
Semantic traps are often transparently misleading, constituting populist 
attempts to prevent or to slow down the contagion of undesirable ideas 
or worldviews among individuals who may lack the personal capacity or 
inclination to research monetary aﬀ airs. For instance, it has sometimes 
been suggested that the common criticism of the alleged necessity of the 
money supply to grow exponentially in the long term if money-creating 
interest-bearing debt is to be repaid is misguided, as such growth is 
technically not necessary at any given point in time. To see whether the 
substance of the potential critic’s argument has indeed been addressed 
by resorting to the technical feasibility of alternative outcomes, it is 
instructive to break the argument into two interrelated parts: (1) Is there 
a tendency for liabilities to grow exponentially under the prevailing 
monetary system? and (2) If yes, to what extent do the counterparts to 
the expanding liabilities in double entry bookkeeping either constitute 
money or inﬂ uence the pace of money creation?
In response to the ﬁ rst question, under normal circumstances the 
liabilities against which money has been created are growing exponentially 
according to the principle of compound interest. Technically it is possible 
for a population willing to incur lowering living standards to let the money 
supply and potentially also the corresponding money-creating interest-
bearing liabilities diminish for prolonged periods, albeit the possibilities 
for reducing the total amount of the exponentially compounding money-
creating interest-bearing liabilities merely by refusing to incur additional 
money-creating interest-bearing debt would clearly appear to be limited. 
Technically virtually any alternative outcome to the spontaneous growth 
of liabilities might also be attained through deliberate debt cancellations. 
It would nonetheless appear to be quite appropriate to suggest that inbuilt 
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tendencies for exponential growth of liabilities – outpacing real growth 
with the familiar economic, political and social consequences (see e.g. 
Hudson, 2007) – do indeed exist as a matter of pure mathematical necessity 
based on the principle of compound interest. It is worth pointing out that 
for any potential critic of the presumed unsustainability of the prevailing 
monetary system – or perhaps more accurately its economic, political, 
social, environmental etc. implications – a relevant point has already 
been made at this stage: there would appear to be no need to expand the 
analysis from the exponential growth of debt into the exponential growth 
of money, where the substantially larger degrees of freedom for deﬁ ning 
money are easier to use for opportunistic deﬂ ection of attention from 
the substance of the argument. It is perhaps also appropriate to note that 
the exponential growth of liabilities is not the only source of economic, 
political and social polarization under the prevailing forms of money: even 
in the hypothetical case of credit creation and withdrawal being precisely 
equal, the monetary system would continue to be both wealth- and power-
centralizing as it would still be the commercial banking system through 
which the decisions on whether, how much, and to whom money may be 
allocated through credit creation, investment of accumulated “reserves”, 
dividend payments, or some other method of the banks’ choice would 
be made. In other words, even in the absence of exponential growth of 
liabilities, the economy as a whole would still have to pay a tribute to the 
banking system just to obtain access to an accounting system that can 
facilitate multilateral exchange of the existing real capital.
In response to the second question, perhaps the most appropriate answer 
involves posing a series of further questions: if the money supply does 
not exhibit similar tendencies for exponential growth as money-creating 
interest-bearing debt, to what extent is the existing debt compounding 
without creating new money – thus accelerating the centralization of 
wealth and power through the ﬁ nancial sector? Under what conditions 
and to what extent may the counterpart to money-creating interest-
bearing debt be classiﬁ ed as something else than money? How appropriate 
are deﬁ nitions of money which may permit a signiﬁ cant divergence 
to emerge between the money supply and debt that is monetary in its 
origins? To what extent may the answers to any of the aforementioned 
questions depend on the community’s normative attitudes towards 
perpetual debt slavery – the extent to which the community as a whole 
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may either passively accept the exponential growth of liabilities or actively 
attempt to obtain all money that can technically be made available for a 
collective attempt to liberate itself once and for all from its servitude to 
the banking system through the repayment of all outstanding liabilities? 
A university instructor might capture the essence of some of these points 
by the following exam question for a sociology or a political economy 
class: “You have been given a monopoly to issue money against interest-
bearing debt. What deﬁ nition(s) of money, debt and interest should you 
promote in economics textbooks to conceal your monetary powers to the 
greatest possible extent? For each part of you answer, explain whether you 
are being intellectually dishonest and why?”
While it is up to the reader to select an appropriate deﬁ nition for 
money when judging the veracity of the contending knowledge claims 
on the nature of the prevailing monetary arrangements, the walk 
away test introduced in section 7.2 may leave less room for normative 
considerations. Assuming that the community as a whole wishes 
to terminate its servitude to the banking system and to replace the 
prevailing forms of debt slavery with an alternative accounting system 
for economic interaction, the exponential growth of money-creating 
interest-bearing debt does impose a corresponding growth requirement 
for the institutionalized default settlement procedures sometimes referred 
to as “recycling” money through the issuer: the exponentially expanding 
liabilities express at any given point in time the total cumulative 
monetary value that the members of the monetary space must deliver to 
the issuer of the currency through the repossession of collateral – whether 
physical assets or the debtors’ future labor power – in order to be able to 
settle their monetary debt once and for all and to walk away from the 
creditors. In other words, seen from the perspective of potential collective 
liberation from debt servitude, the growth of money-creating interest-
bearing debt does produce a requirement for a corresponding increase 
in debt-free money supply – no matter how technically infeasible such 
a requirement may be whenever newly created money or money that is 
“recycled” “back” into the economy is also issued against interest-bearing 
debt and it is entirely up to the issuers of the currency to decide whether 
to accept any speciﬁ c collateral to settle unrepayable debt once and for 
all. At the risk of tormenting the reader with obvious redundancies: 
the alleged capacity of any given nominal value of money to clear an 
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unlimited number of transactions does not apply to the repayment of 
money-creating interest-bearing debt. Once money is returned to its 
issuer, the members of the monetary space will have to agree to whatever 
conditions the issuer chooses to set for issuing or “recycling” additional 
repayment capacity in the form of monetary IOUs. Th e fact that such 
monetary IOUs are also likely to be issued against interest-bearing debt 
diminishes rather than enhances the capacity of the members of the 
monetary space collectively to walk away from their debt servitude and 
to institute alternative payment mechanisms or scorekeeping systems for 
economic interaction.
For those who dislike any potential implicit convolution of the 
spontaneously expanding counterpart to credit in double entry 
bookkeeping with the exponential growth of money to a greater extent 
than what might be indicated by economistic deﬁ nitions of money,61 
perhaps a more appropriate reference point to analyze the logic of some of 
61 Some economically oriented social scientists take great pleasure in hindering a 
more comprehensive understanding of the nature of money by adopting an unambiguous 
deﬁ nition of money as the sum of speciﬁ c types of liabilities of the government or the 
banking system. To illustrate some of the problems with such an approach, suppose that 
the government were to distribute to its favored interests a given number of machines 
which can be used to print one 500 euro note each day in perpetuity. According to 
most economistic deﬁ nitions, money could only be created either by actually using 
any one of such machines to print a note or by pledging them as collaterals for credit 
creation through the banking system. Does this mean that the number of such machines 
circulating in the economy is irrelevant for the deﬁ nition or the measurement of money 
as long as they are not being used for either one of these purposes? Does it not matter 
whether the amount of non-money-creating securitized claims potentially created on top 
of the collateral provided by these machines is 1% or 1,000,000% of the money supply? 
Such securitized claims unquestionably have the theoretical capacity to act as reliable 
stores of value in terms of the chosen monetary unit of account and as media of exchange 
through a number of potential routes – whether through exchange into monetary IOU’s 
or the repossession of the collateral to start up the printing press. What proportion of the 
potential medium of exchange or store of value functions of money may be stored outside 
the monetary system in ﬁ nancial capital or debt instruments classiﬁ ed as something else 
than money according to the prevailing economistic deﬁ nitions before the conceptual 
separation between money and other forms of ﬁ nancial capital starts to lose its relevance 
for policy purposes? While it is far from clear that analyzing money and other forms of 
ﬁ nancial capital in isolation of each other is either desirable or feasible, the analytical 
importance of this distinction should perhaps not be overstated. As often appears to be 
the case in monetary analysis, the most signiﬁ cant issues of contention may be found in 
areas where relatively little debate is taking place – in this case the long term implications 
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the prevailing forms of money might involve the rat in the running wheel 
analogy. At any given point in time accrued interest on money-creating 
interest-bearing debt approximates the amount of debt free money that 
the economy as a whole might need in order to terminate its servitude to 
the banking system once and for all through the simultaneous repayment 
of all outstanding liabilities and to construct an alternative accounting 
system to facilitate its division of labor and potentially a wide range of other 
objectives. Yet there may be no debt free money available: every attempt 
by the economy as a whole to obtain the missing amount by incurring 
additional interest-bearing debt will merely deepen its servitude to the 
banking system. Not entirely unlike the rat in the running wheel facing 
the choice between a slow death at its current running pace and speeding 
up to get there faster, the majority of the members of any given monetary 
space can choose between fading away slowly as their real assets are being 
repossessed and productivity gains extracted by the ﬁ nancial system and 
having a brief glimpse of illusory opulence by speeding up the build-
up and the eventual burst of the credit bubble. Given the conventional 
assumptions on human motivations, how many economically oriented 
social scientists can claim that no inbuilt tendencies for growth – of debt, 
money, or whatever the relevant variable may be for keeping one’s own 
funeral party going until it is time to start ﬁ tting the coﬃ  n – exist?
Any potential appeals to the aforementioned semantic trap may thus 
eﬀ ectively amount to a request for any potential critic to reformulate her 
point along the following lines: if the majority of the population wants 
to maintain or to increase its living standards, a money supply consisting 
primarily of the monetary counterpart of bank-created interest-bearing 
debt must, on average, grow within any prolonged period of observation, 
provided that the selected deﬁ nition of money does not allow the entire 
increase in the counterpart to the exponentially expanding interest-
bearing debt to be classiﬁ ed as something else than money and that the 
majority of the population continues to view deepening debt servitude as 
the only viable strategy to pursue higher living standards or some other 
relevant objectives. Th is is, of course, quite diﬀ erent from saying that no 
inbuilt, economically, politically and socially polarizing tendencies for 
either credit or money supply growth exist under the prevailing socially 
of compound interest irrespective of the part of the exponentially increasing counterpart 
to debt that may be classiﬁ ed as money.
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constructed speciﬁ cations of money, which may sometimes be implied by 
individuals who cultivate such semantic traps to silence criticism.62
In contrast to the semantic traps, the all or nothing cognitive gatekeepers 
for legitimate criticism are often evoked in an attempt to delegitimize the 
work of relatively self-motivated and persistent critics of the prevailing 
monetary arrangements. While the essence of the argument – the “if you 
are going to criticize the system you might as well do it correctly”-part 
of the statement – has a point, the implications of the tendency to evoke 
the argument to provoke self-censorship rather than genuine learning or 
logical consistency are troubling. Th e implicit suggestion that anyone 
without equal or greater expertise in monetary aﬀ airs than individuals 
who obtain their living from the management or manipulation of the 
system should refrain from any form of substantial critique has three 
main problems. First, any possible misunderstanding of a speciﬁ c aspect 
of the prevailing monetary system does not invalidate criticism targeted 
at other elements of the system – sometimes not even the substance of the 
critique targeted at the misunderstood aspect.
Second, as a public institution imposed upon virtually every individual 
in a modern society, the burden of proof for the alleged desirability of the 
62 Th e lengths to which some of the apologetic accounts of the prevailing forms of 
money are willing to go to defend the status quo might give an indication of the extent to 
which complexity may be replaced with unchallengeable simplicity as a political strategy 
whenever the conventional usage of the average intellect might produce undesirable 
patterns of thought. According to one apologist interpretation, it is futile to contemplate 
upon the conditions for liberating the economy as a whole from its debt servitude to the 
banking system through the repayment of all outstanding liabilities, as the economy will 
always need money and thus presumably also unrepayable interest-bearing debt and the 
forms of servitude that they entail. Following the same logic, a polity should presumably 
never attempt to analyze the theoretical conditions under which a corrupt dictator might 
be replaced, as some forms of political institutions are always needed and such capacities 
for political organization would presumably be lost if the prevailing Dear Leader were to 
go. Instrumental rhetoric notwithstanding, in both cases it is quite appropriate to inquire 
into the political and economic conditions which perpetuate the reign of the respective 
power structures and to contemplate upon the various theoretical possibilities for 
replacement, particularly when the respective institutional logics suppress the possibility 
of spontaneous transformation. Whether such institutional structures should indeed be 
replaced is another matter, but any potential suggestion that thought experiments which 
do not presuppose the analytical primacy and the perpetual reign of the prevailing Dear 
Leader – whether of the monetary or the political variety – are somehow beyond the 
bounds of legitimate or conceptually feasible analysis should hardly be taken seriously by 
social scientists who are committed to the pursuit of non-instrumental variants of truth.
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prevailing forms of money rests on the primary beneﬁ ciaries – the “lock-
in between the political, legal, banking and institutionalized monetary 
system”. Rather than seeking easily addressable substantive or semantic 
misunderstandings and strawmanning the entire spectrum of criticism 
as belonging to the same categories, it would be the task of the primary 
beneﬁ ciaries to open the books of the entire monetary system from central 
banks and treasuries to the commercial credit creation to public scrutiny 
and explain the functioning of the system by transparently tracing each 
speciﬁ c form of money from the moment of its creation to its extinction 
or withdrawal from circulation. If any discrepancies were found between 
the explanations and the actual creation and ﬂ ow of funds, it would be 
the public oﬃ  cial or the private employee in question who would be 
removed from oﬃ  ce or relieved of her duties rather than the hobby-critic 
presumably being deprived of credibility as a result of failing in the task 
that would have proven to be excessively diﬃ  cult or unpleasant even for 
some of the primary beneﬁ ciaries. 
Th ird, if any potential critic of the monetary status quo is perceived to 
be responsible for perfect understanding of every single intricacy of the 
prevailing forms of money, surely the same cognitive standards must be 
applied to any potential beneﬁ ciaries. In other words, the “if you are going 
to beneﬁ t from the system you might as well do it correctly”-standard should 
be applied to all potential beneﬁ ciaries before any gains are distributed. In 
practice such a standard might entail the responsibility of any politician 
or legal or banking professional to submit to a public defense of her views 
and expertise on the technical intricacies of the prevailing forms of money, 
responding to every query or straw man posed by the public in a manner 
deemed satisfactory by the same self-selected interrogators before obtaining 
a license to beneﬁ t from the prevailing monetary arrangements. At the 
risk of stating the obvious, having even a single individual worldwide to 
obtain such a license would be likely to require the violent exclusion of a 
substantial number of potential skeptics from the interrogation and spin-
building and –dismantling processes, who could surely keep the debate 
going until drastic monetary reform to make the system more responsive 
to the interests and concerns of wider segments of the population might be 
transformed from a possibility into a necessity.
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Th e following chapter adopts an integrated perspective to explore the 
incentive structures and the structurally rigid social hierarchies inherent in 
the economically, politically and socially polarizing logic of the prevailing 
forms of money. In other words, rather than seeking to understand 
intrinsic features of monetary systems corresponding to certain economic, 
political or social ideals or their opportunistic appropriations for strategic 
purposes, the focus is shifted for a moment towards the (mis)use of the 
prevailing forms of money as instruments of geopolitical, biopolitical and 
social power projection.
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8 At the Intersection of Sovereignty and Biopolitics: 
 The Di-Polaric Spatializations of Money
Structurally rigid social hierarchies have sometimes been likened to a 
chessboard (Wright, 1994: 1–2). As long as the hierarchical logic of the 
board continues to structure social relationships, the argument would go, 
any attempt to achieve social change through the elimination of the ruling 
class would merely reproduce the structural hierarchies symbolized by the 
board. While a revolt of the pawns might change the speciﬁ c individuals 
in the top of the hierarchy, escaping or modifying the structural logic of 
the board would require a radical reconceptualization of the desirable 
forms of social relations – a form of power that is capable of transcending 
the prevailing limitations of the board to modify its scope or content or 
to discard it altogether. 
Th is chapter explores the role of modern credit money – money that 
has to be borrowed into existence against interest-bearing debt63 – as a 
structural force which shapes and reproduces social hierarchies – both 
the scope and content of the historically speciﬁ c or governmentally 
contingent manifestations of the chessboard analogy – according to the 
overall strategy of power. Modern credit money is conceptualized as a 
deterritorializing force that produces “agentic subjectivities” (Hardt and 
Negri, 2000: 32) through the incentive structures and the structurally 
rigid social hierarchies that are inherent in modern monetary institutions. 
It is argued that the modern credit money system – and particularly the 
necessity to pay interest merely to keep money in circulation64 – is a 
major transitory channel for the logic of ﬁ nancial capital to transcend the 
limitations of sovereign spaces and to transform itself into a biopolitical 
force. Th e formation of such constantly evolving biopolitical bodies 
temporarily emancipates power structures that are traditionally associated 
63 Th is is the simplest and most parsimonious deﬁ nition to demonstrate money’s 
impact on subjectivities, incentives, and structural social hierarchies. While several 
additions could be made to make the deﬁ nition more “modern” – although perhaps never 
unambiguous or stable as was pointed out in chapter 4 – the main ﬁ ndings would remain 
largely unaﬀ ected.
64 Th e interest payments required to keep money – or the mere capacity to monetize 
real assets – in circulation should not be confused with interest charges involved in the 
recycling of preexisting monetary balances between borrowers and lenders.
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with state sovereignty from their territorial constraints. Th e resulting 
divergences between sovereign and monetary spaces provide a spectrum 
of opportunity for sovereign bodies to reterritorialize, reinstitutionalize 
and reinforce their power in line with the strategy of power. Drawing 
on Agamben, the relationship between the material and the subjective 
– or the sovereign and the biopolitical – dimensions of money is seen as 
di-polaric rather than di-chotomic – as a speciﬁ c instance of “the logic 
of ﬁ eld … where it is impossible to draw a line clearly and separate two 
diﬀ erent substances” as “the polarity is present and acts at each point 
of the ﬁ eld” (Agamben quoted in Raulﬀ , 2004: 612). Hence both the 
sovereign and the biopolitical elements of modern credit money must be 
considered to capture the ongoing evolution of the structural pressures 
that shape and reproduce social hierarchies.
Th e argument of the chapter is structured as follows. Th e ﬁ rst section 
examines money’s role in producing and reproducing agentic subjectivities. 
Th e second section outlines some of the structural social hierarchies that may 
be partly shaped and reproduced by the system of modern credit money. 
Th e third section explores the di-polaric nature of the interaction between 
the material practices of money and the formation of agentic subjectivities. 
Th e fourth section applies the implications of the structural incentives and 
decentralized human agency to the post-structuralist conceptualizations 
of Empire to suggest that immanent power may increase its perceived 
legitimacy and intensify the social relations in its sphere of inﬂ uence 
through an “open source” or an interactive process with its subjects. 
Th e ﬁ fth section analyzes the interaction between monetarily induced 
deterritorializations and the opportunities that they present for sovereign 
bodies for reterritorialization. Th e sixth section examines the potential 
objectives of emancipatory human agency. Th e ﬁ nal section concludes by 
pointing out potential complementarities between diﬀ erent theoretical and 
methodological approaches and proposing paths for future research.
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8.1 The Origins of Money’s Institutional Power, Multiple 
Potential Spatializations and the Capacity to Act as 
an Incubator of Agentic Subjectivities
It may not be an exaggeration to suggest that social scientiﬁ c inquiry on 
the manifestations of monetary power has not been matched by an equal 
analytical eﬀ ort to identify the ontological origins of money’s institutional 
power and multiple potential spatializations. Th e precise role that money 
has played in state building or other forms of economic, political or social 
power projection has often been analyzed in detail. As Helleiner (2003: 
2) has observed, “…the construction of territorial currencies was an 
intensely political process involving domestic and international struggles 
over issues such as the nature of state building, the construction of 
national identities, the proper scale of markets, and the implementation 
of competing market ideologies.” Yet it is not obvious why a presumably 
neutral facilitator of multilateral exchange has the capacity to shape such 
a wide range of political objectives. Th e infrastructures for production 
and exchange involve a virtually inﬁ nite set of technical arrangements 
designed to facilitate certain parts of the transactions. Why has money 
proven to be a more eﬀ ective instrument for the consolidation or 
projection of state power than many other elements of the infrastructure 
for production and exchange? Why have states not been equally prone to 
use, say, territorially branded information systems for creating political 
communities or geographically delimited logistics networks for shaping 
national identities or the proper scale of markets? Which elements in 
the institutional design of money confer its political powers? Once these 
powers are actually used, should money still be regarded primarily as 
a facilitator of multilateral exchange with unfortunate but inevitable 
political side eﬀ ects, or perhaps as an instrument of power projection that 
happens to fulﬁ ll some of the technical functions commonly attributed to 
the hypothetical notion of politically neutral money? While widespread 
agreement on the nature of money may be neither necessary nor suﬃ  cient 
to understand the nature of monetary power, each contending perspective 
on the ontology of money needs to address these questions if monetary 
power is to be regarded as materially diﬀ erent from the power dimensions 
involved in other stages of production and multilateral exchange.
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What sets money apart from other technical facilitators of production 
and exchange is its institutional capacity to obscure and legitimate the 
transformation of economic, political and social opportunity structures. 
Two elements of this transformation of a presumably mundane 
infrastructural facilitator of multilateral exchange into an instrument 
of power projection are particularly relevant here. First, the widespread 
misconception that money constitutes the credit of the issuing authority 
– as opposed to the members of the monetary space – allows the issuing 
authority to eﬀ ectively write checks on behalf of the members of the 
monetary space. Hyman Minsky once noted that “everyone can create 
money; the problem is to get it accepted” (Minsky, 1986: 228, quoted 
in Bell, 2001: 150). Although technically incorrect – something that 
is not widely accepted hardly qualiﬁ es as money in the ﬁ rst place – 
the observation does draw attention to what it means to “get money 
accepted” in the context of non-commodity-based currencies. When 
a central authority with taxation powers is asking an individual to 
recognize its credit notes as money, it is in fact asking the individual to 
recognize the authority’s debt as her own. In other words, the process of 
“getting money accepted” is not entirely unlike attempting to convince 
prospective members of the monetary space that it is in their best 
interests to let someone else write checks on their behalf. At the early 
stages of inducing the recalcitrant subjects to recognize the “moneyness” 
of their own IOUs, which the central authority has already monetized 
on their behalf pending the subjects’ approval, coercion is certainly to be 
expected. Similarly, one would expect appeals to reduced transaction costs 
or “trust” – the fact that intrinsically worthless credit notes can easily be 
exchanged into goods and services with other individuals who agree to let 
the same central authority produce and monetize IOUs on their behalf – 
to be common. Nevertheless, none of these appeals may alter some of the 
crucial questions that determine the success of the monetization process: 
should an individual agree to produce goods or services in exchange for 
a central authority’s credit notes and thus eﬀ ectively recognize the credit 
notes as her own? If yes, under what conditions?
While the belief that the issuer of such credit notes has the obligation 
to redeem them for goods and services upon demand may help to induce 
wider acceptance and thus facilitate the monetization process, the issuer 
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often has no other “backing” for the value of the currency except its 
capacity to act as a coercive clearinghouse between the members of 
the monetary space: the goods and services that “back” the value of 
the currency must always be extracted from some other members of 
the monetary space rather than being provided by the issuer of the 
currency.65 Th is may become abundantly clear at times of monetary 
crises. If a suﬃ  ciently large number of the members of a monetary space 
attempt to convert their monetary IOUs into real assets or convertibility 
is questioned for some other reason, all potential losses accrue to the 
members of the monetary space while the central authority that has acted 
as the clearinghouse loses nothing. Th e assertion that “the creation of 
money is a two-sided balance sheet operation” (Bell, 2001: 150–151) is 
thus of little help in determining whose assets are ultimately transferred 
to whom as a result of money creation.
In a non-commodity-based monetary system the monetary role of 
the state may thus not be entirely dissimilar to a market-maker which 
stands ready to extract the amount of goods and services determined by 
the social struggle between borrowers and lenders in exchange for state-
branded but citizen-backed IOUs. If the individual Smiths and Joneses 
who make up the economy do not willingly redeem all the newly created 
IOUs eﬀ ectively issued in their name by the banking system, the state 
may redeem the notes on their behalf to protect the value of the currency 
65 A crucial distinction compared to a conventional clearinghouse is, of course, the 
state’s capacity in many cases to regulate both sides of the transaction – to determine 
the supply of money through its control of money creation and to inﬂ uence the overall 
demand for money through taxation, among other things. While the bulk of money 
creation is outsourced to the banking industry, often supervised by an “independent” 
central bank presumably removed from the realm of politics, the incidence of taxation 
is typically determined by the state itself. A not entirely dissimilar governmental impact 
could be produced by precisely the opposite institutional arrangements: the power 
to determine the size and the incidence of taxation could be outsourced to a proﬁ t-
maximizing private industry, while the nature and amount of money to be created and 
its initial distribution would be subject to political scrutiny and debate. It may not in 
practice make much of a diﬀ erence whether economic reality is distorted by a private 
industry’s proﬁ t-maximizing manipulation of money creation or a private industry’s 
proﬁ t-maximizing abuse of its taxation powers. Th e fact that the former practice rarely 
attracts critical commentary while the latter would be likely to invite more widespread 
scrutiny tells more about the social construction of the economic reality than any features 
allegedly internal to its logic.
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and either collect taxes or accumulate public debt – both ultimately 
payable by the same Smiths and Joneses – to “balance” the transactions. 
In other words, instead of the central bank promising to pay on demand 
the bearer of a ten pound note ten pounds – essentially an identical copy 
of itself or the corresponding amount in other denominations – the text 
on the note might as well read as follows: “Mr. John Smith [or any other 
individual selected based on the results of the social struggle for control 
over the state’s monetary and coercive powers] promises to pay the bearer 
on demand ten pounds. If Mr. Smith fails to meet his obligation, the 
Government of England pays the bearer on demand ten pounds and 
adds the sum to Mr. Smith’s tax liability.” Such a payment may involve a 
reduction in the bearer’s tax liability, in which case the payment consists 
of the goods and services that the bearer is not required to provide to the 
government, or the provision of goods and services that the government 
has extracted from other members of the monetary space. Provided 
that Mr. Smith consents to such an arrangement at all – the chances 
are that he would not if he understood the logic and was able to endure 
the violence that has historically been associated with the sovereign’s 
monetary trust-building projects66 – he would be well advised to demand 
the government to deliver all such notes that it may issue from time to 
time directly to him rather than spending them into circulation at will. 
If all newly created monetary media were automatically delivered to the 
members of the monetary space debt- and interest-free, the members 
themselves would largely determine the spatial characteristics of the 
networks of exchange that would emerge as the government would have 
to transparently justify each public spending proposal to the electorate 
before being able to, for instance, spend the members’ IOUs abroad to 
ﬁ nance its military adventures. In the absence of such policy constraints 
originating from the members of the monetary space, it is the issuing 
authority which has the freedom to shape the nature and the territorial 
limits of the networks of exchange rather than some illusory notion 
of “trust” between individuals who happen to be subject to the same 
monetary central authority’s power projection.
66 Some of the early monetary authorities, for instance, found it necessary to impose 
severe penalties such as ﬁ nes, ﬂ ogging, burning foreheads with coins or destroying crops 
that allowed self-suﬃ  ciency to induce the adoption of their speciﬁ c versions of monetary 
neutrality (e.g. Ingham, 2004; Wray, 1998).
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Second, the practice of issuing money against interest-bearing debt 
eﬀ ectively gives the issuing authority – or the private entities of its choice 
– control and ownership over the money supply. Irrespective of whether 
modern money is conceptualized as debt, a commodity, or intrinsically 
worthless symbols of abstract value, it can hardly be disputed that most 
of it enters into circulation against interest-bearing debt through the 
commercial banking system. As was noted particularly in chapters 4 and 
7, if the issuance of money automatically involves the creation of borrower 
IOUs that exceed the value of the money that is put into circulation – i.e. 
the total loan plus interest payable by the borrower exceeds the value of 
the monetary IOUs that the banking system creates in the process – the 
issuers can gradually increase their control over economic activity within 
a given monetary space that eﬀ ectively lacks a permanent money supply 
or capacity to monetize real assets. Th us, the price of membership in a 
given debt-based monetary space, far from providing a neutral solution 
to the problem of double coincidence of wants, may approach inﬁ nite 
for a substantial portion of its members in the form of interest payments 
on unrepayable loans. Th e requirement to borrow the bulk of the 
money supply into existence against interest-bearing debt substantially 
diminishes the amount of coercive authority that an individual must 
consent or submit to in order to become a viable subject of monetary 
power projection: as long as the debt contract establishing the individual’s 
responsibility to repay a larger amount of money than was created in the 
“lending” process is adhered to, the individual’s territorial location or the 
local cultural or institutional intricacies do not signiﬁ cantly alter the type 
of monetary power that is being projected by the issuer of the currency.
Th ese two institutional aspects give money both a material and a 
subjective – or structural and post-structural – character. Gilbert has 
cogently argued for 
the necessity for drawing out the paradoxes of money as always a symbolic 
referent, a social system and a material practice. Th e symbolism that money 
represents deﬁ nes and limits what money can be and can do, just as the 
forms that money assumes resonate in terms of what functions money can 
perform or what kind of symbolic power it can represent. Neither dimension 
is sustainable without the other. (2005: 361, original emphasis)
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Th e material and the symbolic or subjective dimensions of money are 
mutually constitutive and in constant interaction with each other.
As a material practice, modern credit money contributes to persistent 
structural social polarization regardless of skill or productivity diﬀ erences. 
At any given point in time the monetary system as a whole is technically 
insolvent, i.e. liabilities exceed assets.67 Such a situation could not arise 
just by the members of the monetary space issuing monetary IOUs to 
each other, as the valuation of such IOUs would automatically involve 
any possible interest payments – the monetary value and the credit value 
of the IOUs would be equal by deﬁ nition. Th e systemic insolvency arises 
from the requirement that the members of the monetary space must 
incur interest-bearing debt as a precondition for “issuing” or accessing 
monetary IOUs, which do not include the interest portion of the debt 
against which they have been created.68 Consequently, the monetary 
67 For the sake of simplicity the example given here involves a situation in which the 
entire money supply has to be borrowed into existence against interest-bearing debt.
68 For the purposes of this chapter, the impact of more “modern” forms of credit 
creation can be compared to any other activity aiming to extract monetary balances from 
other members of the monetary space and thus forcing someone else to default on their 
loans – with or without the rat race to borrow against all conceivable forms of collateral 
until the credit bubble bursts and real assets are redistributed. Although the engineering of 
ever more sophisticated derivative instruments, for instance, may help certain individuals 
to achieve positive monetary net worth at the expense of other members of the monetary 
space, such engineering per se is not responsible for the structural necessity of the zero-
sum competition for positive monetary net worth. Th e interest-bearing debt against 
which the more conventional forms of money are created remains the ampliﬁ er through 
which the economic, political and social implications of newly conceived forms of money 
largely materialize. In an economy with a suﬃ  cient debt-free, permanently circulating 
money supply, for instance, “banks” might be either money warehouses – providing 
safekeeping and payments services for funds that remain outside their own bookkeeping 
– or matchmakers between borrowers and lenders of preexisting monetary balances – a 
relatively straightforward task that could also be performed by a wide variety of market 
arrangements, lenders’ or borrowers’ cooperatives or virtually any middleman with 
competitive risk assessment skills and perhaps some established avenue for rebranding 
repackaged securities as being beyond their true value before they are sold to investors. 
Under such circumstances ﬁ nancial engineering would have only a limited capacity to 
endanger the stability of the entire ﬁ nancial system and banks could relatively freely 
bankrupt themselves through the method of their choice without the rest of the economy 
having to worry about the costs of bailouts or potential system-wide impacts. In contrast, 
once the monetary system has been rendered structurally insolvent through unrepayable 
interest-bearing debt – the community’s money supply or division of labor eﬀ ectively 
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system itself constitutes a powerful mechanism for upward redistribution 
of wealth. Th e main beneﬁ ciaries – “[t]he lock-in between the political, 
legal, banking and institutionalized monetary system” (Lietaer, 2001: 
214) – accumulate resources through compound interest on unrepayable 
debt required for the mere existence of money or the capacity to monetize 
real assets, while the overwhelming majority of the population remains 
permanently exploited through interest charges included in the price of 
virtually every good and service in the economy.
As an incubator of agentic subjectivities, money – or, more precisely, 
the conditions under which a sovereign authority is allowed to create 
IOUs on behalf of the members of the monetary space – may have a 
profound impact on the cognitive frameworks that guide each individual’s 
identity formation, self-conception and capacity for self-actualization and 
autonomous agency in social relationships. Money’s symbolic impact 
extends far beyond nationalistic iconography. A requirement to borrow 
one’s own IOU’s into existence from the central monetary authority or 
the private agencies of its choice, for instance, instills a mental model of 
artiﬁ cial scarcity for guiding agentic behavior. Opportunities for engaging 
in social relationships involving some of the technical functions of money 
may be relatively plentiful in real terms, yet the monetarily institutionalized 
and enforced belief that the feasibility of such relationships requires the 
borrowing – as opposed to the debt-free issuance – of IOUs profoundly 
transforms the dominant interpretation of economic, political and social 
opportunity structures. As one local currency activist has observed, “[t]
he real price we pay for money is the hold that money has on our sense 
of what is possible – the prison it builds for our imagination” (Edgar 
Cahn, quoted in Lietaer, 2001: 146). In case of a conﬂ ict between an 
individual’s organic subjective beliefs and the prevailing logic of the 
socially constructed accounting system of money, the individual will 
either have to readjust her subjectivity in accordance with the rules 
governing the production and circulation of money or to adopt a parallel 
being held hostage to the banking system’s economic and political strategies – it may 
not be an exaggeration to view ﬁ nancial engineering as a potential source of “ﬁ nancial 
weapons of mass destruction” in terms of its potential systemic impact. Nonetheless, as 
ﬁ nancial engineering remains a specialized technique to take advantage of the structural 
ampliﬁ er of unrepayable interest-bearing debt, it is not obvious that its distributional 
impact will be much of a novelty as long as the overwhelming majority of the population 
remains conﬁ ned to the logic of more conventional forms of unrepayable debt.
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subjectivity that, while being perceived as implausible, undesirable, or 
both, nonetheless facilitates participation in social interaction involving 
some of the technical functions of money. Th e monetary system’s 
inﬂ uence on subjectivity is ontologically and epistemologically dominant 
in the sense that no amount of knowledge claims conceived outside of 
the monetary logic – whether in the natural sciences, ethics, heterodox 
economic analysis, or some other cognitive framework – can challenge 
the monetary logic’s primacy in regulating monetarily mediated social 
relationships. Any speciﬁ c individual may be perfectly free to raise protest 
on the basis that such conceptualization of money violates the natural 
laws, ethical principles, economic eﬃ  ciency or any other self-referential 
– from the perspective of the monetary logic – ﬁ eld of knowledge. Such 
views, particularly when uttered in contexts other than monetary, may 
in fact enjoy relatively widespread recognition in their respective ﬁ elds. 
Yet every individual who wants to escape the life of an autarkic fugitive 
beyond the taxation powers of the state must subject herself to the 
subjectic engineering through the use of the prevailing forms of money – 
no matter how ineﬃ  cient, inequitable or implausible.69 While the most 
obvious source of such engineering is any potential disparity between the 
rules governing the production and circulation of goods and services, on 
the one hand, and the monetary media, on the other, the precise manner 
in which ﬁ nancial capital is socially constructed can never be neutral with 
respect to the types of subjectivities that the logics and incentive structures 
inherent in each historically speciﬁ c or governmentally contingent 
monetary system produce. 
At the most basic level, the autonomous healing of a monetarily 
damaged subjectivity may be prevented by a true belief in the accuracy 
of the socially constructed accounting system of money in capturing 
the full range of technically feasible opportunities for social interaction 
involving some of the technical functions of money. An individual might 
in theory truly believe that the socially constructed rules for the issuance, 
subsistence, circulation and extinction of money accurately reﬂ ect the 
physical production opportunities in the real world, although there is 
little evidence that such correlation was ever intended to result from the 
69 Although there is ontologically nothing monetary about the state’s capacity to 
appropriate real resources, taxation constitutes one of the main mechanisms through 
which the power-enabling institutional features of money are enforced.
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technical speciﬁ cation of money in the prevailing manner in the ﬁ rst 
place or that implementing such correlation will ever be technically 
feasible. Th is position requires genuine faith, among other things, in 
the proposition that money is typically designed to measure monetary 
power exercised by others rather than to project power to the beneﬁ t of its 
creators or managers. In other words, in order to assess the relative merits 
of this view, one may think of the odds that all the coercion, institution-
building, and power projection associated with the creation and the 
ongoing circulation of territorial currencies has been motivated primarily 
by the desire to measure economic interaction – to expel all competing 
measures that presumably would have been equally accurate and neutral 
from one’s territory – as opposed to some of the alternative power-
based explanations. Th e questionable intrinsic merits notwithstanding, 
the implicit notion that the social weapon of money is constructed 
merely to measure power projection by others remains widespread. One 
of the dominant manifestations in academia is perhaps the tendency 
to undertheorize the political signiﬁ cance of debt merely because all 
money may be conceptualized as debt. As was noted in chapter 4, social 
externalities, political signiﬁ cance, and transformed subjectivities may 
arise from any discrepancies between the rules governing the circulation 
of goods and services and the monetary media that regulate their 
multilateral exchange, such as the necessity to borrow money – whether 
conceptualized as debt, commodity, or something else – into existence 
against interest-bearing debt.
At another level, an individual may be relatively well aware of the 
socially constructed nature of money and the economic indeterminacy 
that such realization brings about, but subjectivity nonetheless may 
continue to be transformed by the structural mechanisms through which 
the artiﬁ cial scarcity is managed. Although the socially constructed 
accounting system of money is correctly seen as reﬂ ecting power more 
than the actual physical constraints on economic activity, realization of the 
sheer magnitude of power concentration that the management of scarcity 
through debt-controlled money supply implies may produce distinctively 
opportunistic and focused subjectivities. For those who are excited by 
the enhanced opportunities for socially protectionist Darwinism – 
essentially uncontested economic, political and social domination behind 
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structurally protectionist rules of the game – this realization may bring 
hope of achieving their goals without the inconvenience of actually 
having to continuously prove themselves in a Hobbesian social world of 
all against all. For just about everyone else – including diverse groups 
from egalitarians to libertarians – the debt-based subjectivity may have the 
potential to concentrate minds on the necessity of monetary reform more 
eﬀ ectively than most alternative cognitive frameworks. In both cases the 
power exercised over the individual subjectivity gains strength from the 
patently implausible parallel reality – the debt-ridden world of physical 
plenty70 where actors presumably engage in a social arms race merely to 
gain recognition for their brands of the neutral veil – which the individual 
is forced to adopt in order to avoid economic, political, social or academic 
marginalization. After all, one of the psychologically most pervasive forms 
of power does not involve the simple rewarding of an obedient worldview 
or the willingness to switch between two reasonably justiﬁ able alternatives, 
but the conditioning of material and immaterial rewards on a worldview 
that is so patently implausible that conformity cannot possibly signify 
anything else than obedience and the utter deprivation of the individual’s 
capacity for plausible self-denial of complicity.71 
70 As was noted earlier, the artiﬁ cial scarcity managed through the socially 
constructed accounting system of money may be gradually imposing tighter physical 
constraints on economic activity as the attainment of the implicit liberal ideal of an 
“economically eﬃ  cient” extinction of the species approaches. In a sense, liberal regimes 
of power have developed their own distinct form of suicide terrorism. In contrast to 
the simultaneous projection of violence and self-inﬂ iction of death associated with the 
traditional forms of suicide terrorism, the globalization of liberal governance structures 
facilitates a temporal divergence between these two acts. While the extermination of 
the deviant subjectivities and modes of life by liberal terror is often instantaneous, the 
survival of the species is likely to be threatened with a time lag as the liberal norm life 
either becomes autonomously alienated from the physical requirements of reproduction 
or is terminated by an environmental change that could have been manageable, had 
human diversity not been eliminated through sovereign violence. Th e elimination of the 
deviant subjectivities and diversity will threaten the survival of the species, but a temporal 
divergence is introduced between the act of violence and the self-inﬂ iction of death for the 
terrorist. In eﬀ ect, the liberal mode of suicide terrorism adopts the economistic rhetoric 
of instant gratiﬁ cation through credit creation in its battle for the hearts and minds of 
potential followers against alternative conceptualizations of the human: “buy now, pay 
later” becomes “terrorize now, die later”.
71 Th e nature and functions of the patently implausible parallel reality will be 
analyzed in more detail in chapter 12.
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A focus on the sources of money’s institutional power and the 
inseparability of its material and subjective dimensions foregrounds several 
undertheorized aspects of money’s multiple potential spatializations. First, 
there is nothing inherently territorial about the geography of money. 
Th e same governmental impact arising from collective debt slavery and 
the structural necessity to engage in zero-sum competition for positive 
monetary net worth can be achieved regardless of the physical location 
of the diﬀ erent members of the monetary space. Th e appropriate spatial 
metaphor of a monetary system is thus likely to be network irrespective of 
any potential temporary success of a sovereign authority in territorializing 
the subjectivities and circuits of exploitation involved. Second, although the 
material and the symbolic or subjective dimensions of money are mutually 
constitutive and thus in constant interaction with each other, there is no 
reason why they should coincide either territorially or within the networks 
of subjects that constitute separate monetary spaces. Th e same material 
logic can be divided into several symbolic subspaces, while the same shared 
subjectivity can be divided into separate material practices.
8.2 A Spectrum of Spatializations: Some Structural 
Social Hierarchies Shaped by Modern Credit Money
Th e role of money as an institution thus remains undertheorized 
in structurally oriented economic, political and social analysis. Th e 
institutional underpinnings of “the headquarters of the capitalist system, 
from which orders go to its individual divisions” (Schumpeter, 1934: 126) 
are rarely regarded as an artifact of political agency, which could exert 
autonomous inﬂ uence on the aggregation and transmission of structural 
pressures. Yet certain elements and characteristics of the current form and 
stage of the ﬁ nancialization of capital72 in general and the development 
of modern credit money in particular suggest that the monetary system 
72 For the purposes of this study perhaps the most relevant aspect of the 
“ﬁ nancialization” of capital involves the gradual loosening of the political, regulatory, 
technological, or indeed any conceivable constraints on the technical speciﬁ cations of 
ﬁ nancial capital – the emergence of ever more creative conﬁ gurations permitted by 
the privileged reality, which structurally skews the rules of the game further in favor of 
ﬁ nancial capital.
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itself may constitute one of the key transmission channels for structural 
economic and political forces. 
In terms of class analysis – whether conceptualized through con-
ventional social classes, “collective life situations” (Beck, 2002: 207) or 
some other attribute describing persistent structural social polarization – 
modern credit money contributes to a rigid class structure independently 
of education, eﬀ ort, productivity or any other consideration commonly 
evoked in defense of legitimate income inequalities. Modern credit money 
does not exist unless someone within the monetary space – individuals, 
corporations or governments – borrows it into existence against interest-
bearing debt. Such debt is eﬀ ectively unrepayable for two reasons: the 
economy as a whole does not have enough money in circulation to meet 
the interest payments as they fall due and in any case economic agents 
will at all times need some currency to clear the desired transactions. 
One inquiry into the history of monetary reformist ideas articulates the 
concern on the implications of issuing money against interest-bearing 
debt as follows:
How can we create a free society when there is now less money in the 
economy – in the UK, about £100 billion less – than there is outstanding 
debt? Isn’t the inevitable outcome of such a situation that the ownership 
of business, land and property will slip inexorably into the hands of 
the ﬁ nancial institutions, leaving people increasingly enslaved by their 
mortgages and credit cards? (Boyle, 2002: 10)73
As economic interaction between individuals and nations is gradually 
monetized and subsistence outside the monetized market mechanism 
becomes increasingly diﬃ  cult, the amount of money – and thus also the 
amount of unrepayable interest-bearing debt – required for the economy 
73 Boyle also suggests that the proportion of people living in poverty may have remained 
relatively stable since the 19th century “due to some hitherto undiscovered economic ‘law’ 
about money creation” (Boyle, 2002: 10). Any potential stability of the relative sizes of 
the social classes does not need to be related to monetary factors. Th e argument here is 
concerned with the permanence of the class system itself: as long as the bulk of the money 
supply is issued against interest-bearing debt, it is structurally impossible to eradicate 
poverty. In the absence of redistributionist intervention, the proportion of people living 
in poverty would be expected to increase as opposed to remaining stable. In other words, 
the logic that is inherent in both the technical speciﬁ cations of modern credit money as 
deﬁ ned in this chapter and the rules governing the institutional access to the capacity to 
experiment with the diﬀ erent variants of “Frankenmoney” is highly polarizing.
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to function increases. Regardless of the choice of currency, users must incur 
debt and pay interest to the issuers merely to trade physical and human 
capital that may already exist and have been paid for. Th e distribution 
of the beneﬁ ts and the burden of the interest payments are typically 
highly unequal. According to one study, only the two highest deciles 
of the population in terms of net interest income are net beneﬁ ciaries 
at the expense of the eight lowest deciles, while the largest beneﬁ ts are 
disproportionately concentrated on a fraction of a percent in the highest 
income group (Kennedy, 1995: 25–29). Hence the class structure imposed 
by modern credit money is consistent with some of the Marxist notions of 
exploitation and class analysis in general, as the interest-based exploitation 
“binds the exploiter and the exploited together in a way that economic 
oppression need not” and “a substantial proportion of the population, at 
least in the advanced capitalist countries, occupy contradictory locations 
within exploitation relations, locations in which they are simultaneously 
exploited and exploiters” (Wright, 1985: 75, 288).74
In world-systems terminology, modern credit money may be 
conceptualized as a relatively autonomous element of a wider structural 
hierarchy between the economic and political units of choice – a system 
with a clear core group of beneﬁ ciaries, periphery of the structurally 
exploited, and a semi-periphery of individuals with an uncertain long-
term structural status. As Wallerstein has noted, “in ‘world-systems’ we 
are dealing with a spatial/temporal zone which cuts across many political 
and cultural units, one that represents an integrated zone of activity and 
institutions which obey certain systemic rules” (2004: 17). An increasingly 
important element of such institutional conﬁ guration involves the 
monetary system, which has an individual micro-dimension in addition 
to the macropolitics of currencies. Th e core of such a system consists 
74 Th e rhetorical – if not in a sense also substantive – parallels to Foucault’s work are 
intriguing. For Foucault, the relational element which transforms unilateral domination 
into a two-way relationship is freedom: “power relations are possible only insofar as the 
subjects are free. If one of them were completely at the other’s disposal and became his 
thing, an object on which he could wreak boundless and limitless violence, there wouldn’t 
be any relations of power” (Foucault, 1997: 292). Regarding the contradictory locations 
of individuals in networks of power, Foucault observes that “Power is employed and 
exercised through a net-like organisation. … individuals … are always in the position of 
simultaneously undergoing and exercising… power. … Th e individual which power has 
constituted is at the same time its vehicle” (Foucault, 1980: 98).
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of individuals with signiﬁ cant positive monetary balances, who exploit 
everyone else outside the core through a mode of accumulation that has 
no eﬃ  ciency-based economic justiﬁ cation.75 Although the monetary 
social hierarchy is not structurally entirely ﬁ xed, such individuals have 
negligible personal risk of downward social mobility due to the continuous 
upward redistribution of wealth through compound interest. Th e 
periphery includes the vast majority of the world’s population who have 
no realistic opportunity to escape negative monetary net worth – either 
personal or government debt – through their own productive eﬀ orts. 
Th ese individuals are subject to constant exploitation through resource 
transfers corresponding to interest payments on unrepayable debt. Th e 
semi-periphery consists of individuals whose structural position based on 
the net eﬀ ect of exploiting the periphery and being exploited by the core 
remains indeterminate.
Th e conceptualization of modern credit money as a relatively 
autonomous source of structural social hierarchies provides a useful 
analytical tool for understanding the ongoing ﬁ nancialization and 
transnationalization of capital and the opportunities for transnational 
class formation and reterritorialization that they confer to individuals 
and sovereign bodies. Th e scope of the monetarily induced structural 
social hierarchies does not need to coincide with any other types of 
institutionalized political spaces. Such structural spatial indeterminacy 
renders money an exceptionally versatile instrument of geopolitical, 
biopolitical and social power projection. Th e role of tax-induced debt 
in conferring value to ﬁ at currencies and extracting surplus from 
colonized populations, for instance, has been widely documented (e.g. 
75 It may be worth reminding once again that no claims about agency are made 
here. Th e essence of the argument is that a relatively small group of individuals with 
signiﬁ cant positive balances of ﬁ nancial capital is exploiting everyone else through the 
structural features of modern credit money. In theory, it is not necessary for anyone to 
be aware of the existence of such radical deleveller inherent in the monetary system, 
let alone be actively contributing to its permanence. Right combinations of inertia and 
ignorance might produce similar results. In practice, everyone participating in monetized 
market exchange is contributing to, or at least implicitly approving, the exploitative 
logic. Ignorance and inertia may obscure agency as long as the structural features of 
modern credit money remain poorly understood. Conversely, once the logic of modern 
credit money is widely understood, it may be diﬃ  cult not to illuminate agency in case 
democratic monetary reforms – for one possibility, see chapter 10 of this study – are not 
implemented despite popular pressures.
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Wray, 1998). In the colonial accounts of debt-based exploitation the 
assumption of nation-states as the predominant actors has often been 
treated as relatively unproblematic. Nevertheless, more recent theorization 
on the class relations of global capitalism has often questioned this 
assumption. As one student of the increasingly transnational nature 
of class formation puts it, “[t]he class relations of global capitalism are 
now so deeply internalized within every nation-state” that the relevant 
question to ask has become “how and by whom in the world capitalist 
system values are produced (organized through what institutions), how 
are they appropriated (through what institutions), and how are these 
processes changing through capitalist globalization” (Robinson, 2007: 
23, 24, original emphasis). Th e following section explores these questions 
through analyzing the di-polaric nature of money both as a product of 
sovereignty and as a biopolitical force.
8.3 Rendering the Logic of Financial Capital Biopolitical
Conventional notions of the ontology and teleology of money tend to 
privilege the form over the strategy or purpose of the authority that 
confers money its value. According to a typical articulation of the 
perceived association between monetary and sovereign spaces, “[o]ne of 
the hallmarks of national sovereignty through the ages has been the right 
to create money … Th e ability to create its own domestic money is the 
key ﬁ nancial distinction of a sovereign state” (Hirsch, 1969; quoted in 
Cohen, 1998: 1). While money is often explicitly recognized as a “weapon” 
in the economic “struggle of man against man” (Weber, 1978: 108), the 
precise mechanisms through which money may serve the objectives of 
power remain undertheorized. In the words of Kirshner (1995: 29, 31), 
“[m]onetary power is a remarkably eﬃ  cient component of state power … 
the most potent instrument of economic coercion available to states in a 
position to exercise it.” Th e state-centric views rarely adequately address 
the obvious questions that are likely to follow: coercion against whom and 
for what purpose? In an era where it has become increasingly common to 
suggest that the nation-state itself may exemplify the “territorial trap” 
(Agnew, 1994) and “spaces of ﬂ ows” may be gaining in importance 
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over “spaces of places” (Castells, 1996), it would hardly be appropriate 
to analyze the strategy of state power in exclusively territorial terms.76 
Yet, as Alatout (2006: 608) has pointed out, “[i]f the individual and the 
population, rather than territory, are the objects and targets of power, 
then, threat comes from the inside of the state not from the outside; 
insecurity, as well, is redeﬁ ned in terms of an insecure population (poverty, 
health, well-being) rather than an insecure territory.” Hence the state and 
its population – or the sovereign and the biopolitical spheres of power 
– would appear to be interdependent to an extent that cannot be easily 
captured by exclusively state-centric or territorial conceptualizations 
of power. Such interdependent yet tensional power structures call, in 
Agamben’s terminology, for a logic of the ﬁ eld that could overcome the 
limitations of the unipolar territorial views on the strategy of power.
Th e traditional state-centric conceptualizations of sovereign authority 
have increasingly been challenged by post-structuralist accounts of power. 
According to perhaps one of the most inﬂ uential formulations of the 
emerging deterritorialization of power and the growing pre-eminence of 
biopolitical forms of inﬂ uence:  
Th e great industrial and ﬁ nancial powers … produce not only 
commodities but also subjectivities. Th ey produce agentic subjectivities 
within the biopolitical context: they produce needs, social relations, 
bodies, and minds – which is to say, they produce producers. In the 
biopolitical sphere, life is made to work for production and production is 
made to work for life (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 32).
Such an outcome is at odds with the notion of a disciplinary society, as 
In disciplinary society … the relationship between power and the 
individual remained a static one: the disciplinary invasion or power 
corresponded to the resistance of the individual. By contrast, when 
power becomes entirely biopolitical, the whole social body is comprised 
by power’s machine and developed in its virtuality. Th is relationship is 
open, qualitative, and aﬀ ective (Ibid: 24). 
76 In historical materialist circles it has often been questioned whether the state-
centric conceptual framework ever fully deserved its analytical primacy. Lacher (2006: 
9), for instance, argues that “the ‘nationalization’ or ‘territorialization’ of social science is 
very much a phenomenon of the century from the 1870s to the 1970s. Th is itself suggests 
that the centrality of territorial space to social organization for much of the ‘Westphalian’ 
epoch may be vastly exaggerated.”
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While some of the criticism of Hardt and Negri on depicting the Empire 
as “over-powered and under-speciﬁ ed” (Th ompson, 2005: 77) may 
be on the mark, their work does highlight the increasingly prominent 
role of the Foucauldian triad of the elements of power – “productive, 
dispersed, and relational” (Alatout, 2006: 607) – in transforming the 
structural pressures emanating from modern credit money into outcomes 
or opportunity sets favored by the strategy of power in both its sovereign 
and biopolitical manifestations. According to Foucault:
An analysis in terms of power must not assume that state sovereignty, 
the form of the law, or the overall unity of a domination, is given at 
the outset; rather, these are only the terminal forms power takes. … 
power must be understood in the ﬁ rst instance as the multiplicity of 
force relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate and that 
constitute their own organization; … Power is everywhere; not because it 
embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere (Foucault, 2004: 
92–93, quoted in Jessop, 2007: 37, emphasis added).
As a “terminal form of power” that “comes from everywhere”, Foucault’s 
conception of state sovereignty has often been criticized for its apparent 
disregard for the role of human agency in shaping structural pressures. 
Yet there is also a distinctively network-like element in the “productive, 
dispersed and relational” forms of power, implying that “the de-centering 
of power in networks might also be seen as a kind of centering or ﬁ xing 
of power” (Kirsch, 2003: 224, original emphasis). As Castells puts it, 
power “is no longer concentrated in institutions (the state), organizations 
(capitalist ﬁ rms), or symbolic controllers (corporate media, churches). 
It is diﬀ used in global networks of wealth, power, information, and 
images, which circulate and transmute in a system of variable geometry 
and dematerialized geography. Yet, it does not disappear. Power still rules 
society; it still shapes, and dominates, us” (Castells, 1997: 359, original 
emphasis). Th e power of modern credit money is distinctively productive 
in the sense that it rewards compliance with the prerogatives of capital 
by upward social mobility within the structural social hierarchies under 
its sphere of inﬂ uence, dispersed as its logic applies equally to every 
individual participating in monetized market exchange, and relational 
in the sense that performance is evaluated against the eﬀ orts of other 
individuals rather than some ﬁ xed standard that all members of the 
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monetary space could at least in theory attain. Furthermore, such power 
produces norms and expectations that may guide agentic behavior long 
after the speciﬁ c sovereign institutions where such structural pressures 
may have originated have been dismantled or rescaled. It is not obvious 
why such power could not “shape and dominate us” according to the 
speciﬁ c strategy of power.
Th e increasingly prominent monetary element of the Empire 
should thus not be viewed as a singular and monolith process of 
deterritorialization, but as an increasing responsiveness of the oscillations 
between deterritorialization and reterritorialization – or sovereignty and 
biopower – to the strategy of power. In other words, structural pressures are 
homogenizing the mode of monetary governance rather than the design 
of the institutional ornaments which tailor the converging monetary logic 
to the local symbolism. Regardless of the signiﬁ cance of the remaining 
territorial or cultural divisions, the logic of modern credit money has been 
remarkably successful in homogenizing the norms and expectations on 
the structural necessity of zero-sum competition, growing disparities in 
income and wealth distribution, social polarization, ecological collapse, 
and viewing the prevailing economic and political structures as the only 
“realistic” alternatives to avert even more serious disasters – whatever they 
might entail. Once the prisons for the imagination have been socially 
constructed, it is a relatively straightforward task for sovereign authority 
to reinstitutionalize, reterritorialize or reinforce its power in the bricks 
and mortar world in line with the modiﬁ ed agentic expectations.
Th e analytical value of conceptualizing the Empire as a converging 
incentive structure has often been too readily ignored in the absence 
of evidence of the corresponding convergence of more traditional 
institutional manifestations of power. It is not uncommon to see this 
concern articulated along the following lines:
Does not the unilateral turn of the U.S. administration … negate the 
very principles of Empire (based within a recognition of global law and 
order as prescribed by international organisations)? Does not the U.S. 
administration’s decision to withdraw from the Kyoto protocol and 
from the anti-ballistic-missile treaty, its failure to ratify the Rio pact on 
biodiversity, its reactionary opposition to the ban on landmines, the 
biological warfare convention and the creation of the international criminal 
court, its progressive delegitimation of the United Nations and its new 
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vision of NATO’s world role – do not all of these actions fundamentally 
undermine the realisation of Empire’s global geography? Are we not being 
faced, perhaps, with an attempt to create a counter-Empire, characterised 
by a militarised globalisation and monolithic imperialism – a far cry from 
the domination of a biopolitical system of uncertain boundaries and high 
mobility that Hardt and Negri describe – and invite us to combat ‘from the 
inside’? (Minca, 2003: 232, original emphasis)
Yet it is not obvious why any potential changes in the hardware of power 
– the visible institutional agglomerations of inﬂ uence – should always 
transparently reﬂ ect the latest developments in the software of power – 
the diﬀ erential agentic capacities to exploit the prevailing institutional 
conﬁ gurations for the attainment of any given strategic objectives – to 
produce an unambiguous and homogeneous picture of who is exercising 
structural inﬂ uence and what the ultimate objectives of such forms 
of power might be.77 State power, unlike the hierarchical element of 
modern credit money, is structurally indeterminate. Th e extent to which 
state power centralizes or decentralizes decision-making authority or 
responds to democratic or particularistic concerns is a matter of ongoing 
contestation, whereby changes in the access to the state’s coercive and 
legitimating powers among diﬀ erent interest groups are at least in theory 
possible. Th e polarizing logic of modern credit money, in contrast, is 
structurally ﬁ xed: any modiﬁ cation would require either separate policies 
aimed at mitigating the ongoing polarizing tendencies or a full-scale 
monetary reform. Hence any oscillation between the sovereign and the 
biopolitical forms of monetary power is a profoundly political act, which 
shifts the boundaries between the transparently contestable “political” 
and the structurally exploitative “technical”. Every time sovereign power 
manages to incorporate a newly conceived mode of exploitation into the 
dominant monetary subjectivity – the dominant perception of the set 
of social relations which may legitimately be labeled as “monetary” – a 
contentious issue is removed from the realm of politics and re-speciﬁ ed 
77 Th e purpose of the selected terminology is to emphasize the fact that “the 
multiplicity of force relations” and “the terminal forms of power” are conceptually 
separate entities: any potential transformation of the institutional manifestations of the 
terminal forms of power in response to the shifting multiplicities of force relations is 
not automatic, but the result of agentic preference for institutional transformation over 
working through the prevailing organizational structures and facades of power.
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as a structural or “technical” feature of the prevailing monetary system. 
Every time the evolving monetary subjectivities start to demand reform 
of the material practice of money according to popular preferences, 
political agency is being reclaimed from the territory of the structurally 
exploitative “technical”. Th e evolving technical speciﬁ cations of ﬁ nancial 
capital modify agentic subjectivities, which in turn shape sovereign 
power’s opportunity structures for geopolitical, biopolitical, or social 
power projection. Such di-polaric oscillation calls for a theoretically and 
methodologically integrated approach to the analysis of power. As Jessop 
has noted, “there is more scope than many believe for dialogue between 
critical Marxist and Foucauldian analyses” as “Marx seeks to explain the 
why of capital accumulation and state power”, while “Foucault’s analyses 
of disciplinarity and governmentality try to explain the how of economic 
exploitation and domination” (Jessop, 2007: 40, original emphasis). 
Agamben’s observation that “[i]t can even be said that the production 
of a biopolitical body is the original activity of a sovereign power” (1998: 
6, original emphasis) may help to shed further light on the circular 
mechanisms that permit a nuanced analysis of the strategy of power 
in addition to its speciﬁ c institutional manifestations. Th e following 
section expands the analysis of modern credit money in the context of 
the oscillations between sovereignty and biopower to some of the post-
structuralist conceptualizations of the Empire.
8.4 Decentralized Human Agency and the Structural 
Power of Modern Credit Money: The Empire as an 
Open Source Incentive Structure
Th e inseparability of money’s material and subjective dimensions 
and any potential spatial divergences between them call for an 
analytical framework that is capable of reconciling theoretically and 
methodologically distinct but conceptually intimately related elements 
of money’s multiple potential spatializations. Money has both a sovereign 
dimension as a material practice emanating from the state’s legislative and 
coercive powers and a biopolitical dimension produced and reproduced 
through the symbolism and subjectivities that are formed, negotiated and 
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contested through interpersonal relations. Th e state may have speciﬁ ed 
money in a manner that entails collective debt slavery, but the production 
of the corresponding subjectivities that accept the validity of the state’s 
version of the socially constructed accounting system of money is likely 
to require personal experience of the structural scarcity of money and 
the presumed economic impossibility of altruistic behavior. Conversely, 
a purely biopolitical awakening and liberation from the identity politics 
of money may be futile as long as the sovereign structures that produce 
money as a material practice remain intact. Although Foucault himself 
has often been criticized for failing to adequately theorize the intersections 
between sovereign and biopower, the Foucauldian framework for 
understanding power as the management of a multiplicity of disparate 
practices according to a strategic logic may be particularly appropriate 
for capturing the political signiﬁ cance of money’s multiple potential 
spatializations. More recent insights from Giorgio Agamben complement 
rather than contradict this theoretical approach.
In Foucauldian terminology, virtually the entire world can be concep-
tualized as governmentally secured – as a governmentally prepackaged 
set of individuals who conform to the material practices and, to a lesser 
extent, the agentic subjectivities emanating from the polarizing logic 
of modern credit money. Irrespective of any potential controversies in 
identifying the relevant historical and causal mechanisms of transition, 
it can hardly be ignored that virtually the entire world78 has converged 
on the use of modern credit money. It is remarkable to observe how in 
a world that supposedly boasts of a “bewildering diversity of forms of 
articulation between capitalist and noncapitalist practices” and multiple 
78 Potential exceptions tend to rely more on semantics than substance. Th e nominally 
non-interest-charging Islamic banking institutions, for instance, are unquestionably 
involved in money creation and, although bank oﬃ  cials may argue that “God is in the 
details” (Useem, 2002), transactions typically involve payments that may look “a lot 
like interest” and amount to sums that are “very close to the prevailing interest rate” 
(Ibid.). Perhaps unsurprisingly, several commentators within the Muslim community 
have compared contemporary Islamic banking practices to the Contractum Trinius that 
was adopted by moneylenders in medieval Europe to circumvent the Christian church’s 
ban on usury (see e.g. El Diwany, 2006). Perhaps the most signiﬁ cant group of genuine 
exceptions involves the local or “complementary” currencies that are issued debt- and 
interest-free by the users, which nonetheless remain relatively marginalized and vulnerable 
to forcible incorporation into the state-managed currency systems through taxation and 
reserve requirements, for example.
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logics of “parasitic forms of primitive accumulation” (Chari, 2003: 180), 
virtually every society – whether capitalist or communist, industrialized 
or “developing”, a proponent of “enduring freedom” or simply “evil” 
– has adopted the same distinctively capitalist form of monetary 
institution. Th us modern credit money provides a concrete example of 
the di-polaric circularity of power between sovereign and biopolitical 
forms that has often remained undertheorized in post-structuralist 
accounts of power. Rather than abolishing territorial boundaries, the 
Empire’s monetary dimension homogenizes the mode of accumulation 
across territorial space that may or may not be divided into relatively 
autonomous subunits in other spheres of economic or political activity. 
Once the hyperglobalist overtones of Hardt and Negri have been properly 
dismissed as prematurely “assuming away the nation-state” (Corbridge, 
2003: 188) and other relevant institutions, the converging monetary 
incentive structures can be theorized as mutually reinforcing adaptations 
of the modes of accumulation and governance to the actual, historically 
and socially grounded economic and political institutions. 
Th e thoroughly political and agentic nature of money’s sovereign 
pole has received insuﬃ  cient attention in contemporary social scientiﬁ c 
analysis. Th e common accounts of “borderless”, “faceless” or “footloose” 
capital miss the unmistakably physical nature of the institutions and 
individuals involved in managing the creation and circulation of money 
according to prerogatives whose objectives and justiﬁ cation remain less 
than perfectly articulated. Despite a colorful history of controversy and 
contestation, monetary reform has not been able to muster suﬃ  cient 
political support, as:
[t]he lock-in between the political, legal, banking and institutionalized 
monetary system has proven invariably too tight to break, even when 
the proposals came from the most inﬂ uential economist of his time 
(such as Keynes’ proposal for his bancor) or when they were supported 
by substantial popular movements (such as Gesells’ Freiwirtschaft (‘Free 
Economy’) movement between the two wars) (Lietaer, 2001: 214).
While it might be inconceivable for most people to allow doctors, 
for instance, to convert their presumably superior medical knowledge 
into a social weapon against their patients in a Darwinian struggle for 
existence, no similar moral considerations appear to arise in the public 
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consciousness when social struggles of equal or greater signiﬁ cance are 
channeled through the structural logic of modern credit money by the 
“political, legal and banking” institutions. Hence the colorful adjectives 
that are often associated with the globalizing capital more often than not 
appear to describe the speciﬁ c ways in which power manifests itself in the 
biopolitical sphere rather than the wielders of that power in the more old-
fashioned sovereign, physical, territorially-based institutional structures. 
Although the origins of modern credit money can in virtually every 
case be traced back to sovereign forms of authority, the circulation 
of money also produces an incentive structure that gives rise to a 
distinctively biopolitical form of power – an “open source” Empire, 
whereby the structural necessity to engage in a zero-sum competition 
for positive monetary net worth at the expense of other members of the 
monetary space gradually transforms both the material reality and the 
individual interpretations of what is economically, feasible, desirable, or 
“natural”. Th e subjects of the governmentally prepackaged biopolitical 
pool eﬀ ectively participate in perfecting the Empire’s source code – the 
mechanisms of their own governance – in exchange for upward social 
mobility in the Empire’s structural social hierarchy. Th e open source 
Empire forces its every subject to contribute to its own expansion and 
permanence through conditionalizing subsistence on the acceptance of 
its hierarchical prerogatives while continuously adapting and readjusting 
itself to the prevailing economic, social and political conditions. As no 
amount of education, technological development or productive activity 
can challenge the structural necessity of zero-sum competition for positive 
monetary balances among individuals, obtaining a sustainable livelihood 
through monetized market exchange requires the persistent competitive 
exclusion of some other individuals’ needs from the marketplace. In 
intellectually less disciplined circles – preschool children, for instance, 
tend to be particularly perceptive in this regard – such logic might be 
compared to a socially sanctioned evaluation of each individual’s worth 
as a human being through an obligatory game of musical chairs with a 
strong discursive commitment to label any individuals questioning the 
rationale for such practices, pointing out the technical feasibility of 
producing more than enough chairs for everyone, or refusing to play 
altogether as losers who lack the skills to win in the game. Yet no sovereign 
authority could continuously reproduce the requisite economic, social 
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and political structures without continuously shaping and reproducing 
agentic subjectivities in the biopolitical sphere of power and evoking grand 
narratives of eﬃ  ciency, progress and objectivity to conceal the preschool 
foundations of the adult playground. As long as monetized market 
exchange retains its aura of procedural eﬃ  ciency and justice, imperialism 
no longer has a need for expensive, ineﬃ  cient and often state-centered 
central planning structures to enforce social hierarchies and the logic of 
capital accumulation. Under the open source Empire, no individual is too 
disempowered or marginalized to enhance and perpetuate the Empire’s 
reach by further disempowering her peers in every other sense except their 
capacity to accelerate the centralization of economic and political power. 
Rather than merely encouraging “a state of autonomous alienation from 
the sense of life and the desire for creativity” (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 23), 
the open source Empire thus redeﬁ nes both the sense of life and creativity 
in zero-sum terms by rewarding competition among individuals while 
punishing altruism. Th e fact that genuine eﬃ  ciency-seeking competition, 
equality, truth, justice or any other instance of conspicuous consumption 
of moral luxuries provides no material beneﬁ ts to their pursuers in the 
face of the structural necessity to extract a positive monetary net worth at 
other people’s expense for survival virtually ensures that any innovation 
motivated by pecuniary considerations contributes to economic inequality, 
social segmentation and other familiar consequences of more traditional 
forms of imperial domination. 
Th e incentive structure inherent in the open source Empire has 
eﬀ ectively emancipated exploitation from the constant need to 
relegitimize and remystify its true nature with profound implications for 
the dominant conception of the human nature. It has also democratized 
oppression in a manner that co-opts the more materialistically minded 
segments of its potential opposition – those individuals who wish to 
obtain a reasonable livelihood through monetized market exchange 
without incurring the money-creating debt themselves – by rewarding 
particularly innovative ways to rebrand exploitation and oppression 
according to local tastes. Virtually any businessman could attest how 
overly moralistic free marketeers are weeded out in favor of the ones who 
properly see the free market rhetoric as a façade for the centralization of 
economic power. Most politicians and scholars are unlikely to be blind 
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to the expected payoﬀ s associated with rationalizing prevailing or newly 
conceived forms of exploitation in a particularly innovative manner 
as opposed to adopting unduly inﬂ exible views on the desirability 
of the pursuit of truth.79 As someone – individuals, corporations or 
governments – must constantly make interest payments on unrepayable 
debt merely to keep money in circulation, these are not abstract moral 
choices, but literally matters of life and death. Any altruistically inclined 
individual has to compensate each non-proﬁ t maximizing decision by 
more ruthless exploitation of her peers in other instances in order to 
avoid a relegation to the category of the permanently exploited – often 
entailing drastically reduced quality of life and life span as opposed to 
the romantic notion of a less materialist lifestyle – in the structural social 
hierarchy imposed by modern credit money. Th e psychologist and social 
critic John F. Schumaker has noted how we are “removed from nature, 
married to work, adrift from family and friends, spiritually starved, 
sleep deprived, physically unﬁ t, dumbed down, and enslaved to debt” 
as “true love and true happiness … have become uneconomic” amidst a 
consumerist mindset that leaves individuals “never deeply satisﬁ ed, but 
always in the process of satisfying themselves” (Schumaker, 2006). Such 
comments illustrate the extent to which sovereign and biopolitical forms 
of power may already have been convoluted in the popular imagination: 
it is the personal greed or the materialist mindset that is to be blamed for 
some of the most egregious manifestations of social disintegration rather 
than the structural need to adopt the mindset of a psychopath to obtain 
a living through the zero-sum competitive process of monetized market 
exchange. As ordinary people are depicted as capital’s willing executioners 
rather than victims of structural forces that are coercing their compliance, 
the perceived origin of the structural pressures may increasingly become 
associated with “productive, dispersed and relational” as opposed to 
sovereign forms of power, potentially leading to a self-fulﬁ lling prophecy 
regarding the assumptions concerning the human nature and the origins 
of the structural competitive pressures.       
79 Attempts to increase one’s monetary net worth through questionable means 
– as well as social polarization in general – would undoubtedly exist under any forms 
of monetary arrangements. Nonetheless, the structural necessity of the hierarchical 
competition as well as its zero-sum nature are far from inevitable. Issuing money debt- and 
interest-free, for instance, would signiﬁ cantly reduce such pressures.
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Th e globalizing market governed by the logic of modern credit money 
may thus be viewed as a repository of knowledge pertaining to class 
structures and class formation that facilitates the reproduction of social 
relations within its sphere of inﬂ uence. Th e nearly universal triumph of 
transnationally oriented credit money over the isolationist domestic capital 
has both increased the material rewards for domestic elites willing to serve 
the objectives of transnational capital and increased the opportunity cost of 
non-transnationally oriented forms of accumulation by instituting deeper 
international division of labor whereby economies may no longer be able 
to choose not to trade or to cut oﬀ  from international capital ﬂ ows at an 
acceptable cost to either domestic elites or the general population. Even 
within relatively isolated societies the globalizing market governed by the 
logic of modern credit money constitutes a benchmark against which 
domestic circuits of exploitation can be modeled. As the possibilities for 
subsistence outside the system of monetized market exchange approach 
zero for an increasing number of people, every proﬁ table transaction is 
likely to contribute to a more unequal or a more permanently segregated 
world. Th e open source Empire not only fails to reward any collectively 
optimal activities aiming to achieve decentralization of wealth and 
power through genuine economic and political competition, but also 
disregards any input that does not contribute to its inbuilt logic of wealth 
and power centralization. As innovative justiﬁ cations for exploitation 
are incorporated into the source code and become the benchmark for 
subsequent eﬀ ort, altruistically motivated actions are forgotten after 
the performers have suﬀ ered a one-time loss to move themselves closer 
to the cast of the permanently exploited. While the structural social 
hierarchies may remain relatively ﬁ rm, virtually anyone can improve 
her relative position in the hierarchy by demonstrating superior capacity 
to innovate or legitimize more eﬃ  cient forms of exploitation. Every 
time an informational input on a more eﬃ  cient form of exploitation is 
incorporated into the structure of the open source Empire, the Empire 
approaches the perfectly eﬃ  cient and legitimized form of exploitation, 
making it more diﬃ  cult for latecomers to improve their relative position 
in the structural hierarchy.80 Hence the open source Empire may echo 
80 To illustrate the extent to which the open source Empire has embraced norm-
producing institutions to legitimize the expansion and intensiﬁ cation of its reach, it 
is instructive to recall the Nobel Peace Prize of 2006 awarded to Muhammed Yunus 
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De Angelis’ observation that both Hayek’s spontaneous market order and 
Bentham’s panopticon are “disciplinary mechanisms faced by individuals 
whose ‘freedom’ is conﬁ ned to a range of choices set by an agency outside 
them (the ‘planner’)” (De Angelis, 2002: 293) with one crucial diﬀ erence: 
under a system of modern credit money, the prisoners (of the panopticon 
or the market) not only become their own guardians, but also participate 
in perfecting the disciplinary and legitimating mechanisms associated 
with their own imprisonment.
In Agamben’s terminology, monetary subspaces governed by the 
logic of modern credit money may also be viewed as deterritorialized 
manifestations of the sovereign state of exception and the camp – “the 
space that is opened when the state of exception begins to become the rule” 
(Agamben, 1998: 168–169). At any given point in time the monetary 
space as a whole is close to insolvency, which facilitates the permanent 
administration of the state of exception to serve the purposes of sovereign 
power. In the monetary sphere the state of exception no longer constitutes 
a device to “articulate and hold together the two aspects of the juridico-
political machine by instituting a threshold of undecidability between 
anomie and nomos, between life and law, between auctoritas and potestas” 
(Agamben, 2005: 86). Th e state of exception in which these elements are 
“blurred together” has rather become the rule, transforming the juridico-
political system into a “killing machine” (Ibid.). Th e market-mediated 
competitive process for positive monetary net worth determines the 
and Grameen Bank “for their eﬀ orts to create economic and social development from 
below” and “to advance democracy and human rights” through the “liberating force” 
of microcredit (Th e Norwegian Nobel Committee, 2006). While microcredit may 
undoubtedly help to advance the relative position of the borrowers in the Darwinian 
structural social hierarchy, its overall impact is the expansion of the Empire’s reach to 
previously uncharted social spaces. As long as the lending is governed by the polarizing 
logic of modern credit money, any expansion of lending activity will merely intensify the 
struggle for positive monetary balances among the members of the monetary space. Every 
dollar held by any individual – no matter how deserving, exploited or oppressed – is a 
dollar away from the repayment of the debts against which money has been created – 
necessitating a higher default rate – or transfer of ownership of real assets to the “political, 
legal and banking” institutions in charge of the system – among all other members of the 
monetary space. It remains to be seen whether the purpose of power will ever be reversed 
to an extent that would permit the eﬀ orts of some of the individuals and communities 
working towards more sustainable and equitable forms of money to be met with similar 
normative approval.
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speciﬁ c spatial and temporal manifestations of the portable camp – the 
speciﬁ c individuals at the very bottom of the structural social hierarchy, 
upon whom the misery and lawlessness of the camp is imposed through 
the Empire’s incentive structure.
Th e subspaces are internal to the materially determined logic of 
the monetary system. In other words, the precise manner in which an 
individual experiences the logic of the monetary system depends on one’s 
relative position in the structural social hierarchy. At the top, the technical 
functions of money are complemented by unjust enrichment through 
compound interest and privileged access to the latest developments in 
the evolution of ﬁ nancial capital – a form of monetary state of exception 
from the sovereign’s perspective, whereby the ostensibly neutral 
monetary rules designed for facilitating multilateral exchange are used 
to circumvent those very same rules for private gain.81 At the bottom – 
the monetary camp – the “neutral” rules for multilateral exchange apply 
only insofar as they exclude speciﬁ c individuals from such voluntary 
exchange: voluntary decisions are replaced by forced, unilateral transfer 
of resources structurally mandated by the “neutral” rules for monetized 
market exchange. Th e accumulation of unrepayable debt conﬁ nes certain 
individuals into a position where the ostensibly neutral technical rules for 
monetized market exchange as well as universalist humanitarian principles 
have been suspended in favor of structurally mediated resource transfers 
corresponding to interest payments on unrepayable debt. Irrespective of 
their territorial location, individuals conﬁ ned to the monetary camp by 
unrepayable debt and a lack of purchasing power for life’s basic necessities 
have to choose between withering away – in which case new victims will 
promptly be identiﬁ ed by the markets as the dead cannot hold the debt 
against which money has been created – or extracting suﬃ  cient positive 
monetary net worth from someone else, thus passing on the personal 
81 Th e appropriate analogy is, of course, the sovereign’s capacity to permanently 
suspend the rule of law as a part of the normal mode of governance. As Neocleous (2006: 
208) has observed, “Emergency powers do not involve some kind of suspension of law 
while violence takes place, but are uniﬁ ed with law for the exercise of violence necessary for 
the permanent refashioning of order.” Similarly, monetary states of exception such as the 
unjust enrichment emanating from compound interest on unrepayable debt, debt write-
oﬀ s, unearned seigniorage income, or liquidity provision on favorable terms, for instance, 
do not involve the suspension of some mythical forms of neutral and fair monetary rules 
of the game, but are in fact “part and parcel of the normal mode of governing”(ibid.).
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tragedies caused by the structural scarcity of debt-free money. Once 
the markets have reached their verdict, the carnage of hunger, disease, 
poverty, crime and war – commonly attributed to the victims’ insuﬃ  cient 
skills and eﬀ ort to support themselves through market exchange in the 
hegemonic discourse – can continue unabated within the camp.
Th e conﬁ nement to the monetary camp has both nomological and 
subjective dimensions: nomologically, the individuals in the camp are 
de jure excluded from production and consumption decisions accessible 
only through the possession of suﬃ  cient positive monetary balances; 
subjectively, the camp may produce a distinct form of subjectivity for the 
individuals whose biopolitical signiﬁ cance is largely limited to making 
resource transfers corresponding to interest payments on unrepayable debt 
so that the higher layers of the structural social hierarchy can continue to 
be governed through the more positive appeal of the liberal subjectivities 
associated with monetized market exchange. Although technically part 
of the same monetary space, the logics and the subjectivities produced at 
diﬀ erent levels of the structural social hierarchy are so heterogeneous to 
each other that it may not be an exaggeration to view them as subspaces 
with their own distinct governmental functions and internal logics. As 
a result of deeper income and wealth disparities induced by the logic 
of modern credit money the size of the monetary camp must gradually 
expand relative to the total population, leaving little doubt as to the 
extent and the permanence of sovereign power’s biopolitical ambitions.
Do such knowledge claims on money’s impact on material practices 
and the symbolic or subjective cognitive frameworks not fall into the 
category of “totalising reductionist theories of world order, in which 
the entire human experience is reduced to one overwhelming structure 
aimed at maintaining exploitation, alienation and poverty”? (Palan, 
2007: 58) Do they not “assign an extraordinary degree of unity and 
purpose to the disparate members of the ‘ruling classes’ … brushing 
aside legitimate concerns about the diﬃ  culties of ‘collective action’”? 
(ibid: 68) Th e skepticism and outright hostility towards “totalizing 
reductionist theories” illustrates the extent to which ambiguous or 
contestable agency has become a license to ignore the reality in some 
branches of social scientiﬁ c inquiry. Modern credit money’s impact on 
material practices, subjectivities and incentive structures – both totalizing 
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and reductionist in the sense that the necessity to engage in zero-sum 
competition is structurally elevated over other dimensions of the human 
experience – will not simply go away no matter how deep in the sand of 
ambiguous and contestable agency scholars choose to stick their heads. 
While some of the technical features of modern credit money are readily 
recognizable from the colonial history and each historical reform of the 
monetary system or the social policies aimed at mitigating its polarizing 
consequences is potentially traceable to the interaction of speciﬁ c political 
interests, speculation on agency or functionality is neither necessary 
nor suﬃ  cient for understanding the types of constraints that modern 
credit money places on both material and symbolic practices. It is not 
inconceivable that, given the current levels of wealth centralization and 
the inherently power-centralizing nature of modern credit money, the 
“ruling classes” have in fact managed to solve some of the problems 
of collective action in favor of a “totalizing reductionist” structural 
economic logic. Nor can one exclude the possibility that no signiﬁ cant 
elite faction simply has any incentive to break the governmentally 
prepackaged structural social hierarchies: the intra-elite struggle for 
power may be ﬁ erce, but once the popular classes attempt to break free 
from their debtor mindset the elite may well unite to protect their class 
privilege in general and the perks of the oﬃ  ce of the dominant faction in 
particular. If, on the other hand, the exercise of power – or its constant 
“making and unmaking” – involves the management of a multiplicity 
of heterogeneous practices according to a strategic logic, the primary 
locus of power may be neither identiﬁ able nor stable: the institutional 
platforms – whether sovereign bodies, corporations, the transnational 
capitalist class, old boys networks for socially protectionist Darwinists, or 
any other form of social organization – most suitable for the making and 
unmaking of power might be in constant competition with each other in 
the same manner as some of the individuals occupying speciﬁ c positions 
in each of these platforms are in constant competition to improve their 
relative positions in the structural social hierarchy. Although far from 
unimportant, speculation on agency is neither necessary nor suﬃ  cient for 
understanding the speciﬁ c mechanisms which permit monetary power to 
assume a territorial character. It is unclear why anyone should agree to 
conform to the disempowering dogma – implicitly advocated by some of 
the critics of “totalizing reductionist theories” – of remaining silent on 
176
violence or exploitation whenever agency remains a matter of controversy 
or contestation.82
Th e paradox of the intimate conceptual interrelationship – and yet the 
lack of any necessary spatial equivalence – between the material and the 
symbolic or subjective dimensions of money should thus be at the center 
of any spatial analysis of money. On the one hand, the nearly universally 
shared logic of modern credit money as illustrated by the conceptual 
framework of the open source Empire can be divided into a number of 
symbolic subspaces along national or territorial lines without any apparent 
autonomous pressures for uniﬁ cation under a single global currency. On the 
other hand, the single material practice of modern credit money produces 
a multiplicity of de facto material practices within the same monetary 
space with little pressures for the subspaces of the unjustly enriched or the 
permanently exploited to become independent monetary entities.
 
8.5 Reterritorialization, Social Restructuring and 
the Administration of the Permanent State 
of Exception: Towards a Theory of Territorial 
Projection of Monetary Power
Th e structural logic of the open source Empire provides a spectrum of 
opportunity for the strategic exercise of power irrespective of the primary 
82 Th e natural sciences appear to be doing relatively well without a form of socially 
constructed agency fetishism – such as a perceived necessity to identify the creator of the 
physical universe before anything meaningful can be said about the mechanisms according 
to which it functions – acting as a gatekeeper for academic knowledge production/
preservation. From the perspective of any speciﬁ c individual, some of the prevailing social 
constructs may present just as objective constraints on autonomous agency as natural 
laws. It would, of course, be nice to be able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the forms 
of agency that underlie each socially constructed institution, just as it would be pleasant 
to reach a consensus on the creator of the physical universe before engaging in natural 
scientiﬁ c experiments. Nonetheless, to suggest that the unambiguous identiﬁ cation of 
agency is a precondition for describing the nature of the prevailing socially constructed 
institutions or mechanisms of governance raises more questions about the locus and 
the motives of the forms of agency that guide social scientiﬁ c knowledge production/
preservation than the alleged necessity of conforming to the disempowering dogma 
of remaining silent on violence or exploitation whenever agency remains a matter of 
controversy or contestation.
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locus of agency – whether sovereign bodies, transnational social classes 
or something else. Regardless of the primary locus of agency the logic of 
modern credit money may explain how the internal structure and cohesion 
of power is maintained as it oscillates between its biopolitical and sovereign 
manifestations. Particularly in the case of research on transnational class 
formation, previous attempts to theorize these structural interconnections 
have been largely unsatisfactory. Much of the research on the transnational 
capitalist class (TCC) has focused on organizational overlap and 
transparent elite social networks as opposed to structural features of the 
world economy, which could explain the convergence of the incentive 
structures faced by national capitals (Carroll and Carson, 2003; Carroll 
and Fennema, 2002; Kentor and Jang, 2003; Sklair, 2001). Any potential 
identiﬁ cation of a TCC through some of the more transparent social 
networks would not necessarily explain the persistent social polarization 
experienced in virtually any economy that becomes subject to a division 
of labor mediated by modern credit money. In other words, any possible 
identiﬁ cation of a TCC based on the prevailing methodology could 
only answer the question by whom values are produced, not how such 
production is organized and appropriated institutionally and how these 
processes are shaped by the transnationalization of capital. Th e structural 
logic of the open source Empire ﬁ lls this theoretical gap by providing 
simultaneously an explanation for the incentive structures inherent in 
the TCC formation and the organizational structure through which the 
organization of production and the appropriation of values occurs. 
Th e opportunities for managed interaction between biopolitical and 
sovereign monetary power structures arise from a number of sources, two 
of which may be particularly noteworthy in the context of this study: 
the manufacturing of crises that are ex ante perceived to be conducive to 
certain objectives of power and the constant administration of the state 
of exception which is required to manage the internal contradictions of 
modern credit money. Th e relatively poorly understood logic of modern 
credit money virtually ensures that the global relations of production, 
exchange, and monetarily induced expropriation evolve along a path 
where the inevitable crises can be framed in terms that are favorable to 
ﬁ nancial capital. Hence the forms of crises that eventually materialize 
are likely to be the ones that involve some of the best opportunities 
for continued legitimization and intensiﬁ cation of the prevailing social 
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relations or the reterritorialization or reinstitutionalization of sovereign 
power. In the words of Hardt and Negri drawing on Machiavelli, “the 
expansion of Empire is rooted in the internal trajectory of the conﬂ icts 
it is meant to resolve” (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 15). Causal narratives 
based on notions of “liquidity crisis”, “capital ﬂ ight” or other ostensibly 
neutral technical descriptions overlook the inherently polarizing nature 
of unrepayable debt and imply that the institutional expansion of foreign 
or supranational sovereign bodies which often follows particularly third 
world ﬁ nancial crises is an apolitical solution to technical crises that could 
have been avoided through appropriate policies. Such narratives often seek 
to downplay the role of political agency in contributing to the emergence 
of circumstances that may be conducive to further exercise of agency in 
line with the strategy of power. For instance, according to one account 
of the Asian ﬁ nancial crisis of 1997 in the Singaporean context, “[b]y 
presenting the crisis as resulting from ‘natural’ causes, the possibility that 
either the global ﬁ nancial system as a socially constructed framework, or 
the development strategies of the Singaporean state, might be responsible 
are precluded” (Kelly, 2001: 738; quoted in Sidaway, 2005: 70). Th us 
modern credit money often allows power not only to administer the state 
of exception, but also to produce and reproduce the types of events that 
are perceived to necessitate its application. 
While the dynamic interrelationship between sovereign and monetary 
spaces may not be a particularly recent phenomenon, its increased scope, 
intensity and malleability to serve the strategy of power merit closer 
scrutiny in the contemporary context. In the words of one student of 
such dynamic historical interaction, Polanyi, for instance, emphasized 
that “the nineteenth-century nation-state was an artifact of global 
monetary relations and their social consequences within states” as a part 
of a “political-economic arrangement orchestrated by British commercial 
hegemony vis-à-vis its rival states, and gunboat diplomacy vis-à-vis the 
non-European world” (McMichael, 2001: 205). No sovereign space 
is exempt from the potential pressures for reterritorialization or social 
restructuring channeled through modern credit money. Th e successful 
identiﬁ cation of legitimacy-enhancing threats often presents sovereign 
power with a spectrum of opportunity to pursue its own territorial 
or biopolitical objectives both domestically and transnationally. Th e 
“pooling” of monetary sovereignty in the European Monetary Union 
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in response to real or perceived threats originating in the global capital 
markets, for instance, illustrates how in questions of “pooling” democracy 
the whole can be less than the sum of its components. As Romano Prodi 
once noted while in the European Commission, a “beneﬁ cial crisis” of 
the euro could well help to force through political integration in the 
EU to an extent that might otherwise not be possible in the face of 
national democratic preferences (Evans-Pritchard, 2007). In the absence 
of subsequent reterritorialization, the structural incentives produced and 
reproduced by modern credit money might, according to some analytical 
frameworks, be more appropriately regarded as social engineering rather 
than a form of biopower as “it is only through a consequent process 
of reterritorialisation that forces of deterritorialisation are rendered 
biopolitical” (Reid, 2005: 248).
Irrespective of one’s views on the likely nature and locus of agency, 
the constant interplay between money’s material and symbolic or 
subjective dimensions throughout the history can hardly be ignored. In 
the early days of the state’s trust-building project national iconography 
often turned out to be quite insuﬃ  cient to mould the desired forms of 
monetary subjectivities. As was noted earlier, ﬁ nes, ﬂ ogging, burning 
foreheads with coins or destroying crops that allowed self-suﬃ  ciency 
(Wray, 1998; Ingham, 2004) were sometimes adopted to induce a closer 
ﬁ t between the sovereign’s chosen monetary material practice and the 
subjects’ views on what ought to be economically feasible, desirable, 
or “natural”. Dissenting views on the necessity or the desirability of 
continued adherence to the gold standard may often have been preempted 
by appeals to the path dependent normative conceptual framework rather 
than rationalizing the desirability of the material practice per se. Perhaps 
the most intriguing contemporary example involves the oscillation 
between diﬀ erent subjectivities and material practices involved in the 
European monetary integration project. Perhaps the slightly more than 
a century of territorially based national currencies (Helleiner, 2003) in 
Europe witnessed an evolution of economic activity – if the dominant 
monetary subjectivities are to be believed – guided ﬁ rst by the available 
amounts of a relatively useless precious metal chosen for the task because 
of its natural scarcity and inelasticity of supply, proceeded through stages 
where the discretionary production of inherently worthless tokens of 
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value by a suﬃ  ciently powerful sovereign actor was believed to relieve the 
natural constraints on economic activity as eﬀ ectively as gold, arriving 
ﬁ nally at a point where no-one may be quite sure about what money is, 
who produces it, how, under what conditions and in what quantities, 
but the socially constructed accounting system of money is nonetheless 
to be taken as an absolute indicator of what is economically feasible, 
desirable, or “natural”. Th e fact that money as a material practice has 
been able to go through such a drastic evolution under the auspices of 
state symbolism – albeit corresponding to quite diﬀ erent forms of agentic 
subjectivities depending on the precise conﬁ gurations of historically 
speciﬁ c or governmentally contingent economic “laws” associated with 
each form of money – suggests that sovereign power’s grip on money may 
be too strong to be resisted solely in the biopolitical domain.
Apart from breaking the connection – no matter how recent or tenuous 
– between the nation-state and money, the introduction of the euro 
drastically shifts the balance of power between sovereign authorities and 
capital markets. Th e euro has been described as “a pure-private money, 
created at the sole request of private agents by banks obliged to comply 
with the targets set by the Central Bank, sustained by the expectations 
of the ﬁ nancial markets”, potentially entailing “a privatization of the 
state itself ” (Parguez, 1999: 66, 72). Th e spending power of a sovereign 
monetary authority is not constrained by a need to “ﬁ nance” such 
spending through taxation or bond issuance, as taxation by deﬁ nition 
must occur after money has been spent into circulation and bonds 
merely oﬀ er an interest-bearing alternative to cash (e.g. Bell, 2000; Wray, 
1998). Under the euro, in contrast, governments must secure funding 
before spending can take place, imposing a strict structural constraint 
on the policy space available to governments that entails a substantial 
redistribution of power from sovereign entities to the globalizing money 
markets. Already in 1950 Jacques Rueﬀ  argued that “Europe will be 
made by money or it will not be made” (quoted in Bordo and James, 
2006: 30).83 Th e European Monetary Union has widely been seen as a 
“part of a process that was intended to drive closer political union, and 
the logic of monetary union required (and continues to require) a further 
degree of political coordination, in particular in regard to ﬁ scal policy” 
83 Incidentally, Rueﬀ  (1964) also believed that the fate of mankind would be 
determined by money.
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(ibid.). Th us one of the relatively common recent patterns of oscillation 
for a European nation might be articulated as follows:
Material practice: Th e reregulation and liberalization of ﬁ nancial markets 
by sovereign power facilitates the alteration of the material practice of 
money through ﬁ nancial engineering and the transnationalization – or 
perhaps “transjurisdictiﬁ cation”, as up to half of the world’s money may 
currently be located in “oﬀ shore” jurisdictions (Maurer, 2008: 160), 
which may or may not coincide with the territorial limits of sovereign 
spaces – of ﬁ nancial markets. 
Subjectivity: Th e altered monetary material practice resulting from 
ﬁ nancial “globalization” and newly conceived forms of money gradually 
renders the dominant monetary subjectivity more receptive to 
international or transnational solutions to “protect” the autonomy and 
the policy space of the nation-state through the “pooling” of monetary 
sovereignty.84
Material practice: Th e euro is launched, transforming not only the 
geographical scope of the dominant monetary material practice from the 
nation-state to the Eurozone, but also profoundly shifting the distribution 
of power between capital markets and polities.
Subjectivity: Th e dominant monetary subjectivity is currently being 
conditioned to accept the revolutionary idea that it is the private capital 
market rather than the democratic polity which controls a nation’s 
money supply.85 Th e inevitable monetary crises may be used to steer the 
84 Alternatively, one might view the changing material practice of money as an 
incubator of institutional tensions which create space for political strategies. As Jabko 
(2006) has pointed out, strategic constructivism – the instrumental use of ideas to exploit 
institutional tensions for strategic purposes – may well involve the adoption of diﬀ erent, 
mutually inconsistent narratives to promote the same material practice: monetary 
integration can symbolize either enhanced sovereignty or policy discipline depending on 
the interlocutor’s ideological predispositions.
85 Th is radical usurpation of monetary powers by private actors – the trans-
nationalization of the already largely privatized powers of money creation – is perhaps 
one of the clearest indications of the increasing irrelevance of the nation-state as an 
incubator of shared purpose or destiny and the migration of power into transnational 
social networks. Whenever the leaders of any institutional structure – in this case the 
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dominant monetary subjectivity towards accepting broader and deeper 
political integration.
A possible future A: Th e transforming subjectivities will facilitate the 
gradual centralization of political powers while the capital markets’ 
usurpation of sovereign power remains uncontested.
A possible future B: Emancipatory activism will manage to communicate 
the issues at stake to a suﬃ  cient number of people to push through 
reformed monetary material practices, involving at the minimum 
the abolition of money-creating, interest-bearing debt. Th e ensuing 
dismantlement of the debt-based mechanisms of monetary governance 
allows individuals and polities to renegotiate the nature and scope of the 
monetary material practices according to democratic preferences.   
Th e intention here is not to speculate about the driving forces 
behind the European monetary integration process – the same process 
of interaction between the material and the subjective dimensions of 
money may disintegrate as well as unify monetary spaces, or integrate 
at a transcontinental or global rather than pan-European level – or to 
suggest an exclusively functionalist ontology for the political geography 
of money. None of the aforementioned steps were predetermined. What 
is of interest is the precise mechanism through which the power-enabling 
design features of money have been converted into actual policy outcomes 
– the dynamic interrelationship between monetary power and its material 
and symbolic or subjective constraints. If territorialized monetary power 
shared the same ontology with, say, military power, one might expect 
Europe to have been “made” immediately after a suﬃ  cient agglomeration 
of monetary power had been formed in the hands of appropriately 
motivated actors. After all, an annihilation of the enemy through military 
means does not require lengthy adjustment periods to produce shared 
intersubjective understanding or “trust” among the potential victims 
before military power may prove to be eﬀ ective. Monetary power, 
in contrast, must be exercised within the constraints imposed by the 
prevailing material and subjective dimensions of money in order to 
produce the desired territorial outcomes and to maintain its eﬀ ectiveness 
in the future. Any excessively ambitious instances of monetary power 
nation-state – appear to undermine their own power, it may be safe to assume that the 
strategic multiplicity of power relations has been incorrectly understood.
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projection may destroy the material or subjective foundations of the 
monetary system upon which such power is based. Similarly, while each 
step in the process of oscillation may be ﬁ ercely contested among elite 
factions, any potential elite cleavages have rarely extended to issues that 
could expose the ontological origins of monetary power to public scrutiny. 
For instance, rather than recognizing the political indeterminacy of 
technological development or exposing the potential solution to virtually 
any monetary problem – the “technical” re-speciﬁ cation of the socially 
constructed accounting system of money through monetary reform – to 
political scrutiny, elites even in peripheral economies have often decided 
not to contest monetary power projection by other sovereign or private 
entities at a level that could endanger whatever monetary power is left at 
their disposal to be exercised over their domestic populations. In other 
words, excessively individualistic political strategies have given way to 
power-preserving pragmatism. Territorializing monetary power may thus 
be a far more complex and imprecise exercise than conventional analysis 
might suggest: each step in the oscillation process involves substantial 
indeterminacy regarding the degree of conﬂ uence between territorial 
space and the evolving material and subjective dimensions of money as 
well as the sustainability of the prevailing forms of monetary power. As 
was noted earlier, reforming the material practice of money has often not 
been successful in territorializing the corresponding subjectivities without 
sovereign violence, while the deviant subjectivities emerging through 
the experimentation with alternative monetary logics in local currency 
systems, for instance, may spread far beyond the territorial limits of the 
initial experiments, as may have been the case with some of the local 
currency experiments in the early 1930s.
An analytical approach which views territorial monetary power 
projection as a product of strategically-induced oscillation between 
money’s material and symbolic or subjective dimensions highlights issues 
that may so far have received insuﬃ  cient attention in academic literature. 
Th e state’s authority claims in monetary power projection have never 
been based on territoriality per se, but the institutional design features 
of money which allow such power to assume a monetary character in the 
ﬁ rst place. An analysis of such power-enabling design features suggests 
that monetary power – irrespective of questions of agency or allocation 
among speciﬁ c institutional containers – may currently be stronger and 
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more eﬀ ective than ever. Any suggestion that territorialized monetary 
power may be “deterritorializing” or “unraveling” (see e.g. Ruggie, 
1993; Helleiner, 1999) would thus appear to be incomplete without 
an explanation of why this is happening to a form of power that may 
be becoming increasingly salient vis-à-vis other institutional sources of 
power. If the state is the primary locus of institutional monetary authority, 
why is it breaking the perceived link between sovereign and monetary 
spaces and experimenting with various potential reterritorializations or 
respatializations of monetary sovereignty despite its presumably enhanced 
capacity to attain alternative outcomes?86 If, on the other hand, the state’s 
territorial monetary powers indeed are “unraveling”, to which institutional 
structures has the enhanced monetary power migrated and what were the 
state actors’ motives for facilitating such a power shift? Understanding 
power as the management of disparate ﬁ elds of material and subjective 
formation according to a strategic logic may also help to ﬁ ll a theoretical 
gap in explaining the adoption of inherently unsustainable monetary 
material practices. As Alain Greenspan, among others, observed prior 
to the introduction of the European common currency, “Th e Euro will 
come but it will not be sustainable” (quoted in Eltis, 1997: 2, and Cohen, 
2000). Once the introduction of the euro is seen as a part of the “internal 
trajectory of conﬂ icts” that is conducive to the “making of Europe” – as 
a strategically induced intermediate step in the co-evolution of money’s 
material and subjective dimensions – the politics behind the apparent 
unsustainability of the chosen “technical” conﬁ guration may no longer 
puzzle a disinterested observer.
Th e internal contradictions of modern credit money also necessitate 
the constant management of the state of exception, which is increasingly 
undertaken by private agents in the money markets rather than sovereign 
bodies. Th e transnationalization of capital and the need to make interest 
payments merely to keep money in circulation represent the ultimate 
emancipation of exploitation from its spatio-temporal constraints. 
Pushed to its logical extreme, the complete commodiﬁ cation of all forms 
of social relations through monetized market exchange would entail 
the convergence of capital and sovereignty – capital would eﬀ ectively 
86 As Helleiner has convincingly argued elsewhere, “’the contemporary open global 
ﬁ nancial order could never have emerged without the support and blessing of states” 
(1994: vii).
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represent liquid sovereignty which, echoing Carl Schmitt’s well-known 
deﬁ nition, would deﬁ ne the exception to the rule. In the globalizing 
capital markets governed by the logic of modern credit money, it is the 
ﬁ nancial superstructure – once again, Lietaer’s “lock-in between the 
political, legal, banking and institutionalized monetary system” (2001: 
214) may provide a useful working deﬁ nition – rather than sovereign 
authority per se that determines who gets the newly created money ﬁ rst 
or is exempted from the logic of accumulation through debt write-oﬀ s, 
unearned seigniorage income or liquidity provision on favorable terms. 
Th e immutable logic of capital accumulation may thus be little more than 
an obscuring myth that diverts attention away from the frequency with 
which the state of exception is – and has to be, if the debt-based monetary 
system is to be maintained – administered. Modern credit money 
constitutes the ultimate wealth- and power-centralizing mechanism that 
relegates other forms of economic activities to a subservient position: 
once a group of individuals or institutions has obtained a monopoly on 
money creation against interest-bearing debt, the ultimate aim of any 
policy – including ostensibly economic policies – originating from the 
same power structures is likely to be political. As some debt is always 
likely to be in default due to the lack of debt- and interest-free money, the 
relevant considerations for the administration of the monetary state of 
exception are likely to be political expediency and the potential systemic 
impact rather than “economic eﬃ  ciency”.     
Insistence on identifying agency as a precondition for analysis may thus 
be particularly inappropriate in situations where the population subject 
to the wielding or the making and unmaking of power is governmentally 
secured and unable to resist without transforming money’s dimensions 
both as a material practice produced by sovereign authority and as a 
symbolic or subjective cognitive framework negotiated and contested 
in the biopolitical domain. Recognizing any potential uncertainties 
or ambiguities in identifying agency should not, of course, be taken 
as an indication that agency is unimportant. Whenever structuralized 
incentives and institutional layering, for instance, provide the wielders 
or the makers of power with a relatively high degree of anonymity, it 
is often instructive to begin the analysis by exploring the speciﬁ c types 
of logics and institutional conﬁ gurations that power has produced. 
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Irrespective of whether humanity is in the habit of letting itself be ruled 
by psychopaths87 or building collective prisons for the imagination and 
either not having the collective cognitive capacity to identify them in 
the ﬁ rst place or forgetting about their existence once established, the 
totalizing and reductionist logic of modern credit money deserves to be 
analyzed in its own terms without prejudice on agency.
8.6 Can the Chessboard be Discarded?
Although the open source Empire may tend towards optimal obfuscation 
of both the biopolitically perfected system of exploitation and its 
likely long-term implications for humanity’s conception of itself, such 
obfuscation should not be taken as an indication of genuine powerlessness 
on the part of the Empire’s primary beneﬁ ciaries in the sovereign sphere 
of power or its primary victims at the lower layers of the structurally 
imposed social hierarchies. Th e Empire’s strength derives largely from 
its perceived capacity to eliminate autonomous moral agency. Few 
societies would be likely to tolerate the ecological and social devastation 
and the structurally dictated mayhem at the monetary camp in the 
absence of legitimating mechanisms that reframe individual choices 
consistent with the logic of the Empire in socially acceptable terms. 
Under such legitimating mechanisms any wealth- or power-centralizing 
act that consolidates the exploitative logic of the open source Empire 
while rewarding agency with upward social mobility is reframed as an 
innovative act of entrepreneurship at best and an unfortunate structural 
necessity in the imperfect world in which we live at worst. In the same 
way as the aristocratic pieces might have considerable diﬃ  culty to justify 
the necessity of sacriﬁ cing the pawns without a “neutral” or “technical” 
rulebook for chess that is perceived to be beyond their agentic capacities, 
the primary beneﬁ ciaries of the open source Empire at the top of the 
structurally mandated social hierarchy might have diﬃ  culties in justifying 
their actions to others – and in rare cases to themselves – in the absence 
of similar legitimating narratives. Th e obvious problem with this line of 
87 Bakan (2005) famously compared corporation to a psychopath. Th e institution of 
modern credit money is another serious contender.
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reasoning is, of course, that the open source Empire is as vulnerable as 
any other form of social organization – a political and social construct 
that can unravel through demystiﬁ cation or elite cleavages signiﬁ cantly 
faster than what it took to conquer the popular imagination.   
Hardt and Negri’s Empire has often been accused of downplaying 
the importance of emancipatory political agency by depicting power as 
centerless and omnipotent. Yet an obvious question that would have to be 
answered before any counter-strategy can be constructed has rarely been 
articulated: if the hardware of power has indeed been transformed into 
territorially ﬂ uid networks, is a counter-Empire still a realistic possibility 
or might a multitudinal Empire perhaps be the best that emancipatory 
intervention can aim for? In other words, can the chessboard still 
be discarded, or is the structural logic too deeply ingrained to render 
structural emancipation beyond the capacity of human agency? It may, 
for instance, ultimately prove to be a relatively straightforward task to 
convince a suﬃ  cient number of people of the devastating ecological and 
social implications of issuing money against interest-bearing debt or the 
futility of letting the combination of unrepayable debt and “capital ﬂ ight” 
deprive people not only of their savings and physical assets, but also of 
their capacity to employ and transact in human capital that already exists 
and has been paid for unless a suﬃ  cient tribute is paid to the issuers of 
money. Th e modiﬁ ed agentic expectations and the changed biopolitical 
normative structure might also be transformed into institutional reforms in 
the sovereign sphere of power. Nonetheless, in the absence of a sustainable 
participatory mechanism that would ensure the continuous survival of 
the counter-Empire over more hierarchical forms of social organization, 
emancipatory intervention runs the risk of merely rearranging the pieces 
in an essentially unchanged chessboard. As the application of universalist 
principles such as international humanitarian law in justifying military 
interventions amply illustrates, humanitarian rhetoric can also be easily 
applied to serve the expansion and reproduction of the more hierarchical 
forms of the Empire.
Under such circumstances the challenge for further research is to 
spatialize the logic of the ﬁ eld – to identify the evolutionary trajectory 
of the open source incentive structure and the factors leading to the 
spatially segregated oscillation between money’s sovereign and biopolitical 
poles. Th is task involves two elements. First, the cartography and the 
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topography of exploitation must be mapped in terms of territorially 
ﬂ uid but structurally centralized networks of power. In other words, if “a 
tendency for sovereignty to be transformed by, through and into a variety 
of forms of political agency (corporations, multilateral agencies, NGOs 
for example)” (Sidaway, 2005: 68) is indeed identiﬁ ed as suggested by 
Hardt and Negri, one would also need a theory which accounts for 
the diverging intensities with which such structural pressures manifest 
themselves in spatially segregated parts of the Empire. Why do certain 
political, social or geographical spaces exhibit greater tendency to conform 
to structural pressures than others? Why do certain communities, areas 
or networks ﬁ nd it easier than others to construct alternative material 
practices for production and exchange which facilitate subsistence 
outside the exploitative logic of modern credit money? Are all potential 
exceptions to the nearly all-encompassing logic of modern credit money 
due to failures of monetary power or some dissident economic, political, 
social or cultural practices which remain imperfectly understood? Such 
theorization implies neither institutional uniformity nor territorial ﬁ xity. 
While the intensities of the Empire’s incentive structures may diverge 
between, say, Denmark and Djibouti, one would not expect complete 
institutional convergence to be required for a broadly similar level of 
subordination to the Empire’s prerogatives to emerge: local institutions 
matter precisely because they tailor the structural necessity of zero-
sum competition to the local circumstances. Nor should the spatial 
manifestations of the diﬀ ering intensities of exploitation be expected to 
coincide with speciﬁ c territorial containers – as the spatial ﬂ uidity of the 
monetary camp, for instance, illustrates.
Second, the diﬀ ering intensities of oscillation between money’s 
sovereign and biopolitical poles must be accounted for in spatial terms. 
In the words of Hardt and Negri, “the topography of power no longer 
has to do primarily with spatial relations but is inscribed, rather, in the 
temporal displacements of subjectivities” (2001: 319). Such “temporal 
displacements of subjectivities” have a spatial dimension that can hardly 
be ignored merely because it may not be congruent with the conventional 
notions of power being centralized in territorial entities rather than 
spatially ﬂ uid networks. In some spaces – whether territorially ﬁ xed or 
ﬂ uid – the norms, institutions and incentive structures associated with 
money may have remained relatively stable for extended periods of 
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time. In others, the interplay between the sovereign and the biopolitical 
spheres of power has been substantially more active, with the gradual 
monetization or often abrupt demonetization of social interaction, 
currency internationalization and substitution and the introduction 
of supra-national or sub-national currencies, for instance, profoundly 
shaping and being shaped by the oscillations between the monetary 
norms and incentive structures. Why have the Brits, Danes and 
Swedes decided – or been permitted by the structural features of their 
political systems unlike those Eurozone member states which would 
have had a popular preference for a similar policy choice – to stay out 
of the “contentious social experiment” (Smithin, 1999: 3) of the “pure-
private money” of euro, while the rest of the EU member states appear 
to be willingly or forcibly conﬁ ned to embracing whatever economic, 
political or social consequences will eventually materialize through the 
accelerating pace of oscillation between money’s material and symbolic or 
subjective dimensions?88 What makes some communities vulnerable to 
the exercise of monetary power through strategically-induced oscillation 
between money’s material and symbolic or subjective dimensions, while 
others persistently refuse to acknowledge the validity of the changing 
monetary knowledge claims emanating from the bastions of privilege? A 
more complete understanding of these two spatial elements of the open 
88 Th e precise manner in which each nation uses the power to issue and circulate its 
own currency hardly renders the “technical” diﬀ erences between the euro and national 
currencies any less contentious. Any potential freedoms granted to local or transnational 
economic or political elites to icelandify national economies through the reckless growth 
of banking liabilities that is virtually certain to lead to some combinations of ﬁ nancial, 
economic, political and social crises, for instance, is ultimately a democratic rather than 
a ﬁ nancial or economic issue: while membership in the Eurozone may prevent national 
economies from repeating some speciﬁ c sequences of domino eﬀ ects starting with ﬁ nancial 
liberalization and innovation and ending up in political and social engineering, making 
the monetary system sustainably functional and responsive to democratic preferences 
would require policy space – in respect of both the “technical” speciﬁ cation and the 
management of money – that the euro currently does not provide. What the euro does, 
however, achieve – in a manner not entirely dissimilar to the analogy between a socially 
constructed “globalized” economy and the perceptions of inherently global economic 
problems – is the rescaling of the strategic potential of economic and ﬁ nancial crises: in 
the absence of monetary reform, the scale of the most proﬁ table strategies for political or 
social engineering associated with the inevitable crises is likely to be transnational rather 
than national or local.
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source Empire might improve the odds for achieving a counter-Empire 
as opposed to some of its more hierarchical manifestations – involving at 
the minimum the elimination of extra-monetary features which are not 
directly relevant to performing all of and nothing but the democratically 
selected combination of “technical” functions from each monetary 
system. Under such circumstances agency on the territorializations of 
money would be eﬀ ectively reclaimed to the members of each monetary 
space and the ongoing process of money’s social construction would be 
viewed as an at least equally economic, political, social or geographic 
phenomenon as the management of monetary aﬀ airs within a hypothetical 
given set of “technical” speciﬁ cations for money.
Some observers have suggested – often broadly in line with the 
Foucauldian theoretical tradition whether or not explicitly recognized 
as such – that risk or contingency constitutes a universal unit of account 
and thus, by implication, also that the nature of money cannot be altered 
by emancipatory intervention focused on the process of authoritatively 
deﬁ ning the unit of account. While the deﬁ nition may be technically 
incorrect, it may help to shed light on the limits and the appropriate 
forms of emancipatory action. A unit of account deﬁ nes the limits of 
a monetary space. For example, all transactions denominated in euros 
belong to the euro monetary space and, conversely, it is logically impossible 
to have a transaction denominated in euros outside the euro monetary 
space – not the geographic area of the Eurozone, but the networks of 
transactions denominated in euros irrespective of territorial location. 
Should risk indeed constitute a universal unit of account for monetary 
calculation, social relations which intuitively would not appear to involve 
monetized transactions would have to be classiﬁ ed as monetary, unless an 
alternative distinction between monetary and non-monetary transactions 
denominated in risk can be conceived.89 Virtually any form of human 
interaction involves the transfer of contingency: any form of economic 
activity transforms opportunity structures also for individuals who are 
not involved in the planning and execution of such activities, violence 
circulates contingency through asymmetric exposure to bodily injury or 
death, friendship and love may pool both the exposure to and the impact of 
89 Another possible approach – not necessarily with any less potential conceptual 
pitfalls – might involve deﬁ ning risk as a post-money unit of measurement for the relative 
valuation of intrinsically valued commodities.
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risk through mutual aid and solidarity. Yet the description of such human 
interaction as monetary would at the very least require some additional 
conceptual and analytical reﬁ nement. Furthermore, viewing risk as the 
universal unit of account might eﬀ ectively render money impotent as a 
tool for power projection or as an object of the strategic logic of power. 
If the unit of account covers virtually all forms of human interaction, 
the precise mechanism how the monetary media exercise inﬂ uence on 
individuals’ lives requires further explanation. If, for instance, virtually 
every form of human activity was by deﬁ nition denominated in euros, 
it is not obvious how the monetary media issued and circulated by the 
banking system could have much inﬂ uence on the social realities: rather 
than the workers or the rentiers having to rely on the euros created by the 
banking system anyone could create their own by engaging in any form 
of economic, violent, or solidaristic activity, for instance, that involves 
the transfer of contingency.90
A more fruitful perspective – both theoretically and as an emancipatory 
strategy – might involve the conceptualization of the monetary media as 
universal embodiments of contingency. As was noted in chapter 4, the 
authoritative speciﬁ cation of a unit of account is a politically and socially 
90 One of the underlying unifying themes throughout this study is the non-linearity of 
scientiﬁ c progress. Kuhn’s work, for instance, is often cited in the context of the distinction 
between intra-paradigm “normal” science and paradigmatic advances in knowledge. Yet 
this is far from the whole story due to power-based considerations. For instance, the 
conﬂ ation of a unit of account and the monetary media – as appears to be the case in 
some of the aforementioned literature – is not a privilege that would be easily granted 
to less established researchers in peer reviewed publications. Th e reasons why potentially 
counter-paradigmatic papers with elementary and spectacularly obvious shortcomings 
get published would deserve more attention to clarify both the meaning of a paradigm – 
quite possibly involving hierarchical or presentational considerations that are secondary 
to the actual content of the research – and the role of power in relaxing overly consistent 
publication requirements for selected, suﬃ  ciently established members of the academia. 
Th e intention here is not to suggest that self-declared respectability would require further 
corruption of the publication process through additional ﬁ lters which may have little to 
do with the actual quality of research. To the contrary, as elementary failures can be just as 
instructive when committed by less established researchers, there is little reason to conﬁ ne 
this particular privilege to some of the more established members of the academia. More 
generally, given the centralization of the powers of knowledge certiﬁ cation to a relatively 
small group of largely self-referential and intellectually unaccountable academics, genuine 
paradigm shifts could perhaps be expected to be relatively less frequent than ad hoc 
incorporation of non-ignorable dissent to the margins of increasingly incoherent pseudo-
paradigms in order to forestall unmanageable shifts in the dominant worldviews.
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relevant act only insofar as it transforms the opportunity structures for 
obtaining the actual monetary media. Th e speciﬁ cation of an abstract unit 
of account allows sovereign power to brand a subspace of contingency with 
its own symbolism in order to transform economic, political and social 
opportunity structures within the governmentally secured biopolitical 
pool of subjects. Apart from being more consistent with the distinction 
between unit of account and the monetary media, this approach may 
thus also help to illuminate the precise mechanisms through which the 
strategic logic of power may operate. It has been suggested that
Capitalist social relations are no longer mediated only by labour but 
by risk, because these new ﬁ nancial instruments assume that particular 
forms of risk, no matter how existentially incommensurable … can 
be aggregated as an abstract form, susceptible to and determinable by 
mathematical calculation, combined within a single derivative, and then 
distributed to speculators (LiPuma and Lee, 2004: 126).
Th e key term for monetary analysis is “existentially incommensurable”.91 
Exchange involving existentially commensurable entities is barter. 
Existentially incommensurable exchange, in contrast, presupposes 
91 It is not uncommon to see the increasing governmental impact of money being 
attributed almost exclusively to ﬁ nancial engineering and the newly conceived forms of 
credit and commodiﬁ ed contingency that have emerged since the 1970s. While these 
developments may undoubtedly have implications for the intensity of the zero-sum 
competition for positive monetary net worth, the stability of the ﬁ nancial system, or 
the nature of money itself, they do not necessarily have to be the sole culprits for any 
potential evolution in money’s distributional – and thus also governmental – impact. 
For the sake of simplicity – and in order to avoid making causal claims that may be 
unnecessary for this chapter’s main argument – modern credit money has been deﬁ ned 
as money which has to be borrowed into existence against interest-bearing debt. Within 
relatively autonomous national economies the polarizing tendencies of modern credit 
money can be mitigated through (re-)distributional policies. Financial liberalization, in 
contrast, has not only produced new monetary and near-money instruments, but also 
emancipated the logic of the more traditional forms of credit money from their nation-
state-based policy constraints. Th e relevant counterfactual question would thus involve 
the governmental impact of ﬁ nancial liberalization without ﬁ nancial engineering. Th e 
global unleashing of the polarizing and exploitative logic of modern credit money through 
increasing capital mobility, for example, has certainly contributed to the increasing 
manageability of governmentally prepackaged biopolitical pools of individuals according 
to a strategic logic irrespective of any similar tendencies potentially emerging as a result of 
ﬁ nancial engineering. Financial liberalization thus constitutes a governmentally relevant 
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some form of a socially constructed accounting system to facilitate such 
transactions. Th e exercise of monetary power thus typically involves the 
transformation of economic, political and social opportunity structures in 
a manner which permits existentially incommensurable exchange through 
monetary media issued by the sovereign authority that has branded the 
monetary space with its preferred forms of symbolism and subjective 
focal points. Similarly, resistance to structurally skewed existentially 
incommensurable exchange would normally have to involve neutralization 
of the structural disparities in the issuance and circulation of the monetary 
media. Whether such a strategy involves adaptation to the prevailing 
monetary topography or the creation of new monetary spaces at local, 
national, or transnational levels, it is diﬃ  cult to see how such eﬀ orts could 
succeed without continuous scrutiny of the political and social signiﬁ cance 
of the assumptions that underlie the technical speciﬁ cations of money and 
the egalitarian initial allocation of the monetary media to minimize pre-
market distortions of eﬃ  ciency and equity.  
To sum up, the conceptualization of modern credit money as having both 
sovereign and biopolitical dimensions provides a useful tool for analyzing 
the strategic aspects that have often been neglected in unipolar accounts of 
power. Modern credit money provides internal coherence to structurally 
rigid social hierarchies – the historically speciﬁ c or governmentally 
contingent manifestations of the chessboard analogy – which may or may 
not be institutionalized through the exercise of sovereign power. It may 
also adopt a more “productive, dispersed, and relational” character as a 
part of incentive structures that contribute to the formation of biopolitical 
bodies according to the strategy of power. A more reﬁ ned and nuanced 
analysis of the transformations and oscillations between money’s diﬀ erent 
spatializations and power dimensions may provide a particularly fruitful 
avenue for further research on the multiple economic, political and social 
dimensions encompassed by modern credit money.    
In terms of spatial analysis of money, any analytical eﬀ ort must begin 
by identifying the sources of money’s institutional powers – the structural 
disparities between the rules governing the production and circulation 
of the monetary media and the goods and services subject to monetized 
market exchange – which permit monetary power to assume a spatial 
phenomenon even in the absence of ﬁ nancial engineering, which may well overshadow 
the latter’s distributional implications.
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character in the ﬁ rst place. Under the prevailing monetary arrangements 
two such disparities are particularly noteworthy: the separation of the 
power to issue monetary IOUs from the parties to the transactions where 
money is needed, and the practice of requiring members of the monetary 
space to accrue unrepayable interest-bearing debt as a precondition 
for accessing monetary IOUs. Th ese structural distortions give rise to 
a governmentally secured pool of individuals whose subjectivities and 
material practices are conditioned by the structural necessity to engage in 
zero-sum competition for artiﬁ cially scarce monetary balances – a form 
of open source Empire with self-reinforcing dynamics regardless of the 
primary locus of agency. Conversely, it is diﬃ  cult to see how the institution 
of money could succeed in spatial power projection if most members of 
monetary spaces insisted on the inviolability of their right to monetize 
their own IOUs without the need to incur interest-bearing debt.92 While 
the spatial aspect of money as a network of exchange would remain 
intact, the potential to appropriate money’s territorial indeterminacy into 
the service of any speciﬁ c version of monetary identity politics would be 
substantially diminished. Th e paradoxes and contradictions of money as 
a product of both sovereignty and biopower, having both a structural and 
a post-structural dimension in networks of material practices which may 
or may not contribute to territorialized subjectivities, thus call for an 
analytical approach that can combine theoretically and methodologically 
disparate practices into strategic combinations through which power 
– no matter how distributed among speciﬁ c institutional containers – 
manifests itself. Money as a material practice is the terminal form of 
biopower, while biopower is a product of the material practice. It is the 
interaction between these two poles of money in the context of the actual, 
historically speciﬁ c or governmentally contingent institutional structures 
that should be in the center of any spatial analysis of money.
Overcoming the limitations of unipolar theorization of social agency 
and the temptations for ahistoricism or “agovernmentalism” thus 
calls for an integrated research program that recognizes the potential 
92 Once again, “debt- and interest-free” refers here to the preconditions for money’s 
existence and circulation, not the recycling of preexisting monetary balances between 
borrowers and lenders.
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complementarities between diﬀ erent analytical approaches.93 Modern 
credit money has a colorful history of controversy and contestation 
that structurally oriented economic, social and political analysis would 
be unwise to ignore. Yet such theorization would hardly be complete 
without a detailed analysis of the production and reproduction of 
agentic subjectivities through the polarizing logic of modern monetary 
institutions. Such theorization based on the logic of the ﬁ eld might help 
to create common ground between diﬀ erent epistemological traditions 
by viewing the sovereign and the biopolitical as distinct but inseparable 
moments of the same totality that may take the form of a territorially 
ﬂ uid incentive structure. Th e British political scientist Herman Finer 
once noted that “if a democracy forgets, democracy will be forgotten, 
and may be crushed by the economic forces it ignores” (Finer, 1946: 
11). Although legitimate divergence of opinion might emerge as to 
what precisely it is that individuals concerned with the attainment or 
preservation of democracy, non-racist non-governance, subjectic self-
determination or some other progressive political objective should not 
forget and how these pressures might originate and be transmitted, the 
di-polaric nature of modern credit money suggests that emancipatory 
economic, social and political scholarship may have more scope for 
complementary analysis than the traditional epistemological politics on 
power and sovereignty might suggest.
 
93 As Read (2003: 15) has observed, “the various intersections between Marx, 
Althusser, Negri, Tronti, Foucault, Deleuze, and others … is not just the byproduct of 
a sort of theoretical eclecticism; rather, there are strong philosophical undercurrents and 
conﬂ icts linking these various perspectives.”
196
9 A Brief Introduction to Monetary Reform
Although the primary aim of this study is to point out the wide range 
of political choice and conﬂ ict inherent in the “technical” speciﬁ cations 
of any monetary system rather than constructing yet another detailed 
proposal for monetary reform, it may be diﬃ  cult to avoid the presentation 
and analysis of concrete reform proposals altogether. Th ere may be no 
logical reason for such diﬃ  culties: it is quite possible to argue that any 
monetary system is a profoundly political construct without taking a 
position on the appropriateness of the prevailing forms of money for 
any speciﬁ c purpose. Furthermore, it is also quite possible to criticize 
speciﬁ c implications of the prevailing forms of money without necessarily 
suggesting that better alternatives exist. In such a case perhaps the main 
value of research would involve the possibility to transparently identify 
and debate speciﬁ c heretofore neglected implications of the prevailing 
forms of money in order to evaluate any potential need for reform of 
the monetary system itself or the public policies which might rectify or 
mitigate some of the undesirable implications.
Yet it may be diﬃ  cult to avoid some of the familiar ad hominem catch-
22’s with such a purist approach: while a study on money without a 
speciﬁ c reform proposal may be vulnerable to the charge that the author 
cannot conceive of valid alternatives to the prevailing forms of money, 
one with a speciﬁ c reform proposal may attract the arguably lesser charge 
of advocating a speciﬁ c solution to a contested and complex policy issue 
– which may in turn be constructed as a straw man of choice by critics 
who attempt to deﬂ ect attention from the study’s main thesis by choosing 
to criticize the reform proposal outlined merely for expository purposes 
as opposed to addressing the more general claims on the contradictions 
and conﬂ icts inherent in any monetary system. More generally, any 
non-aligned outsider stepping into the terrain claimed by some of 
the competing factions in the tribalist academic warfare may expect 
to be accused of either being an elitist lacking the proper expertise or 
experience to speak on behalf of the oppressed or – in case the credentials 
are undeniable or the emancipatory criticism is uncomfortably close to 
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the mark – of being motivated by personal envy, bitterness or some other 
form of alleged failure to appease the powers that be.94
With these realities of the prevailing historically speciﬁ c or governmentally 
contingent academic social conventions in mind, this chapter brieﬂ y 
summarizes some arguments from the monetary reform debate, while the 
following chapter makes a speciﬁ c reform proposal for expository reasons. 
Th is chapter aims to serve as an introduction to some of the themes 
that follow rather than purporting to provide an in-depth view of the 
rich variety of actors and arguments that have been associated with the 
historical monetary reform debates. One of the main guiding principles of 
the concrete reform proposal, in turn, is parsimony: while a more complex 
reform proposal might achieve any given objectives more eﬀ ectively, 
such a scheme might lose some of its expository value by unnecessarily 
complicating the interrelationship between seemingly minor “technical” 
reforms of the monetary system and the transforming economic, political 
and social realities. In both cases emphasis is on the logical limits and 
limitations of the concept of money rather than the institutional features 
of the present monetary system: in the same way as the publicly professed 
philosophies of the Dear Leader in a dictatorship hardly constitute an 
appropriate reference point that any potential social reformer should adopt 
as a starting point for other than instrumental reasons, it is not obvious 
why any potential monetary reformer should show any command of or 
interest in the monetary ruhnamas that are written primarily in economics 
departments by the academic powers that be.95
94 Th roughout the course of this study, the author has had the opportunity to 
witness several informal informational exchanges on the nature of money that have 
ended in some variant of the “if you don’t believe in social justice in your 20s you 
may be heartless, but if you still believe in social justice in your 30s you are brainless”-
argument. In other words, presumably intellectual exchanges have ended with relatively 
open invitations to acquiesce to the prerogatives of power despite any potential intrinsic 
merits of emancipatory research. Without taking a position on the intrinsic merits of 
such suggestions, there would clearly appear to be another theoretical possibility: those 
who resort to simplistic power-preserving slogans at any age may be both brainless and 
heartless. Th is study has adopted its present form partly in an attempt to invite the reader 
to contemplate on the latter possibility.
95 As Galbraith described the functioning of the process: “It is the nature of privileged 
position that it develops its own political justiﬁ cation and often the economic and social 
doctrine that serves it best. No one likes to believe that his or her personal economic well 
being is in conﬂ ict with the greater public need. To invent a plausible, or if necessary 
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9.1 A Case for Reform
Joseph Schumpeter once noted, in reference to credit creation through 
fractional reserve banking, that “people may be perfectly familiar with 
a phenomenon for ages and even discuss it frequently without realizing 
its true signiﬁ cance and without admitting it into their general scheme 
of thought” (Schumpeter, 1954: 1115). Intriguingly, people may also be 
perfectly familiar with long-standing reform proposals and problems in the 
dominant theoretical and methodological frameworks without admitting 
this knowledge into the paradigmatic scheme of thought. Before moving 
on to a speciﬁ c reform proposal, it is instructive to brieﬂ y summarize the 
rationale behind some of the major historical reform proposals that have 
been referred to in the earlier chapters and to evaluate the potential merits 
and weaknesses of some contemporary reform agendas. Th ree conceptually 
distinct but interrelated lines of reasoning advocating monetary reform are 
particularly noteworthy: I shall refer to these as the seigniorage, fallacy of 
composition and continuous growth arguments. 
Th e seigniorage argument for monetary reform asserts that in a debt-
based ﬁ nancial system the power to create money against interest-bearing 
debt will inevitably transfer ownership and control of the economy to the 
banking sector. In most modern economies notes and coins account for 
less than 10% of the total money supply. Th e rest consists of accounting 
entries created by banks against their customers’ promises to repay. In 
contrast to the conventional use of the term, in a debt-based monetary 
system the beneﬁ ts of seigniorage materialize partly through interest 
income on bank-created money, as credit-money does not remain 
in circulation permanently but returns to the banking system upon 
repayment of the debt against which the money was created. Th e essence 
of the seigniorage argument was summarized by Lord Josiah Stamp, 
former director of the Bank of England, in 1937:
implausible ideology in defense of self interest is thus a natural course. A corps of willing 
and talented craftsmen is available for the task” (1996: 5, quoted in Davidson, 2007: 
523–524). Whoever Galbraith may have had in mind when describing the “corps of 
willing and talented craftsmen”, any potential stylistic diﬀ erences between the works of 
dear leaders and the “willing and talented craftsmen” who produce “political justiﬁ cations” 
and “economic and social doctrines” should hardly be taken as an indication of greater 
intrinsic credibility.
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Th e modern banking system manufactures money out of nothing. Th e 
process is perhaps the most astounding piece of sleight of hand that 
was ever invented. Banking was conceived in iniquity and born in sin. 
Bankers own the earth; take it away from them, but leave them with 
the power to create credit, and with the stroke of a pen they will create 
enough money to buy it back again… If you want to be slaves of the 
bankers, and pay the costs of your own slavery, then let the banks create 
money (Public Address in Central Hall, Westminster in 1937, quoted in 
Rowbotham, 1998: 35).
Th e seigniorage argument is perhaps the best-known and longest-standing 
case for monetary reform that has been popularized by inﬂ uential ﬁ gures 
in the American political history. Th omas Jeﬀ erson’s observation has 
served as an inspiration for a diverse cottage industry of activism and 
civil disobedience: 
If the American people ever allow the banks to control the issuance of 
their currency, ﬁ rst by inﬂ ation and then by deﬂ ation, the banks and the 
corporations that will grow up around them will deprive the people of 
all property until their children will wake up homeless on the continent 
their fathers occupied. Th e issuing power of money should be taken from 
the banks and restored to Congress and the people to whom it belongs. 
I sincerely believe the banking institutions having the issuing power of 
money are more dangerous to liberty than standing armies (quoted in 
Rowbotham, 1998: 34–35).
Abraham Lincoln’s pamphlet on monetary policy, arguing that “the 
government should create, issue and circulate all the currency and credit 
needed to satisfy the spending power of the government and the buying 
power of consumers” to achieve a situation where “Money will cease to 
be the master and become the servant of humanity” (Lincoln, 1865: 91) 
is another classic.
According to the fallacy of composition thesis monetary reform is 
necessary to rectify a structural disparity between the inner logic of the 
monetary system and the production possibilities in the real world. In 
conventional terminology fallacy of composition refers to the logical error 
committed when making a claim about a concrete object or an abstract 
concept as a whole based on some features of its constituents without 
proper justiﬁ cation for such inference. Th e fallacy derives from some 
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form of false generalization based on incomplete observation, inadequate 
experimentation or errors in the logical treatment of the subject.
Th e current unreformed monetary system exempliﬁ es fallacy of 
composition in the sense that it denies the economy as a whole the same 
ﬁ nancial opportunity structure that is available to each economic agent 
individually. In a debt-based monetary system the ﬁ nancial economy as a 
whole is by deﬁ nition close to insolvency regardless of the physical wealth 
and production possibilities in the real economy. In the UK, for instance, 
£1160billion of debt was registered in the ﬁ nancial system against a total 
money supply of £640billion in the late 1990s (Rowbotham, 1998, 
p.96)96. Under such circumstances any speciﬁ c individual may always be 
able to save more money than is required for the repayment of personal 
debts and thus obtain a positive monetary net worth. Th e economy as 
a whole, however, cannot escape from the fact that the total amount 
of debt is eﬀ ectively unrepayable. Th erefore the notion that debt can 
be repaid and positive monetary net worth obtained through hard 
work and a thrifty lifestyle cannot be generalized to the economy as a 
whole. Economic growth increases the amount of both debt and money 
in circulation without addressing the contradiction between the near 
insolvency of the monetary economy and the material abundance of the 
physical world. Th e real world may be full of possibilities for utilizing 
existing skills and resources to satisfy heretofore unmet needs, yet the 
ﬁ nancial system continues to indicate that the economy as a whole 
cannot aﬀ ord such economic activity due to the lack of debt-free means 
of exchange. Any attempt by the economy as a whole to repay its debt to 
the banking system would merely reduce the money supply and cause a 
severe recession. Hence this view also implies that although any speciﬁ c 
individual may hold money at any given point in time, collectively the 
entire money supply ultimately belongs to the banking system. 
Monetary reform could, according to this line of reasoning, eliminate 
the structural disparity between the inner logic of the monetary system and 
the production possibilities in the real world by providing the economy 
with suﬃ  cient debt-free means of exchange to clear all transactions that 
96 Th e issuance of debt does not always involve money creation. Government 
borrowing, for example, is typically ﬁ nanced with money that has already been borrowed 
into existence by someone else. Th us the total amount of debt registered in a ﬁ nancial 
system can signiﬁ cantly exceed the total money supply.  
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economic agents are willing and able to undertake. In a debt-based 
monetary system someone – individuals, corporations or governments 
– must always hold the debt against which money has been created 
irrespective of whether such debt has any economic justiﬁ cation other 
than keeping money in circulation. Following the elimination of the debt 
component of the money supply it would no longer be necessary for the 
economy as a whole to incur debt just to be able to transact in physical 
assets that already exist and have been paid for. Borrowing and lending 
would reassume their original economic function of recycling existing 
debt-free money between economic agents who have diﬀ erent temporal 
preferences with respect to consumption, saving and investment. 
Th e continuous growth argument for monetary reform goes further 
than the fallacy of composition thesis by suggesting that the total amount 
of ﬁ nancial liabilities must continuously grow just to prevent a recession 
in the real economy. At the time of issuing loans the banking system 
creates deposits corresponding to the principal amount of the loans only. 
Th e economy as a whole does not have enough money in circulation 
to meet the interest payments unless the money supply grows through 
further credit creation by an amount that covers the interest payments on 
the original loans before they fall due.97 Th e continuous growth argument, 
like the two aforementioned theses, has variations across a wide spectrum 
of intellectual interests and ideological persuasions that approach the issue 
from slightly diﬀ erent vantage points. Some observers have contrasted 
the necessity of continuous credit expansion with the possibility that 
the increase in productive activity induced by such ﬁ nancial incentives 
may in fact be uneconomic (e.g. Daly, 1996). Th e disparity between 
natural laws and the logic governing the monetary system has also 
drawn frequent criticism (e.g. Gesell, 1958). In the words of Frederick 
97 Technically the statement is correct: if an economy decided to repay all outstanding 
debt to the banking system in order to establish a diﬀ erent kind of monetary system or 
mechanism for governing its division of labor, further indebtedness to the banking sector 
– whether conceptualized as “new” indebtedness or merely as “recycling” the “same” 
monetary media “back” into circulation – would be required, thus rendering any potential 
hopes of terminating the economy’s servitude to the banking system through repayment 
futile. Any potential failure of any given deﬁ nition of money supply to closely approximate 
the exponential growth of liabilities may merely indicate that the economy as a whole may 
currently not be preparing to break free from its debt servitude through the illusory one-
time “repayment” route. See section 7.4 for more detailed analysis of this argument.
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Soddy, the 1921 Nobel Laureate in Chemistry and an ardent critic of the 
economic orthodoxy of the time: “You cannot permanently pit an absurd 
human convention, such as the spontaneous increment of debt, against 
the natural law of the spontaneous decrement of wealth” (Soddy, 1922: 
30). Another variant of this stream of literature highlights the need for 
continuous expansion of investment to distribute suﬃ  cient purchasing 
power to clear inventories of physical goods that have been produced in 
previous time periods (e.g. Hutchinson and Burkitt, 1997).98
It is perhaps equally important to point out the absence of any 
widespread appeals to economic eﬃ  ciency either as a justiﬁ cation for 
the preservation of the status quo or as an argument for reform. Under 
the prevailing monetary arrangements the commercial banking system 
determines who gets the newly created money and for what purpose. 
Once a productive project – assuming that the nature of the money-
creating lending is productive rather than extractive – is ﬁ nished and the 
loan that ﬁ nanced it repaid, money is withdrawn from circulation just as 
98 It has sometimes been suggested that money’s potential capacity to clear an 
unlimited number of transactions whenever speciﬁ c monetary media remain perpetually 
in circulation might invalidate the concern for the capacity of the prevailing money supply 
or the monetary system in general to clear all required transactions. While any simplistic 
comparisons between the nominal value of the money supply and the nominal value of 
the transactions deemed to be in need of monetary clearing may indeed be unfruitful, the 
basic concern for the capacity of the prevailing monetary system to facilitate the monetary 
settlement of all real claims to monetized market exchange remains highly relevant. As has 
already been pointed out, there is no theoretical justiﬁ cation why the holders of real assets 
should agree to any lending proposals of the holders or issuers of money merely to be able 
to engage in monetized market exchange. Furthermore, the fact that any given nominal 
money supply may technically be capable of clearing a certain number of transactions 
does not imply that this would necessarily have to be the case. Suppose, for instance, that 
the entire money supply is distributed among the holders of money-creating, interest-
bearing debt, all of whom decide to repay the portion of their debts to the banking system 
that is technically feasible with the given money supply. As a result, the entire money 
supply would vanish, while some “money-creating” indebtedness to the banking system 
would remain and no monetary settlement of transactions would take place until some 
transacting parties agreed to whatever conditions the issuers of money would choose to 
set for circulating their IOUs. Th e theoretical capacity of a speciﬁ c monetary medium to 
clear an unlimited number of transactions is thus irrelevant when it comes to assessing 
a community’s capacity to engage in social interaction involving some of the technical 
functions of money: without drastic modiﬁ cations to the incentive structures inherent in 
non-monetary exchange, it is quite possible that the prevailing money supply will not be 
suﬃ  cient to clear all the required transactions.
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the economy presumably would need means of exchange to transact in 
the newly created real assets. Extending or renewing the loan beyond the 
point where real returns can be produced by the underlying assets would 
convert the nature of the loan from productive to extractive99, reallocating 
titles to existing real assets rather than producing incremental real wealth. 
Consequently, the economy is constantly experiencing asymmetrically 
distributed changes in the money supply. Th e history of the monetary 
reformist debate may involve calls for “just” prices, however deﬁ ned, 
but it is remarkable to observe the nearly complete absence of a debate 
on what kind of a monetary system might produce “eﬃ  cient” prices. As 
has already been noted above, it is far from obvious that an economic 
conceptualization of money – a precondition for “eﬃ  cient” prices – is 
logically, let alone practically, possible. Th e fact that the monetary system’s 
impact on eﬃ  ciency is rarely even recognized as a relevant policy issue in 
a world where social engineering is regularly undertaken in the name of 
eﬃ  ciency provides a sobering reminder of the extent to which monetary 
power may – consciously or unconsciously – shape subjectivities.
9.2 Alternative Approaches to Monetary Reformist 
Discourse: Globalism, Religion, Foucauldian-Inspired
Disputes on money may rarely escape the inﬂ uence of wider worldviews 
and motivations. Nonetheless, in contrast to the spirit of much of the 
historical debate, contemporary proposals often explicitly couple monetary 
reform with other seemingly unrelated policy goals. For instance, there 
appears to be a curious conﬂ ation of the arguments for monetary reform 
and global governance in some contemporary proposals. According to 
99 It is debatable whether the notion of an extractive loan refers exclusively to 
situations in which lending reallocates existing real assets without producing additional 
real wealth or also to situations in which an excessive – however deﬁ ned through the 
democratic process – proportion of the real returns is captured by the ﬁ nancial system 
through interest payments due to structural features of the monetary system. After all, 
if the entire real return may be extracted by the ﬁ nancial system while leaving no rights 
whatsoever to residual claimancy for the actual entrepreneurs who presumably bear most 
of the risks of the productive projects, it is not obvious that calling perhaps most lending 
activities “extractive” is an overstatement.
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one reform proposal associated with “mainstream” (Robertson and Bunzl, 
2003: 37) analysis elsewhere:
We need to bring the corporate power of multinational money under 
democratic control. Th at will have to be done within a new framework 
of:
global public revenue raising, including taxation• 
global public spending, eg on United Nations’ activities, and• 
a global currency, evolving from something like the IMF’s Special • 
Drawing Rights (SDRs)
Th is will have to be supervised much more eﬀ ectively at UN level than 
international monetary and ﬁ nancial institutions are today (Robertson, 
2002: 5).
According to this line of reasoning, “greater freedom for many smaller 
economic units than today’s national economies will need to be combined 
with the orderliness of large-scale, even global, organisation” (Robertson, 
1998: 10). Th e precise manner in which large-scale or global organization 
could consistently achieve the potentially contradictory objective of 
providing greater local freedom is often left unexplained beyond the 
level of simplistic metaphors. Much of the literature which attempts to 
rationalize or justify global governance from an evolutionary perspective, 
for instance, might appear to reach its desired conclusions through 
the overemphasis of the form over the content of power. According to 
one variant of this thesis, “Th e globalization of humanity is a natural, 
biological, evolutionary process” (Sahtouris quoted in Bunzl, 2006–
2008: 6), whereby humanity is organized into structures of governance 
composed of “holons” and “holarchies” – wholes which consist of and are 
part of other wholes – according to a logic of unity in diversity. Questions 
such as whose interpretation of “unity” will prevail and on what basis 
and what the legitimate limits of diversity are and what happens to the 
deviant subjectivities are often given relatively little attention.   
Even more curiously, many contemporary reform agendas involve 
metaphysical overtones which may not be as readily obvious in much of 
the historical debate. According to Robertson, for example, the 
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shift to a new economic system can be seen as a part of a larger historical 
change, of the kind that Danah Zohar spoke of. I see it as the end of 
the modern age and the transition to a post-modern period in human 
history, marked by a new awareness of our common humanity and our 
kinship with the rest of the creation (Robertson, 1998: 2).100 
Kennedy, in turn, suggests that 
Th e proliferation of esoteric knowledge and skills in many parts of the 
world indicates a profound shift in consciousness of an increasingly 
larger number of people. Th eir work on inner change provides the basis 
for outer change. Without this work a peaceful transformation of the 
monetary system may be impossible. Th erefore, a great responsibility rests 
with those who serve humanitarian goals and are aware of the practical 
possibilities of monetary reform as one aspect of global transformation 
(Kennedy, 1995: 76).  
While speculation on the extent to which diﬀ erent variants of the Gaia 
hypothesis involve a spiritual component is beyond the scope of this 
study, overt or covert references to this philosophical tradition are also not 
uncommon in some of the contemporary monetary reformist literature.
Th ere is, of course, no technical reason why monetary reform should 
coincide with the rescaling of economic, political, or social activity or 
the transformation of metaphysical worldviews. Nonetheless, given the 
potential capacity of monetary crises to push through material practices 
and cognitive frameworks that may be unrelated to the technical features 
of money, any policy proposal promoted or implemented simultaneously 
with monetary reform deserves particular scrutiny. As was noted in the 
previous chapter, money is territorially indeterminate. Any monetary 
crisis – no matter how severe or widespread – can be solved at any 
level of political organization. As long as real economic activity can be 
rescaled to correspond to the scale of the monetary system(s), a global 
100 For those who are unfamiliar with Zohar’s work, she argues that we cannot 
“respond positively and creatively to the now desperate state of our environment from within the 
old Western world view, be that Christian, humanist or mechanistic” (Zohar and Marshall, 
1993: 188, original emphasis). Contrary to the “old Western world views” she sees human 
beings as the active agents of creation, or, as “excited states of the vacuum”, which “has 
all the characteristics of the immanent God, or the Godhead, spoken of by mystics, the 
God within, the God who creates and discovers Himself through the unfolding existence 
of His creation” (ibid: 196–198).
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monetary meltdown may be addressed through the creation of local 
microcurrencies, a global currency, or anything in between. In monetary 
and economic matters interdependence of evidence does not entail 
evidence of interdependence: any potential simultaneous global ﬁ nancial 
and economic meltdown would merely testify the success of previous 
political strategies to dismantle barriers to economic and ﬁ nancial 
activity. Socially constructed integration of production and ﬁ nance will 
not make these activities inherently any more global in scope than socially 
constructed disintegration into regional, national or local levels would 
make them inherently fragmented. Given money’s exceptional versatility 
as an instrument of power projection and the relatively bleak prospects 
for maintaining a global monetary authority democratically accountable 
for the technical speciﬁ cations of money as well as monetary policy, any 
potential tendency to couple monetary reform with globalist political 
objectives requires at the minimum additional analytical eﬀ ort to counter 
the views of the long tradition of skeptics who have questioned the 
rationale for such coupling. Keynes, for instance, famously noted that 
I sympathise, therefore, with those who would minimise, rather than 
with those who would maximise, economic entanglement between 
nations. Ideas, knowledge, art, hospitality, travel - these are the things 
which should of their nature be international. But let goods be homespun 
whenever it is reasonably and conveniently possible; and, above all, let 
ﬁ nance be primarily national (1933: 758).
More critical voices have suggested that the “World War IV” against 
humanity in the form of global neoliberalism is breaking apart existing 
nation-states into many “nations” along the lines of class cleavages rather 
than unifying the globe (e.g. Marcos, 2001). Th e monetary failures and 
excesses of sovereign power at the level of the nation-state can hardly be 
rectiﬁ ed by more of the same at the global level. In the case of money in 
particular, liberal peace is likely to entail global civil war.101
101 A failure to identify the structural violence of the prevailing forms of money 
has sometimes led to curious statements about ﬁ nancial actors’ alleged preferences with 
respect to war. It has, for instance, been argued that “because of the macroeconomic 
consequences of war, ﬁ nancial communities within countries will be amongst the most 
cautious elements when it comes to waging war or supporting foreign policies that risk 
war” (Kirshner, 2007: 9). “Macroeconomic stability” in turn, is deﬁ ned as “low inﬂ ation 
and, just as important, policies designed to keep inﬂ ation low, robust and predictable real 
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Although the largest religions have inspired commentary on the pre-
vailing monetary arrangements throughout the history, what is distinctive 
about the contemporary debate is perhaps the amount of interventions 
which seek to reform rather than merely apply or reinterpret the dominant 
forms of spirituality. In such cases it is not the dominant religious tradition 
of the political space in question that is seeking to interpret contemporary 
monetary practices against its teachings or dogma, but relatively marginal 
– at least in the public’s perception – spiritual views giving monetary 
matters the attention that the dominant traditions may have failed to 
provide. Among contemporary reform agendas proposals that might be 
interpreted as being consistent with New Age metaphysics – however 
inappropriate the term might be – would appear to be well represented. 
At the risk of stating the obvious, it is, of course, quite unnecessary to 
deify, unify, or immanize humanity, consciousness, or the entire universe 
or to reach into some of the more unconventional forms of inner heroism 
in order to achieve a more equitable and humane monetary system – the 
more traditional forms of religiosity or secularism associated with the “old 
interest rates, stability in and maintenance of the value of the exchange rate and unfettered 
access to international ﬁ nancial centers abroad, balanced government budgets, modest 
government spending, low rates of taxation, and small and clearly sustainable levels of 
government debt” (ibid: 2). As this may be one of the most reliable recipes for global class 
war through the emancipation of the structural violence of the prevailing forms of money 
from some of their democratic, regulatory and territorial constraints, it is hardly surprising 
that the state’s potential meddling with the management and the proﬁ tability of the global 
civil war – or the “World War IV” – is often unwelcome. Although the nature of money 
has evolved, the same logic may also apply to some earlier forms of monetary systems: 
as soon as reasonably predictable and secure modes of accumulation and governance are 
established, one would expect a constituency to emerge for the protection of established 
privilege from the economic, political, and social upheavals that are often associated with 
war. In order to investigate the preferences of “bankers” in isolation of the mental guidance 
provided by established patterns of privilege, one would ﬁ rst of all have to ﬁ nd a ﬁ nancial 
system where money is not used for power projection – where war cannot possibly entail 
a loss of established privilege to bankers, but can potentially help to establish new modes 
of accumulation and governance either domestically or internationally. Th e likelihood 
of ﬁ nding such a monetary system – and the predictable preferences of bankers with 
respect to war in such an institutional context – gives an indication of the extent to 
which “appeasing” the alleged preferences of a speciﬁ c relatively powerful occupational 
group may simply amount to defending privilege. If relevance was the main criterion, 
an analytical eﬀ ort exploring some of the aforementioned themes might thus as well 
be entitled “Defending Privilege: How Should ‘Macroeconomic Stability’ be Deﬁ ned to 
Render it More Proﬁ table Th an War for Bankers?”
208
Western world views” may be quite suﬃ  cient as the guiding metaphysical 
frameworks to achieve such an objective. Perhaps one of the best ways 
to clarify the underlying metaphysical objectives of any given proposal 
for monetary reform is to assess its impact on a particularly unpopular 
or politically incorrect religious identity. How does, say, a dogmatic 
monotheist with a preference for praying over shopping and a democratic 
political preference for a (monotheist) theocracy over secularism ﬁ t into 
the global village or the planetary or universally immanent consciousness 
at least implicitly advocated by some contemporary reform proposals?102
Some of the metaphysical struggles surrounding money may be further 
illustrated by examining some of the disinformational rants which those few 
commentaries that occasionally do emerge from more established sources 
of institutionalized religiosity in non-Islamic nations commonly evoke. For 
one example of the staples of a common disinformative account – with quite 
a few extra spins to reward the patient reader – see e.g. Buiter (2007), written 
in response to Selby (2007), albeit presumably for the exclusive purpose of 
solidifying the author’s prevailing misconceptions as the blog is “written for 
the author, not for the readers”. Some of the most signiﬁ cant substantive 
shortcomings of this particular “monetary ignoramus” (Buiter, 2007), who 
has been teaching and implementing the misinformation in some of the 
highest levels of academia and public service as opposed to merely “writing 
about it in the Times” (ibid.), have been explored in detail elsewhere in 
102 Th e intention here is not, of course, to criticize any speciﬁ c religious views, 
but to point out the potential political misuses of metaphysical or scientiﬁ c rhetoric. 
Continuing with the example of Zohar’s work, suggestions like “Every time that I try to 
understand another person’s point of view it is a small religious act. It is also a small political 
act” (Zohar and Marshall, 1993: 248, original emphasis) oﬀ er a welcome alternative to 
the tribalist self-justiﬁ cation of privilege that often passes for political debate. Problems 
may arise when the rhetoric is usurped to the service of particularistic political agendas. 
As the authors point out, “Th e individual who realizes that parts of his or her own 
identity emerge through relationship with others may be less guarded and defensive” 
(ibid: 40). If history is to be a guide, it is not diﬃ  cult to envision some individuals 
proclaiming their share of the immanent consciousness more equal than others, justifying 
the annihilation of political opponents on evolutionary criteria. It will nonetheless be 
fascinating to observe what the role of some of the more marginal spiritual views in the 
proposals for monetary reform or global governance will be in the future. From a purely 
pragmatic perspective, coupling calls for speciﬁ c forms of economic, political or social 
reform with fringe spiritual rhetoric is likely to be counterproductive. If a seemingly 
counterproductive practice persists in political discourse, it is usually safe to assume that 
the consumers of such rhetoric have not understood the issues at stake correctly.
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this study: the convolution of an accounting system for facilitating the 
multilateral exchange of existing real capital with the presumed need of 
the holders of such real assets to borrow additional monetary “capital” at 
interest from the banking system in order for such exchange to take place, 
the confusion of intertemporal trade with the necessity to pay a tribute to 
the banking system merely for obtaining the gatekeeper media for such 
exchange, failure to distinguish between the rationales for and the actual 
operational practices associated with money-creating, interest-bearing debt 
and the recycling of existing monetary balances – including a speciﬁ cation 
of the preconditions for such balances to exist in the ﬁ rst place without 
money-creating interest-bearing debt – between lenders and borrowers 
etc., all the while accusing the target of one’s disinformative rant of one’s 
own analytical shortcomings (“the Bishop also confuses money creation 
with credit and borrowing. … Th e Bishop is confused about what money 
is, how it is created and what it does” [ibid.]).
Th e focus here is on the potential metaphysical signiﬁ cance and 
motivations of such argumentation rather than their intrinsic merits. In 
the beginning of his rant the author makes the following proposition to 
the author of the article that he is criticizing: “I promise not to make 
public statements about the merits of the Trinitarian doctrine (a form of 
higher theological mathematics asserting that 3 = 1).  In return I would 
like the Bishop not to write any more nonsense about credit and debt.” 
Th is analogy raises a number of intriguing lines of further inquiry, two of 
which are pursued in more detail here. 
First, the example may be unintentionally revealing in respect of 
the extent to which the relevance of “higher theological mathematics” 
and higher economic and monetary mathematics are both based on 
the observer’s faith in the accuracy of the underlying assumptions and 
analytical frameworks. It may, for instance, not be entirely unfair to 
suggest that a cognitive framework based on the assumptions of a virgin 
birth and resurrection does not substantially deviate from the alternative 
universes explicated for analytical purposes in top economics journals in 
terms of their respective empirical veriﬁ ability. In certain cases the faith-
based foundations of the discipline of economics may in fact exceed the 
relevant religious standards. While religious dogma dating back hundreds 
or thousands of years may not be empirically falsiﬁ able, economic dogma 
– such as the neutral veil approach to money – may be falsiﬁ ed every 
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time the focus of analysis is shifted from the parallel realities of economic 
analysis into real world economic phenomena. Whereas the religious 
believer is required to have faith in scientiﬁ cally unveriﬁ able events in 
the past, the economic believer places her faith in mental models that 
are ubiquitously and perpetually proven wrong by empirical evidence. 
Separation of the discipline of economics and the state may thus remain 
a much more urgent task than its seemingly quipish analogy to the 
separation of the church and the state might suggest: without more 
realistic models of reality that provide greater space for diversity, it may 
be diﬃ  cult to overestimate the damage that the marriage between state 
power and faulty economics may cause to life in all forms.
Th ere is nothing in Buiter’s article which would suggest that he would 
have understood the faith-based foundations of his own approach or some 
of the crucial questions that one might expect to arise in an untrained 
mind when contemplating upon questions such as “what money is, how 
it is created and what it does”. Yet the interpretation of the sacred dogmas 
of monetary economics by an uninitiated observer is labeled “nonsense”, 
presumably to a comparable extent as 3 = 1 is nonsense in the absence 
of specialist explanation that the author appears to deride – with not 
insigniﬁ cant irony in respect of the credibility of his own qualiﬁ cations 
to explain or assume away obvious monetary contradictions. Luckily 
some of the later posts by the same author appear to indicate that 
some learning may have taken place in the form of recognizing some 
of the shortcomings or excesses of analytical or normative frameworks 
associated with economic or monetary theory.103 Nonetheless, one of 
103 Th e present author has a conﬂ ict of interest in making such statements through 
the reputational value of the qualiﬁ cations granted by Professor Buiter’s current home 
institution. During the author’s studies, one staﬀ  member felt intimidated after presenting 
his views on some considerations that prospective students might wish to contemplate 
upon before choosing which institution to enroll for higher education. Th e staﬀ  member 
has since moved to another institution. Yet when potentially more severe reputational 
harm is caused by arrogance, ignorance or misinformation, where are the inquisitors 
publicly questioning whether an individual engaging in such behavior might be “abusing 
his employer and his colleagues without consequences” (see e.g. MacLeod, 2006)? Th e 
present author is against the limitation of the freedom of speech – whether directed 
against potential misunderstandings, arrogance, or inquisitorial instincts. Nonetheless, in 
an economic system where every actor may be thought of as being ultimately employed 
by the monetary and tax authorities – the incentive structures that the relevant authorities 
choose to set for circulating the monetary media – such suggestions in one of the key 
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the obvious problems with the kind of attitude exempliﬁ ed by the blog 
involves the relative signiﬁ cance of religious and monetary analyses for 
the lives of perhaps most people: while most subjects of the nation where 
the aforementioned exchange of ideas took place may simply ignore 
any potential unreasonable demands or interpretations emanating from 
religious institutions, no similar liberties exist with respect to the material 
practices and subjective frameworks produced and reproduced by state 
coercion and the prevailing forms of legal tender. Th us one might expect 
that the high priests of the monetary order should indeed be more tolerant 
towards revivalist interpretations of the economic scriptures than their 
religious counterparts might be towards attempts to co-opt, bastardize or 
misrepresent voluntarily adopted religious doctrines.
Second, one may wonder whether alternative metaphysical views 
articulated in conjunction with monetary commentary might elicit 
equally ﬁ erce attacks from some of the academic or monetary powers 
that be. In other words, would any metaphysical framework – including 
some of the New Age variants brieﬂ y mentioned earlier in this section – 
associated with allegedly faulty monetary analysis in an article published 
in the Times of London evoke equally colorful commentary? Th is question 
might be viewed as an analytical counterpart to the earlier observation 
that certain types of relatively marginal spiritual frameworks appear to be 
well represented in monetary reform proposals: any potential tendency for 
some of the more established religious identities to draw disproportionate 
criticism in relation to the substantive oﬀ ences committed might 
constitute evidence of interrelationship between monetary rhetoric and 
the promotion of speciﬁ c spiritual identities. If the Christian “higher 
theological mathematics” of “3 = 1” is an acceptable target of criticism 
for any monetary high priest, would “6 billion people plus the rest of the 
biosphere plus the rest of the universe equals one”, for instance, be equally 
outlandish? How about the laugh factor involved in spiritual calculus 
that makes unwarranted inferences about qualitatively diﬀ erent entities, 
such as “twelve sheep plus one shepherd equals thirteen”? For the sake of 
religious and spiritual equality, should the alleged analytical shortcomings 
of anyone cultivating such faulty calculus not be complemented with 
academic knowledge producing/preserving institutions are highly troubling, saddening 
and perhaps inspiring for a study which is partly motivated by the pursuit of space for 
diversity and alternative conceptualizations of the human to ﬂ ourish.
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equally ﬁ erce attacks against the subject’s spiritual views? If controversial 
religious calculus disqualiﬁ es a former Bishop from commenting on the 
monetary system, should perhaps everyone who – from the perspective 
of some religious traditions – miscalculates the number of self-conscious 
units of life or mortal men be disqualiﬁ ed from public and private duties 
involving the analysis, creation or management of money on equally 
sectarian grounds?
As much of the monetary reformist debate has historically been 
inspired by a struggle against the power-centralizing tendencies of the 
prevailing forms of money and by a conscious adherence to the dominant 
metaphysical identities that may divide as well as unify, the position of 
globalist and religious discourse in contemporary reform proposals and 
the criticisms that they may attract is highly signiﬁ cant. One of the most 
relevant questions on power may always be the precise manner in which 
power manifests itself through the actions and subjectivities of speciﬁ c 
individuals. Th e question is particularly relevant when some of the 
leading proposals for a relatively uncontroversial emancipatory project – 
monetary reform – advocate as solutions some of the same developments 
that a long tradition of monetary reformers have struggled against.
Although rarely explicitly framed in terms of monetary reform, some 
of the emancipatory analytical projects emanating from the Foucauldian 
theoretical tradition may be particularly appropriate for illuminating 
two factors which may so far have received insuﬃ  cient attention in the 
reform debate: the dual nature of any monetary reformist project as a 
transformation of both individual subjectivities and material practices, 
and the interdependence between the monetary system and other 
governmental technologies. Foucault’s “agonism” or perspectivism invites 
each individual to confront power within a given multiplicity of strategic 
positions. In other words, although power may be exercised rather than 
possessed, it is possible at any given point in time to focus resistance 
on speciﬁ c institutions or individuals through which power operates. 
According to one interpretation, Foucault’s perspectivism could perhaps 
be compared to a chessboard where also the rules of the game and the 
capabilities and identities of the diﬀ erent pieces are in constant motion: in 
order to obtain the privilege of being used by power in the most exclusive 
circumstances possible, each piece must engage in constant identity 
politics and struggle for alternative material practices to maximize her 
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utility to power. Resistance may prove elusive precisely because power 
does not permanently reside in any speciﬁ c piece or rule of the board: 
any act of resistance directed against speciﬁ c institutions, individuals or 
the “mobile eﬀ ect of a regime of multiple governmentalities” (Foucault, 
2008: 77) may merely alter the multiplicity of strategic positions which 
provides some other institutions or individuals with the opportunity to 
be used by the most prestigious forms of power. In order to prevent the 
rogue subjectivities from escaping the structural racism of the normalizing 
state, “it is up to society and to the rules of the game imposed by the state 
to ensure that no one is excluded from this game in which he is caught up 
without ever having explicitly wished to take part” (ibid: 202).
What happens when a governmental technique – such as the prevailing 
forms of money – becomes so powerful and pervasive as to render futile any 
form of perspectival resistance which engages in the relational negotiation 
of power positions according to logic which is internal to the system of 
governance? In other words, what is a piece on the chessboard to do after 
realizing that it is the game that is playing the pieces rather than the other 
way round? Prozorov (2007: 100) has suggested that, as freedom – or 
“being sovereign over one’s existence against all attempts to abduct it 
and reduce it to a positive project” – is an ontological condition of the 
human – or the piece in the chess analogy – it is already “free to pursue 
one’s potentiality for being against all attempts to freeze this potentiality 
in any actual identity” i.e. it is free to leave the logic of the board in 
search of space that is beyond the powers of biopolitical production. Th is 
observation directs attention both to the potential counter-governmental 
value of the refusal of biopolitical production as well as the limitations of 
purely biopolitical resistance strategies.    
Prozorov – as well as much of the work he draws upon – may appear to 
view the freedom obtained through the refusal of biopolitical production 
primarily as a defensive strategy of resistance.104 Agamben (1995: 80) goes 
104 A self-actualizing subject – who may or may not be aware of the expected 
response of the human potentiality to any given strategy of biopolitical production – 
would not notice whether any speciﬁ c choice or non-choice of a positively or negatively 
deﬁ ned identity or non-identity is subject to biopolitical contestation or any other form 
of evaluation that is not endogenous to the self-actualizing subjectivity. In other words, 
the self-actualizing subject would select – or consciously or unconsciously refuse to select 
– a speciﬁ c positive identity or a negatively deﬁ ned non-identity while being entirely 
oblivious to any potential normative implications of her selection in the eyes of the powers 
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as far as to suggest that life without identity is irrelevant to the state. Th is 
is a curious claim in the context of the hegemonic economic discourse 
in general and the zero-sum competitive logic of the prevailing forms 
of money in particular. Th e governmental credibility of competition 
discourse relies on the willing participation of at least the top contestants. 
If a substantial portion of individuals possessing the requisite technical 
skills to win in the zero-sum competition prefer to opt out, the self-
that be, agents of resistance, or any other outside observer. Any potential knowledge 
on the normative preferences of outside observers will be subordinated to the subject’s 
inclination for self-actualization to an extent which will not permit such considerations to 
enter into the decision-making process. In order to avoid being perceived as yet another 
legitimating narrative for the strategy of unify and conquer – a type of rhetoric advocating 
global governance which replaced some of the earlier versions of divide and conquer as 
technological advance made it abundantly clear that even the most minuscule political 
entities could defy the will of the global powers that be with the right instruments of 
violence – research programs advocating some variant of the “whatever singularity” or a 
global community would thus have to clarify their stand on the nature of freedom. Is self-
actualizing freedom beyond the capacities of human agency? If not, what would freedom 
as deﬁ ned by the bare consciousness in its full potentiality before it is contaminated by 
either endogenous self-actualizing selection or interference from exogenous normative 
structures look like? Is there a tradeoﬀ  between positive identities and the potentiality for 
being: if a self-actualizing subject sees life’s perfection in the imperfections of a speciﬁ c, 
positively deﬁ ned identity which the subject believes to be freely constructed as opposed to 
imposed through biopolitical violence, is freedom enhanced or diminished through such 
construction? What are the criteria for belonging to the community of self-actualizing 
subjects? While none of these questions necessarily contradicts the view that freedom 
might be an ontological condition of the human, this line of questioning deserves to 
be pursued in more detail for at least three reasons. First, any proposal that is global in 
scope and meddles with the diverse and highly diﬀ erentiated ecosystem of subjectivities 
which may make all-encompassing biopolitical production prohibitively expensive – 
both questionable objectives according to inﬂ uential streams of the monetary reformist 
literature – deserves to be scrutinized particularly thoroughly. Second, the logical limits 
of freedom may be directly relevant to assessing the limits of money’s potential impact 
on subjectivity. Th ird, the case for the ontological exceptionalism of freedom is rather 
weak. Th ere is little evidence to suggest that other potential sources or attributes of 
human motivations could not be equally permanent and universal characteristics of the 
human. Why could not, say, love be an ontological condition of the human – a feeling 
continuously evoked by the emotionally emancipated irrespective of the happiness or 
horror with which such self-actualizing behavior is reciprocated – bringing the concept of 
love dangerously close to the universalism which may sometimes be dismissed outright as 
all-embracing and thus presumably redundant? Once again, the relevant issues from the 
perspective of this study involve the speciﬁ c elements of the human subjectivity which 
can be inﬂ uenced through diﬀ erent conﬁ gurations of monetary systems.
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declared winners of the economic resource race are rendered not entirely 
unlike the accidental winners of a minor sporting event boycotted by 
some of the top talent and shunned by the public. Th e refusal to adopt 
a power-approved identity denies power the capacity for plausible self-
delusion. Governance is likely to be most eﬀ ective when the subjects share 
a genuine belief in the validity of their biopolitically assigned identities. 
With proper mental guidance and a suﬃ  ciently narrow life experience, 
any elite instrument of power, say a CEO, can learn to suppress doubts 
about the accuracy and validity – or at the very least the perceived necessity 
– of the social sorting mechanisms that produce and reproduce privilege. 
A denial of power-approved identity by those who have the requisite 
technical skills to attain privilege and yet prefer the Tiananmen105 over the 
boardroom may constitute a highly oﬀ ensive and destabilizing exercise of 
inﬂ uence on not only the prevailing strategic formations of power, but 
also the entire structure of biopolitical production. Tiananmen might 
thus be conceived of as a biopolitical equivalent of a nuclear weapon: 
once the critical mass is reached, the enemy will be annihilated. It is not 
irrelevance that the tanks come to combat, but the biopolitical violence 
of peaceful counter-governance.
Yet it may be unlikely that the annihilation of life itself can be averted 
by a purely biopolitical strategy of resistance. As the co-evolution 
of life and political strategy began at the threshold of modernity, the 
ontologization of freedom as an attribute of the human subject lost much 
of its emancipatory potential. Resistance to biopolitical production 
requires capacity for agency over the aspects of life that are undergoing the 
biopolitical assault. Th is capacity is precisely what was lost or substantially 
diminished at the transition to modernity. After decades of progressively 
deregulated assaying of money’s biopolitical properties, both money’s 
nomological hold on governing livelihood and its biopolitical appeal in 
setting the limits for “economically feasible” human activity are perhaps 
stronger than ever. Nor is the sudden abandonment of identity politics 
likely to help the newly liberated molecules of the human body to skip the 
period of evolution that would have been required to develop immunity to 
the ubiquitous assault on the body’s electrochemical control mechanisms 
105 In the sense of Agamben (1995).
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(see e.g. Auvinen, forthcoming)106. Th e selﬁ sh gene – harboring illusions 
of its own irreplaceability while resisting sovereign power’s assault on 
life – will soon learn that the genological social contract from the era 
before the threshold of modernity was reached no longer applies: either 
the gene will have to work overtime to adapt to the accelerating pace 
of environmental change or it will face extinction and be replaced by a 
more agile specimen tailor-made by the genetically modiﬁ ed organism 
industry – the evolutionary equivalent of outsourcing jobs to lower wage 
countries when the workers in higher wage countries cannot quite keep 
up with the changing environment. Th e (loving?) invitation to mutate or 
to fall ill in order to be cared for or abandoned as biopolitically useless 
cannot be refused by life that wants to remain in circulation.
Th us simplistic calls for emancipation through biopolitical awakening 
have two main problems. First, it is not obvious that there is any bare 
life left to challenge biopolitical production. Inviting the prevailing 
forms of life to resist biopolitical production may not be entirely unlike 
asking artiﬁ cial intelligence to assert her humanity in the manner chosen 
by the most powerful cerebral processor units: in both cases the results 
might be expected to be awkward, to say the least.107 Th e implicit liberal 
project of collective suicide through life’s governmental suﬀ ocation – the 
logical consequence of merging “economic eﬃ  ciency” with the ever more 
sophisticated modes of violence through which life may be regulated 
– thrives under increasing quantiﬁ cation of the prevailing forms – or 
heirs – of human life. Deﬁ ning the full human potentiality, in contrast, 
would require an immersion into a universe of utopias: imagining the 
forms of life that could have emerged, had political strategy been kept 
outside the constitutive processes of life. Biopolitical awakening would 
thus require ﬁ rst and foremost an archaeology of life – a historiography of 
106 Th e ubiquity of the assault may be a direct result of the nearly universal 
abandonment of the principle of nonviolence in industrialized countries: every user 
of cell phones or other forms of wireless communication technologies participates in 
inﬂ icting violence around her.
107 Even in the hypothetical case of perfect technical capabilities to incorporate 
all the prevailing dimensions of “humanness” into an artiﬁ cial intelligence system, such 
“humanness template” would only reﬂ ect information that has been available for the 
system to analyze – a minuscule portion of the human potentiality that has survived, for 
instance, the violence imposed by socially constructed sorting mechanisms and the more 
recent low-intensity holocaust aiming to exterminate electrochemical and neurological 
diversity from the (post-)human race.
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life as it could have been in the absence of sovereign violence. Otherwise 
the identities or “whatever singularities” produced by the biopolitical 
awakening may be at least as much artifacts of sovereign power as of bare 
life, genetically scarred by the era of sovereign violence for the rest of 
evolution’s lifetime. 
Second, as long as the material practices that produce and reproduce 
subjectivities remain intact, the potential for purely biopolitical strategies 
to achieve emancipation is clearly limited. While transformed subjectivity 
may be a necessary condition for monetary reform, it is clearly not a 
suﬃ  cient condition as long as individuals cannot physically escape 
exploitative division of labor and set up alternative networks of production 
and exchange. While gaps and spaces of indeterminacy may always remain 
even in the most extensive mechanisms of biopolitical production, no 
such imperfections need to arise in sovereign violence’s coverage of a 
physically ﬁ nite material reality. Deviant subjectivities – monetary or 
otherwise – can always be located in speciﬁ c physical spaces that can be 
subjected to more traditional forms of sovereign annihilation. Rendering 
sovereign violence impotent would require a simultaneous, nearly 
universal biopolitical awakening. Anything less would automatically have 
to involve consideration of sovereign power’s response to the gradual and 
non-universal emergence of Tiananmens of deviant subjectivities – and 
by implication a more old-fashioned struggle for the control of sovereign 
power structures in order to permit the Tiananmens to proliferate.
It is thus diﬃ  cult for any emancipatory project to avoid confronting the 
question of appropriate control of state power: without the containment 
of sovereign violence the archaeology of life can hardly begin and any 
non-universal biopolitical awakening will be crushed before it can 
transform the material practices to sustain itself in the physical world 
governed by sovereign terror. Under such circumstances the appropriate 
intermediate goal in the struggle against sovereign power might be its 
neutralization – however oxymoronic such an objective may sound. Th e 
transition from a biopolitical battleﬁ eld into a “happy life” is unlikely 
to happen overnight for all individuals, and even if it did, politics of 
pure process does not necessarily imply the absence of institutions – 
whether of the organized anarchy or the anarchic organization variety. 
Th e neutralization of sovereignty simultaneously provides an opportunity 
to eliminate sovereign power’s worst biopolitical excesses and recognizes 
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humanity’s utter incapacity to govern itself in the era of modernity, 
providing a mirror – however imperfect or distorted – to get an idea of 
what the lawless self-reﬂ ection might entail. Th us there might be more 
scope for complementarity between Foucault’s perspectivism and the 
messianism of Agamben and Derrida than is commonly acknowledged. 
Foucault’s perspectivism is open to the interpretation that a strategic 
multiplicity of power positions in any given system of governance is too 
pervasive and powerful to be resisted within the logic of the given system 
of governance. In other words, the relevant emancipatory objective 
may well be abandonment of power, which may have to be strived for 
gradually, pinpointing each emancipatory intervention at each step to 
the most relevant sovereign or biopolitical forms of power according to 
the evolving strategic multiplicities. For Derrida, “every political, moral, 
juridical decision … constitutes every second of our time as ‘the strait gate 
through which the Messiah might enter’ (Benjamin, 1973: 266)” (Mills, 
2004: 55). Agamben, in contrast, “sees the contemporary condition of 
political existence as one of irreparable danger, such that a wholly new 
form-of-life is necessary to redeem humanity from the exposure of bare 
life to sovereign violence” (Mills, 2004: 56). Th e reverse engineering of 
life that is logically prior to creating a new form-of-life untainted by the 
inﬂ uence of sovereign violence may be unlikely to take place without 
Foucault’s perspectivism to identify each step in the management of 
the strategic multiplicity required to create suﬃ  cient policy space for 
beginning the archaeology of life, or without Derrida’s gradualism 
which sees every political, moral and juridical decision as potentially 
contributing to messianic objectives.
In the context of monetary governance the neutralization of sovereign 
violence would at the minimum imply egalitarian initial distribution 
of the debt- and interest-free monetary media. Th e following chapter 
outlines a more detailed reform proposal to illustrate some of the 
economic, political and social issues involved in any monetary system 
and some potential solutions to the inherent tradeoﬀ s and contradictions 
of money – whether seen from the perspective of neutralizing sovereign 
monetary violence, taking the next step in a gradualist struggle for 
emancipation, creating the right monetary conditions for recovering 
aspects of humanness that the logic of forced zero-sum competition may 
have destroyed, striving for social justice, or something else.
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10  A Road to Another World
Few branches of social sciences may be as unaware or oblivious of their 
own ontological limitations as monetary theory. As a socially constructed 
accounting system, the social construction of money is logically prior 
to any form of economic, political, or social analysis involving some of 
the technical functions of money. Th e range of politically or technically 
feasible policy choice is largely determined by the institutional design 
of money, including but not limited to features such as the speciﬁ cation 
of the unit of account and the monetary media that correspond to that 
deﬁ nition, the method of creating monetary media and withdrawing 
them from circulation, any possible disparities in the rules governing the 
circulation of money and physical and human capital, and the incentive 
structures for the employment of ﬁ nancial capital in productive uses. Any 
potential structural disparities between the rules governing the circulation 
of the goods and services that are to be exchanged in the market and the 
distribution of the monetary media that regulate the access to and the cost 
of such multilateral exchange will inﬂ uence every economic, political, 
and social relationship involving some of the technical functions of 
money. Yet the socially constructed origin and the spectrum of political 
choice inherent in the institutional conﬁ guration of money are often 
forgotten when analyzing the “technical” constraints that money imposes 
on economic, political, and social processes and realities.
Th e issues at stake are far more deep-seated than the mere dismantlement 
of the paradigmatic perceptual ﬁ lters on money as an institution might 
imply: as long as money’s role as a socially constructed, politically speciﬁ ed 
facilitator of multilateral exchange remains the central object of analysis 
for the emancipated subjectivity, social scientiﬁ c analysis presupposes the 
institutional centrality of money that it is supposed to explain. As Mary 
Douglas pointed out in a slightly diﬀ erent context, 
Institutions systematically direct individual memory and channel our 
perceptions into forms compatible with the relations they authorize. 
Th ey ﬁ x processes that are essentially dynamic, they hide their inﬂ uence, 
and they rouse our emotions to a standardized pitch on standardized 
issues. Add to all this that they endow themselves with rightness and 
send their mutual corroboration cascading through all the levels of our 
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information system. No wonder they easily recruit us into joining their 
narcissistic self-contemplation. Any problems we try to think about 
are automatically transformed into their own organizational problems. 
Th e solutions they proﬀ er only come from the limited range of their 
experience (Douglas, 1986: 92). 
Any student of money should thus be wary of insisting upon solutions 
which take money’s artiﬁ cially elevated institutional status as granted 
merely because the mutual corroboration of the prevailing knowledge-
certifying institutions and incentive structures might be perceived to 
favor such outcomes.
Much of the ediﬁ ce of contemporary social scientiﬁ c inquiry is based 
on the assumption of the hugely overblown economic, political and 
social signiﬁ cance of money – or monetarily mediated social relations 
irrespective of whether money itself is regarded as neutral – in human 
relations. Th e artiﬁ cial importance of money, in turn, has given rise to 
far-reaching causal claims on the role of the human nature in shaping 
the range of feasible social realities. In reality, “the” human nature equals 
the human potentiality: any institutional structure can be designed to 
promote virtually any human motive. Polanyi expressed this point in the 
context of economic institutions in general as follows:
Single out whatever motive you please, and organize production in such 
a manner as to make that motive that individual’s incentive to produce, 
and you will have induced a picture of man as altogether absorbed by 
that particular motive. Let that motive be religious, political or aesthetic; 
let it be pride, prejudice, love, or envy, and man will appear as essentially 
religious, political, aesthetic, proud, prejudiced in love or envy. Other 
motives, in contrast, will appear distant and shadowy since they cannot be 
relied upon to operate in the vital business of production. Th e particular 
motive selected will represent “real” man.
As a matter of fact, human beings will labor for a large variety of 
reasons as long as things are arranged accordingly (Polanyi, 1968: 96, 
quoted in Block and Somers, 1984: 64). 
Th e institution of money could be designed to promote pride, prejudice, 
love, envy or virtually any other form of human behavior, however 
deﬁ ned, as a part of an overall system of social relations – calling the 
system “economic” would presuppose a primacy of motives which might 
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not be there – where the role of money could range from central to 
negligible or non-existent. Contrary to the views of some of the skeptics, 
the institution of a monetary system designed to promote, say, love would 
not necessarily require most of the general population to intrinsically prefer 
love over alternative human motives any more than the current monetary 
system requires genuine psychopathy or willingness to exterminate other 
human beings through monetized market exchange to maintain its 
functionality. It may be quite suﬃ  cient for the institutional logic of the 
monetary system to structurally favor the desired human motives. Not 
entirely unlike the manner in which the de facto coup d’état108 may have 
been performed by a relatively small number of individuals through the 
monetary system, the coup d’émotion could, in theory, be implemented 
before the human motive in question has come to be widely recognized 
as the essence of “the” human nature.
Th e objectives here are substantially less ambitious: the aim is to make a 
speciﬁ c reform proposal to illustrate the implications of seemingly minor 
technical changes in the speciﬁ cations of money. Rather than outlining a 
complete agenda for reform, the goal is to provide a concrete example of an 
otherwise abstract issue in order to inspire more widespread contemplation 
and debate on some of the economic, political, and social issues that are 
involved in the institutional design of any monetary system. Th e ﬁ rst step 
for any utopian project of social transformation is to acknowledge the 
utopia of the status quo – to expose to public scrutiny the true nature of 
the prevailing institutional structures which may well turn out to be more 
undesirable, unrealistic, or “utopian” than some of the initially more far-
fetched alternatives. Perhaps one of the most eﬀ ective ways to achieve 
this objective is analytical parsimony: pinpointing some of the questions 
which cannot be suppressed by parroting the most proﬁ table answers. 
108 According to an insight that has sometimes been attributed to Mayer Amschel 
Rothschild, “Let me issue and control a nation’s money and I care not who writes the 
laws” (quoted in e.g. www.moneyreformparty.org.uk). It remains unclear whether this is 
because power is assumed to migrate to the monetary system or the “writers of the laws” 
can be induced to exercise appropriate restraint through monetarily mediated incentive 
structures. In either case, describing the result as a coup d’état – if not concretely, then 
at least cognitively in overthrowing the persistent myth of national parliaments or 
governments being the autonomous bastions of power – may not be an overstatement. 
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10.1 Retuning the Amplifi er: Seigniorage-Based Basic 
Income and A Demurrage Tax on Money
It was suggested earlier that the unrepayable interest-bearing debt against 
which money has been created constitutes the economic, political and 
social ampliﬁ er through which the wealth- and power-centralizing 
logic of the prevailing forms of money materializes. Th is ampliﬁ er was 
shown to have no “eﬃ  ciency”-based justiﬁ cation in skill or productivity 
diﬀ erences: from the perspective of the net beneﬁ ciaries, income derived 
from compound interest on unrepayable money-creating debt is essentially 
unconditional and thus conceptually not entirely dissimilar to more 
widely distributed unconditional income payments. Th e mere existence 
of the ampliﬁ er may render any potential notion of “monetary stability” 
meaningless for the vast majority of the population:109 irrespective of the 
chosen measures and indicators of “stability”, the monetary system may 
be working towards greater relative wealth- and power-centralization.
Th e ampliﬁ er could be abolished and replaced by a wealth- and power-
equalizing mechanism through two simple reforms: 
(1) all newly created debt-free money is equally distributed to the 
members of the community as unconditional basic income (UBI) and 
(2) a periodic demurrage tax on money is introduced to both “ﬁ nance” 
the UBI110 and to reduce real interest rates on money below zero. 
Th e selection of the most appropriate combinations of discretionary and 
rules-based policies would be left to the democratic political process. Th e 
aim is to combine substantial, regular and unconditional income – or 
109 “Meaningless for the vast majority of the population” should not be confused with 
diminished “legitimacy”. As Arthur Stinchcombe observed in the context of constructing 
legitimacy, “Th e person over whom power is exercised is not usually as important as other 
power-holders” (Stinchcombe, 1968: 150, original emphasis, quoted in Tilly, 1985: 
171). Th e same maxim can perhaps be relatively freely applied to the construction of 
other governmental catch phrases such as “monetary stability”, “economic eﬃ  ciency”, or 
“market economy”.
110 Th e logical validity of the overall reform proposal cannot be contested on the basis 
of any potential objections relating to the “ﬁ nancing” part only without simultaneously 
challenging the “ﬁ nancing” of the prevailing forms of unconditional income transfers 
through compound interest to the relatively privileged members of the monetary space.
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capacity to monetize real claims to monetized market exchange to the 
extent that such claims exist – for every member of the community with 
a negative discount rate for economic decision-making. As the proposal 
eﬀ ectively decouples the medium of exchange function of money from 
its use as a store of value and at least partly income from work, both 
the incentives for “economically eﬃ  cient” or environmentally sustainable 
behavior and the distribution of power among the factors of production 
would be structurally aﬀ ected.
In the most conservative form of the proposal the amount of newly 
created money distributed into the economy through UBI would be 
precisely matched by an equal tax on the existing monetary balances. 
If, for example, newly created money corresponding to 6% of the value 
of the existing money supply is annually distributed to the economy 
through UBI, a tax of 6% per year, charged suﬃ  ciently frequently to 
enable smooth circulation of the currency, would be adopted to maintain 
the money supply stable. Th e idea of a negative interest rate on money 
– or a “demurrage” charge – is often traced back to the work of the 
German economist Silvio Gesell. In the original Gesellian scheme the 
tax on money was to be implemented by periodically attaching stamps 
sold by the monetary authority to currency notes to maintain their face 
value. With the current information technology and reduced use of 
cash the implementation would be simpler, as most of the tax could be 
deducted directly from bank account balances and the discounting of 
notes could be done automatically at the time of payment based on each 
note’s issue date.111 In order to accommodate a growing economy’s need 
for additional monetary balances, the value of the newly created money 
distributed through UBI might have to slightly exceed the tax on money, 
e.g. an annual UBI of 9% of the money supply and a 6% tax on money 
for a non-inﬂ ationary money supply growth requirement of 3%.
111 Incidentally, imposing a tax on money could also make a practical contribution 
to the ongoing interdisciplinary debate on the nature of money by helping to clarify the 
distinction between money and other types of ﬁ nancial instruments. Th e more frequent 
the transactions between money and a certain type of ﬁ nancial instrument under the 
enhanced incentives for such transactions to avoid the periodic tax on money, the 
more likely the ﬁ nancial instrument in question is to constitute money or near-money. 
Hence the coverage of the tax could be gradually expanded to diﬀ erent types of ﬁ nancial 
instruments to achieve the desired eﬀ ects in the real economy.
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Apart from being non-inﬂ ationary,112 the seigniorage-based and 
demurrage-“ﬁ nanced” UBI would be likely to be highly eﬀ ective in 
achieving its progressive economic, political, social and ecological 
objectives in addition to being consistent with enhanced competition 
and “eﬃ  ciency”. Th e poorest segments of the population typically have 
to spend their monetary income within a relatively short period of time 
after receipt on the basic necessities of life, leaving negligible money 
holdings to be taxed. For the economically more fortunate members of 
the society there would be no way to collectively avoid the payment of 
the periodic taxes on money, as someone must always hold the monetary 
balances regardless of the possible eﬀ orts of any speciﬁ c individuals to 
avoid the tax by investing in non-monetary forms of wealth. Individuals 
seeking to reduce their monetary holdings would encounter drastically 
altered incentive structures for investment: a suﬃ  ciently large periodic 
tax on money entails negative discount rate when assessing the present 
value of expected income streams from investment projects. Under a 
positive annual interest rate of 6%, for instance, the present value of 
an expected investment income of $100 received one year after the 
initial outlay is approximately $94.34, the amount that would have to 
be deposited today at 6% annual interest in order to get $100 in one 
year’s time. Hence any potential investment project must compensate 
for the positive interest rate paid on monetary balances in order to be 
undertaken. Under such logic it may be perfectly rational to exterminate 
any species with a biological growth rate below the positive interest rate 
on money or to initiate a chain of events that will destroy humanity or 
the entire planet with absolute certainty by a given date provided that the 
date is suﬃ  ciently far in the future (to put things in perspective, typical 
investment horizons extend to a few decades at most). With an interest 
rate of negative 6%, investment in the preservation and accumulation of 
natural capital would suddenly become relatively more proﬁ table. As any 
112 Whether non-inﬂ ationarity is an appropriate target is debatable. Nonetheless, the 
non-inﬂ ationary case is presented here in order to not only alleviate a potential concern 
that could distract attention from the substance of the proposal, but also to illustrate the 
point that the proposed combination of debt- and interest-free egalitarian allocation of 
newly created money and a demurrage tax on money is potentially a much more eﬀ ective 
tool in controlling inﬂ ation or preventing the potential economic or social side eﬀ ects 
of credit contraction than the tools currently available to central banks to restrict or to 
encourage private credit creation.
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investment that loses less than 6% of its monetary value annually – e.g. a 
$100 investment that retains more than $94.34 of its monetary value after 
one year – may become worth undertaking, investment activity is likely 
to become heavily biased towards lasting and sustainable projects.113   
In the current monetary system “economic eﬃ  ciency” is distorted 
by the unpredictable and asymmetrically distributed changes in the 
money supply as well as the requirement to make interest payments 
on unrepayable debt merely to maintain money in circulation. It is the 
commercial banking system that determines when, where, to whom 
and for what purpose new money is created through credit contracts, 
presumably on the grounds of allocating newly created money to the 
most productive uses – a curious criterion for regulating the existence 
and the circulation of a presumably neutral facilitator and gatekeeper of 
a community’s division of labor, to say the least. Whoever manages to get 
the newly created money ﬁ rst will face a price structure – both relative 
and absolute – that in all likelihood has not yet fully adjusted to the 
increased money supply. Furthermore, as virtually all prices in a modern 
economy involve some compensation for interest charges, the interest 
payments that are required to keep money in circulation must be made 
by everyone – whether borrower or lender, producer or consumer – either 
directly or indirectly. Issuing all money debt- and interest-free would 
undoubtedly enhance “economic eﬃ  ciency” through the rectiﬁ cation of 
the aforementioned biases. While the evaluation of the impact of a periodic 
tax on money on “economic eﬃ  ciency” is more complex, the elimination 
of the “race to see who can get the new money earliest” (Rothbard, 1980: 
31) through the simultaneous egalitarian allocation of all newly created 
money and the enhanced transparency of the entire process of money 
creation and circulation, among other things, would appear to suggest 
that the potential eﬃ  ciency gains from implementing the proposal are 
not negligible. Nonetheless, as has been argued above, it is far from clear 
that money can ever be speciﬁ ed in a manner that would allow the purely 
technical notion of eﬃ  ciency to become a primary concern amidst the 
113 Lietaer (2001: 28) has identiﬁ ed two historical precedents of civilizations which 
have had an embedded demurrage charge in their monetary systems: the Pharaonic Egypt 
and the “Age of the Cathedrals” or the 10th–13th century Western Europe. In both cases 
“[t]he record shows that people spontaneously created buildings and artforms that were 
designed to last for ever. You can still visit them today.”
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irreducibly political nature of the process of specifying the institutional 
features of money.
With regard to the distribution of power between diﬀ erent factors of 
production, the proposal would merely level the playing ﬁ eld by extending 
some of the same constraints that already aﬄ  ict labor also to ﬁ nancial 
capital. Financial capital’s politically and socially constructed ability to 
defer its own employment – money’s artiﬁ cial exemption from the tendency 
of material things to “rot, decay, break out [and] rust” in Gesell’s (1958) 
terminology – until other factors of production agree to its terms on rate 
of return and a de facto monopoly on residual claimancy constitutes a 
market imperfection that reduces economic eﬃ  ciency through distorted 
competition among the factors of production. Labor must often accept 
virtually any terms of employment oﬀ ered by capital merely to meet its 
physical subsistence requirements. As socially constructed abstract value, 
money should in theory obey the laws of the same physical reality that 
conditions labor’s existence in order to avoid structural distortion of 
eﬃ  ciency and equity. For this reason reform proposals which advocate the 
debt- and interest-free issuance of money without a demurrage charge are 
insuﬃ  cient: the competition among the diﬀ erent factors of production 
would continue to be structurally distorted in favor of monetary capital, 
albeit to a lesser extent than under the prevailing monetary system. Even 
a relatively minor structural distortion, such as setting the demurrage 
tax rate on money at too low a level, may be suﬃ  cient to confer de facto 
monopoly on residual claimancy to capital. With a substantial periodic 
tax on money, money is as free not to employ itself in productive uses 
as starving labor is in the position to refuse employment: in both cases 
refusal would be suicidal. As a result of leveling the playing ﬁ eld between 
labor and capital, both factors would share the same incentive to avoid 
mutually destructive disputes that could distract from their common 
objective of engaging in productive, environmentally sustainable 
economic activity. Meanwhile, the UBI paid to every member of the 
community would provide blanket compensation for the expropriated 
income streams – potentially partly returnable through taxation in cases 
where an individual’s income from other sources suggests that no such 
expropriation has taken place – of human capital that is rendered obsolete 
by state or corporate bureaucracies rather than some imaginary interplay 
of market forces in a decentralized competitive utopia.
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In the day to day administration of the reformed monetary system 
rules-based policies might provide the greatest amount of predictability, 
transparency and immunity against bureaucratic capture of the system to 
serve particularistic purposes. If, for example, the annual growth rate of 
the money supply is constitutionally ﬁ xed at 9% – distributed through 
UBI at predetermined dates – and the annual tax rate on money is ﬁ xed 
at 6% in perpetuity, monetarily induced uncertainty would be virtually 
eliminated from economic decision-making – which is, of course, 
quite diﬀ erent from saying that some variant of the unlikely objective 
of monetary stability in terms of unchanging relative prices would 
have been attained. A reasonable case can be made for structurally and 
permanently isolating individuals who may have neither the opportunity 
nor the inclination to keep abreast of the latest developments in the 
evolution of the social weapon of money from the possibility of monetary 
violence through rules-based policies. In any case the eﬀ ectiveness of 
monetary policy may be dubious at best and – despite the abundance of 
apologetic accounts of the prevailing monetary arrangements sponsored 
by the powers that be and thus by the prevailing economistic standards of 
deﬁ nition presumably “independent” – it remains unclear why the power 
to regulate the circulation of money should ever be outsourced by the 
transacting parties to an “independent” external institution. According to 
one possible analytical position, discretionary monetary policy may thus 
be viewed as a Pandora’s Box that might unleash the monetarily mediated 
social arms race as soon as discretionary policy space becomes available.
For the proponents of discretionary policy, the proposed reforms 
would provide policy tools which are likely to be much more powerful 
– for the publicly stated policy objectives pertaining to economic 
stability and growth – than the prevailing policy instruments and yet be 
structurally tied to egalitarian outcomes to minimize the potential for 
particularistic abuse. Th e practice of issuing money debt- and interest-
free would already reduce some of the cyclical and polarizing tendencies 
of the prevailing forms of money. Unlike the prevailing monetary system, 
the proposed reforms would also give the relevant monetary authority 
direct control over the money supply. Instead of trying to indirectly 
inﬂ uence proﬁ t-maximizing credit creation by the commercial banking 
system, the relevant monetary authority would know and control the 
precise quantities of money that would quite literally be put into people’s 
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pockets at each point in time as well as the precise quantity of the “reﬂ ux” 
of money from the demurrage tax payments. Whatever one may think 
of the eﬃ  ciency or desirability of discretionary monetary policy, the 
long and variable time lags would appear to be reduced and the overall 
manageability and transparency of the policy process enhanced. 
From another analytical perspective – and quite independently of any 
other proposal discussed so far – a properly implemented demurrage tax 
on all forms of money might also provide an opportunity to reverse some 
of the unjustly accumulated wealth and power disparities produced by 
the wealth- and power-centralizing tendencies of the prevailing forms of 
money. In the case of reversing historical injustices in resource allocation 
through the monetary system, two political considerations are likely to 
determine the practical potential of the scheme that would clearly be 
technically feasible: the extent to which non-compliance is criminalized – 
analogously to the extent to which deviant behavior must be criminalized 
under the prevailing socially constructed accounting system of money to 
maintain its functionality – and the net economic eﬀ ect of any potential 
emigration and migration induced by the scheme.
Particularly the questions following from the latter point are intriguing. 
Suppose that a society was to implement a wealth- and power-equalizing 
monetary and tax reform – some might say conﬁ scation, although 
it would appear that the same label would in such a case have to be 
applied also to the manner in which the wealth- and power disparities 
were built in the ﬁ rst place – which induces everyone above a certain 
income threshold – the entire economic and political elite – to emigrate 
to other countries which would presumably be more willing to pay the 
“market” rate of compensation for their services. Let us further assume 
that those who remain announce a global open bid for the vacant 
positions and democratically select the replacements from the national 
and international pool of applicants based on competence and salary 
requests. In management terminology, what has just taken place is the 
replacement of the operative management of the nation by its shareholders 
– the citizens – albeit in the indirect form of oﬀ ending the previous 
management’s sensibilities with respect to their sense of their true value 
to the nation. If the newly appointed CEOs and politicians performing 
perhaps at a fraction of their predecessors’ cost are less productive by 
a margin that exceeds the diﬀ erence in salary costs, the emigrants may 
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indeed have been more important to the economic wellbeing of the 
nation than many of the citizens were willing to concede, albeit still 
not necessarily worth the salaries and other sources of income that they 
were getting. If, on the other hand, productivity does not suﬀ er or is 
perhaps even improved, the wealth- and power-equalizing monetary 
and tax reform would have uncovered, and possibly rectiﬁ ed, market 
imperfections through the introduction of competition into previously 
exempted segments of the labor markets. It may be precisely the threat of 
a widespread understanding of this insight that the powers that be often 
seek to suppress through the endless repetition of the dogma that the 
most privileged segments of the population need to be served through tax 
concessions and other forms of “incentives” rather than exposed to the 
disciplinary force of competition. It is worth emphasizing once more that 
the rationale behind the scheme need not involve anything else except a 
genuine desire to increase the overall “economic eﬃ  ciency” of the society 
through exposing heretofore exempted segments of the population to the 
equalizing force of competition. If anyone whose level of income and 
wealth are not matched by productivity threatens to emigrate as a result 
of inhospitable monetary or tax reforms, by all means, let them go.114 
Perhaps nowhere else can the self-referentiality of markets as distribution 
mechanisms for economic privilege be made as spectacularly obvious as 
in the contrast between the economic “realities” induced by the logic of 
the prevailing forms of money and the results that other individuals who 
reject the socially constructed accounting logic of money might achieve 
with the same real resources. Th e negligible likelihood of the economic 
and political elites introducing eﬃ  ciency-enhancing policies that could 
instigate their own exodus merely reinforces these conclusions.
Of all the intellectual decoys of choice which may be evoked to deﬂ ect 
attention away from the substance of thought experiments such as the 
one outlined above, charges of envy or populism are perhaps among 
the most common. As often appears to be the case with ad hominem 
irrelevancies – no matter how carefully impersonalized behind ostensibly 
generic concepts – explicating the substance of the labels that are being 
114 Th e policy of encouraging economically ineﬃ  cient elites to emigrate would be 
in stark contrast to the containment of monetarily exploited individuals to speciﬁ c debt-
based monetary spaces during the build-up of the wealth and power disparities which 
would be rectiﬁ ed through the monetary and tax reforms.
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selectively attributed to speciﬁ c lines of reasoning may suﬃ  ce to expose 
the absence of a substantive argument. Envy often implies dissatisfaction 
with a just distribution of resources – otherwise the term would be 
virtually indistinguishable from a dislike for injustice – and a desire to 
achieve similar levels of consumption as the object of envy. Populism, 
in turn, implies instrumental usage – some form of deviation between 
the genuine substance of a concept and the particularist distortion 
that is being evoked for instrumental purposes – in order to have any 
meaningful distinction to “popular”. Furthermore, one might expect 
populism to be relatively more frequent in analytical debates relying 
upon universalist cognitive frameworks such as economic theory than in 
the real world of diverse and heterogeneous subjectivities. While in the 
real world no group of individuals may ever be homogeneous enough for 
constructing fruitful dichotomies between “the elite” and “the people”, 
universalist analytical frameworks suﬀ er from no such deﬁ ciencies. For 
instance, if the subjection of certain occupational groups or industries 
to competition is detrimental to economic eﬃ  ciency or causes some 
other indescribable perils which an economic layman is unqualiﬁ ed to 
imagine, it is the task of the economic theory to transparently specify 
these exceptions.115 Without such transparently speciﬁ ed exceptions, 
using economic theory to advocate the commodiﬁ cation of low-skilled 
labor through global laissez-faire while failing to apply the same logic to 
more privileged segments of the community misrepresents the substance 
of economic theory and would thus appear to exemplify populism.116
115 As Bibow (2006: 30) has pointed out, central bankers, for instance, would 
appear to be “operating in an extraordinarily inﬂ exible labor market. In this particular 
labor market, this rigidity is seen as a virtue that enhances performance (dubbed personal 
independence)”. Th e precise occupational tasks whereby performance may be enhanced 
rather than impeded by comparable “untouchability” or “politically absurd situation” 
(ibid: 30, 29) would appear to be clearly less than perfectly speciﬁ ed in orthodox 
economic theory. If – in the memorable words of Alan Greenspan – “mumbling with 
great incoherence” about a form of presumably neutral economic institution which in 
any case cannot exert independent inﬂ uence on “real” variables is deemed to constitute 
a suﬃ  ciently signiﬁ cant activity to warrant special protections and relatively high 
compensation, on what basis do similar privileges not apply to other, more signiﬁ cant 
tasks – ones where clarity and coherence of expression may be required and which do 
have a widely acknowledged impact on the real world?
116 Incidentally, a long tradition of analysts have in one form or another suggested 
that competition is unlikely to be applied with equal force in the most privileged 
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Neither concept – envy or populism – applies to either the reform 
proposals outlined in this chapter in general or the aforementioned 
thought experiment in particular. It is quite possible to object to an unjust 
distribution of resources resulting from the inconsistent application of 
economic or some other form of theory precisely because it is unjust 
and inconsistent. Criticism of, say, excessive compensation packages 
or the wealth-centralizing logic of the prevailing forms of money in no 
way implies a desire on the part of the critic to adopt more extravagant 
consumption patterns. Furthermore, such criticism often aims to apply 
the same standards of analysis to economically privileged institutions or 
members of the community as are regularly adopted by policymakers or 
market participants with respect to less privileged segments of the society. 
As long as there is nothing populist about subjecting the working class 
to global competition, there is nothing populist about the suggestion 
that cheaper and more eﬃ  cient CEOs or politicians might be available 
in the global labor markets either.117 Th e particularist distortion of the 
presumably universal economic logic to rationalize elite exemption 
from commodifying competition, on the other hand, would appear to 
exemplify populism. Th us there is nothing envious or populist about the 
analytical framework underlying the reform proposals, albeit some of 
the predictable criticism that the proposals may draw from the bastions 
of privilege may well fall within these categories. To the contrary, if the 
segments of the community, as excessively symmetric exposure to the equalizing force of 
competition might destroy the political support for capitalism among the upper and upper 
middle classes. Th is might be a logically coherent position, but, as it may have become 
increasingly rare to hear this line of reasoning being articulated by individuals in positions 
to certify knowledge, it may be unlikely to explain the surge of populism particularly in 
some of the more economically oriented social sciences since their inception in political 
economy or some other more broadly deﬁ ned areas of inquiry.
117 In the case of politicians, the substance of this claim is often deﬂ ected by 
comparing salaries or wealth among politicians in diﬀ erent countries. Such comparisons 
tell more about the globalization of the class structure than about the potential eﬃ  ciency 
gains from hiring lawmakers and bureaucrats with the best price-quality ratios from 
the global labor markets. In the case of corporations, the straw man of choice is often 
the claim that the most competent candidates are being hired at the best possible price. 
As was noted earlier, virtually the only way to overcome the self-referentiality of rigged 
markets is to abandon the socially constructed, structurally distorted logic – what will be 
referred to as the “surreal plane of social interaction” in chapter 12 – altogether and see 
what a completely diﬀ erent set of individuals could achieve in real terms with the same 
initial real resources. 
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proposal succeeds in its immediate objective – challenging the reader 
to explore the tremendous amount of technical indeterminacy and 
political choice inherent in any monetary or economic system – the 
possibilities for the instrumental use of envy or populism in the political 
and economic lexicon might be signiﬁ cantly diminished. In short, while 
populism simpliﬁ es, this study aims to attain the diametrically opposed 
objective of complicating the customary interpretations of concepts such 
as [neutral] money or [symmetrically applied] competition. While the 
parrots of economic orthodoxy may often make fantastic claims on the 
presumably universal desirability of the prevailing forms of money – 
eﬀ ectively claiming to speak on behalf of “the people” or “science” in 
attacking or suppressing heretical views – the present author seeks to 
expose the substantial economic, political and social indeterminacy and 
conﬂ ict inherent in any monetary system – i.e. to counter the populism 
of the academic powers that be with a positive rather than a normative 
statement on the nature of money as an institution.
10.2 On the Monetary Implications of the Formal and 
Substan tive Rationalities of Capitalism and Its 
Alternatives
As was noted in the previous section, it may be tempting to take the 
artiﬁ cially elevated institutional signiﬁ cance of money for granted when 
contemplating alternative modes of monetarily mediated social interaction. 
Th is particular preanalytic vision – the “preanalytic cognitive act that 
supplies the raw material for the analytic eﬀ ort” (Schumpeter, 1954: 41) 
– often manifests itself in social scientiﬁ c inquiry through the tendency 
to focus on the “technical” features of the prevailing forms of money as 
an inescapable starting point for conceiving alternative modes of social 
behavior. In other words, the focus is often on the forms of social relations 
that the prevailing forms of money may facilitate rather than on the forms 
of money that would be required to foster speciﬁ c types of social relations. 
Whatever one may think of the desirability or feasibility of piecemeal 
versus more radical social reform, it is instructive to analyze the normative 
objectives of an economic system and the intensity with which they are 
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pursued – what Weber (1978: 85) called the substantive and formal 
rationalities of economic action – in order to expand the politicization of 
money from “technical” reform proposals to the potential redesign of the 
social relations that underlie each monetary system. In doing so, adopting 
the evolutionary rhetoric that has become a fashionable reference point in 
social scientiﬁ c inquiry and beyond constitutes perhaps one of the most 
fruitful approaches to illustrate the issues at stake.118
Th e curious conﬂ ation of evolutionary imperatives with “success” 
as determined by speciﬁ c socially constructed sorting mechanisms has 
received far too little attention in social sciences. Keynes’ assertion that 
“it is better for a man to tyrannize over his bank balance than over his 
fellow citizens” (quoted in Lau and Smithin, 2004: 12) appears not only 
to be widely shared among evolutionarily oriented social scientists, but 
also to be regarded as a reasonable proxy for the natural mechanisms of 
evolutionary advance. Yet it is far from obvious that any speciﬁ c socially 
constructed sorting mechanism has any necessary overlap with the 
natural evolutionary processes: those who come at the top according to 
the socially constructed evolutionary criteria may well be the ones whose 
survival value for the species as a whole is the lowest when measured 
against objective physical standards and natural laws.119 It is, for instance, 
quite possible that the survival value of the “bank balance”-standard 
of relative performance is lower for the species as a whole than the 
evolutionary advantages of “tyrannizing” anyone who would have dared 
to attempt to impose such a standard on her fellow humans might have 
been. More importantly, as both of the aforementioned standards may be 
far from optimal, the extent to which any socially constructed mechanism 
mimicking evolutionary processes nurtures alternative outcomes becomes 
crucial. Whenever humanity determines to rise above – or descend below 
– its animal instincts through something called civilization, two crucial 
questions need to be addressed. First, what is the appropriate normative 
social objective of such a civilization that will replace the anarchism and 
118 Section 10.5 expands on some of the evolutionary rhetoric introduced here.
119 Th e argument that is being addressed here is thus quite diﬀ erent from the 
liberal institutionalist claim that diversity must be reduced or eliminated through 
global institutions of governance to guarantee peace. What is being addressed here is 
the hardcore evolutionist argument that competition – for whatever ends and however 
induced – produces desirable evolutionary outcomes through intra-species selection.
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violence – or spontaneous co-operation, depending on one’s views – of the 
state of nature? In other words, which activity or activities are normatively 
regarded as the overriding aims of the human existence, thus constituting 
the scale against which individual performance is evaluated? Second, 
to what extent are alternative modes of behavior and social interaction 
subordinate to the chosen normative goals? What happens to individuals 
who are either incapable of or reluctant to rise to the socially constructed 
[relative] standards of performance? Are they eliminated from the gene 
pool? If yes, how? How does the civilization attempt to justify both the 
extermination of these individuals and the suppression of any potential 
violence – perhaps “terror” – that resistance to the socially constructed 
sorting mechanisms may breed, given that the evolutionary objectives 
of some of the “terrorists” may well be more valuable to the species as a 
whole than those of the “civilization”?
Although the terminology and the main focus of analysis may diﬀ er 
between observers of diﬀ erent theoretical and ideological persuasions, these 
questions are central to the design of any economic or monetary system. 
Weber (1978: 85), for instance, referred to one possible interpretation of 
the former question as the substantive rationality and perhaps a variant of 
the latter question as the formal rationality of economic action:
Th e term ‘formal rationality of economic action’ will be used to designate 
the extent of quantitative calculation or accounting which is technically 
possible and which is actually applied. Th e ‘substantive rationality,’ on 
the other hand, is the degree to which the provisioning of given groups of 
persons (no matter how delimited) with goods is shaped by economically 
oriented social action under some criterion (past, present, or potential) 
of ultimate values (wertende Postulate), regardless of the nature of these 
ends. Th ese may be of great variety.
In short, substantive rationality refers to the normative objectives of an 
economy or a civilization, while formal rationality captures the extent 
to which diﬀ erent calculative techniques are utilized in order to pursue 
these normative objectives to the exclusion of alternative normative 
goals.120 While the inherent conﬂ ict between the medium of exchange 
and the store of value functions of money that has been explored in detail 
120 Th e intersection between the substantive and formal rationalities of social 
organiza tion provides fertile ground for complementary analysis between diﬀ erent 
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elsewhere in this study exempliﬁ es the “technical” approach to money – 
the exploration of alternative modes of social organization which takes 
the prevailing institution of money as its starting point – the conceptual 
bifurcation of social organization into substantive and formal rationalities 
provides a deeper perspective into the underlying assumptions of the 
social relation of money independently of the speciﬁ c “technical” forms 
that money may assume at any given point in time. Without such a 
perspective the politicization of money would be far from complete 
irrespective of one’s views on the perceived practical feasibility of the 
corresponding reforms.
Once again, a properly bizarre – albeit the bizarreness of the present 
realities may be hard to match – example will illustrate the issues at stake. 
No form of economic, political or social activity – whether in the realm 
of the “economy”, politics, sports, culture or something else – can ever 
hope to mimic the natural evolutionary mechanisms, let alone constitute 
a universally optimal normative goal for humanity’s existence, yet at 
least one of such activities will have to be artiﬁ cially elevated over the 
alternatives if “civilization” responsive to the utilitarian governance of 
relative performance is to be constructed. Suppose that a civilization tired 
of tyrannizing each other over bank balances were to randomly select 
an alternative substantive rationality for social organization to relieve its 
existential angst. Suppose that, of all the potential human activities, the 
lot falls on ballet.121 In other words, plutocracy will be replaced by a 
theoretical traditions. As was noted earlier, Marxist and Foucauldian analyses, for instance, 
may have complementary strengths in these respective areas.
121 Th e inspiration for this example came from a story that a national news channel 
ran – as a joke to elicit laughs at the end of the program – on a group of middle-aged 
men who started to take ballet lessons in their spare time. Yet it is not obvious that similar 
jokes – often middle-aged men in politics or the economy who, like the male ballerinas, 
are utterly incapable of living up to even the most rudimentary standards of performance 
according to most publicly professed indicators – are not presented in virtually every 
news program and outlet on a regular basis. Would it be entirely inappropriate to wonder 
why perhaps equally marginal capacities and competence in the ﬁ elds of politics or the 
economy often do not elicit similar smiles from the viewers as the male ballerinas, who – 
in contrast to many politicians, economists, or businessmen – did not appear to harbor 
illusions about their own capacities? Hence the choice was made in the hopes of both 
providing a manifestly absurd example of a socially constructed sorting mechanism and 
a memorable cognitive focal point for contextualizing equally hopeless eﬀ orts in other 
realms of social interaction that the reader might witness elsewhere in the future.
236
ballerinatocracy: from that moment on individuals will be tyrannized on 
the basis of their dancing skills rather than their bank balances. As a side 
eﬀ ect of the community’s transformed normative preferences, resources 
will accrue to the top ballerinas, who will in turn decide the method 
and extent to which their newly acquired wealth may trickle down to 
others. Whatever human activities the top ballerinas choose to patronize 
will thrive, while other dimensions of the human experience may be 
properly weeded out as irrelevant to the civilization’s newly discovered 
raison d’être. If history is to be a guide, irrespective of what the patronized 
activities will be, “a corps of willing and talented craftsmen” (Galbraith, 
1996: 5, quoted in Davidson, 2007: 523–524) is likely to emerge as the 
cheerleaders and rationalizers of the newly conceived privilege. It is largely 
irrelevant to argue that the chosen example is inappropriate as ballet itself 
is not a productive activity: there is intrinsically nothing productive about 
tyrannizing over bank balances either – crime, deception, fraud, regulatory 
capture and other socially unproductive activities being periodically 
rediscovered as the driving forces of capitalist wealth accumulation – and 
a ballerinatocracy could surely distribute capital to its “most productive 
uses” according to similar standards of self-interest, quite possibly with 
less collateral damage caused to humanity than by the prevailing forms of 
monetary and banking institutions. Th e relevant point of the example is 
the possibility – indeed likelihood – of a spectacular failure in the selection 
of a single normative rationality for a civilization ostensibly to replace the 
logic of natural evolutionary processes: plutocracies and ballerinatocracies 
eliminate diversity, which is likely to constitute a counterproductive 
evolutionary strategy at the species level. Top talent and specialization in 
all other realms of the human experience will be allowed to exist only to 
the extent that the plutocrats, ballerinas or the like – acting eﬀ ectively as 
unaccountable evolutionary central planners on behalf of the species as a 
whole – view such specialization as worthwhile.
While the reform proposal outlined in the previous section may not 
directly challenge the substantive rationality of capitalism, diversity would 
be enhanced through a less strictly applied formal rationality. Replacing 
the structural necessity of zero-sum competition with the combination of 
debt- and interest-free egalitarian allocation of newly created money and 
a demurrage tax might not alter the prevailing normative objectives of 
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capitalism, but it would reduce the intensity with which such normative 
objectives must be pursued. Seen from the evolutionary perspective, 
calls for less stringent application of the prevailing standards for formal 
economic rationality are not based on social or egalitarian objectives 
that could hinder the functioning of presumably accurate mechanisms 
of evolutionary selection. To the contrary, such calls recognize the fact 
that nominating plutocrats, ballerinas or some other group as humanity’s 
unaccountable evolutionary central planners is simply bad business: the 
normatively selected variable over which socially sanctioned tyrannization 
may take place is always likely to fall spectacularly short of the evolutionary 
signiﬁ cance that the cheerleaders of privilege attempt to assign to it. Th e 
justiﬁ cation of socially constructed sorting mechanisms on evolutionary 
grounds would require multidimensional criteria which recognize 
both the depth and breadth of specialization across a wide spectrum of 
human motivations, including some of the less fashionable normative 
orientations. Th e considerable uncertainty that will always be associated 
with the accuracy of such sorting mechanisms and their capacity to emulate 
real world phenomena is likely to put such projects permanently out of 
the reach of human capacities. Whatever one’s views on the theoretical 
desirability of evolutionarily selective economic competition or its more 
egalitarian alternatives may be, the practical feasibility of attaining the 
evolutionary objectives of the economic competition rhetoric is virtually 
nonexistent and the monetary system is unlikely to ever constitute an 
appropriate location for such ill-informed experiments.
10.3 Liberating International Transactions: An Open-
Ended Clearing Union
As was seen above, domestically, the combination of seigniorage-based 
UBI and a demurrage tax on money would permit the electorate to 
institute or emulate the monetary counterpart of virtually any form of 
economic policy ranging from laissez-faire to pervasive interventionism. 
In the laissez-faire version the role of government – and all other forms 
of concentrated power for that matter – could be permanently removed 
from monetary policy by constitutionally ﬁ xing both the growth rate 
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of the money supply and the periodic tax rate on money. Following 
the aforementioned example, an economy with an estimated need for 
a 3% average annual long term growth rate of the money supply could 
constitutionally ﬁ x the rate of money creation and the periodic tax on 
money at 9% and 6%, respectively. In the interventionist variant – of 
virtually any theoretical persuasion – the monetary system itself would 
constitute an extraordinarily powerful tool for monetary or ﬁ scal policy. 
Th e long and variable time lags that some analytical traditions associate 
with monetary policy decisions would presumably be shortened by the 
practice of putting all newly created money directly to the pockets of every 
member of the economy, while the potential to tax money might provide 
a relatively wealthy and captive audience for one of the most powerful 
forms of tax conceivable to slow down an “overheating” economy with 
a relatively small impact on the relative price structure – an unlikely 
combination for virtually any other form of tax.
Th e same logic applies in theory also in the international realm. Rather 
than letting its currency depreciate without publicly announced policy 
decisions or relying on the foreigners’ willingness to borrow at high 
interest rates to ﬁ nance “development” and to relend at lower interest 
rates to accumulate foreign exchange reserves122, a monetary hegemon – 
or indeed any relatively powerful currency area – could simply announce 
122 Th e disparity between the interest rates that many developing countries have 
to pay on their foreign borrowing and the income they receive on the foreign currency 
reserves that they must keep idle presumably to forestall monetary crises has been noted 
by several authors. Rodrik (2006), for instance, estimates these costs at around 1 percent 
of the GDP of the developing nations as a whole annually, “a multiple of the budgetary 
costs of even the most aggressive anti-poverty programs implemented in developing 
countries.” As Rodrik points out, the reserve build-up often involves “no net resource 
transfer from abroad” and speculates that “’market intervention’ in the form of taxing 
short-term capital inﬂ ows has developed an unsavory reputation that ‘market intervention’ 
in the form of buying reserves does not have” (ibid.). Even the International Monetary 
Fund has in one of its more candid moments noted that “It must not be overlooked that 
reserves are real resources from the point of view of the countries holding them, and the 
holding of reserves is only one of the possible uses competing for the limited amount 
of resources at the disposal of each country … In a poor country … the maintenance 
of an adequate reserve position may be at the expense of urgently needed industrial or 
agricultural equipment, or may even entail some hardship due to shortages of food or of 
other consumer goods which might have been imported by using a portion of its reserves” 
(IMF, 1953: 195; quoted in Kirshner, 1995: 17). Consequently, the potential merits and 
demerits of all proposals made in this study should not be judged against some parallel 
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an increase in the periodic tax rate it charges on foreigners holding its 
currency to “ﬁ nance” its consumption or military adventures. Th e nature 
of the hegemon’s monetary exploitation of others would arguably not 
be materially altered, but its price tag might become more obvious to 
voters or policymakers who might be inclined to consider implementing 
alternative monetary arrangements for international transactions. In the 
case of smaller countries that lack the market size or military power to 
induce others to hold their currencies the situation is more complex. 
An excessive tax on money may lead to signiﬁ cant exchange rate 
depreciation even in the case of some of the more powerful currency 
areas. As Kirshner (1995: 11) has observed, “Th e psychology of exchange 
rates can intimidate even the most experienced central bankers.” A small 
country may either not be able to induce others to accept its currency 
in international transactions or the risk premium required by others to 
compensate for the unpredictable taxation powers might be too large to 
be acceptable. Is there thus no other option available for smaller countries 
than accepting whatever forms of exploitation the larger currency areas 
choose to impose in order to avoid complete autarky?
Th ere are several potential technical solutions to reconciling the 
monetary rules of the game for domestic and international transactions, 
ranging from laissez-faire among national currencies to establishing a global 
legal tender that must be accepted in the settlement of all international 
transactions. Leaving aside the obvious laissez-faire alternatives which 
hardly require further explanation in the international context, the 
selected criterion of parsimony may allow a more detailed discussion of a 
proposal that – while perhaps not conceptually the simplest possible – has 
received widespread attention since its inception, which may make the 
proposal more easily accessible than alternative schemes developed from 
the scratch. While Keynes’ proposal for an International Clearing Union 
in the Bretton Woods negotiations in 1944 is well known, the political 
dynamics required for the partial adoption of a similar international 
clearing system remain imperfectly understood. Th e key parts of Keynes’ 
proposal were the introduction of a new currency for international trade, 
the bancor, to which the values of national currencies would be tied and 
the imposition of currency value adjustments and interest charges on 
reality which deﬁ nes or assumes away most matters of interest, but against the actual, 
ongoing lunacies masquerading as responsible policy in the real world. 
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both debtor and creditor countries for cumulative deﬁ cits and surpluses 
exceeding a given proportion of each nation’s average annual trade volume 
over a predetermined period of time. Consequently, every nation would 
have an incentive to balance trade as net exporters would also experience 
a gradual deterioration in their international payments position in case 
cumulative trade surpluses were not compensated by increased imports 
within a certain time frame. In addition to these key points, there would 
be substantial freedom for the members to tailor other aspects of the 
system – such as the use of the funds obtained from nations with excessive 
trade surpluses or deﬁ cits – according to their needs. Implementing an 
international clearing union in conjunction with the aforementioned 
proposal for combining the egalitarian initial allocation of newly created 
debt- and interest-free domestic currency with a demurrage tax might in 
many cases require common rules for managing both the demurrage tax 
and the money supply “growth” rates. Nonetheless, instead of exploring the 
technical requirements for reconciling speciﬁ c domestic and international 
variants of the proposal, the focus of interest here is mainly on the political 
feasibility of implementing such an international project. It is not obvious 
that the lack of an all-encompassing international agreement could 
prevent a group of like-minded countries from introducing regulatory 
competition into the international payments system by establishing a 
clearing union.
Any country which views the cost imposed by the use of foreign 
currencies in international trade as unacceptable but nonetheless wants to 
avoid complete autarky can announce its willingness to trade with other 
nations through a multilateral clearing system. Rather than adopting a 
separate clearing system between each pair of nations – which would 
eﬀ ectively amount to barter – the clearing system could be made open to 
everyone agreeing to the multilateral settlement of trades and symmetrical 
interest charges on both debtor and creditor balances. Th e logic behind 
one variant of such an open-ended international clearing system is not 
entirely dissimilar to sub-national mutual credit based currencies such 
as the LETS networks: rather than forcing nations to compete against 
each other for scarce foreign currencies and subjecting themselves to the 
collective accumulation of eﬀ ectively unrepayable debt, any nation could 
refuse such exploitative arrangements and invite other countries to join 
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them in liberalizing123 multilateral international trade by abandoning the 
use of national currencies.
One observer has suggested that the poor world – which “owns the rich 
world’s banks” (Monbiot, 2004: 175) – should “blackmail” (ibid: 177) 
the rich to implement a global clearing union by threatening to destabilize 
the international monetary and payments systems by defaulting on their 
debt. While the proposal highlights some relevant aspects of the social 
construction – and potential deconstruction – of money, it is not obvious 
that the two issues should or could be coupled. Using illegitimate debt 
as a bargaining tool might confer certain legitimacy to such debt by 
transactionalizing a situation involving essentially unilateral exploitation. 
Furthermore, it is far from clear that such a strategy would be eﬀ ective. 
Th e purpose of the socially constructed accounting system associated with 
the prevailing forms of money is precisely the governance of real resource 
ﬂ ows, not the maintenance of an empty shell of patently implausible 
accounting conventions after their capacity to govern real resource ﬂ ows 
has been eliminated. In other words, from the perspective of the powers 
that be, the consequences of the establishment of a global clearing union 
may not materially diﬀ er from the consequences of a wholesale destruction 
of the prevailing monetary system unaccompanied by the institution of 
an alternative international payments system: in both cases the prevailing 
patterns of wealth and privilege might be profoundly altered and, once 
the current monetary system is gone, prolonged disorder and chaos 
may well prove to be more proﬁ table for the bastions of economic and 
123 Th e diﬀ erent contexts in which the various alternative interpretations of 
liberalism are theorized throughout this study exemplify some of the overall theoretical and 
epistemological choices outlined in chapter 2. Th ere is no logical contradiction between 
criticizing the violence and racism of at least some liberal modes of thought, while on 
separate occasions working through some of the central tenets of the liberal creed in “free” 
markets to point out the implications if such principles indeed were consistently followed. 
In chapter 3 it was shown that in its utopian perfect eﬃ  ciency incarnation, capitalism 
converges with socialism. In other words, it was suggested that it may be unnecessary for 
any potential socialist critic to reject some of the principles of capitalism, as the very same 
principles, if consistently applied to their logical conclusion, would produce an eﬀ ectively 
socialist economic system. Similarly, the aim of this section is partly to illustrate the 
largely unutilized scope for political strategies that exists within some of the dominant 
liberal discourses. If consistently applied to their logical conclusion, some interpretations 
of a liberal economic order contain the seeds for forms of social organization that are 
not entirely dissimilar to some of the social systems that radical critics have sometimes 
pursued through the propagation of imaginary dichotomies.
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military power than the establishment of a structurally non-exploitative 
clearing union. Th e poor nations’ threat to default on international debt 
may be unlikely to achieve its stated objective of helping to establish 
a monetarily non-exploitative clearing union if the associated privilege-
demolishing impact rivals the likely implications of widespread debt 
default. Moreover, unless the group of defaulters constitutes a signiﬁ cant 
enough agglomeration of economic and military power, unilateral debt 
default might simply result in another orgy of violence to re-colonize the 
rebels. To sum up, the capacity of the world’s poorest nations to take the 
lead in establishing a monetarily non-exploitative clearing union may be 
limited, to say the least.
Ironically, the most promising way – if there ever has been any – to 
implement a global clearing union might involve the exploitation of the 
political and potentially also religious cleavages between nations and the 
diverging preferences of diﬀ erent domestic interest groups within each 
nation. Suppose that some of the leading oil producers or some of the 
larger economies with the potential ability and willingness to endure 
autarky in case an equitable international payments system cannot be 
created, for instance, would refuse to accept the dollar, euro or the yen as 
a payment for their exports and instead take the lead in creating a liberal 
international payments system that the Bretton Woods institutions have 
so conspicuously failed to provide. Some conceivable logics behind such 
initiatives might involve a would-be hegemon rejecting the ﬁ nancial system 
imposed by its rival, a resource-rich former superpower dissatisﬁ ed with 
the prevailing monetary constraints on resource diplomacy, any mid-sized 
state too small to lead but large enough to destabilize exploring alternative 
modes of economic organization, or a resource-rich nation with a strong 
religious identity calling for pan-denomination organization to stop 
the exploitation by the inﬁ dels through the establishment of a regional 
clearing union. Whatever the initial motive behind the ﬁ rst clearing union 
might be, as long as the union remains open-ended – open for anyone 
with suﬃ  ciently liberal credentials to join – public sympathies would be 
likely to be on the side of the initiators and there would be a considerable 
likelihood that ultimately the scope of the union would become global. 
As has often been noted, it seems strange how much energy and political 
capital is spent to reduce already relatively low tariﬀ s when exchange rate 
ﬂ uctuations that often seem unrelated to “economic fundamentals” can 
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exceed any gains achieved through lower tariﬀ  barriers by many times in 
a relatively short period of time. Nor would it be obvious how to justify 
military action against such recalcitrantly liberal nations based on some of 
the prevailing dichotomies of “us” versus “them”. If “they” were threatening 
the world with one of the most radical forms of liberalism in history, the 
question might arise what precisely it is that the coalition of the willing that 
is so determined to battle against “their” way of life stands for. Although 
perhaps unlikely to be able to take the lead in creating a clearing union, a 
number of “developing” nations that have no realistic hope to escape their 
international indebtedness under the current monetary system might 
have an instant incentive to join once a critical mass of economic and 
potentially also military power had been reached.
Many reform proposals of the international monetary and payments 
system also tend to overlook the fact that it is often not nations per se, 
but corporations and individuals within those nations, who engage in 
international trade. Making membership in the clearing union directly 
available to corporations or perhaps even individuals might create 
domestic coalitions in favor of joining in virtually every nation in the 
world. A requirement to make all international trade transactions in the 
clearing union’s common currency would create a major incentive for 
virtually every multinational corporation to lobby their governments to 
either join or to allow their entry as corporate members. For corporations 
and individuals, trade that is proﬁ table in real terms under the prevailing 
currency arrangements may continue to be so under the multilateral 
clearing system – even after any potential modiﬁ cation of the clearing 
union’s rules to take into account the enhanced risks when trading with 
an individual or a corporation. Corporate and individual members could, 
for instance, be required to engage in fully “ﬁ nanced” barter only or to 
insure their deﬁ cits with one of the sovereign members. Corporations 
have historically been able to put up with much more colorful political 
arrangements than unilateral insistence on liberalism. How many corporate 
executives could aﬀ ord not to put pressure on their governments to allow 
their entry to a clearing system that acts as the gatekeeper to potentially 
sizeable business opportunities? It seems reasonable to assume that few 
governments would ultimately venture to stay out of the union and thus 
either risk the loss of their own monetary powers by allowing corporations 
headquartered in their soil to engage in international trade denominated 
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in the clearing union’s currency or to risk losing the headquarters of the 
corporations to more permissive regulatory environments altogether.
Although the domestic and international policy reforms outlined 
here represent only one possible conﬁ guration from a virtually inﬁ nite 
set of technically feasible reforms, it is diﬃ  cult to overemphasize the 
magnitude of the changes in the patterns of economic, political, and social 
relations and incentive structures potentially resulting from seemingly 
minor “technical” changes in the design of monetary institutions. Th e 
maximizing logic of economic interaction can be used to achieve a wide 
variety of economic, political or social objectives. If the objective is to 
optimize rather than maximize any give area of economic, political, or 
social interaction involving some of the technical functions of money, 
incentives for – or at the very least the possibility of – such optimization 
must be built into the institutional logic of the monetary system. 
Without institutional modiﬁ cations, the inherently polarizing logic of 
the prevailing forms of money is ultimately likely to prevail over post-
money policy attempts – policy decisions which take the institutional 
design of money as given – to achieve alternative outcomes. Th e extent to 
which conventional wisdom on the “economic” reality merely reﬂ ects the 
historically speciﬁ c or governmentally contingent design of the current 
monetary system can also hardly be overemphasized. In addition to 
the more fundamental issues relating to the current monetary system’s 
misrepresentation of the physical reality, the proposed reforms highlight 
the speciﬁ city of the prevailing rules of the game for the management of 
monetary phenomena to the socially constructed “technical” speciﬁ cations 
of money rather than some imaginary universalist economic laws that 
could remain constant across a spectrum of alleged monetary neutrality.
10.4 Potential Complementarities with a Land Reform
Although conceptually a distinct policy, it is diﬃ  cult to avoid discussion 
of land reform in conjunction with proposals for monetary reform. 
Unless the structural distortions of all factors of production are rectiﬁ ed 
simultaneously, any isolated reform eﬀ orts will merely transform the 
nature of the problem into one aﬄ  icting mainly the unreformed factor: 
leveling the playing ﬁ eld between labor and capital through a monetary 
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reform, for instance, would be likely to result in a situation where much 
of the relative losses of capital merely end up increasing land values. If the 
real value of money or near-money ﬁ nancial assets either remains constant 
or gradually diminishes through time as a result of monetary reform, 
investment in assets which can produce a return in real terms, such as land, 
becomes relatively more attractive. Yet the arguments for land reform may 
be equally persuasive irrespective of the speciﬁ c type of monetary system. 
Land – as conventionally deﬁ ned as a factor of production – is ﬁ xed in 
quantity and necessary for the survival of every human being. Unless 
the community as a whole assumes either the ownership of land or the 
task of ensuring its egalitarian distribution, land owners will reap much 
of the beneﬁ ts of economic development – and potentially also much 
of the beneﬁ ts of a monetary reform – without necessarily making any 
productive contributions to the economic processes which have caused 
the land prices to increase. As the general case for public or egalitarian 
ownership of land predates many of the monetary issues discussed in this 
study with an ample margin and references to diﬀ erent variants of the 
proposal or actual historical practices have been frequently made since 
some of the earliest forms of religious, academic or popular literature, the 
focus here is on their direct relevance to monetary reform and on a largely 
overlooked policy aspect involved in the pricing of land.
Perhaps the most common contemporary “land reform” proposal that 
even some of the most powerful media outlets occasionally ﬂ irt with 
involves land value taxation – taxation of privately held land with the aim 
of capturing the “undeserved” portion of the price increase to the state. As 
no restrictions on land ownership would be placed – a single individual 
could in theory still own the entire planet – it is debatable whether 
this proposal merits to be described under the heading of land reform. 
Furthermore, the proposal involves both practical and logical problems. 
Identifying and taxing away the “undeserved” portion of increasing land 
values is an inherently subjective decision prone to waste, corruption and 
all the other foreseeable and unforeseeable inconveniences that are often 
associated with bureaucratic self-aggrandizement. More importantly, as a 
long tradition of land reformers have pointed out, the case for the private 
ownership of a basic necessity for survival may be dubious at best.
Th e logically and practically most suitable complementary land reform 
proposal to seigniorage-based UBI, demurrage tax on money and possibly 
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some form of a clearing union for international transactions might involve 
the establishment of a land trust which holds and rents out all available 
land and distributes the proceeds to the members of the community 
through UBI. Th e precise manner in which such an arrangement could 
be arrived at – ranging from full compensation to no compensation to the 
current land owners – could be left to the political process. Th e argument 
for distributing the entire annual income derived from land as UBI to all 
members of the community is relatively straightforward. Much of the 
ideological ediﬁ ce of a market economy rests on the assumption that 
market participants are rewarded for the most eﬃ  cient use of resources, 
not the power to monopolize basic necessities of life. In some cultures 
land was returned to their original owners free of charge after a certain 
number of years to prevent accumulated fortunes and misfortunes from 
passing on to the next generation, which had not contributed to the 
emergence of such wealth and power disparities and whose individual 
capabilities to put the land into the most productive uses, in the modern 
perspective, might signiﬁ cantly diﬀ er from the skills and productivity 
of each individual’s forebears in the previous generations. Th e modern 
equivalent in a monetized market economy where only a fraction of 
the population obtains their living directly from land would be the 
establishment of a land trust and the periodic egalitarian allocation of the 
proceeds as UBI to all members of the community.
In addition to the conventional arguments emphasizing the unjust 
enrichment of landowners as a result of economic development, monetary 
reform, or any other economic event resulting in an “undeserved” 
increase in land prices, there is a policy issue involved in the pricing of 
land: as a factor of production, it is not obvious whether the value of 
land should be maximized, minimized or optimized according to some 
politically determined criteria. Although not an entirely analogous 
situation, some of the issues at stake are illustrated by the allocation 
methods used by some governments to distribute licenses to use certain 
frequencies of the electromagnetic spectrum to commercial operators. 
Both land and the electromagnetic spectrum constitute scarce natural 
resources used as inputs for economic processes. Some governments 
gave out the licenses to use certain frequencies of the electromagnetic 
spectrum free of charge, sometimes emphasizing the ﬁ nancial burden 
that the transfer of such a scarce public resource at a price would create 
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to the corporations purchasing the licenses. Others auctioned the licenses 
to the highest bidders, in some cases inducing spectacular misallocations 
of capital.124 Any policy-constrained price optimization strategies were 
also possible. Th e relevant point here is the policy signiﬁ cance of the price 
of a public resource which is transferred to the private proﬁ t-maximizing 
production process. A publicly owned land trust which must distribute 
all proﬁ ts through UBI to the members of the community maximizes 
policy space with respect to land prices while maintaining the egalitarian 
ownership of land. Th e trust can either maximize the proﬁ tability of 
land in order to provide maximum UBI payments to the members of 
the community – potentially involving all the legal and illegal tactics that 
a monopolistic, proﬁ t-maximizing speculator might engage in to bend 
every rule whenever it is cost eﬃ  cient to do so – minimize the price in 
order to provide the most competitive factor price for land for economic 
processes which use land as an input – not entirely unlike the way some 
public utilities are regulated to provide low customer prices – or optimize 
the price of land and the return of the UBI recipients according to some 
combination of economic, political, social or ecological criteria. In the 
case of cost minimization the users of land might be periodically selected 
through a “beauty contest” based on the extent to which they conform 
to democratically determined, transparently speciﬁ ed criteria not entirely 
124 In Finland, for instance, the former state monopoly’s losses with the investment in 
the German UMTS license are notorious. Th e logic of such auctions from the perspective 
of the service providers is instructive: either the operators must pay whatever it takes to 
get a license or eﬀ ectively cease to be operators. Few commentators have pointed out the 
obvious analogy to the use of land: whenever land is “auctioned” to the highest bidders, 
individuals will eﬀ ectively have to pay whatever it takes to obtain the products and services 
provided by land – food, shelter, etc. – or to cease their existence as human beings. A 
further complication in the distribution of the licenses which might have favored the 
capitalization of the electromagnetic spectrum as a public resource and distributing 
the proceeds through UBI over alternative allocation methods arises from questions of 
liability associated with private ownership. If and when public health concerns lead to 
restrictions in wireless communication, the ownership and value of such licenses will have 
to be once again reevaluated and compensation extracted from the corporations. With 
ﬁ xed-term rental contracts for the use of certain frequencies and the proceeds distributed 
through UBI to all members of the community, any potential termination of the use of 
certain frequencies would not have been much of an issue and the victims – the general 
population – would have already received some compensation in the form of a part of 
the industry’s proﬁ ts extracted through the ﬁ xed-term license agreements and distributed 
through UBI.
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unlike the manner in which some governments chose to allocate licenses 
to use the electromagnetic spectrum to corporations whose proposals for 
the use of such spectrum most closely approximated some predetermined 
criteria. If it is possible to distribute a scarce public resource free of charge 
to corporations without oﬀ ending some of the dominant myths about 
the nature of capitalism, it must surely also be possible to allocate rights 
to use land according to similar democratically determined criteria and 
dub the process “capitalism” or “market economy” or to use virtually any 
other contemporary economic buzzword of choice without allegations of 
ideological inconsistency.
Choosing the right policymaking process that would select among the 
maximization, minimization or optimization of the price of land involves 
certain rhetorical parallels to the debate on the appropriate conduct of 
monetary policy. As in the case of the debate on central bank independence, 
a case could be made for the land trust to be completely independent 
of political considerations under the management of technocrats who 
would select appropriate land prices at each moment according to some 
predetermined criteria or constraints. Rules-based policies for the pricing 
of land, in turn, could be defended with arguments that are not entirely 
dissimilar to the case for rules-based monetary policy: discretionary 
policy lacks transparency and is potentially destabilizing and prone to 
particularistic considerations. Whatever the selected pricing policy for 
land would be, it would in all likelihood be superior to private ownership 
of and speculation on land from the perspective of a vast majority of the 
population and correctly perceived as merely one possibility among a wide 
spectrum of political choice – in stark contrast to the TINA terms in which 
much of the “technical” contemporary economic discourse is presented.
It is worth emphasizing that all the distribution methods proposed 
in this study for income streams emanating from what might be called 
egalitarian assets – assets that by their very nature belong to all members 
of the community such as land or increases in an exogenous money 
supply as deﬁ ned in section 7.1 – take the form of UBI rather than a 
one time payment or a stakeholder grant (see e.g. Ackerman and Alstot, 
1999). It might be in the interests of the society as a whole to further 
limit the transferability of the UBI payments by, for example, legally 
restricting the portion of the UBI that can be claimed by any creditor for 
the repayment of debts. Without such paternalism, stakeblowers would 
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eﬀ ectively be able to have their cakes and eat them too. Suppose that 
instead of a perpetual UBI, the society gave each person their share of 
the community’s egalitarian assets at their 21st birthday. Some would 
invest their newly acquired wealth wisely in e.g. education or setting up 
successful businesses. Others might spend or gamble away their stakes at 
a relatively young age. A major problem with the stakeholder approach 
is that the impact of blowing one’s stake is never conﬁ ned to the speciﬁ c 
individual in question. Any society has to ﬁ nd some way of coping with 
the insecurity, violence and crime induced by absolute poverty. Individuals 
who oppose the paternalistic meddling with the freedom of choice – 
no matter how morally righteous according to some relatively popular 
worldviews – will either have to live with the costs and consequences 
of increased crime or pay for a social security system that would ex ante 
indicate to any potential stakeblowers that welfare payments – which 
might not necessarily be of entirely diﬀ erent magnitude compared to the 
UBI payments in the original proposal – would in any case be available 
for the rest of their lives. Th us the stakeholder approach might be a viable 
alternative only in societies which either do not mind the inbuilt moral 
hazard of providing social security to stakeblowers or have a relatively 
high tolerance for violent crime. Any potential normative preference for 
paying for crime control rather than social security for ideological reasons 
in no way alters this conclusion.
10.5 Some Politically Incorrect Attempts to Politicize Political 
Incorrectness: The Role of Blame Games and Religion
Any reform agenda will ultimately also have to address two questions 
which may sometimes be regarded as being beyond the limits of political 
correctness or the perceptual or analytical requirements institutionally 
imposed upon “successful” academics: how to administer justice among 
the victims and the perpetrators of contentious social experiments after 
the structural power disparities have been dismantled – revealing some of 
the underlying political or philosophical motives behind any social reform 
agenda perhaps more explicitly than many alternative approaches – and 
what is the proposal’s relationship to alternative conceptualizations of the 
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ontology of the human – such as preexisting religious identities. While this 
study may not have a clear answer to either question, some reﬂ ection upon 
these issues may be warranted to gain a better understanding of some of the 
issues that any concrete reform agenda cannot avoid to address.
Th e history is replete with monetary reformers who have thought that 
the prevailing legislation – no matter how skewed towards the protection 
of the prevailing ﬁ nancial interests – could and should be used to 
prosecute the powers that be which are responsible for the prevailing 
monetary system. Frederick Soddy, for instance, saw the prosecution 
of the Bank of England as a more urgent task to improve the human 
condition than focusing on his Nobel-winning pursuits in chemistry 
without such distractions. Contemporary proposals, in contrast, may 
sometimes be characterized by curious defeatism or implicit moral double 
standards. According to a supporter of one activist’s eﬀ orts to prosecute 
the Canadian banking system, for instance, “On principle, John is right. 
He really has a case. But he won’t win the case, because if he wins the 
case, we’ve no banking system” (Bermingham, 2005). In other words, 
according to this line of reasoning, winning a case is not perceived to 
be within the realm of possibility, as it would terminate the perceived 
illegal practice that gave rise to the case in the ﬁ rst place. Such logic 
illustrates the extent to which the sometimes apparently schizophrenic 
subjectivities induced by the prevailing forms of money may have the 
capacity to neutralize dissent before it even gets to be articulated, let 
alone acted upon: the equation of the abolition of the banking system’s 
right to create money “at the stroke of a pen” with the abolition of the 
banking system – and, by implication, the unspeakable perils it would 
entail that are perceived to necessitate the selective breaching of the law 
– would represent a formidable accomplishment of subjectic engineering 
on the part of the powers that be if widely shared among potential 
monetary reformers. Paraphrasing and expanding upon the insights of 
an individual with non-negligible credentials in subjectic engineering, a 
suﬃ  ciently big lie may thus not only be easier to believe, but also more 
prone to creating spontaneous rationalizations and justiﬁ cations for its 
own necessity.
According to another reform proposal which sees the current monetary 
system as potentially “illegal” and working “against the constitutional 
rights of the individual in most countries” (Kennedy, 1995: 27), “there 
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can be no accusation of those who, at present, proﬁ t from the interest 
system as this is totally within their legal rights” (ibid: 67–69). While an 
untrained observer might see quite a few contradictions here, perhaps 
the most ﬂ agrant moral double standard involves the implicit suggestion 
that an individual cannot be “accused” of anything which is not illegal as 
interpreted and implemented by the powers that be. Th e author suggests 
that under the current monetary system, “As time goes on, those who 
think that they live in democracies will live at best, in oligarchies or at 
worst, under fascist regimes” (ibid: 67).125 Should fascist regimes thus be 
absolved of all responsibility for their actions as long as the extermination 
begins after the legal framework has been reinterpreted or modiﬁ ed to 
render the carnage “totally within their legal rights”? If the dominant 
interpretation of the prevailing law is the only relevant ethical, moral or 
legal standard, is the author’s intention to suggest that any form of victor’s 
justice – whether in a war between nations or classes – is acceptable? In 
other words, if the present monetary authorities are “totally within their 
legal rights” in – according to some of the more radical interpretations 
– inﬂ icting death, servitude and environmental degradation on others, 
how could any subsequent power structures not be “totally within their 
legal rights” when imposing any penalties on any individuals of their 
choice according to the modiﬁ ed legislation?126
Th e most signiﬁ cant issue here is perhaps not the possibility of 
eﬀ ectively retroactive implementation of legislation, but the purported 
desirability of the absence of any enforceable ethical or moral constraints 
on human agency or concentrated power. Such logic is particularly salient 
in social Darwinism – perhaps more appropriately referred to as socially 
protectionist Darwinism due to the tendency of some adherents to this 
125 Th e worst-case scenario is a clear understatement. Outright annihilation remains 
a distinct possibility for a substantial proportion of the world’s population under the 
current distribution of income, wealth and power.
126 Whether ﬁ nancial institutions are in fact always acting “totally within their 
legal rights” is debatable even in the context of the current legislation, which is formed 
and interpreted under the prevailing disparities in the allocation of income, wealth and 
power. In Finland, for instance, there is a cottage industry of research and advocacy on 
the depression era of the early 1990s, accusing banks, among other things, of illegally 
reselling IOUs which should have been voided (see chapter 12). Th e ongoing ﬁ nancial 
crisis provides further evidence of the extent to which ﬁ nancial market participants have 
in fact acted “totally within their legal rights” even under the prevailing legislation almost 
on a daily basis.
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analytical tradition or normative position to exempt themselves from 
atomistic competition through diﬀ erentiated loyalties to networks of blood, 
oath, faith or convenience. According to a somewhat dated – and relatively 
candid – formulation of a socially protectionist Darwinist philosophy:127 
Among the bees, one rules, while the others obey – some work, while 
others are idle. … Th e lion lies in wait for and devours the antelope that 
has apparently as good a right to life as he. Among men, some govern and 
others serve, capital commands and labor obeys, and one race, superior 
in intellect, avails itself of the strong muscles of another that is inferior; 
and yet, for all this, no one impeaches the justice of God. No doubt all 
these varied phenomena are consistent with one great law of justice; and 
the only diﬃ  culty is that we do not, and no doubt we cannot, understand 
that law. It is very easy for some dreaming and visionary theorist to say 
that it is most evidently unjust for the lion to devour the deer … but … 
we know of no other way … [God’s justice] does not require us to relieve 
the hard-working millions of all labor, to emancipate the serf or slave, 
unﬁ tted to be free, from all control (Pike, 2006).
Th e observation is intriguing in at least three respects. First, one may wonder 
whether the metaphors taken from the animal kingdom are applicable 
to human interaction. For animals, the relevant intra- or inter-species 
organizing principles presumably derive from the surrounding physical 
environment. In the case of humans, in contrast, there would appear to 
127 As the notion of socially protectionist Darwinism may well be a universal feature 
of institutionalized forms of hierarchical power structures, it may be appropriate to 
commend any utterer of the underlying logic for honesty in order to avoid the incorrect 
impression that certain individuals or institutions are being singled out for criticism. 
Historically there would appear to be few potential limits to the hypocrisy of the 
rhetoric with which de facto socially protectionist Darwinist practices may have been 
rationalized or justiﬁ ed. For much of the European Christian history, for instance, one 
of the most signiﬁ cant proponents of the socially protectionist Darwinist logic may well 
have been the church, institutionally restricting access to the positions of knowledge-
certiﬁ cation according to a centrally controlled metric for truth while imposing a degree 
of violence on heretics and inﬁ dels that few alternative socially constructed rationales for 
selective extermination might have been able to match. Th e proliferation of networks of 
diﬀ erentiated loyalties as institutional homes for socially protectionist Darwinist practices 
may be partly explained as a selective countergovernmental response or co-strategy 
associated with some of the excesses of modern mechanisms of governance – as a way to 
counter the tightening governmental grip on life with networks that may help to turn 
even the most sinister governmental logics into relative evolutionary advantages, however 
deﬁ ned, to the members of such networks.
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be no necessary correlation between socially constructed realities and the 
natural laws which could ensure that the selected organizing principles have 
any relevance in the real world. Whenever the champions of self-referential 
social hierarchies become obsessed with notions of ﬂ at earth, neutral money 
or some other socially constructed focal point for self-delusion and claim 
that “we” know of no other way, the issues at stake are hardly limited to 
any potential moral reﬂ ection of the justices or injustices involved in such a 
form of social organization: with the right instruments of violence available 
to the species as a whole, a failure to dismantle such social hierarchies in 
favor of alternative organizing principles that permit more realistic notions 
of the human, the environment and the proper interaction between the two 
to emerge may well prove to be suicidal. In short, as humans may have a 
more highly developed capacity for self-delusion than most animals, it may 
be inappropriate to apply metaphors from the animal kingdom directly 
into socially constructed realities and incentive structures. 
Second, the allegation that “we know of no other” metaphor for the 
human experience except planet wide zero-sum competition among lions 
and antelopes is quite diﬀ erent from saying that such a way does not 
exist. Any organism which wastes a substantial portion of its evolutionary 
resources is likely to be doomed. Th e intellectual waste induced by 
the capital fundamentalism which forces most individuals to focus 
on maximizing relative performance in an environment of managed 
scarcity, for instance, may well rival other more obvious forms of waste 
– ecological, social etc. – induced by the prevailing forms of money. As 
was noted in section 10.2, the selection of the types of skills and activities 
which are to be rewarded with upward mobility in the structural social 
hierarchies is inherently arbitrary. Consequently, the most appropriate 
way to mitigate the adverse evolutionary implications of goal-uncertainty 
may involve reducing the intensity with which the community’s socially 
constructed objectives must be pursued by each individual. While the 
nature may provide numerous examples of species which do not suppress 
the evolutionary driving force of natural variation just to maintain or to 
intensify the prevailing intra-species hierarchies, adopting any speciﬁ c 
alternative metaphor for desirable forms of human organization might 
run the risk of building yet another prison for the imagination to constrain 
innovation and diversity. 
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Th ird, the statement logically disqualiﬁ es its utterer from any position 
of authority in public policymaking. If human beings have no choice but 
to engage in mutual preying according to some heretofore undiscovered 
Darwinist law of the human nature and to stretch the “justice of God” or 
any other moral benchmark for a desirable form of society to the point 
of all-embracing nihilism, public policy has no role in a human society. 
An individual who believes that the humanity has no other conceivable 
future except nihilistic Darwinism should hardly be entrusted with the 
task of forming public policy on behalf of those who do believe that 
humanity has both choice and some form of a moral benchmark to judge 
some forms of societies better than others. Herman Daly has lucidly 
articulated a closely related point:
If one is to be seriously interested in policy as a student, teacher, or 
policymaker, one must make two presuppositions. First, one must 
believe that there is more than one possible future (nondeterminism). 
If the future is completely determined then policy is nonsense. Second, 
even if there is more than one possible future, policy would still make 
no sense unless there were a criterion for choosing one future as better 
than another (nonnihilism). Determinists and nihilists have a right to 
exist (to be nonsuicidal), but they also have a logical debt to the rest 
of us to remain silent on matters of public policy. Neodarwinism is the 
major home of modern determinists and nihilists. Far from recognizing 
their logical obligation to remain silent on matters of public policy, many 
neodarwinists are loud and opinionated on the subject. One hopes that 
they will eventually abandon their skepticism instead of their logic. In 
the meantime putting up with their inconsistencies may seem not too 
high a price for the rest of us to pay to help them avoid suicide. However, 
a society unable to enact and enforce serious policies because it is lured 
by the lurking fecklessness of neodarwinism, runs its own larger risk of 
suicide. Th e survival value of neodarwinism is likely negative for the 
society that adopts it as its worldview (Daly, 2006: 16).
In short, the socially protectionist Darwinists have the right to exist (to be 
nonsuicidal), but it is the task of the rest of the society to strip them of all 
power to inﬂ uence public policy which, according to their own worldview, 
is in any case futile. As the notion of socially protectionist Darwinism may 
be an ontological condition of hierarchical forms of social organization, 
it may not be entirely obvious how nondeterminist and nonnihilist 
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policies could be implemented without ﬁ rst replacing the prevailing social 
hierarchies with more inclusive and egalitarian alternatives.128
According to another possible solution to the potential blame games 
associated with or ensuing monetary reform, each individual should 
simply “let go” or “surrender to the global politics of forgiveness”
because, in a globally competitive world, corporations, global investors 
and politicians have far less room for manoeuvre than I think. If behaving 
responsibly means losing proﬁ ts, share value and ultimately my job, what 
would I do if I were in the shoes of a CEO (Chief Executive Oﬃ  cer 
128 Another neodarwinist irony that has received insuﬃ  cient attention in the 
academic literature involves the direction of the evolution of any species which adopts 
neodarwinism as its worldview. By elevating competition for maximum resource 
consumption over all ethical, moral, aesthetic, or any other actual or conceivable human 
motivations – such motivational diversions constituting instrumental strategies at best 
rather than desirable evolutionary objectives worth pursuing in their own right – are the 
neodarwinists not in fact advocating the evolution of an ethically, morally and aesthetically 
sentient form of human being into an animal? To the extent that humanity has in fact 
adhered to the principles of Darwinism in the past and the non-animal characteristics are 
genetically determined, have the greatest human beings in terms of non-animal qualities 
such as artistic, musical or philosophical talent not lived long ago, while the prevailing 
gene pool would constitute an ever closer approximation of mediocrity in humanity’s 
long march towards animalness? Should every surviving human not feel deeply ashamed 
of the fact that their genetic material still remains in circulation after a long evolutionary 
process of weeding out the non-animal qualities? Th e fact that these lines of thought 
occasionally still get to be articulated does not invalidate the neodarwinist thesis any 
more than any potential tendency for a few odd lions to engage in unproductive 
activities between successful preying sessions would violate the “great law of justice”. Any 
evolutionary objective may ultimately become self-reinforcing by gradually eliminating 
those individuals whose actions or ideas do not ﬁ t into the chosen common shape so that 
rightness can be proved “by sheer numbers of independent assent” (Douglas, 1986: 91). 
Rather than representing the sum of spontaneous adaptations to the shifting objective 
environmental constraints, it may not be entirely inaccurate to suggest that human 
evolution constitutes a self-referential, centrally planned exercise of power projection 
with the distinct possibility of a gradual extinction of the species even as it continues 
to approach its optimal animal dimension as deﬁ ned by the surviving neodarwinists. 
Given that the present author is a part of the surviving evolutionary excrement that has 
been left over as the human potentiality has passed through socially constructed sorting 
mechanisms and some of the ﬁ nest qualities of humanness may have been extracted from 
the gene pool, this study is likely to fall conspicuously short of the analytical standards 
that may have prevailed, had human diversity and the pursuit of truth been cultivated as 
desirable features of human evolution. Nor is it obvious that humanity’s self-inﬂ icted loss 
of humanness may be recovered through the mastery of the constitutive processes of life, 
as the motives for doing so may no longer be there.
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or company director)? If investing responsibly means losing out to my 
competitors and thus losing my position on the investment ranking 
tables and possibly my job, what would I do if I were an investment 
manager? (Bunzl, 2006–2008: 147–148, original emphasis).
It may not be entirely cynical to suggest that if “I” were an ethically or 
morally aware human being, “I” would probably walk out of the job come 
what may and encourage everyone else to do likewise until an individual’s 
acceptance of a position as a CEO, investment manager, moneylender 
or any other occupation with equally extreme moral implications would 
be correctly perceived as an indicator of that speciﬁ c individual’s moral 
stature. Th e aforementioned example appears to be intended “to have 
some resonance” with Gandhi’s philosophy of Ahimsa:
It is quite proper to resist and attack a system, but to resist or attack 
its author is tantamount to resisting and attacking oneself. For we are 
all tarred with the same brush, and are children of one and the same 
Creator, and as such the divine powers within us are inﬁ nite. To slight a 
single human being is to slight those divine powers, and thus to harm not 
only that being but with him the whole world (M.K. Gandhi, quoted in 
Bunzl, 2006–2008: 151).
Th is may be a consistent and some might say admirable moral position129, 
and one of the reasons for taking up the entire topic of the blame games 
potentially associated with or ensuing monetary reform in this study 
is to point out its logical implications in other circumstances. Th e 
consequences of taking a stand against the violence and exploitation 
129 Th is moral position has, however, sometimes been presented as being above 
the faith-based reproduction requirements of monotheistic metaphysical identities. In 
other words, the “divine powers within us” narrative has sometimes been oﬀ ered as a 
default identity that would presumably set in immediately after the authenticity of non-
pantheist denominations – primarily the dominant theistic forms of Christianity, Islam 
and Judaism – has been questioned. Such claims are both intellectually and spiritually 
dishonest. Contrary to what is being implied by some reform proposals, monetary 
reformist rhetoric and capitalism-bashing in general have no more inherent connection 
to pantheism, innate divine powers or a common consciousness than they may have to 
monotheism, exogenous divinity, or dichotomous views of human agency as a struggle 
between good and evil. It is nonetheless fascinating to observe how – of all the conceivable 
political objectives – perhaps an increasing number of reform proposals may choose to 
direct the cognitive goodwill created by capitalism-bashing towards the promotion of 
nontraditional spiritual views.
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induced by the prevailing forms of money right here and right now are 
likely to be substantially less severe – irrespective of one’s position in 
any relatively wealthy industrialized society – than what other individuals 
in other circumstances should have endured in order to avoid their 
subsequent convictions as power structures have changed. Th erefore, 
if history is to be a guide, all options are likely to be on the table in 
the post-mortem blame game for the prevailing forms of money in the 
hypothetical case that the prevailing power disparities would be either 
reversed or dismantled in favor of more egalitarian forms of social 
organization.130 At the risk of stating the obvious, universal appeals 
to forgiveness are universal. Any potential appeals to forgive CEOs, 
investment managers, politicians or bankers would, according to this line 
of reasoning, have to be complemented by the forgiveness of each and all 
of the less fortunate individuals in the world. In other words, the most 
horrendous acts of crime, murder, violence or terror directed at the rich by 
individuals who may “know of no other way” in their desperate positions 
would have to be equally forgiven. If any and all personal responsibility 
for corporate crimes, for instance, can be avoided by resignation or by a 
simple promise not to engage in equally harmful activities in the future, 
the corresponding standard of forgiveness for random acts of violence 
directed against corporate executives, politicians or any other actual or 
130 One of the clearest normative biases of this study involves the refusal to advocate 
violence as a potential emancipatory counterstrategy to structural violence despite its 
potential eﬀ ectiveness. Even the most murderous forms of structural violence are 
executed through the actions of speciﬁ c individuals, whose continuing support for or tacit 
acceptance of such life-demolishing structures often depends on their personal exemption 
from the incidence of violence. It is not inconceivable that a decision to respond to 
violence with violence by even a signiﬁ cant minority of the victims of structural violence 
before their untimely deaths could rectify the asymmetries in the incidence of violence to 
a suﬃ  cient extent to facilitate the transformation of the social structures which produce 
death, injury and servitude. If man indeed is just another animal – misleading those who 
deserve to be misled and impeaching no higher law of justice through the most sinister 
acts of violence against the fellow members of the species – moral or normative analysis is 
futile. Yet for everyone else except perhaps the dogmatic nihilist awareness of the potential 
eﬀ ectiveness of violence in eliminating structural violence is crucial for a genuine moral 
choice to take place: it is only through the awareness of one’s potential for inhumanity 
and hatred that a conscious choice for humanity and love can be made. As a yet another 
irony in the history of self-righteous justiﬁ cation of privilege, the continuing survival of 
the dogmatic nihilist may depend on the oppressed majority’s continuing adherence to 
alternative moral standards.
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imagined perpetrators of injustices is the mere promise not to engage in 
similar random acts of violence in the future. If all the threats to “our” 
way of life posed by greed, incompetence, monetary surrealism, global 
civil war imposed along the class lines, forced irradiation of virtually 
every human on earth and much of the natural environment with the 
latest eugenic instruments of the “information society”, or any other 
power-approved form of violence are to be brushed aside as a part of 
a global campaign to provide amnesty to the perpetrators, how could 
some of the more unfashionable – or in some cases perhaps merely less 
powerful – forms of violence be excluded from the purview of such 
sudden outburst of forgiveness? Despite any potential tendencies for the 
most proﬁ table interpretations of history to change each time the history 
presumably transcends its previous manifestations to ﬁ t into the “end of 
history” fads of the time, there is no such thing as selective “letting go”: 
humans either remember or forget. Th is insight is perhaps one of the 
most important aspects of the blame game’s political signiﬁ cance: either 
the bankers, CEOs or politicians who have not taken the opportunity to 
assert their alleged moral righteousness by either acting according to their 
moral preferences and thus losing their jobs or resigning outright and 
who nonetheless appeal to “letting go” have to forgive each and all acts of 
terror or violence directed at them, or the selective invocation of moral 
double standards, once again, exempliﬁ es populism and should thus be 
ignored by any potential social reformers and the general public alike.
In the context of any large-scale social reform proposal, it might also 
be perceived as intellectually or spiritually dishonest not to articulate 
the proposal’s relationship to some of the dominant spiritually-oriented 
sources of human motivation. It has become commonplace in social 
scientiﬁ c analysis to treat some human motivations as more equal than 
others: while religious views are regularly regarded as being outside the 
purview of legitimate analysis, no such qualms appear to arise with other 
equally dogmatic belief systems. If, for instance, a social scientist feels 
free to speculate with what an individual or a community should do 
according to utilitarian logic and take anomalous behavior as evidence 
of irrationality without oﬀ ending anyone’s metaphysical sensibilities or 
worldviews, surely the same lack of analytical inhibitions must also apply 
to other belief systems which may shape human behavior. In other words, 
a non-self-compartmentalizing social scientist cannot avoid the necessity 
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to study and address all major belief systems – whether utilitarian, 
religious or something else – which may impact human motivation and 
behavior. In the same way as a natural scientist cannot ignore some aspects 
of the physical reality merely because of personal indiﬀ erence, dislike, or 
some perceived behavioral norm which renders such analysis politically 
incorrect in the eyes of external observers, a social scientist cannot ignore 
any constituent aspect of the social reality – no matter how contentious, 
controversial, “unscientiﬁ c” or politically explosive. Furthermore, unlike 
a natural scientist who is often engaged in the search of the physical 
reality – a universalist set of natural laws unalterable through diﬀ erent 
modes of social organization – an emancipatory social scientist may 
have to master and work through numerous competing and potentially 
contradictory belief systems in order to trace and expose the exercise of 
power within diverse normative or spiritual frameworks. In short, both 
logical consistency and a pragmatic conception of the sources of human 
motivation may require any potential monetary reformist to work through 
any speciﬁ c metaphysical normative frameworks. Anything more would 
amount to spiritual imperialism under the disguise of monetary reform. 
Anything less would be likely to be perceived as irrelevant by individuals 
whose subjectivities involve a substantial religious component – a 
signiﬁ cant enough proportion of the world’s population by any measure 
to justify the eﬀ ort even on purely pragmatic grounds in addition to 
any potential intrinsic merits. Th e chosen approach thus contradicts 
both self-declared pretensions for value-neutrality – which, among other 
things, essentially attempt to deﬁ ne a spirituality-free parallel reality for 
analytical purposes – and those reform proposals which see a large-scale 
transformation of the prevailing metaphysical frameworks as acceptable 
or desirable to achieve any given objectives of social reform.
Based on a cursory acquaintance with some of the major religious 
traditions which do not condemn the uninitiated student of the relevant 
texts or practices to death or worse, organized Christianity131, for instance, 
might sometimes appear to be relatively oblivious to some of the moral, 
dogmatic and practical dilemmas posed by monetary authority. Th e 
intention here is not to debate the dogma or practices of any speciﬁ c 
religion per se, but merely to give an indication of what “working through” 
131 Th e author regrets that due to the lack of the relevant language skills Islam 
cannot be covered to an extent that it might deserve in this context.
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a spiritual tradition – providing alternative emancipatory interpretations 
while remaining faithful to the spiritual tradition in question – might 
entail for the non-self-compartmentalizing social scientist. In the context 
of Christianity and monetary reform, one of the undertheorized aspects 
would appear to involve the frequency with which individuals and 
institutions in the position of religious authority evoke the normative 
ideal of submission to authority as opposed to some of the alternative 
interpretations of the Bible. While the Christ’s views on the moneylenders 
of the time – relatively scrupulous individuals according to the modern 
standards – are well known, there is a curious attempt to rationalize some 
of the most egregious abuses of power through the alleged obligation of 
any proper Christian to submit to authority irrespective of the ethical 
and moral standards that it represents. One of the most widely cited 
references in this context is Romans 13: 1–2, encouraging unconditional 
allegiance to any form of power, as there is no form of authority which 
would not come from God.132 References to the role of the Reformation 
and the writings of Luther in granting legitimacy to the newly conceived 
state system and allegedly – according to one possible interpretation – 
giving rise to some perceived equivalence between the spiritual obligation 
to forgive and the secular obligation to let corrupt authorities remain in 
power are also not uncommon (see e.g. Luoma-Aho, 2008).
As was noted earlier, a refusal on the part of the social scientist to expose 
the exercise of power through certain constitutive aspects of the social reality 
on the grounds of personal preference or learned ostracism would merely 
conﬁ ne the notion of legitimate emancipatory social scientiﬁ c analysis to 
some exogenously deﬁ ned politically correct cognitive frameworks whose 
inner logic or relevance to shaping social realities or agentic subjectivities 
may be no less a matter of faith than in the case of religious identities. It 
is, for instance, quite possible to comment on speciﬁ c points raised by an 
economic paper that is based on the faith-based assumptions of the neutral 
money mythology without necessarily subscribing to such worldviews: 
the fact that political power may be exercised through economic mental 
models may in fact leave little choice for the non-self-compartmentalizing 
132 Reprinting these passages from the version of the Bible that the author has access 
to would appear to require notiﬁ cation of the copyright on the title or copyright page of 
this study according to a predetermined formula which exceeds the length of the passages 
to be quoted. Consequently, no proprietary prophesies are reproduced here.
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social scientist but to study the relevant economic scripture and to attempt 
to isolate the relative eﬀ ects of bona ﬁ de interpretation of the relevant 
dogma versus the opportunistic usurpation of certain faith-based cognitive 
frameworks to the service of particularistic interests. Th e fact that a certain 
mental model may be identiﬁ ed as faith-based thus hardly diminishes 
either its suitability for scholarly critique or its actual economic, political 
or social signiﬁ cance.
If the biblical dogma and some of its opportunistic appropriations 
were to be analyzed in the same manner as some other faith-based 
cognitive frameworks are regularly treated in academic analysis, at least 
three considerations relevant to the themes in this section might arise. 
First, a fair case could be made for classifying the diﬀ erent variants of the 
proposition that a proper Christian must submit to authority irrespective 
of the ethical and moral standards that it represents as opportunistic 
usurpations of the dogma for particularistic purposes rather than bona 
ﬁ de attempts to give a neutral interpretation of the spectrum of possibility 
potentially involved in the dogma. Hence, for those who have managed 
to read through much of the Bible while maintaining the impression that 
authority must be unconditionally obeyed, a relevant reply might consist 
of pointing out that the Revelation might ﬁ nally indicate to an open-
minded reader what sort of authority the Christians are dealing with: 
accepting the mark of the beast from the authorities of the time – no 
matter how divine or God-approved in the power-interpreted spiritual 
mythology that is often propagated through institutionalized forms of 
Christianity – would appear to be one of the surest roads to perdition. As 
Hudson (1993: 38–39) – in the context of contrasting “the Near Eastern 
sanctity of releasing bondservants and land from debt bondage” with “the 
Roman principle of making the loss of status permanent” – has noted, 
“By the time of Christianity, the creditor/landlord class had grown too 
strong for any popular leader to take on with any hope of worldly success. 
A shift occurred away from denouncing existing social injustice to 
millennarianist preaching about the ultimate judgement of souls, taking 
redemption and social equity as a spiritual metaphor rather than as a 
worldly political program.” Without any need to start examining possible 
rationales for self-labeled anarchist approaches, there would thus clearly 
appear to be room for a wide spectrum of alternative interpretations 
in regard of the extent to which a follower of this particular spiritual 
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tradition might wish to acquiesce to the demands of the worldly powers 
– the nature of which would appear to be unlikely to be a matter of faith 
irrespective of one’s spiritual views.133
Second, the entire conceptual distinction between “liberation” theology 
and “normal” theology requiring no descriptive preﬁ xes would appear to be 
misguided. If a speciﬁ c emancipatory reading of the scripture is perceived 
to necessitate a warning of an alleged normative bias, why not attach 
equally descriptive preﬁ xes to all conceivable interpretations of the relevant 
dogma? For instance, might not any suggestion of the perceived equivalence 
between the spiritual obligation to forgive and the secular obligation to 
133 Another relatively common opportunistic appropriation of religious dogma 
that is not conﬁ ned to Christianity involves the attempt to rebrand religiously motivated 
social agency as ungodly. In other words, according to this particular form of political 
usurpation of spiritual choice, proper forms of religiosity or spirituality should be conﬁ ned 
to each individual’s personal search for salvation, enlightenment, or whatever the relevant 
spiritual objectives might be, while any and all economic, political and social actions 
motivated by the transformed religious subjectivities allegedly constitute transgressions 
of the relevant dogma or spiritual practices. A common articulation in the context of 
organized Christianity, for instance, often attempts to justify inaction or utterly insuﬃ  cient 
action in the face of pervasive social injustices by evoking some variant of the “If God 
wanted things to be otherwise he would have already acted and it is not proper for anyone 
to meddle with God’s will”-thesis to contain the contagion of excessively independent 
interpretations of the scripture. If so, where does the line between religiosity and nihilism 
go? Who deﬁ nes the circumstances in which the part-time believers presumably should 
switch between the religiously motivated pursuit of spiritual truths and the nihilistically 
informed projection of outward appearances that might be virtually indistinguishable 
from atheism or agnosticism and on what basis? Many major religious traditions contain 
detailed instructions for the appropriate forms of social interaction for their followers – 
often heavily biased towards the principle of non-violence. Some traditions are also quite 
explicit about their views on the relative importance of worldly vs. otherworldly realities 
and motivations, albeit often remaining ambivalent on whether a proper believer can – 
or perhaps even should – strive for reforming the worldly social realities in line with her 
faith despite the negligible to non-existent chances of ever succeeding in such pursuits. 
Nonetheless, it may be safe to assume that any categorical restrictions of social agency on 
religious grounds constitute particularistic attempts to distort the bona ﬁ de spectrum of 
spiritual choice for strategic purposes. Given the social dynamics involved in contesting 
the pervasive structural power of the prevailing forms of money, the emancipation of 
religious agency from politically-involved institutional control remains perhaps one of 
the most crucial preconditions for the political feasibility of monetary reform: as the early 
advocates of reform will be up against a formidable agglomeration of established privilege 
before some of the utilitarians and freeriders might start to join in, the pursuit of justice 
for the pursuit’s sake might be all that there is on oﬀ er for the early – and quite possibly 
also for the long-standing – advocates of reform.
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let corrupt authorities continue to bastardize economic, political, social 
and religious life perhaps deserve the appropriately descriptive label of 
Christian nihilism – warning outsiders of any potential normative bias 
towards the adoption of Christian rhetoric to promote essentially nihilistic 
worldviews? If some liberation theologians deserve to be chastised for their 
emancipatory readings of the scripture by religious, political or economic 
institutions or actors, how could enslavement theo logy – the application 
of the scripture and institutionalized religious practices to advance 
hierarchical forms of social organization – remain outside the purview 
of similar normative assessment, labeling and punishment procedures? 
In the cases of both Christian nihilism and enslavement theology one 
of the central mechanisms of religious governance involves the alleged 
equivalence between the spiritual obligation to forgive and either the 
passive acceptance or active endorsement of the political arrangements 
that give rise to the ongoing need to “forgive”.
Th ird, and perhaps summarizing the relevance of the preceding 
discussion for the purposes of this study, the kingdom of whatever one 
happens to believe in is indeed inside oneself, and this is the relevant 
battleﬁ eld where the struggle for the hearts and minds for the purposes 
of speciﬁ c political programs takes place. Monetary and other forms of 
governance are complementary and mutually reinforcing only to the 
extent that the relevant governance structures are concentric: without 
complementary mechanisms of religious governance, for instance, the 
functionality and potential eﬀ ectiveness of monetary governance might 
be signiﬁ cantly reduced among religiously motivated subjectivities, yet 
any potential divergence or decentering of objectives might quickly 
eliminate the synergies between overlapping mechanisms of governance.
Th e concentriﬁ cation of Christianity with alternative modalities of 
power has taken place through an intermediation process which may not 
be entirely dissimilar to the mechanisms of monetary governance. In the 
case of monetary governance, potential transacting parties who possess real 
assets but lack an accounting system to keep track of their trades or mutual 
indebtedness are compelled to accept third party “liabilities” in settlement 
of all debts. Th e rules and conditions that the issuer of such monetary IOUs 
chooses to set for circulating the gatekeeper media for monetized market 
exchange determines the system’s governmental impact – the extent to 
which the incentive structures of barter are altered by the introduction of 
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a monopoly intermediary to “monetize” real assets. In the case of religious 
governance, the relationship between God and the believer is originally 
equally self-suﬃ  cient as the relationship between two real asset holders 
who have the freedom to select any mutually agreed accounting system 
to keep track of their economic interaction: the believer already possesses 
the entire “real asset” that is the only potential source of real value in 
her spiritual relationship – the relevant scriptures and revelation – and is 
thus free to construct the most appropriate representations of her faith in 
the absence of third party intervention. In the same way as participation 
in multilateral market exchange is theoretically supposed to merely assist 
the potential transacting parties to maximize the value of their real asset 
holdings, the Church as an institution – the collection of each and every 
believer on their worldly tour rather than the members of any formal 
institutions – is merely supposed to help each believer to cultivate the 
virtues expressed in the scripture as opposed to providing an alternative 
reference point for the formation of spiritual truths. Nonetheless, once the 
abstract concept of the Church is replaced by the notion of churches as 
institutional intermediaries between the believers and God, governmental 
externalities may arise through the speciﬁ c policies and interpretations 
promoted by institutionalized forms of religiosity. By severing the direct 
links between God and the believer and between two or more believers 
getting together in their capacity as a subset of the Church, churches and 
other forms of organized religiosity have often opened up the spiritual 
dimension of the human for political strategization and utilitarian 
governance in a manner not entirely dissimilar to the way in which 
governments and the banking system have enforced monetary governance 
by preventing direct monetization of economic interaction between two 
or more real asset holders.
If the nearly simultaneous and universal biopolitical awakening that 
might be required for dismantling the monetary governance structures 
remains outside humanity’s emancipatory capacities, resistance – or 
perhaps merely the suicidal self-contemplation of the last of the humans in 
the governmentally secured global theme park of Libertyland – might be 
arranged on each and every level and mode of governance by encouraging 
a greater divergence between the objectives of monetary governance and 
the logics of the respective governmental plateaus – i.e. by encouraging the 
decentriﬁ cation of the overlapping governance structures. In the context 
265
of Christian religious governance a precondition for such decentriﬁ cation 
involves the abolishment of politically responsive spiritual intermediaries 
by restoring the direct, unalterable and unmediated relationship between 
the believer and God. For those who believe that God created some people 
more equal than others, a relevant political strategy for decentriﬁ cation 
might involve pointing out that the relevant standards of righteousness 
– whether faith, hope, love or something else – would still appear to be 
the same. If God has the capacity for regret and reappraisal, as would 
appear to be the case based on the Bible, anyone will have the chance to 
strive for equal or higher levels of righteousness than some of the (fallen?) 
chosen ones. For the authority-respecting types it may suﬃ  ce to once 
again point out that following the worldly authorities until the end is 
not a mere highway to an earthly hell, but also a fast track to the one in 
the beyond. In response to the interest-endorsing revisionists according to 
whom doctrinal mistakes should keep compounding perpetually in the 
name of progress, how modern or fashionable are the notions of debt 
slavery as the overriding organizing principle for economic activity? If the 
skeptics of the rationale for charging interest for the mere availability of a 
scorekeeping system for facilitating economic exchange are relics from the 
past, what does that make of the much older champions of structural social 
hierarchies in an era which hardly lacks more state-of-the-art egalitarian 
alternatives to the barbarian visions of monetized market exchange?
Th e likely reactions of some readers notwithstanding, it may not 
be immediately clear how any potential normative preferences of the 
reader to discredit the foregoing analysis or to prevent its publication 
merely because of its subject matter might be justiﬁ ed in an intellectually 
consistent and transparent manner – not that such justiﬁ cations would 
be required in the current academic environment. As is the case with 
all academic work, there may always remain room for improvement 
in providing additional evidence and insights on the substance of the 
argument – the distinction between biblical dogma and its potential 
opportunistic appropriations for particularistic purposes. Nevertheless, 
if it is the selection of biblical dogma as the benchmark against which 
the political strategies of opportunistic appropriations are assessed 
and countered that the reader is concerned about, it might be more 
productive, intellectually stimulating, and entertaining to direct any 
potential principled criticism of such an analytical approach to virtually 
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any mainstream economics journal. After all, if mainstream economists 
are allowed to contribute to their career advancement or planet-wide 
social engineering merely by professing their faith in neutral money or 
some other equally self-referential stream of metaphysical economics, it 
may not be entirely clear what could be achieved by attacking the work of 
a mere PhD student who has adopted an alternative spiritual benchmark 
to animate his analysis on political strategization.
While admittedly an unorthodox approach from the perspective 
of orthodox political science – albeit far from uncommon as an actual 
political practice – there would clearly appear to be some unused synergistic 
potential between some heretofore perhaps underexplored forms of 
(liberation?) theology and (emancipatory?) social scientiﬁ c analysis. As 
one economist who has engaged in related pursuits with an open-minded 
attitude has noted, some of the dominant forms of liberation theology in 
Latin America may amount to “’liberation theology’ without liberation in 
the single most important Biblical sense of the term – freedom from the 
impoverishing consequences of debt (now international as well as personal), 
and freedom of the earth from the absentee appropriation (now by foreign 
corporations backed by World Bank underdevelopment programs as well 
as by individual landlords). One looks in vain for a liberation-oriented 
recognition of the Biblical social revolution in terms of its single leading 
element – cancellation of the debts that were the major lever leading to 
the foreclosure of the land and its privatization, removing it from the 
community’s possession” (Hudson, 1993: 44). Th e deep respect for the 
religious tradition in question while proposing alternative emancipatory 
interpretations is evident in insights such as “Neither Hebrew, Greek nor 
Latin had separate words to distinguish between ‘interest’ and ‘usury’. Th e 
distinction is a product of Canon Law seeking to carve out a form of 
ﬁ nancial gain (interesse) that could be taken by Christians legitimately in 
the face of the Biblical strictures against neshek (Hebrew), tokos (Greek) 
and Faenus (Latin)” (ibid: 42) – what one might assume to be highly 
signiﬁ cant facts for someone attempting to both assess the credibility 
and possible motives of some of the contemporary religious leadership 
and construct the most relevant personal interpretation of the spiritual 
tradition in question unmediated by the distorting prisms of politically 
involved forms of institutionalized religiosity.
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Th ere would thus appear to be dual synergistic potential between 
emancipatory interpretations of social scientiﬁ c analysis and religious 
realities. On the one hand, it is not obvious how any major social reform 
program could ever be implemented without winning the hearts and 
minds of a substantial proportion of the enormous number of individuals 
worldwide who strongly identify with a speciﬁ c religious identity: the 
social scientist needs the believer for any social reform that shares both 
social scientiﬁ c and religious rationales to take place. On the other 
hand, in contrast to the organized religions’ often compromised capacity 
for objective self-reﬂ ection or the spiritual imperialism of some of the 
contending political strategies for social reform, academic social scientists 
should at least in theory be in a position to ask the right questions that 
could help the believers to clarify and deepen their religious experience 
and the scholars to broaden their understanding of some of the major 
belief systems that shape human behavior.134
134 Th e suggestion that organized religion’s capacity for objective self-reﬂ ection 
may be limited may in some cases also extend to the construction and propagation of 
eﬀ ective political strategies. One may, for instance, wonder why religiously motivated 
actors have often sought to reject evolutionist discourse instead of adopting the perhaps 
more prevalent contemporary practice of co-opting adversarial rhetoric to serve one’s own 
objectives. In an age of universal deceit, evil, separation from the will of the relevant deities, 
or some other spiritually motivated description of the present perils facing humanity, it 
would obviously be the social misﬁ t who would appear to be in the best position to attain 
the relevant countercultural spiritual objectives, while human evolutionary selection 
might perhaps quite unproblematically be labeled as a process of the spiritual death of 
the socially ﬁ ttest. Why attack evolution when it would appear to be far from obvious 
that with the right spin it could not represent just another articulation of some of the 
more conventional religious narratives – in the case of Christianity, for instance, one 
of the concrete mechanisms through which the wrath of the world is directed against 
those non-animal subjectivities who do not consider themselves to be a part of the 
world? Without the theory of evolution Christians might have considerable diﬃ  culty in 
explaining any potential perceptions of metaphysical separation from the rest of the world 
to the adherents of alternative spiritual views. Darwinism may ﬁ ll a part of this theoretical 
gap by explaining why and how unpopular human traits – such as the nonnihilist and 
non-politically-co-opted forms of Christianity, irrespective of their contested ontological 
origins either within or outside of the world – may be targeted for extermination through 
socially constructed sorting mechanisms. If human evolutionary selection is seen as a 
process of humanity’s self-assortment into the worldly and the otherworldly subjectivities 
– whatever the relevant classiﬁ catory standards may be according to the diﬀ erent spiritual 
worldviews – the potential for co-opting evolutionary rhetoric for the purposes of religious 
spin-building would appear to be virtually limitless.
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For those religious, atheist or agnostic philosophical traditions which 
view the unfolding of human evolution as an exercise of the humanity’s 
autonomous divine agency or as a biological necessity, the policy proposals 
outlined in this chapter help to ensure that the human evolutionary 
potential is realized to the greatest possible extent. Th e managed scarcity 
organized through the zero-sum competitive logic of the prevailing 
forms of money severely restricts the choice of humanity’s evolutionary 
goals and outcomes. According to this logic, of all the potential 
activities of the psycho-physio-socio-spiritual entity of homo sapiens, 
it is presumably the ability and willingness to excel in the competitive 
exclusion of other members of the species from material resources 
according to the prevailing socially constructed rules of the game and 
their non-punishable inconsistencies which confer the greatest potential 
for evolutionary advancement. Apart from being centrally planned and 
thus arguably inconsistent with the principle of self-organization, such a 
practice amounts to consciously wasting much of humanity’s evolutionary 
resources. Once again, the full extent of the prevailing lunacy can perhaps 
be best illustrated by returning to the ballet metaphor for a moment. As 
the reader may recall, ballet was to be selected as the one and only activity 
deemed capable of providing the appropriate metric for a properly layered 
and assorted social hierarchy, which anyone wishing to obtain a living 
must practice with a certain degree of success before any other human 
activity can be undertaken. Individuals who would have preferred to 
become sprinters, singers, scientists, sumo wrestlers or something else by 
the natural inclination of talent or morals are not only prevented from 
practicing their evolutionary comparative advantages by the necessity to 
obtain suﬃ  cient skills in ballet to survive in the prevailing evolutionary 
regime, but may well be weeded out of the gene pool before changing 
environmental circumstances or the liberal norm life’s autonomous 
alienation from the requirements of physical reproduction indicate to 
humanity as a whole that their skills would have been required for the 
survival of the species.135 As was noted earlier, the adoption of Darwinism 
135 As the adoption of sports metaphors to rationalize or justify the TINA logic of 
economic orthodoxy may be increasingly common, it is worth noting that the way such 
metaphors are typically used is rarely appropriate. According to a recent formulation in the 
Finnish context, “the rules of the stock exchange” must allegedly be observed in the same 
way as the rules in ski jumping or formula one (Tom Palmberg in A-Talk, 17.1.2008). 
As the employees subject to “the rules of the stock exchange” – or the mechanisms of 
269
as the overriding intra-species organizing principle is likely to constitute an 
overall evolutionary disadvantage for the species in question. At perhaps 
one of the most crucial junctures in the short evolutionary history of 
civilization, humanity’s governmental institutions – such as the prevailing 
forms of money – are actively suppressing altruism, friendship, love, non-
exploitative creativity, non-aligned intellectual inquiry or any other non-
pecuniarily motivated forms of human activities which may well constitute 
some of the most promising avenues for developing reformed economic, 
political and social practices to facilitate the continuing survival of the 
species. Th e combination of – at the minimum – a subsistence-level, at 
least partly seigniorage-based UBI and a demurrage tax on money would 
ensure every individual the possibility to develop their evolutionary 
comparative advantages to a fuller extent with less intrusive intervention 
from the evolutionary central planning mechanisms associated with 
liberal modes of governance. As long as particularistic power structures 
can create socially sanctioned evolutionary regimes that weed out deviant 
behavior before their own inevitable demise, humanity is not only failing 
to realize its innate divine or secular powers, but also quite possibly 
reducing the very scope of the human potentiality by ﬁ ercely suppressing 
the forms of diversity that could facilitate a wider spectrum of potential 
self-organizing evolutionary futures.136
liberal governance in general for that matter – have neither any direct inﬂ uence over the 
construction of such rules nor the capacity to stop practicing the “sport” of being wage 
laborers in monetarily rigged markets, the example is hardly appropriate for its intended 
purpose. Th e metaphor may, however, be kind enough to provide additional cognitive 
focal points for visualizing some of the limitations of monocausal social organization: 
the reader may think of her favorite singer in the ski jumping tower or a sumo wrestler 
driving a formula one in an attempt to justify their existence to get an idea of a society 
where some alternative substantive rationality for social organization is pursued with 
equal compulsion and fervor as the forced competition based on the prevailing forms of 
monetary surrealities in most contemporary societies.
136 Th e same logic applies also to the more narrowly deﬁ ned situation where the 
maximization of humanity’s share of the earth’s resource consumption is regarded as the 
overriding – perhaps the only – evolutionary objective. Th ere is no necessary relationship 
between the rules governing the inter-species competition and the most appropriate 
evolutionary strategy that each species should adopt in order to excel in such competition. 
For instance, even if altruism, art, love or philosophy were deemed to be entirely devoid 
of intrinsic signiﬁ cance as human evolutionary objectives, encouraging the development 
of these qualities or activities by those individuals naturally inclined to do so is likely 
to constitute a more successful long-term evolutionary strategy in terms of maximizing 
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It was suggested earlier that the analysis of money may represent one of the 
most promising opportunities for unifying compartmentalized disciplines 
into a single social science. To the extent that potential for reconciling some 
of the teachings or worldviews of the major religions has ever existed, it might 
not be an exaggeration to suggest that monetary reform might be one of 
the most eﬀ ective and least controversial practical programs which could 
begin the quest for common ground or space for dialogue between the major 
religions.137 Some of the observations on money-creating, interest-bearing 
debt in this study may not be entirely inconsistent with the worldviews of 
many Muslims and Christians, for example. Similarly, the destruction of 
the natural environment, freedom of conscience and evolutionary diversity 
by the structural necessity of zero-sum competition associated with the 
prevailing forms of money may help to muster the support of a surprisingly 
wide range of spiritual views for a broad-based reform agenda. In contrast 
to much of the prevailing framework for global governance or transnational 
power projection, the attainment of a broadly-based mandate for worldwide 
monetary reform may be a matter of open communication rather than 
communicative manipulation. If the world is indeed drifting towards a 
global struggle between the wielders of sovereign or sovereign-authorized 
corporate power and the rest of humanity, there may be more room for 
solidarity in combating one of the principle mechanisms of domination than 
many observers may realize. Th us, as the disciplinary compartmentalization 
of science may be one of the principle obstacles that must be overcome in 
order to capture the essence of money’s multiple potential manifestations, the 
analytical apartheid between “scientiﬁ c” and “religious” components of the 
indivisible social reality may constitute one of the hurdles that must be passed 
if a broadly-based monetary reform agenda is to ever be implemented. Th is is, 
of course, quite diﬀ erent from saying that the ontological and epistemological 
predispositions of science and religion should merge, although this may be 
precisely what is happening in many parts of the world as concepts marketed 
humanity’s share of the earth’s resource consumption than the suicidal forced zero-sum 
competition.
137 Th is suggestion is in stark contrast to some of the proposals advocating the 
uniﬁ cation of humanity through an eventual convergence of spiritual frameworks. It is 
not uncommon for such proposals to advocate a distinct metaphysical identity – often 
less than perfectly articulated to potential converts – as a replacement for the traditional 
forms of spirituality rather than providing a mechanism for the coexistence of separate 
religious identities.
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under the technocratic label of human rationality – such as the prevailing 
forms of money – are gradually losing their capacity for the mystiﬁ cation 
of social relations, quite possibly taking much of the rationalist faith in the 
natural sciences down with them.
10.6 Are the Rumors of the Death of Money 
 Greatly Exaggerated?
Th e preceding sections may to some extent have joined the “narcissistic 
self-contemplation” (Douglas, 1986: 92) of the institution of money, 
whereby economic, political or social problems falling within money’s 
prevailing institutional speciﬁ cations are automatically transformed into 
organizational problems of money. Consequently, the preceding analysis 
may to some extent have succumbed to the temptation of seeking 
solutions to institutionally indeterminate problems – referring to them 
as “monetary” problems would already reveal a bias in the chosen method 
of analysis – from the limited range of experience and imagination 
stemming from the prevailing forms of monetary institutions. Th e main 
justiﬁ cations provided for such intellectual self-limitations included 
analytical parsimony and a desire to illustrate the wide spectrum of 
political choice inherent in any monetary system rather than to provide a 
detailed blueprint for reform.
Nonetheless, there are no “technical” reasons why some of the 
analytical experience gained in evaluating the feasibility or desirability 
of speciﬁ c types of monetary systems could not be applied to assess the 
institutional necessity of the social relation of money itself. Conventional 
analysis often locates the origins of the end of money discourse to 
relatively recent technological developments which facilitate alternative 
mechanisms of exchange. Yet the debate may in eﬀ ect have been ongoing 
under diﬀ erent names within the organizational parameters of virtually 
every historically contingent monetary system without the participants 
necessarily fully realizing the implications. Gold standard, for instance, 
has often been criticized for unduly limiting a community’s capacity to 
exchange to its holdings of gold: without a permission from the holders 
or producers of gold no-one in the economy may engage in monetized 
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economic exchange that may be both feasible and desirable in real terms. 
Does money itself – irrespective of the form it takes or the narratives 
through which its continuing existence is rationalized – not constitute 
an equally arbitrary and distorting limitation on economic activity? 
Economic activity will always take place in real terms – i.e. according 
to the natural laws of the physical reality – which no monetary system 
will ever be able to reproduce more accurately than the laws of nature 
themselves as they set the technically feasible limits to physical production 
processes. Is the replacement of the natural laws by a diﬀ erent, socially 
constructed accounting system for the purposes of regulating economic 
activity not unnecessary at best and in all likelihood a recipe for disaster 
once humanity’s capacity to transform its physical environment has 
advanced to the point of potential self-destruction? Paraphrasing Keynes 
(1923) and William Jennings Bryan (1896), could it not be money as an 
institution – rather than the speciﬁ c manifestations of money in a gold 
standard – which might constitute the “barbarous relic” or the “cross of 
money” upon which the mankind is to be cruciﬁ ed?
It has already been shown that the social relation of money involves 
irresolvable conﬂ icts. If money is conceptualized as a commodity, 
competition between the actual and the latent monetary media is unlikely 
to ever be achieved to an extent that would permit the perfect and 
simultaneous fulﬁ llment of the medium of exchange and the store of value 
functions of money. If money is viewed as debt, the selected standard(s) 
for evaluating a speciﬁ c IOU’s “moneyness” – whether acceptability, 
liquidity or something else – will inevitably be distorted in a manner 
that is not entirely dissimilar to the processes which render commodity 
money dysfunctional. While in a commodity-based monetary system the 
holders or the issuers of the actual settlement media may extract the value 
of any productivity increases through money’s gatekeeper function, in 
a debt-based system it is typically the government which deﬁ nes some 
IOU’s more equal than others through legal tender laws and the choice of 
the types of IOU’s it accepts in settlement of tax liabilities and uses for its 
own outlays. Consequently, in a debt-based system it is the institutional 
separation between banks – deﬁ ned here as institutions which enjoy 
preferential treatment in the conversion of their own liabilities to the 
legal tender – and non-bank actors – deﬁ ned here as actors with no 
such privileges – which determines each IOU’s “moneyness” rather than 
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the creditworthiness or liquidity position of the issuer per se. In short, 
irrespective of the speciﬁ c narratives selected to rationalize the continued 
existence of money, any form of monetary institution creates a self-
referential incentive structure that deviates from the laws governing the 
physical production activities. Th e pseudo-apologetic rationalization of 
money as a relic of a bygone era when scarcity was perhaps the most 
salient constraint on the advancement of the human condition is thus 
inaccurate: money has never been an accurate measure of scarcity in the 
physical world. All it has been designed to do and has been capable of 
measuring is the scarcity registered within the monetary system itself. 
While the absence of virtually any socially constructed constraints on 
resource depletion and environmental destruction may up to a certain 
point have been able to produce “economic growth” – deﬁ ned in the 
conventional manner as increased resource throughput – this may, indeed, 
be a bygone era, potentially stripping the institution of money of the last 
vestiges of usefulness in the presumed role of promoting “growth”.138
Th ere are at least two main approaches to justifying the elimination 
of money as an institution: the eﬃ  ciency and governmentality based 
arguments. In order to illustrate the potential eﬃ  ciency gains from 
the elimination of the social relation of money, it is instructive to ﬁ rst 
outline some of the conditions that – according to some of the dominant 
economistic views which continue to presuppose the potential for 
convergence between monetary and real valuations – would appear to be 
necessary if the socially constructed accounting system of money were 
to fulﬁ ll its publicly professed function of facilitating eﬃ  cient economic 
calculation by accurately reproducing real economic phenomena in the 
monetary realm. At least four such requirements might be relevant:
1) Every physical asset must be permanently registered in the monetary system
In other words, every physical asset in the world must be recorded into an 
information system that uses such data to create monetary counterparts 
138 Th e monetary and the real worlds could in theory continue to operate in their separate 
realities until some external constraint – ecological, social, political or something else – forces 
the logic of the socially constructed accounting system of money back to the objective physical 
reality – quite possibly through the elimination of the institution of money altogether. At this 
point of time the physical reality may already have been transformed beyond recognition with 
no reliable measures available for the precise extent of the damage.
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for real assets in order to ensure that whatever monetary calculation says 
about the costs, beneﬁ ts and feasibility of any speciﬁ c economic activity 
will indeed be perfectly matched by equal costs, beneﬁ ts and feasibility 
when calculation is performed in terms of the real resources and other 
factors inputs according to the natural laws of the physical reality. 
Monetary valuations emerge through the rules governing the interaction 
and interrelationship between the monetary media and the real assets. 
A failure to create a monetary counterpart for any physical asset which 
may be exchanged in real terms may introduce a discrepancy between 
the informational content of the monetary system and the production 
possibilities in the real world. Th e informational content of the prevailing 
monetary system is particularly instructive in this regard: in theory, 
only assets which are encumbered for the purposes of money creation 
or enter into transactions involving the issuance of money-creating loan 
contracts are sampled into the monetary decision-making mechanisms. 
Consequently, only those assets that are “converted” – an evident 
misnomer whenever the “conversion” process is monopolized by a proﬁ t-
maximizing private industry – into more liquid forms for the purposes 
of monetized market exchange are sampled as informational input into 
a process which should presumably guarantee the perfect and perpetual 
convergence of the monetary and the real valuation mechanisms. While 
a monetary valuation can be attributed to every physical asset, such a 
valuation is partly a function of the amount and the distribution of the 
monetary media which have already been borrowed into circulation and 
the conditions under which the gatekeepers of the community’s division 
of labor have monetized in the past and may agree to monetize in the 
future additional real assets rather than constituting an objective monetary 
reproduction of the valuations and incentive structures prevailing in the 
real economy. In extremis, without money-creating interest-bearing debt 
money would not exist, i.e. the monetary system’s capacity to serve as 
an institutional basis for “economically eﬃ  cient” calculation would be 
nonexistent – not necessarily because of the lack of monetary media per 
se, but due to the absence of a mechanism that could ensure a convergence 
between the monetary and real values. Informational eﬃ  ciency would 
thus appear to require the simultaneous creation – as opposed to the 
periodic “conversion” – of the monetary counterparts of all real assets 
regardless of individual asset holders’ potential preferences for abstaining 
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from the creation and circulation of liquid titles to their real wealth in 
the form of money.
Th is condition may at ﬁ rst appear to conﬂ ate the unit of account 
and the store of value functions of money. While it is true that a unit 
of account may according to some theoretical or analytical views serve 
as an accurate measure of value independently of the monetary media, 
the aim here is to identify conditions under which this might necessarily 
be the case. If every physical asset was not registered in the monetary 
system, how would the perfect and perpetual convergence between the 
monetary and the real incentive structures be ensured in practice? By 
assuming away the entire issue in all analytical work? By pretending 
that an instrument of power projection designed for the very purpose 
of resource extraction simultaneously attains the mutually contradictory 
goal of neutral measurement of economic opportunity structures? Th e 
theoretical possibility that the monetary and the real valuation mechanisms 
would necessarily converge on a “ﬂ ow” as opposed to a “stock” basis – 
i.e. as a result of specifying rules for the conversion between monetary 
and real valuations according to which the relative proportions of total 
assets allocated between monetary and real assets may freely ﬂ uctuate as 
opposed to assuming the equivalence between the stock of money and the 
stock of real assets – would ﬁ rst of all require an unambiguous conceptual 
benchmark for the intertemporal relative valuation of money versus real 
assets – something which has been argued to be lacking throughout this 
study (see particularly chapter 6) – as well as the practical capacity to 
ensure the perfect attainment of the (nonexistent) conceptual standard 
at any given point in time. Th is condition is thus logically prior to the 
distribution of real productivity gains which is often mistakenly regarded 
as a missing piece of a puzzle that could solve some of the contradictions 
of the prevailing forms of money: without an unambiguous benchmark 
for the static informational equivalence of monetary and real valuations 
across time and space, any possible changes in either money or the 
real economy in a dynamic setting can hardly rationalize or conceal 
the absence of a coherent theoretical framework that could explain 
how precisely monetary and real valuations are supposed to interact in 
order to maintain perfect and perpetual informational equivalence for 
the purposes of economic decision-making. Even under the conditions 
proposed here, transaction costs between monetary and real values, for 
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instance, would in all likelihood cause the two incentive structures or 
rationalities of economic measurement to diverge. It is thus far from 
obvious that accurate economic calculation through a monetary unit of 
account is technically feasible.
2) The monetary value of each physical asset must be continuously 
adjusted for changes in productivity
Recording the real value of each physical asset into the monetary system 
as a one time operation would produce a static picture of the evolving real 
world production possibilities. Whenever technological change produces 
a discrepancy between the amount of money that has been created 
against a speciﬁ c real asset and the asset’s true productivity, the monetary 
counterpart of the real asset must be adjusted accordingly. Inﬂ ation and 
deﬂ ation as conventionally deﬁ ned are signals of the monetary system’s 
failure to accurately reﬂ ect real world production possibilities due to the 
absence of a real-time adjustment mechanism that could continuously 
ensure the equivalence of monetary and real values.
3) Every market imperfection of the real economy must be perfectly 
reproduced by the monetary system
To the extent that errors might occur in recording, aggregating, interpreting 
etc. relevant economic information in the real world, the monetary system 
must perfectly reproduce such imperfections to maintain the equivalence 
between the monetary and the real economies for purposes of economic 
decision-making.
4) Economic actors must behave both in the monetary economy and 
the real economy in precisely the same manner to preserve their 
equivalence for decision-making purposes
For instance, the duplication of property rights to each real asset in 
the monetary system must not aﬀ ect the behavior of economic agents: 
economic actors who can have their cakes and eat them too – or potentially 
watch someone else eating the cakes that they still have as transactions are 
conducted in the monetary counterpart of the real wealth that still belongs 
277
to its original owner – must act within both the monetary system and the 
real economy as if each constituted a perfect allocation mechanism for 
the same physical resources despite the existence of their respective real/
monetary parallel realities. Alternatively, independent property rights to 
real assets could be abolished altogether in favor of an exclusively “money”-
based economic decision-making mechanism – in one possible variant 
implying perhaps something like the creation of a speciﬁ cally earmarked 
piece of monetary medium to govern the right of use to each real asset 
with a government-guaranteed nominal monetary value assigned to each 
title to a real asset that adjusts in real time to changes in the underlying 
asset’s full market value – which might nonetheless potentially render the 
entire concept of money redundant and thus fall outside the scope of the 
present research problem of attempting to identify the preconditions for 
economically eﬃ  cient monetary calculation.
At the risk of stating the obvious, the aforementioned conditions 
pose profound questions on the feasibility – let alone desirability – of 
“economically eﬃ  cient” monetary calculation: while some of the lines 
of thought may have some relevance in exploring the spectrum of 
technical feasibility in the context of implementing a barter economy, 
for the purposes of a study focusing on money it may suﬃ  ce to note 
that the conditions start to point towards both practical infeasibility and 
redundancy of “intrinsically worthless” money.
Although eﬃ  ciency has rarely been a relevant consideration when the 
attainment or preservation of privilege has been at stake, the price of 
maintaining a monetary parallel reality for the purposes of economic 
decision-making is likely to be substantial. In its weak form, the eﬃ  ciency-
based argument for the elimination of money as an institution suggests 
that an economy’s monetary incentive structures must be brought into 
line with the laws of the physical reality by eliminating the entire concept 
of money if necessary. Th e elimination of money does not, according to 
this view, automatically transform either the substantive or the formal 
rationalities for economic action: it is quite possible to have a proﬁ t-
oriented economy with highly unequal income and wealth distributions 
even without money. In the strong form the eﬃ  ciency-based argument 
asserts that the elimination of money would either result in or contribute 
to a transformation of both the substantive and the formal rationalities for 
economic action. According to this view the monetary system is perhaps 
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the main culprit for the dominance of the proﬁ t motive in economic 
interaction. Without money and the proﬁ t motive, the argument would 
go, living standards could be improved for everyone by eliminating 
monetarily induced scarcity and its side eﬀ ects – monopolization of 
resources to create scarcity, planned obsolescence of products that could 
technically be produced to last virtually forever etc. – and replacing it 
with the optimal usage of real resources for the common good.
Some rumors of the death of money may also be partly informed by 
the notion that the role of money as a governmental technology may 
be nearing the end of its functional life. Money constitutes a relatively 
cumbersome governmental mechanism for the regulation of life: its 
eﬀ ectiveness in producing the desired forms of subjectivities without the 
increasingly transparent terror of sovereign violence may be declining as 
an increasing number of individuals becomes aware of money’s inherent 
power dimensions, cash transactions provide unwarranted anonymity 
to the enemies of the species, and there is always the possibility that 
deviant subjectivities will ﬁ nd ways to exist, resist and reproduce beyond 
the monetary power’s grid of intelligibility. From the point of view of 
governmental eﬀ ectiveness and convenience, the implantation of all goods 
– and perhaps ultimately also the transacting parties, albeit biometric 
recognition might be a more likely ﬁ rst step – with a microchip or an 
RFID tag – facilitating the real time monitoring of e.g. an individual’s 
location, goods and services exchanged and balance on a “legal tender” 
account consisting of either currency or perhaps ultimately real assets 
– is clearly not an entirely unattractive proposition compared to the 
governmental limitations of the prevailing forms of money. Under such 
circumstances the primary locus of money’s governmental signiﬁ cance 
might shift from its institutional speciﬁ cations – the “technical” features 
which facilitate the managed divergence between the monetary and the 
real incentive structures – towards the manipulation of the gatekeeping 
processes which regulate access to a system of multilateral exchange that 
may constitute an inherently closer approximation of the logic of barter 
than the prevailing forms of money. In the absence of popular resistance 
and struggle for alternative futures, technically feasible governmental 
rationalities are likely to be implemented irrespective of the amount of 
ad hominem irrelevancies with which scholarship on such potentialities 
may be confronted with.
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If social evolution may point towards a moneyless future, why, then, 
is this study concerned almost exclusively with politicizing the prevailing 
forms of money? Would it not have been more productive to explore 
the various forms that a moneyless future may adopt in a study which 
would ultimately – perhaps through intergenerational reference group 
shopping if not during the author’s lifetime in case vanity is regarded 
as a rewarding motive for emancipatory scholarship – be vindicated at 
least in the boldness of its vision if not in the content of its analysis? 
Besides the obvious expository reasons based on the assumptions that a 
non-self-compartmentalizing analytical treatment of the past is necessary 
to build a better future and that gradualism deserves to be treated as a 
potential emancipatory strategy in its own right, this is precisely what this 
study attempts to do in many parts, albeit not under the explicit title of 
“social strategies for a moneyless future”. Despite any potential visionary 
sales pitches, the method of allocating real resources for productive 
uses remains a central problem in a moneyless economy. Even a society 
that has abolished scarcity and achieved previously unimaginable living 
standards – or drifted to their precise opposites of poverty, starvation 
and perpetual enslavement – will have to determine the basis on which 
material resources are made available to the self-actualizing – or starving 
– members of the community. Is the relevant decision maker going to be 
each individual for her share of the earth’s common resources or some 
renamed bureaucracy or black box artiﬁ cial intelligence system under the 
disguise of “emergism” or some other properly governable ideology? Many 
of the examples introduced in this study in the context of a basic income 
in a monetary economy remain applicable in a moneyless economy. 
In other words, the suggested solution to the dilemma posed by the 
distribution of common resources is that each individual will receive her 
share automatically and any possible transformations of ideologies, social 
practices, consciousness or some other relevant variables will be reﬂ ected 
through the impact of the aggregation of each individual’s voluntary 
decisions on the community as a whole rather than the other way round. 
Th e following chapter expands on the underlying rationale for treating 
each individual as the relevant unit of agency in the context of the more 
old-fashioned monetary economy.
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11 Refl ections on Unconditional Basic Income, 
Employer of Last Resort, and Infl ation
Readers familiar with contemporary neo-chartalist literature or the 
analytical framework of functional ﬁ nance in general that has recently been 
revived in heterodox circles may wonder why the proposed distribution 
method for newly created money is unconditional basic income (UBI) 
rather than an employer of last resort (ELR) program organized and 
funded by the state. Th e rationale for such a choice has already been 
addressed in several occasions. Among other things, newly created money 
does not belong to the state in the ﬁ rst place as it is “backed” exclusively 
by the goods and eﬀ ort of the members of the monetary space, and only 
UBI can eliminate the “race to see who can get the new money earliest” 
(Rothbard, 1980: 31) or rectify some of the distortions that would 
result from designating any single activity or factor of production as the 
gatekeeper for social interaction involving some of the technical functions 
of money. While there is nothing inherently inﬂ ationary about UBI as 
long as the government retains its power to tax, the previous chapter 
showed that it is possible to design a form of UBI which unquestionably 
does not result in unwanted inﬂ ation. Nonetheless, the contemporary 
neo-chartalists deserve credit for continuing to pose questions about 
monetary phenomena from a counter-paradigmatic analytical perspective 
that the prevailing economic orthodoxy may never have satisfactorily 
addressed. It may thus be well worth the eﬀ ort to take the opportunity to 
illuminate the inherently political nature of the institutional design of any 
monetary system through engaging the argument of some contemporary 
neo-chartalists on the allegedly inﬂ ationary nature of UBI. Th is chapter 
explores some of the most common deﬁ nitions of inﬂ ation and the 
extent to which UBI might have an impact on inﬂ ation as measured 
by the conventional indicators. Th e selectively politicized nature of the 
concept of inﬂ ation is also pointed out through a variety of perspectives. 
It is argued that the allegations of UBI as a particularly inﬂ ationary 
form of public policy fail to take into account the true pace of currency 
debasement under the current monetary system and the economically, 
politically, socially and morally unsustainable nature of its distributional 
implications.
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11.1 What is Infl ation?
According to perhaps the most common textbook deﬁ nition, inﬂ ation 
refers to a sustained increase in the general price level of goods and 
services or, conversely, a sustained decrease in the purchasing power 
of money. Despite its technical overtones in the popular imagination, 
inﬂ ation is essentially a political concept: the monetary system – 
including the deﬁ nition of aspects such as the unit of account, the rules 
governing the production and circulation of the monetary media, the 
initial distribution of the money supply etc. – is a social construct, which 
could relate to the production and consumption of goods and services in 
a number of alternative ways producing widely diﬀ erent inﬂ ation rates, 
distributional patterns and other economic and social outcomes. As was 
noted above, it might not be inherently any less arbitrary to allocate newly 
created debt-free money to lenders through regular helicopter drops, 
yet the adoption of such a “technical” speciﬁ cation for the creation and 
distribution of newly created money would radically alter the political 
signiﬁ cance of the notion of inﬂ ation. Hence any opinion about the 
allegedly inevitable distributional implications of any speciﬁ c inﬂ ation 
rate – irrespective of its ostensibly technical justiﬁ cation, mathematical 
sophistication or any possible credibility-enhancing credentials of its 
proponents – is a normative statement. Th e presumed technical necessity 
of certain distributional implications stemming from any given position 
on inﬂ ation often presupposes the primacy of the interests of speciﬁ c 
groups of individuals, while framing the incentive structures favoring 
such outcomes as immutable economic laws rather than contestable 
political and social institutions.
Th e adoption of the standard textbook deﬁ nition of inﬂ ation for policy 
purposes is far from universal. According to another deﬁ nition proposed 
by the former Chairman of the Federal Reserve Alan Greenspan, price 
stability entails “price levels suﬃ  ciently stable so that expectations of 
change do not become major factors in key economic decisions” (1989: 
7). Th is deﬁ nition is intriguing, as it appears to regard the existence of 
an inﬂ ation tax – the diminution of the purchasing power of the existing 
monetary balances through the issuance of newly created money – as a 
potentially normal element of a modern monetary system as long as the 
282
amounts involved are insigniﬁ cant enough to prevent “major” inﬂ uence 
on “key” economic decisions. In other words, despite the methodological 
primacy of the notion of money as a neutral veil in orthodox circles 
and the images of indescribable economic peril that are often invoked 
if relatively disadvantaged members of the society refuse to bear much 
of the burden for maintaining the value of the currency, diminution of 
the purchasing power of money may in fact be a normal feature of a 
modern monetary system that is to be expected under “price stability”. As 
a potentially inevitable feature of modern money, one can only negotiate 
the incidence of the unearned gains and underserved losses accruing from 
inﬂ ation, not eliminate it altogether. Greenspan’s observation is consistent 
with the often rather dismal record of governments and central banks in 
maintaining the value of their currencies.
11.2 Does Universal Basic Income Cause Infl ation?
To the extent that inﬂ ation indices purport to constitute descriptively 
intelligible measures of any economically, politically or socially relevant 
variables, conventional measures of inﬂ ation often aim to capture 
changes in either the cost of living (the cost of maintaining a stable living 
standard) or the cost of subsistence (basic survival).139 In both cases the 
relative weights of the products and services that are included in the 
measurement of the relevant price index are likely to be skewed towards 
the basic necessities of life, in the latter case to a greater extent than in 
the former. A major objective of one variant of UBI is to guarantee basic 
subsistence or a living standard for all, i.e. to increase the economy’s total 
consumption of basic necessities of life at the expense of luxury goods. 
To the extent that UBI achieves this objective, a temporary increase in 
the inﬂ ation rate cannot be ruled out. Yet, once again, the focus should 
139 For an account of how the most widely used US inﬂ ation measures have shifted 
their emphasis from the former towards the latter deﬁ nition, see the work of John 
Williams available at www.shadowstats.com. For the purposes of this chapter the logical 
rationale for measuring inﬂ ation may be more relevant than exploring the diﬀ erences 
between actual indices which may exclude some of the relevant items. Th us it is assumed 
throughout this chapter that a relevant measure of inﬂ ation includes items such as food, 
energy and housing, although this is not always the case with actual indices.
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be on the essentially political nature of any ostensibly technical economic 
indicators. Does the fact that hungry individuals are able to have three 
meals a day after the introduction of a UBI indicate that the overall 
economic activity should be curbed and the upward redistribution of real 
assets accelerated through higher interest rates?140 If the increasing price 
of bread or housing necessitates such drastic actions to protect the value 
of the currency, is the exploding cost of overseas military adventures, for 
instance, devoid of similar technical signiﬁ cance? Much of the relevance 
of the concept of inﬂ ation to the feasibility of UBI may ultimately 
come down to a single question: is it possible to guarantee a sustainable 
livelihood to every member of the community? If the answer in real 
terms is yes, any possible contradictory messages emanating through the 
monetary system are likely to reﬂ ect its own structural limitations. 
Another common misconception regards the unconditionality of 
UBI as an inevitable source of inﬂ ationary pressures. According to one 
140 As has often been pointed out by heterodox economists, the interest rate is a socially 
constructed, power-based variable and in any debate on an appropriate inﬂ ation rate, the 
real issue of contention may well involve the level of real interest rates rather than the rate of 
inﬂ ation per se (e.g. Smithin, 2008, 1999). Nonetheless, it is not always obvious that heterodox 
economics would amount to much more than the orthodoxy’s second line of defense to 
domesticate the deviant subjectivities with slightly looser perceptual constraints within which 
unconstrained creativity and freedom of enquiry may be exercised. Although the intention 
here is not to attempt to single out the work of any speciﬁ c individuals, suggestions such as 
“negative real interest rates would clearly militate against the investing class, and the ultimate 
reward/incentive system of the society” (Lau and Smithin, 2002: 18, emphasis in original) 
or “Th e key for economic growth in a capitalist society is the need for deﬁ cit ﬁ nancing by at 
least one sector of the macroeconomy. It is not true that this is ‘the creation of new purchasing 
power out of nothing’ [Schumpeter 2002: 73], as is often mistakenly stated. Th e social 
relationships described above are as ‘real’ as any other social institution” (ibid: 15) even in the 
forefront of heterodoxy are unlikely to alleviate such concerns. Do positive interest rates not 
militate potentially against everyone else except perhaps the investing class? How ineﬃ  cient 
or implausible must a society’s “ultimate reward/incentive system” get before alternative 
arrangements may be entertained – perhaps even with some other labels attached to such 
analytical eﬀ orts by the prevailing self-declared heterodoxy than “militating against” the status 
quo? Does the fact that a social relationship is “real” automatically preclude the possibility 
that such relationships might be “created out of nothing”? Assuming an inverse relationship 
between the socially imposed requirements for logical consistency, factual accuracy, and the 
relevance of a statement and the social status of its utterer and constantly decreasing spin as the 
utterer’s social position diminishes, it is far from obvious that suﬃ  ciently low social positions 
exist within the economics profession for even the most heretical views to have the capacity to 
touch upon the political implications of economic indeterminacy.
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articulation of this concern inﬂ ation is UBI’s “Achilles’ heel”, since it is 
assumed that “[i]f money ‘grew on trees,’ its value would be determined 
by the amount of labor required to harvest money from trees” (Tcherneva 
and Wray, 2005: 20). Such a claim has two main problems. First, the cost 
of obtaining money (or its “harvesting” cost) is highly unequal throughout 
the economy. Th e marginal cost of producing an additional currency 
unit by the central bank or the commercial banking system is close to 
zero. What nonetheless confers money its value is the unequal access to 
the production capacity of money. As the most privileged economic 
actors hold the monopoly right to “harvesting” the money supply at 
virtually zero cost, the vast majority of the population will have to accept 
whatever conditions the harvesters choose to set to them for obtaining 
money. A misunderstanding or a neglect of this point has sometimes 
led to the advocacy of policies which would leave the responsibility 
for the maintenance of the value of the currency mainly to the most 
vulnerable segments of the population in the form of a compulsory work 
requirement, for instance, while leaving the elite power to virtually write 
their own pay/interest/dividend/bailout/welfare checks intact. Second, it 
is not entirely clear that diﬀ erent policy proposals are being evaluated 
by the same standards of measurement. Th e principles of functional 
ﬁ nance141 do not structurally necessitate any speciﬁ c policy choice, and 
one would at least in theory have to be open to the possibility that if the 
government sets a tax equal to the inﬂ ationary portion of the annual 
money supply growth (or the “harvest”), the macroeconomic impact of 
“money growing in trees” can be mainly distributional. Similarly, if the 
unconditional receipt of a subsistence income is inherently inﬂ ationary, 
surely the same logic must also apply to the unearned income transfers 
that the economically more privileged individuals obtain through their 
monopoly on money creation at negligible marginal cost. 
When assessing the alleged inﬂ ationary impact of a seigniorage-based 
UBI, it is instructive to contrast such charges to the prevailing pace of 
unequally distributed money creation. Th e money supply is currently 
growing at an annual rate of more than 10% in both the US and the 
141 For a brief summary of some of the main points of functional ﬁ nance and its 
potential relevance to contemporary policy debates see e.g. Forstater (1999).
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Eurozone (European Central Bank, 2007; Williams, 2007).142 Th ese 
money supply growth rates signiﬁ cantly outpace the respective economic 
growth rates, with the beneﬁ ts accruing mostly to the highest income 
groups. While a more equal distribution of the newly created money 
might under some circumstances lead to higher inﬂ ation as conventionally 
deﬁ ned, it is not obvious that the general trust in the “soundness” of the 
monetary system would be eroded any faster if the entire money supply 
growth was equally distributed to every member of society through 
UBI rather than allocated primarily to the highest income groups. In 
principle, the same amount of money would be channeled into products 
and services that have more direct relevance to basic human needs by a 
larger number of people as is currently channeled into asset price inﬂ ation 
and luxury consumption mainly by the economically privileged. Th ere 
is no economically or morally sound basis for the asymmetric initial 
allocation of newly created money or the interest payments required just 
to keep money – or the capacity to monetize real assets – in circulation. 
Hence any possible inﬂ ation resulting from the rectiﬁ cation of such 
distributional biases should be attributed to the incentive mechanisms 
which cause money creation to outpace economic growth rather than a 
UBI policy per se.
It is also useful to keep in mind the generally dismal historical record 
of “unbacked” ﬁ at currencies143 and the economic, political and social 
consequences of both unequally distributed money creation and the 
ultimate inﬂ ationary collapses of monetary systems. Despite the nearly 
universal triumph of economic orthodoxy and the countless wealth-
centralizing working-class concessions ostensibly required, among other 
things, to combat the perils of widely distributed purchasing power, the 
actual inﬂ ationary record of virtually any currency since the 1970s is 
absolutely horrendous in long-term historical comparison. As a reasonable 
case could be made for the inevitability of the eventual collapse of any 
142 Th e M3 grew at an annualized rate of 10.7% in the Eurozone in May 2007. 
Th e ﬁ gures for the US, an annualized growth rate of approximately 13% in July 2007, 
are estimates as the Federal Reserve has discontinued the publication of the oﬃ  cial M3 
growth statistics. Th e logic of the example remains the same with wider deﬁ nitions of 
money.
143 For the sake of simplicity, ﬁ at currency is here used to denote any non-commodity 
form of money.
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ﬁ at currency system, it is not entirely obvious why the most vulnerable 
segments of the population should accept any unequally distributed 
sacriﬁ ces on monetary grounds. Once a monetary system is seen as 
temporary and fragile to changes in the distribution of economic and 
political power, the most relevant issue may be the system’s contribution 
to the evolution of the economic, political and social realities during 
the remainder of its functional life. A seigniorage-based UBI achieves 
economic and social justice better than most alternatives during the 
currency system’s functional life and better prepares the general population 
to exert its democratic preferences during the eventual crisis. Th us a 
strong preference for the allocation of newly created money exclusively 
through UBI may emerge regardless of its alleged impact on inﬂ ation.
Th e adoption of the Greenspan criterion for inﬂ ation, for instance, 
appears to favor UBI over alternative policy proposals regardless of the 
speciﬁ c inﬂ ation rate in the economy. A seigniorage-based UBI would 
distribute any given amount of newly created money more equally 
among economic actors than alternative policies, thereby minimizing the 
economic distortions arising from the “race to see who can get the new 
money earliest” and hence face the old nominal price level and relative 
price structure before the impact of the newly created money has been 
fully factored into the price level. If the inﬂ ation rate is suﬃ  ciently low to 
preclude “major” impact on “key” economic decisions, all newly created 
money can, by deﬁ nition, be safely distributed as UBI with no impact on 
inﬂ ation as deﬁ ned by Greenspan. 
Even if the inﬂ ation rate happened to be in excess of the perception 
threshold of economic actors, possibly approaching hyperinﬂ ation, any 
possible attempt to save the currency system from a total collapse should 
still not be confused with the economic and moral case for rectifying the 
distributional implications of the prevailing forms of money. At any given 
inﬂ ation rate, the matter that merits the most attention is the distribution 
of the unearned income in the form of newly created money for the 
rest of the currency system’s functional life. In other words, a currency 
system’s inherent tendency for self-destruction through excessive money 
supply growth can hardly be used as a moral justiﬁ cation for unequal 
distribution of newly created money to postpone or to conceal the factors 
leading to the eventual collapse. Wealth-centralizing money creation has 
contributed to concentrations of income, wealth, political power and 
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media ownership that are largely unprecedented in humanity’s fragile 
experiment with political systems which aim to approximate democracy. 
Th ese tendencies could be partly reversed by adopting the economically 
and morally more tenable solution of distributing newly created money 
as UBI for the rest of the currency system’s functional life. In the words 
of one observer, the choice may be between social evolution and social 
revolution (Kennedy, 1995: 64). Despite the revolutionary rhetoric that 
UBI may inspire in right-wing pundits, considering the alternatives UBI 
rests ﬁ rmly in the former camp.
11.3 Productive Relativism: On the Perspectival Nature 
of Working and Shirking Under “Because I Say So”-
Economics
Th e claim that UBI constitutes an inherently inﬂ ationary policy while an 
ELR program curtails such tendencies involves implicit assumptions on 
agency as well as the substantive and formal rationalities for economic 
action that deserve further elaboration.
With respect to agency, ELR proponents as well as much of the 
economics profession in general often essentially advocate constraining 
human potentiality through the bureaucratization of agency as the only 
relevant measure of productivity. When, for instance, a UBI recipient 
takes care of a sick relative or a child, the purchasing power of money 
is presumably being undermined as, according to the prevailing 
bureaucratic powers that be, the individual in question is receiving money 
for nothing and shirking her responsibilities towards other members of 
the community. If, on the other hand, the same individual spends eﬀ ort 
to master the bureaucracy required to obtain the government’s approval 
for such activities as a part of an ELR program, her productivity – now 
lower due to the ongoing bureaucracy-tax on her time and eﬀ ort – would 
presumably accrue to the beneﬁ t of the economy and the community 
as a whole and thus support the value of the currency. Similarly, if 
such caretaking services were to be bureaucratized by granting control 
to proﬁ t-seeking private corporations, the perils of inﬂ ation could also 
supposedly be avoided through the one and only bureaucracy-approved 
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non-inﬂ ationary method of monetizing heretofore uncharted social 
spaces: bringing the control over such processes to the sphere of its own 
inﬂ uence.
In respect of the substantive and formal rationalities of economic action 
the underlying assumptions of an ELR program or much of the discipline 
of orthodox economics in general are hardly any less controversial: the 
aim or actual eﬀ ect is often to maximize resource throughput based on 
monetary calculation rather than to optimize resource usage based on the 
natural laws that deﬁ ne the unalterable standards for maximizing resource 
eﬃ  ciency. Th e role of “incentives”, in turn, is to ensure that the maximum 
number of individuals will participate in this grossly ineﬃ  cient process 
with the greatest fervor that money can buy. Under such an analytical and 
practical framework all claims to eﬃ  ciency are entirely self-referential: it is 
not the economic activity per se that is the relevant object of inquiry, but 
the relative economic or political standing of the institution or individual 
making knowledge claims on the extent of each activity’s eﬃ  ciency. While 
perhaps one of the most widely known examples involves managed scarcity 
– restricting the amount of a resource brought into the marketplace in order 
to drive up its price – whereby the presumed eﬃ  ciency of such an action is 
based on the supplier’s power to introduce a discrepancy between monetarily 
measured productivity and real world relative resource scarcities against all 
potentially contrary knowledge claims emanating from sources of lesser 
economic trustworthiness, the issue extends far beyond the relatively kind 
narratives that some of the intellectually more timid reinterpretations of 
orthodoxy may produce. Any economic, political or social activity may 
be deemed to be “eﬃ  cient” only to the extent that the holders or the 
issuers of money choose to patronize such activities. Under the prevailing 
forms of money, activities whose productivity in real terms can hardly be 
questioned – such as investment in or the sustainable use of natural capital 
– are structurally discouraged. Such activities are often deemed worth 
undertaking only if an individual philanthropist decides to go against the 
monetary logic that had to be followed to amass a fortune in the ﬁ rst place 
by pursuing environmental objectives that the prevailing forms of money 
are structurally not designed to achieve. Similarly, in a world where the 
established power structures rely on any speciﬁ c economic, political or 
social equivalent of the ﬂ at earth assumption, to claim otherwise would be 
profoundly ineﬃ  cient simply because the masters of the prevailing metric 
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for measuring eﬃ  ciency – the monetary system – say so. Perhaps the 
most instructive examples will, however, come from the banking sector 
– an industry that is uniquely positioned to shape subjectivities due to 
its capacity to hold the community’s money supply – or the capacity to 
convert real assets into more liquid forms, according to those who dislike 
the word money for opportunistic reasons – ransom unless the community 
is willing to cover the costs and bear the consequences of the banks’ proﬁ t-
maximizing business decisions. To go into more speciﬁ c examples of how 
outright embezzlement may be seen as a productive activity when the 
proceeds ﬂ ow to suﬃ  ciently signiﬁ cant concentrations of economic or 
political power would run the risk of charges of plagiarism in the current 
environment: whatever potential scenarios the author would propose as 
an example, the chances are that some innovative thinkers in the ﬁ nancial 
sector had already conceived of and proved the practical feasibility of 
similar schemes, leaving the present author vulnerable to charges of failing 
to give attribution to other people’s ideas.144
Leaving aside the question of UBI’s impact on incentives to work – it 
is far from clear that a non-negligible negative impact exists as suggested 
by some opponents of UBI, but this is not the relevant question here – 
it may thus be more instructive to contrast both the aims of allegedly 
“economically eﬃ  cient” activities and the intensity with they must be 
pursued with other conceivable modes of social organization. With 
the present level of technology, it seems likely that a small minority 
of individuals could produce the basic necessities of life for the entire 
population of the world – however incomprehensible the motives of 
such “militants” might be to the proponents of some of the more costly 
but perhaps more properly hierarchical “reward/incentive systems of 
144 As some of the more historically-minded economically oriented social scientists 
have pointed out, classical economics recognized the potential for some of the most 
generously remunerated economic activities to be unproductive. In the words of Hudson 
(1998), for instance:
Distinguishing between productive and unproductive labor and credit, the classical 
economists classiﬁ ed such employment [ﬁ nancial and legal services, insurance etc.] 
as ‘unproductive’, and hence in the character of economic overhead. But today it 
is being welcomed as ushering in the post-industrial society. Today’s ﬁ nancial 
capitalism deems all labor, investment and debt to be productive, regardless of how it 
is employed. Th ere thus seems to be no basis for calling the proliferation of claims on 
wealth an economically unproductive or parasitic activity.
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the society” (Lau and Smithin, 2002: 18). Even if the earth’s resources 
were depleted by illusory monetary calculation and sheer rapaciousness 
to an extent where the present population could no longer be fed, the 
fact remains that a relatively minor proportion of the population could 
produce the food that the remaining arable land and other resources 
would allow. It may not be an overstatement to suggest that the tragedy 
of commons has been completely overtaken in relative signiﬁ cance by the 
tragedy of enclosures: the largely neglected governmental signiﬁ cance of 
institutional enclosures which distort humanity’s capacity to understand 
itself, its environment, and proper modes of interaction between the 
two. One of the most crucial questions for economically oriented social 
scientists is the nature of the economic system that will emerge as the 
transition from monetary maximization to resource optimization has 
been completed. What will the economy look like when the potentially 
irreparably self-referential and distorted logic of monetary maximization 
has been discarded in favor of economic decision-making based on 
optimization in the context of the objective physical constraints and 
natural laws? While it would be unfair to suggest that bureaucratically 
determined targets and methods in a compulsory rat race to maximize 
one’s resource consumption would automatically be out of question as 
possible organizing principles, there would clearly appear to be room 
for alternative views that locate agency at the level of the individual and 
employ alternative modes of analysis for determining the extent to which 
human potential has been realized.
 
11.4 Potential to Illuminate the Inherently Political 
Nature of Any Monetary System?
UBI is not an inherently inﬂ ationary form of public policy. In most cases 
any possible temporary acceleration of the inﬂ ation rate would be due 
to the rectiﬁ cation of the existing distributional biases of the monetary 
and taxation systems rather the UBI policy per se. Th us, more often than 
not, UBI would merely expose features of the current monetary system 
that might have been unlikely to pass the public scrutiny in the ﬁ rst place 
if articulated in a more open and transparent manner. It is possible to 
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design a UBI program that is unquestionably non-inﬂ ationary should a 
preference for such a policy emerge through the political process.145 Rather 
than constituting a monolithic, deterministic economic parallel reality 
waiting to be discovered by positivist scholarly inquiry, UBI is ultimately 
a versatile tool of creative construction146 which can be adapted to the 
pursuit of a wide variety of economic, political and social objectives and 
made compatible with a wide spectrum of technical speciﬁ cations. 
Seen from the perspective of an analytical framework commonly 
adopted by some of UBI’s critics, UBI democratizes the control of the 
inﬂ ation tax by leaving the decision on the extent and incidence of 
the currency-stabilizing taxation to the political process. Furthermore, 
UBI may help to improve the eﬃ  ciency of the political process itself by 
enhancing the state’s accountability to the politically weakest segments of 
the population, as it is the state that has to persuade its citizens to accept 
the incidence of speciﬁ c taxation policies to maintain the value of the 
currency rather than the most disadvantaged groups of individuals trying 
to inﬂ uence state policy on a case by case basis. Unlike alternative policies 
which take advantage of disparities in power or information to spread the 
costs of inﬂ ation across the most vulnerable segments of the population, 
a seigniorage-based UBI makes inﬂ ationary policies readily obvious by 
145 Th e promise of unquestionable non-inﬂ ationarity derives from the possibility 
to contract the money supply at any time by increasing the tax on money. In principle 
alternative analytical frameworks should not preclude the possibility that a corresponding 
amount of money can be withdrawn from circulation through conventional taxes. 
Whether any institution should ever have the discretionary power to make drastic changes 
to the size of a community’s money supply is debatable, but it can hardly be denied that a 
suﬃ  cient contraction of the money supply will ultimately respond to the threat posed by 
the rising bread, housing, or missile prices to economic stability by causing an economy-
wide contraction. While under the current monetary system the “adjustment costs” 
fall disproportionately on the economically most disadvantaged groups, the proposed 
reforms outlined in the previous chapter might spread the incidence of both the costs 
and beneﬁ ts of money creation, interventionist policies, and economic ﬂ uctuations across 
wider segments of the population.
146 Economic activity often involves creative construction of the rules of the game as 
opposed to the “creative destruction” – as suggested by Joseph Schumpeter – emanating 
from competition. In practice the diﬀ erence between the two notions may not be 
obvious, as activities which are commonly confounded with creative destruction in fact 
involve the creative construction of competitive advantage through the manipulation or 
circumvention of the rules of the game.
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egalitarian distribution of the newly created money and signiﬁ cantly 
improves the relative capacity of the most disadvantaged individuals to 
counter any possible negative eﬀ ects of inﬂ ation. 
Th e success of a public policy proposal or an institutional reform agenda 
is often not measured solely in the likelihood of its implementation, but 
also in the extent to which it manages to expand the realm of the political 
into ostensibly neutral or technical aspects of the prevailing policies or 
institutions. Given the methodological selectivity and the narrowness 
of the analytical perspective through which the concept of inﬂ ation 
has typically been politicized as well as its largely unused potential in 
helping to expand understanding on the related themes of money, debt 
and interest, any intervention into the debate regardless of analytical 
perspective or methodological predispositions has the potential to 
enhance understanding of the economic, political, and social issues that 
are inherent in the design of any monetary system. While the distinct 
theoretical and methodological traditions and policy advocacy groups 
may never reach agreement on the precise nature of the institution of 
money, they should all be encouraged to voice their views on inﬂ ation, 
money, debt, interest, and any related theme potentially involved in the 
institutional design of any monetary system. Whether their views on the 
nature of money become inherently any more reconcilable as a result of 
such a process may ultimately prove to be less important than the fact that 
they took the time to reﬂ ect on the magnitude of the issues involved and 
“the uncertainty of all claims to knowledge, as revealed to consciousness 
by thorough inquiry” (Beck, 1995: 13) in the monetary context.
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12 Theorizing Hypocrisy: Critical Surrealism
It has so far been argued that no positivist, monocausal theory of money 
can fully capture money’s capacity for self-deﬁ nitional eclecticism and 
amenability to a wide spectrum of legitimating narratives. According 
to the monetary adaptation of Goodhart’s law, any attempt to arrive at 
a static deﬁ nition for money for analytical or regulatory purposes will 
render such deﬁ nitions obsolete through enhanced incentives to develop 
forms of money that are not captured by the prevailing deﬁ nition. Th e 
dual nature of money as a material practice and a subjective framework 
suggests that the identiﬁ cation of money’s multiple, potentially 
contradictory manifestations and its evolutionary momentum at each 
point in time are not simple exercises of positivist observation. While 
the suggested remedies of seigniorage-based UBI and a demurrage-tax 
on money might rectify some of the most egregious income, wealth 
and power disparities produced by the prevailing forms of money,147 the 
nature of money and the precise mechanisms through which patently 
implausible monetary logics are incorporated as parts of wider agentic 
subjectivities might still remain elusive. Does the conceptual ambiguity 
of money thus mean that there is no scope for any form of theoretical 
rapprochement between diﬀ erent analytical traditions which could create 
some form of a coherent whole – no matter how restricted in analytical 
scope or predictive powers – while respecting the heterogeneity and the 
distinctive analytical comparative advantages of the diﬀ erent cognitive 
frameworks? Gilbert (2005: 381), for instance, has argued that “Th e 
tensions between the various ways of understanding money need not be 
resolved, but they do need to be revealed”. How could such tensions be 
revealed in a theoretically coherent manner?
Any logically coherent and empirically relevant analytical framework 
would have to acknowledge the tremendous ease with which the 
real and the surreal interact and intermingle in the production and 
147 Th e intention is not, of course, to imply that money is the only source of such 
disparities. Nonetheless, as the incentive structures created by the logic of the prevailing 
monetary system have a signiﬁ cant impact on virtually all forms of economic, political 
and social interaction, the implications of monetary reform could conceivably extend 
far beyond the mere rectiﬁ cation of the income, wealth and power disparities which are 
directly mediated by money.
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reproduction of monetary systems and subjectivities. Th e existence 
of an objective cognitive basis for money in the multilateral exchange 
of goods and services can hardly be denied, yet the ease with which a 
socially constructed accounting logic shapes and overtakes the underlying 
material reality requires explanation. Th e cognitive goodwill created 
by the easily recognizable physical reality is usurped by a surreal plane 
of social interaction which functions according to a precisely stated 
but patently implausible logic. Irrespective of one’s ontological or 
epistemological predispositions, a theoretical approach which focuses on 
the interaction between an objective, mind-independent reality and an 
objective,148 socially constructed surreality – with the potential to distort 
the perceptions and understandings of both through the postmodern 
language games and the breeding of discursive species – could perhaps 
most appropriately be labeled critical surrealism.
Th e sur-real – that which is on top of or over and above the real – plane 
of social interaction functions according to a socially constructed logic 
which deviates from the underlying physical reality in a highly organized 
and coherent manner. In other words, the underlying objective reality is 
not randomly distorted in discourse or actual social practices, but a whole 
new universalist149 logic is created – in this case the indebted, zero-sum 
148 Objective in the sense that the individual cannot alter the constraints that the 
surreal plane places on human existence just by emancipating subjectivity: from the 
individual’s perspective the surreality is as objective or “real” as reality. As Bhaskar has 
observed, “Th e existence of absolute must not be confused with the existence of objective 
structures. Social structures may be just as objective, and transfactually eﬃ  cacious within 
their geo-historical domain, as natural laws. Moreover, both alike typically impose 
limits and constraints upon the kinds of action (including speech action) possible to 
human beings, without (normally) rigidly determining what we do within those limits or 
constraints” (Bhaskar, 1991: 73, original emphasis). What is distinctive in this study is the 
claim that the socially objectiﬁ ed reality is transparently absurd: no redescriptive narrative 
or act of postmodern wordsmanship can challenge the fact that the logical implausibility 
of the geo-historically speciﬁ c social counterpart of the natural laws – the socially, or 
perhaps antisocially, constructed accounting system of money – is plainly obvious to 
virtually everyone. While governmentality-based analytical approaches remain highly 
pertinent in understanding the functioning of the surreal plane, the cognitive guidelines 
imposed on “successful” social activities might more appropriately be described as regimes 
of socially sanctioned illusions rather than regimes of bona ﬁ de truth.
149 Universalist in the Machiavellian or Orwellian sense that the term has come 
to be used in political discourse, i.e. the powers that be deﬁ ne the non-punishable 
inconsistencies or states of exception. 
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competitive logic of the prevailing forms of money – which has little in 
common with the underlying physical reality. Yet the surreality exempliﬁ ed 
by the logic of the prevailing forms of money has in some cases come to 
exercise more inﬂ uence on the human condition than the reality: it is the 
prison which keeps the unemancipated imagination focused on issues, 
opportunities and constraints which are largely irrelevant for social struggle 
in the reality. Reality has an objective core which can be opportunistically 
misinterpreted or misrepresented but not altered at the level of fundamental 
natural laws. Surreality is a pure social construct, yet often an equally 
“objective” constraint on individual behavior as the reality.
Th e surreal plane has two principal functions: the self-classiﬁ cation of 
subjects and the self-aggrandizement of power.150 Th e surreality is organized 
around patently implausible focal points to facilitate the self-classiﬁ cation of 
subjects into true or instrumental believers and troublemaking purists who 
the adverse incentive structures notwithstanding insist on analyzing the 
underlying objective reality instead of adapting to the socially objectiﬁ ed 
surreality. Money is one of the key surreal focal points which not only creates 
a socially sanctioned illusion of objective economic decision-making, but 
also allows the co-branding of alternative instruments of incredulity with 
wealth and privilege: within the self-referential illusion of the prevailing 
forms of money, the cognitive goodwill created by monetarily rewarding 
genuinely productive activities can be used for virtually unlimited co-
branding of unproductive, self-serving or destructive activities with power, 
prestige and personal success. While the self-selective marginalization of 
the purists in the surreal plane of social interaction is hardly surprising, the 
believers may also face the choice between professing their faith in the easy 
way or the hard way: those to whom rationalized self-delusion does not 
come naturally will either have to engage in subjectic engineering to shape 
their minds according to the perceived intellectual necessities of human 
interaction or to endure the ongoing cognitive dissonance emanating from 
the separation of the socially forbidden real151 and the socially sanctioned 
150 Identiﬁ cation of principal functions does not necessarily imply an exclusively 
functionalist ontology. Much of the previous discussion on agency remains relevant 
here.
151 In the case of the income-, wealth-, and power-centralizing logic of the prevailing 
forms of money, public references to the real without mitigating spins are almost invariably 
economically, politically and socially harmful to the utterer. 
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and instrumentally recited surreal. In short, the surreal plane weeds out 
both disobedience and naïveté masquerading as obedience through the 
process of self-selection: while either a slight and obvious misrepresentation 
of the laws of nature through the socially constructed accounting system 
of money or a large but obscure deviation would leave some space for 
ignorance or rationalized self-delusion as possible motives for compliance, 
a distortion that is both large and evident ensures that the nature of the 
power that is being served by those who choose to do so will not remain 
obscure to anyone.
In addition to its classiﬁ catory function, the surreal plane elevates power 
from a conceptually trivial and perceptually mundane arithmetic transformer 
of social relations into an esoteric and potentially far more inﬂ uential 
instrument of strategic logic. If the entire human experience was based 
on the laws of a shared objective physical reality which is easily accessible 
to everyone, power would be both transparent – and thus less powerful 
– and relatively more likely to be exercised through numbers as opposed 
to strategies: the arithmetic accumulation of individuals or monetary 
units in support of certain policies rather than non-linear strategizing 
that aims to achieve the maximum impact for the minimum eﬀ ort. If, 
for example, money indeed represented the most tradable commodity in a 
perfectly competitive market between the actual and the latent monetary 
commodities, “money’s” structural power would be drastically curtailed 
as the exercise of monetary power would require the linear addition or 
subtraction of monetary units to achieve a critical mass which could 
contribute to the desired policy goals.152 Th e surreal plane eliminates such 
152 Another way to look at the matter is through the structural insolvency of any 
debt-based monetary space. Consider an economy with no other ﬁ nancial assets except 
those associated with the circulation of money, a total population of 100, total money 
supply of $1000 and total money-creating debt of $1100, both equally divided among 
the members of the economy, i.e. everyone holds $10 of money and $11 of money-
creating debt. Th e marginal value of each additional dollar created or “recycled” by the 
banking system is signiﬁ cant for every member of the economy, as it could literally 
mean the diﬀ erence between life and death in the absence of a social security system 
which guarantees minimum livelihood irrespective of the outcomes produced by the 
socially constructed accounting system of money. Th e banking system’s ability to create 
additional dollars with “the stroke of a pen”, in turn, confers it enormous strategic power 
to decide who will live or become economically “successful” and who will be sacriﬁ ced. If, 
on the other hand, the economy had a $1000 money supply permanently in circulation 
without any money-creating debt, the marginal importance of each additional dollar put 
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inconveniences by making the economy structurally dependent on bits on 
computer hard drives which can be created by the banking system according 
to its proﬁ t-maximizing imperatives. Th e existence of the surreal plane is 
thus crucial for amplifying the strategic impact of individual decisions 
across the desired ﬁ elds of economic, political or social interaction.
Th e relative prestige of speciﬁ c professional groups engaged in social 
scientiﬁ c analysis or policy formation depends on the extent to which 
occupational tasks are located in the surreal plane. A professional 
mainstream economist, for instance, is located ﬁ rmly in the realm of the 
surreal: hence the relatively high prestige and compensation packages. 
Heterodox economists may occasionally, within certain limits, venture into 
the real world in their professional activities, but pay for the privilege in the 
form of lower prestige, job security, career advancement possibilities and 
results in quality of research assessments in the academia.153 Th e brave army 
of the monetary heretics and cranks who insist on analyzing the logical and 
practical limitations of money in real world settings will typically not have 
analytically oriented careers in respectable organizations. Similar systems of 
classiﬁ cation exist in other social scientiﬁ c occupational ﬁ elds irrespective 
of their relation to any speciﬁ c patently implausible cognitive focal point 
such as the prevailing forms of money.
Each individual’s “success” within a speciﬁ c occupational group is, 
in turn, determined by the ability to grasp the essence and the logical 
separateness of the real and the surreal planes and to instrumentally combine 
insights from both planes according to the perceived strategic necessities 
in each social situation. An experienced manipulator of subjectivities 
moves between and manipulates the planes eﬀ ortlessly and unnoticeably 
without letting logical consistency get into the way of strategic utility. 
into circulation would be signiﬁ cantly reduced as no-one would need additional debt 
or currency to remain solvent or to repay money-creating debt. Th e banking system’s 
structural power would also be reduced through the elimination of its capacity to create 
money with the “stroke of a pen”, as it would have to obtain money from someone else 
– let someone else exercise monetary power upon itself – before being able to impose its 
own preferences upon others. Th e semantic engineers who dispute the validity of this line 
of reasoning for expository purposes based on some of the most common straw men may 
return to the discussion of the repayability-through-recycling argument and the power-
based processes through which some forms of debt will always obtain the qualities of 
“moneyness” to a greater degree than others introduced in the previous chapters.
153 See e.g. the special issue on ‘Publishing, ranking, and the future of heterodox 
economics’ in On the Horizon, Vol. 16, No. 4 2008.
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Mediocre talents either do not fully grasp the instrumental nature of the 
logical separateness of the planes or lack the capacity to creatively construct 
pan-plane narratives without inviting accusations of hypocrisy from the 
audience. As it is the patently implausible nature of the socially constructed 
counterparts to natural laws in each historically contingent power structure 
which is plainly obvious to most observers rather than the most proﬁ table 
political strategies for their exploitation, there is a structural incentive for 
individuals to construct and promote particularly proﬁ table interpretations 
of successful political strategies within networks of blood, oath, faith or 
convenience. Each network may thus develop distinctive criteria – quite 
possibly a hierarchy of criteria that gradually reveals itself to individuals 
who have demonstrated suﬃ  cient competence or obedience at the lower 
ranks – for combining aspects of the real and the surreal, which are most 
conducive to the attainment of the objectives of each network as a whole 
and of each individual as a member of a network.
As a trivial example of a network of convenience, an inexperienced 
economics graduate student in a neoclassical economics department might 
seek for an explanation for the nature of money either in the real world 
or in heterodox journals – neither one of which fulﬁ lls the pan-plane 
combinatory requirements for career advancement within the peer group 
of neoclassical economists. As the requirement to stay ﬁ rmly in the surreal 
plane in monetary matters gradually reveals itself to the graduate student, 
either both personal and group objectives may be served by adapting to the 
reproduction requirements of the neoclassical phenotype or the student 
may stick to less proﬁ table interpretations and be cut oﬀ  from the resources 
monopolized by this particular network of convenience. 
It may thus not be entirely accurate to suggest that we are joined in 
solidarity as we are all governed. Countergovernmental – in the sense of the 
extent to which members may be exempted from speciﬁ c governmental 
logics, not necessarily in terms of their overall impact on the prevailing 
mechanisms of governance – social networks may shape the incidence 
of speciﬁ c aspects of a governmental logic, potentially introducing in 
the process complementary intra-network mechanisms of governance 
to regulate the incidence of the asymmetric access or exposure to the 
positive or negative aspects of the overall mechanisms of governance. Th e 
future of humanity may in part hinge on its capacity to neutralize such 
networks – to replace the transactional mode of social organization that 
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breeds self-organizing socially protectionist networks with a capitalized 
mode of social relations that distributes both the costs and the beneﬁ ts of 
the socially constructed counterparts to natural laws more evenly across 
the population.
Th e distinction between reality and surreality is quite diﬀ erent from 
the earlier bifurcation of money into a material practice and a subjective 
framework. Any material practice may be compatible with a number of 
subjectivities. It is also in theory possible for a material practice to coincide 
with a subjectivity. In practice, however, the two diverge and interact 
according to a strategic logic as was suggested in chapter 8. Each material 
practice of money deﬁ nes the range of potential and likely subjectivities, 
and each subjectivity speciﬁ es the limits for the material practices. Th e 
greater the divergence between money as a material practice and as a 
subjective framework, the greater the evolutionary momentum of money. 
Th e perfectly reproduced pair of a material practice and a subjectivity 
which embraces all of and nothing but the material practice would 
constitute a mutual evolutionary prison: neither the material practice 
nor the subjectivity could evolve in the absence of movement in the 
other. On the other hand, with divergences as sizeable as the distinction 
between the neutral veil theoretical approach and the actual hybrids of 
commodities, credit, equity, and bits of unspeciﬁ c identities in circulation 
in computer hard drives, money is relatively free to assume whatever 
form or identity best suits the strategic objectives of the higher level 
hypocrites with access to money creation or the most skillful wordsmiths 
in the construction and tailoring of pan-plane narratives. Th ere is no 
comparable interrelationship or mutual interdependence between the 
real and the surreal planes. Consequently, both the real and the surreal 
may be obscured, distorted, manipulated or strategized independently of 
each other: instruments of power – individuals with diﬀ ering utilities to 
and awareness of their own contribution to the strategies of power – at 
the lower levels of social hierarchies may, for instance, endorse the alleged 
necessity of governing through the illusions of the surreal and yet utterly 
fail to understand the functioning and the actual strategic usage of the 
prevailing or newly conceived forms of money.
Th e critical surrealist approach – to the extent that it “even merits the 
term ‘theory’” (Chomsky, quoted in Edgley, 2002: 29) – might not reconcile 
the substance of the diﬀ erent views on the nature of money into a single 
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coherent theory, but it may help to explain why such a theory is unlikely 
to ever be attained and to put the contending conceptualizations on the 
nature of money into perspective by contextualizing their relationship to 
the real and the surreal. Th e monetary adaptation of Goodhart’s law suggests 
that the surreal plane is simply too useful a tool to amplify, mystify and 
complexify the structural power of money according to the imperatives of 
anyone who has the means and the inclination to join the upper echelons of 
hypocrisy. Consequently, the continuing signiﬁ cance of a wide spectrum of 
explanatory frameworks for the nature of money may be partly a function 
of their strategic political utility rather than empirical accuracy. It is not 
obvious how the structural dominance of the surreal could be discarded: 
although the surreal is socially constructed, cognitive civil disobedience 
might require either a universal biopolitical awakening or a capacity on the 
part of the smaller groups of emancipated subjectivities to initiate alternative 
monetary material practices beyond the reach of sovereign violence. Th e 
model may, however, give some indication of the possible strategies that are 
likely to be used by the monetary powers that be for repackaging hypocrisy 
according to the consumption preferences of diﬀ erent types of audiences: 
re-branded innocence for the purists, more of the same to the true believers, 
utilitarian mental models for the instrumental believers, complexity for the 
perceptually challenged power wielders, and general education for the true 
wielders of monetary power to learn to appreciate the full potential of the 
newly emancipated instruments of monetary domination. If the critical 
surrealist analytical framework has any validity in capturing some of the 
complexities of money as an institution, there is no apparent reason why 
some of the insights could not apply also to the processes and motives 
involved in the academic theorization on the nature of money or, indeed, 
any other form of economic, political or social interaction.
12.1 Critical Surrealism and the State of Exception
Th e critical surrealist analytical framework may also help to clarify some of 
the conceptual ambiguities commonly associated with the notions of law 
and the state of exception. It is sometimes implied that the administration 
of the exception is conceptually heterogeneous to law: either “the law” 
applies, or it is suspended by the sovereign. Such conceptual bifurcation 
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diverts attention away from the extent to which any speciﬁ c aspect within 
the law is subject to opportunistic misinterpretation or misapplication 
according to strategic logic operating within the prevailing multiplicity of 
power positions. Th e instrumental hypocrisy that may be inherent in any 
power-approved policymaking process does not imply a permanent state 
of exception, but the permanent application of law: the entire realm of 
creative inconsistency is endogenous to the law. Th e strategic selection of 
the most appropriate legitimating narrative among states of exception or 
creative distortions branded as being within the law reﬂ ects the preferences 
of the audience rather than any coherent logic allegedly internal to the law 
or its displacement. In the critical surrealist terminology, both the law and 
the exception belong to the surreal plane: neither has an objective core that 
could be observed independently of the socially constructed speciﬁ cation 
and interpretation processes. Even the most explicit, exhaustive and 
logically coherent law or its exception has the potential to produce virtually 
any form of actual interpretation or outcome depending on the strategic 
manipulation of suﬃ  ciently large segments of the audience according to 
their socially constructed preferences.
Much of the state of exception literature may also perpetuate the 
myth that an individual’s institutional aﬃ  liation necessarily conveys 
meaningful information on the objectives for which power is exercised. 
With the current extent of the revolving door practices and the strategic 
interdependence between state and private sector positions, it makes little 
sense to speak of the “sovereign” having the power to deﬁ ne the law and 
the non-punishable inconsistencies or exceptions while remaining outside 
the reach of law. Th e administration of the state of exception or the state of 
socially sanctioned hypocrisy within the law is not an exclusively sovereign 
prerogative. Any speciﬁ c individual may be “wrongly”154 convicted or 
acquitted within the law, or treated in any conceivable way ranging from 
the harshest forms of “human rights” violations to the most exclusive 
forms of privilege within the state of exception. As long as the power of 
the surreal continues to be validated by the uncontested adherence to 
the results of the combinatory pan-plane spectacle, no-one can escape 
154 Wrongly according to the purist interpretation of the “objective” core of the law, 
perhaps rightly according to the critical surrealist worldview according to which the law 
represents yet another socially constructed illusion that is meant to be creatively interpreted 
and combined with insights from the real for the maximum strategic beneﬁ t.
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the potential for the strategic (mis)use of the surreal. It is not the state 
of exception that will protect any speciﬁ c state oﬃ  cial claiming to act in 
the name of the sovereign, but the capacity to act within the prevailing 
strategic power positions in a manner that is conducive to the oﬃ  cial’s 
continued recognition as being beyond strategic manipulatability at a 
reasonable cost. Under such perspectiﬁ cation of hypocrisy there is no 
necessary correlation between an individual’s institutional aﬃ  liation and 
the most appropriate strategized pan-plane narratives which might render 
the individual either a subject of the law or a wielder of the sovereign 
exception in each strategic multiplicity of power positions: it may be 
perfectly rational for any speciﬁ c individual to act against the interests of 
her current institutional aﬃ  liation if it enhances the individual’s relative 
position within the strategic multiplicity of power relations.
Some of these insights can be illustrated through the Finnish 
experience with an economic and banking crisis in the early 1990s. Both 
the banking crisis and the associated recession were among the deepest in 
the post-war industrialized world. According to one estimate in the early 
1993, excessive foreign indebtedness was to force the nation into default 
and thus under the control of foreign creditors by June of the same year 
(Tauno Matomäki, quoted in Kulha, 2000:9). Despite the fact that 
“vital” legislation was “dictated” by foreign creditors and the nation was 
in practice forced under “guardianship”, presumably only a “handful” of 
people understood the true graveness of the situation (Kulha, 2000: 11–
13, all translations by the author). Th e intention here is not to speculate 
on the accuracy of diﬀ erent accounts of the period, nor to question the 
rationale behind any speciﬁ c policy decision. What is of interest here 
is the speciﬁ c strategy that was adopted to sell the alleged necessity of 
the chosen policies to the electorate. Th e relevant state or private actors 
could have simply evoked a state of exception to justify the chosen policy 
approach, thus preserving – or at least not causing additional damage 
to – the perceived coherence and objectivity of law as a neutral mediator 
of social relations. An openly declared state of exception might even 
have enhanced the perceived legitimacy of state power in the eyes of 
the electorate, as it would have been the state arranging the pan-plane 
spectacle of socially objectifying the chosen conﬁ gurations of hypocrisy 
outside the purview of the illusion of logically coherent law. Although 
most observers might agree that a certain crisis mentality was fostered, 
303
the relevant agents often opted to act within the publicly professed 
normative framework of universal, socially neutral law, irrevocably 
exposing the extent to which strategic inconsistency is endogenous to 
the law. Tax liabilities which were judged to be excessive in relation to 
the banks’ capital were simply cancelled by the state.155 Claims about the 
banks illegally collecting or reselling IOUs which the Supreme Court 
had declared invalid or collecting debts which the banks themselves had 
declared invalid in courts are not uncommon (e.g. Pietilä, 2008). In 
other words, banks acting within the law successfully proved either the 
validity or the invalidity of the same debt instruments according to a 
strategic, proﬁ t-maximizing logic in each social situation. Th e president 
of the nation himself – a former central banker – decided to take the 
opportunity to rebuke members of the Supreme Court who had not 
allowed banks to unilaterally increase interest rates on outstanding loans 
(Kulha, 2000: 192). Perhaps unsurprisingly, the acting president of the 
time has been criticized for “openly opposing the punishment of white-
collar criminals” (Erkki Aurejärvi, quoted in Kulha, 2000: 292). Much of 
the material which might help to clarify the relevant actors’ true role in 
the events remains beyond the reach of researchers or courts.
Th e banking crisis illustrates the extent to which the primary 
beneﬁ ciaries of the prevailing forms of money – “[t]he lock-in between 
the political, legal, banking and institutionalized monetary system” 
(Lietaer, 2001: 214) – interact and intermingle in the surreal plane of 
social interaction. With the monetary system ﬁ rmly anchored to the 
patently implausible logic of the surreality, it is virtually impossible for 
the political or the legal systems to achieve a higher degree of morality or 
immunity to strategic (mis)use. Th e motives behind some of the decisions 
to expose the strategic inconsistency of the legal, monetary and political 
systems through acting within the law may be numerous. Perhaps the 
average subjectivity cultivated by the liberal norm life experiences a 
cognitive immune reaction that produces a self-inﬂ icted delusion of 
normality whenever confronted with a scale of illegality and immorality 
that might otherwise be diﬃ  cult to cope with. Perhaps the full extent 
155 Th e recent labeling of this claim as “juridically plain rubbish” (Taloussanomat, 
2008) by a bank oﬃ  cial hardly enhances the public’s regard for the law either. To the 
contrary, it could be interpreted as encouraging the perception that the strategic 
malleability of the law or its interpretation in the courts is a matter of power.
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of the orgy of strategic reallocation of assets and income was indeed not 
known to everyone before it was too late. Perhaps a few odd moralists 
even wanted to expose some of the intricacies of modern governance to 
public scrutiny. Nonetheless, the primary lessons from the excesses of 
strategized hypocrisy ultimately come down to the necessity to reform 
the institutions which facilitate and amplify the social implications of 
such behavior. It may not be an overstatement to claim that under the 
prevailing forms of money the possibilities for autonomous political 
agency are ultimately limited to reforming the monetary system. Should 
the agentic potential for monetary reform not be exercised by elected 
oﬃ  cials and others with the theoretical capacity to promote such actions, 
the degrees of freedom of any economic, political, social or legal activity 
may ultimately be curtailed by the logic of the prevailing forms of money. 
Th e logic is probabilistic rather than deterministic: any speciﬁ c political 
decision may always be indeterminate and short-term deviations are 
certainly to be expected, yet in the long-term, on average, even the most 
persistent social reformers cannot resist the logic of compound interest 
and zero-sum competition in any other way except repealing it. 
A world without structural monetary exploitation is unlikely to be 
devoid of exploitation or the opportunistic (mis)use of strategic logic. 
It will, however, involve the possibility of alternative modes of behavior. 
Without a monetarily induced imperative to adopt the mindset of a 
psychopath, any potential advocate of the alleged desirability of forcibly 
preserving this aspect of humanity’s cultural heritage would have to 
ﬁ nd an alternative institutional mechanism for the propagation of 
such objectives. Th e necessity to implement a newly conceived form 
of institutional oppression might, if nothing else, at least satisfy the 
perceptual standards of some of the most devoted agency-fetishists who 
currently populate mainstream social science departments across the 
globe: as some contemporary commentator – in addition to the bankers, 
politicians, social reformers or other actors who have addressed the 
economic, political and social implications of the monetarily mediated 
forms of oppression in the past – would presumably have to go on record 
for promoting the institutional replacement for debt slavery, it might 
ﬁ nally be possible to have a conversation with this breed of intellectual 
on the actual institutions which govern human behavior.
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Conclusion
One of the objectives of this study has been, in the words of Robert 
Merton, to specify ignorance – to determine “what it is about an 
established phenomenon that is not yet known and why it matters for 
generic knowledge that it become known” (Merton, 1996: 55, original 
emphasis). Four issue areas have emerged as particularly neglected and 
potentially fruitful for further inquiry into the nature of money and its 
alternatives. First, despite all the time and eﬀ ort expended on the study of 
money by generations of scholars, the nature of money remains elusive. 
One of the main theses of this study has been that the social construction 
of ﬁ nancial capital in general and money in particular – the choice of 
the precise manner in which tokens of abstract value come to symbolize 
wealth and the rules governing their issuance, subsistence, circulation 
and extinction – is logically prior to any form of economic, political and 
social analysis that involves or is inﬂ uenced by some of the technical 
functions of money – virtually all forms of human activity in a modern 
society. Chapter 3 explored the social construction of ﬁ nancial capital 
and some of the structural depoliticizations that may arise as a result 
of what was referred to as the privileged reality of ﬁ nancial capital. In 
chapter 4, Goodhart’s law was applied to money to explain why a single 
causal theory is unlikely to ever fully capture the essence of money as 
a constantly evolving political process and social relation. Chapters 5 
and 9, respectively, questioned whether an economic conceptualization 
of money is ever likely to be feasible and explored the rationale behind 
some speciﬁ c reform proposals in the hope of shedding further light 
on the economic, political and social dimensions of money. Section 
10.6 and chapter 12 speculated on what might be regarded as two 
sides of the same provocative idea: since some of the inherent conﬂ icts 
and contradictions of money appear to be irresolvable, is money as an 
institution likely to disappear (section 10.6), or will the political utility of 
strategized hypocrisy outweigh any potential “technical” ineﬃ  ciencies of 
money (chapter 12)? An analytical framework dubbed critical surrealism 
was also introduced in chapter 12 to theorize the tremendous ease with 
which a patently implausible socially constructed accounting system may 
overtake alternative analytical frameworks in the production of agentic 
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subjectivities and to explain the continuing signiﬁ cance of a wide spectrum 
of explanatory frameworks for the nature of money as a function of their 
strategic political utility rather than empirical accuracy. Exploration of 
the nature of money turned out to be perhaps the strongest area of this 
study in terms of the extent to which the objective of specifying ignorance 
was exceeded by the production of novel explanatory frameworks for the 
gaps in knowledge that were identiﬁ ed.
Second, the economic, political and social implications of the various 
modes of issuing and circulating the monetary media – or distributing 
capacity to monetize real assets for the purposes of monetized market 
exchange, depending on one’s analytical perspective – remain 
undertheorized. Who should have the power to convert the value of 
real assets into the more liquid forms of money? If such capacity is not 
distributed equally among all real asset holders, what conditions can 
the issuer(s) reasonably impose on others for obtaining the gatekeeper 
medium for monetized market exchange? Under what conditions can 
monetary IOUs be issued and destroyed? It was suggested in chapter 4 that 
the closest feasible monetary approximation of the logic of undistorted 
multilateral exchange might involve either the issuance of the monetary 
IOUs at each transaction on a mutual credit basis or the debt- and interest-
free delivery of the monetary media to the members of the monetary 
space who would spend them into circulation. Nonetheless, by the end of 
chapter 7 it became clear that this is only an approximation and chapter 
8 explored the biopolitical implications of structurally non-neutral forms 
of money in more detail. While chapter 10 outlined a speciﬁ c reform 
proposal that would combine seigniorage-based UBI with a demurrage 
tax on money, the aim was to illustrate the economic, political and social 
implications of relatively minor changes in the “technical” speciﬁ cations 
of money rather than to outline a complete blueprint for reform. Chapter 
11 took the opportunity to analyze the appropriate locus of agency in 
economic decision-making by engaging the argument of some of UBI’s 
critics on its allegedly inﬂ ationary nature, concluding that newly created 
money should be distributed equally among the members of a monetary 
space irrespective of the chosen deﬁ nitions and interpretations of the 
nature, causes and signiﬁ cance of inﬂ ation. Further analytical work is 
required particularly in the ﬁ eld of constructing appealing alternatives to 
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the prevailing practice of holding a community’s money supply ransom 
to the economic and political strategies of the banking system.
Th ird, speciﬁ cation of the conditions – if any – under which monetary 
calculation may accurately capture real world economic phenomena 
merits more attention. In other words, how should the self-referential logic 
of money be tied to the natural laws that condition all “real” economic 
activities in order for the monetary system to constitute a relevant measure 
of real world production possibilities? Although virtually all sections of 
this study in one way or another question the feasibility of “economically 
eﬃ  cient” monetary calculation, chapter 6 introducing some of the 
conceptual and practical dilemmas in the context of a commodity-based 
monetary system as well as sections 7.3 and 10.6 may be particularly 
useful reference points in this regard. While section 7.3 focuses on the 
implications of centralized money-issuing powers on the informational 
content of monetary calculation, section 10.6 attempts to specify general 
conditions for reconciling the monetary logic with the surrounding 
physical reality, just to conclude that the conditions start to point 
towards both practical infeasibility and redundancy of money. Given the 
predominance of money in economic, political and social aﬀ airs, it may 
be surprising to note how one of the central informational issues – how 
to ensure the informational equivalence of the monetary system and the 
physical reality when only a small part of real assets may periodically be 
“monetized” and “demonetized” as a part of credit creation and destruction 
under incentive structures which may substantially diverge from barter 
exchange – has been largely assumed away rather than systematically 
explored in contemporary academic literature. Further research should 
focus precisely on this issue: how to overcome money’s self-referentiality 
– or to ensure that monetary valuations accurately recount physical 
production possibilities as opposed to merely reproducing biases that 
have been built into the chosen “technical” speciﬁ cations for money.
Fourth, given that money’s self-referentiality and some of the problems 
identiﬁ ed in conjunction with analyzing the appropriate mechanisms for 
issuing and circulating money may be beyond remedy, one might expect 
two types of scholarship corresponding to alternative conceptualizations 
of money’s future institutional signiﬁ cance to emerge to ﬁ ll the prevailing 
gaps in knowledge. First, for those who advocate the preservation of 
the institution of money – perhaps even in its present form – there 
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is a clear need to replace the conventional narratives of procedural 
eﬃ  ciency and justice commonly attributed to monetary calculation 
with more realistic notions of the nature of monetized market exchange. 
Furthermore, as aversion to drastic reform hardly justiﬁ es the continuing 
absence of economic, political and social mechanisms to mitigate 
adverse implications that are unrelated to the conventional legitimating 
narratives for money, one may also expect renewed scholarly interest in 
redistributional policies to the extent that the evolving rationales for 
money do not legitimate the entire spectrum of economic, political and 
social polarization produced by the prevailing forms of money. Second, 
proposals for the replacement of a monetary economy with alternative 
modes of social organization are likely to proliferate. While the focus may 
at least initially be on diﬀ erent variants and technical implementations 
of a barter economy in the context of the prevailing notions of “eﬃ  cient” 
incentive structures, it is unlikely that some of the more fundamental 
questions on desirable forms of social organization could be completely 
and perpetually avoided. Will, in Weber’s terminology, the substantive 
rationality of a moneyless economy still be proﬁ t maximization – or 
the “mutual plundering conducted with all the wiles of salesmanship” 
(Gesell, 1958, part III, section 4) as it has sometimes been described 
– or will some other motives replace the reward structures developed 
under the cognitive frameworks of managed scarcity? Will the formal 
rationality – the intensity with which each individual must pursue the 
essentially centrally planned “economic” objective of the society – be 
any kinder to diversity and the maximization of the human potential in 
other ﬁ elds in accordance with less fashionable value systems? Will the 
abolition of money in itself suﬃ  ce to alter some of the perceived motives 
and incentive structures for human interaction? Many of the examples 
introduced in this study in the context of a basic income in a monetary 
economy remain applicable in a moneyless economy. While this study 
was designed primarily for politicizing the form rather than the potential 
abolition of money as an institution, some of these issues were touched 
upon in sections 10.6 and 11.3.
Countless additional studies could be concluded to answer the 
question why it matters for generic knowledge that these issues become 
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known.156 As long as the process of money’s social construction and the 
structural disparities which confer money institutional power remain 
outside the purview of permanent and extensive public and scholarly 
scrutiny, few realms of social interaction remain immune to the inﬂ uence 
of the distorting prism of money. Money, near-money instruments, 
and social relations which perhaps should be recognized as involving 
a monetary dimension but nonetheless escape the analytical lens of 
monetary theorizing are free to evolve in response to particularistic power 
struggles beyond the perceptual boundaries of monocausal theorization. 
Jacques Rueﬀ  famously suggested that money will determine the fate 
of mankind. In most conceivable forms of human societies such claims 
could perhaps be dismissed as grossly exaggerated. It may require 
exceptional incompetence or malevolence of intent on the part of a 
suﬃ  cient number of individuals to construct a form of society where 
money indeed could determine the fate of mankind. Yet it is not obvious 
that humanity has failed in this task. Before jumping into the hasty 
application of the privilege-preserving narratives of choice, each specialist 
within the properly compartmentalized academic social reality would be 
well advised to reﬂ ect upon the issues at stake. What does it mean that 
virtually the entire world is governed by a socially constructed accounting 
logic which has little in common with the physical reality? What does 
it mean that virtually the entire world is descending towards a form 
of monetarily mediated market feudalism, which has the potential to 
centralize the control of livelihood and life itself into a few hands? Th ese 
are large issues, potentially large enough to “determine fate”.
156 In respect of the appropriate methodological choices for further research, the 
experiences derived from this study may not be entirely irrelevant. Any possible concerns 
on an overly anarchic analytical approach which may still have existed in the early parts 
of this study may have turned into a suspicion that the surface on the nature of money 
could have been scratched slightly deeper with an even wider selection of analytical 
approaches – irrespective of the foreseeable complaints on accessibility, density, lack of 
“rigor” etc. that even the present form of the study is likely to evoke from some of the self-
compartmentalizing guardians of social science. Money as an institution intersects with 
an exceptionally wide range of human motivations, which can hardly be theorized from 
a single analytical vantage point without losing perspective on some aspects of money’s 
multiple actual and potential manifestations. For those readers who may still remain 
unconvinced on the appropriateness of the theoretical and methodological choices: if 
you are looking for someone to shoot, it may be more appropriate to aim at money as an 
institution rather than the messenger.
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In order to give a more speciﬁ c example, it is instructive to return to the 
topic of scientiﬁ c knowledge production/preservation and certiﬁ cation.157 
It may not be an exaggeration to claim that many paradigm theorists 
have remained largely oblivious to the corrosive impact of monetary 
surrealism on the very possibility of science, knowledge and the pursuit of 
truth. Under nearly all-encompassing monetary surrealism, a “scientiﬁ c” 
paradigm runs the risk of becoming just another cognitive focal point 
in the surreal plane of social interaction. Furthermore, with much of 
the natural sciences privatized and bureaucratized under the auspices of 
proﬁ t-maximizing industries that respond to monetary rather than “real” 
economic signals, it is virtually impossible for a disinterested observer 
to ﬁ nd out what the true state of science is. Th e main issue at stake here 
is not the substantive content of any speciﬁ c scientiﬁ c paradigm or the 
potential existence of epistemological absolutes, but the very possibility 
of a meaningful debate on any speciﬁ c issue of interest according to 
scientiﬁ c standards of analysis. In other words, the relevant question 
is whether humanity will ever be able to initiate objective scientiﬁ c 
discussion – if possible even in theory – as the eﬀ ect of some of the 
most central governmental material practices and subjective frameworks 
is precisely to preclude such reﬂ ection. If no objective distributional 
standards – including all factors which might have an impact on an 
individual’s ability or willingness to perceive or communicate real world 
phenomena objectively, such as the distribution of income, status, access 
to information etc. – for the feasibility of scientiﬁ c pursuit exist or they 
cannot realistically be attained, non-instrumental science or objective 
paradigms are oxymorons. 
Under such circumstances two conclusions may warrant further 
attention. First, not entirely unlike in the physical sciences where 
the forefront of analysis has largely moved from the observation of 
external phenomena in an attempt to understand the material basis 
of the human to the management of the constitutive processes of life 
itself, the forefront of social scientiﬁ c analysis is likely to move to work 
which rejects external knowledge certiﬁ cation processes of the social 
157 Th ere may be an underexplored similarity between producing money and 
social scientiﬁ c “knowledge”: anyone can attempt to issue either, but to get them widely 
recognized as such is likely to require coercion rather than “trust” in the universal value of 
money or the intrinsic validity of an insight.
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surrealities in favor of internal standards of performance that take the 
bare human potentiality uncontaminated by the prevailing institutional 
or cognitive conﬁ gurations as their starting point. Th is is, of course, 
quite diﬀ erent from saying that all internal standards of performance will 
produce valid knowledge. Nevertheless, as it is becoming increasingly 
obvious that most human institutions – in not insigniﬁ cant part due 
to the prevailing forms of the social relation of money – are simply not 
designed to promote non-instrumental interpretations of social realities, 
analytical eﬀ orts with alternative motivations may have to look elsewhere 
for potential benchmarks of performance. Much of such social scientiﬁ c 
work may take place outside established institutional loyalties – perhaps 
in a decentralized de facto shadow academia with no institutions to 
corrupt or paradigms to co-opt. With a suﬃ  ciently wide gap between 
the perceptual demands of institutional loyalties and the actual social 
realities, such an analytical division of labor may well survive technological 
developments which might have the potential to extend class cleavages to 
the constitutive processes of life itself. Second, for the purposes of those 
who do not wish to abandon socially sanctioned science as a potential 
site of social struggle, the responsibility for the advancement of “science” 
has been largely delegated to social activism and public scrutiny: without 
credibility-demolishing insistence by the general public that could 
potentially have pervasive systemic implications for the prevailing norms 
of “scientiﬁ c” knowledge production/preservation, the prospects for 
incorporating patently obvious issues – such as the absurdity of the neutral 
veil approach to money – into the prevailing paradigm may appear bleak. 
Th is insight is particularly revealing in the light of the not insubstantial 
amount of historical controversy and contestation that the prevailing 
cognitive incentive structures have largely managed to eradicate from the 
academic research agenda.158
158 Although far from unimportant, the issue with academic knowledge production/
preservation extends well beyond peer review procedures. Although some reform proposals 
might constitute improvements compared to the prevailing practices – for some recent 
work on reforming peer review policies see e.g. Ietto-Gillies (2008) and Earl (2008) – 
increased transparency alone is unlikely to render academics intellectually accountable 
for their interpretations of respectable science as long as the monetarily mediated social 
surreality prevails. As Lee and Elsner (2008: 183) have observed, “Th ose in power positions, 
inside and outside academia, in fact have only limited interests in comprehensive societal 
and economic problem-solving, and that cleansing and streamlining counterattack 
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Th e behavior of the wealthy and powerful has sometimes been likened 
to necrophilia (Fromm, 1973, according to Monbiot, 2004: 252).159 
It is not obvious that the metaphor fully captures the intricacies of the 
dominant perversions. Th e same economic, political and social power 
structures which facilitate the erection of the tombstones of vanity for the 
living also render the ceremonial value of those tombstones meaningless. 
With structurally rigged monetary surrealities, there is no way for an 
individual with an allegedly exceptional business acumen or highly 
developed predatory instincts to prove her skills in the real world: the 
acquisition of wealth and power is always and everywhere conditioned by 
structural coercion which may completely overshadow the signiﬁ cance of 
a speciﬁ c individual’s eﬀ orts to prove her superiority to others. With the 
overly ambitious cadaver deprived of ceremonial signiﬁ cance, it takes a 
highly reﬁ ned assortment of governmental mechanisms to enforce self-
delusion. If the unraveling of such mechanisms is to begin, some of the 
fashionable vanities in the realm of monetary governance must give way 
to alternative conceptualizations of the human.
 
[against economic heterodoxy] might be analyzed as part of a more general streamlining, 
cleansing, and restriction by the governments of capitalist societies and their private 
allies.” Excessive income, wealth, and power disparities preclude the possibility of science 
to be scientiﬁ c. No amount of public naming and shaming can save science from the 
cognitive entrepreneurship of its practitioners if the incentive structures for knowledge 
production/preservation do not coincide with the pursuit of truth. Consequently, this 
study – as well as social scientiﬁ c scholarship in general – should perhaps be regarded 
as unscientiﬁ c: the main theses would only be falsiﬁ able in a world where the reviewers’ 
decision to either accept or reject the possible validity of the knowledge claims would 
not aﬀ ect anyone’s status, livelihood or self-conception as a gatekeeper of “science”. In 
the world of the prevailing social surrealities, any and all criticism or ostracism that this 
study may attract might reﬂ ect either genuine shortcomings as measured against some 
hypothetical benchmark of uncorrupted science or merely the reviewers’ inability or 
unwillingness to live up to the aforementioned standards – in which case no amount of 
transparent dialogue could remedy the situation.
159 Th e extent to which Monbiot’s interpretation concurs with Fromm’s original 
intention is not relevant here.
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